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ABSTRACT

The principle of individual criminal responsibility evidences the recognition by
the international community that crimes against international law are committed by
individuals, not abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.

This principle which was first propagated by the Nuremberg tribunal has now
been confirmed and codified by the international community in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute established a sui generis permanent
international criminal court and unequivocally provides that a person who commits a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually responsible and liable
for punishment.

This study explores this undertaking by the international community to replace
the culture of impunity with the culture of accountability. The study celebrates the
historic establishment of the Court but suggests that it is not yet time for hurrah. The
international community must demonstrate its support for the Court by mustering the
political will to cooperate fully with the Court and free the Court from inherent
bottlenecks in the Statute that may restrict the effectiveness of the Court.
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CHAPTER ONE
===============================================================

INTRODUCTION
___________________________

The genre of law referred to as international criminal law deals with the
proscription and the prosecution of individuals who commit egregious crimes that
threaten the peace and security of the international community. 1 The rationale for the
prosecution of individuals who violate international crimes is to ensure an international
criminal justice system that does not allow any safe heaven for an accused person. 2
Therefore, the goal of international criminal justice is to establish a system that ensures
the prosecution of an accused regardless of his or her country of nationality or position. 3
The agitation of international criminal justice was originally staunchly resisted by
States which oppose the notion that international law should regulate behavior of
governments over their nationals.

Such notion of direct international regulation of

nationals was considered a heresy, let alone the suggestion that international law should
proscribe accountability for individuals accused of criminal infractions. 4 This is because
the body of laws generally referred to as international law was conceptually designed to

1

The term “international community” is used to refer to the group of countries as represented in the United
Nations.
2
United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan echoed that the goal of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) is to “ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta, and no army anywhere can abuse human rights
with impunity.” See, United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview,
available at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.html (last visited March 6, 2006) [hereinafter ICC
Overview].
3
Id. (indicating that we need international criminal court inter alia, “to achieve justice for all”, “to end
impunity”, “to help end conflicts”, “to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals”, “to take over when
national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act”, and “to deter future war criminals”).
4
Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 4 (Oxford, 2nd Ed. 2001).

2

provide rights and obligations primarily to States. Individuals were not regarded as
subjects of international law but third party beneficiaries. 5
The notion that States are the primary subjects of international law was
entrenched by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 6 which led to the disintegration of
western Christendom and inspired a universalization of international relations and,
therefore, of international law. 7 The Peace Treaty of Westphalia reflected the emergent
political philosophy of statehood premised on the theory of political sovereignty as the
cornerstone of the rights and duties of the various States that came into existence. 8
International law was therefore developed along statehood.

Thus, according to the

positive school 9 which overshadowed the field of international law from late eighteenth
century, international law is concerned primarily with relations between States and
between their sovereigns. 10 Under the positive school of thought, State sovereignty was
absolute and inviolable. 11
Accordingly, many States legislative practice recognizes that the first and best
established jurisdictional principle is “territoriality.” Territoriality is considered the
5

Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 4, at 4.
The Peace Treaty of Westphalia is a peace settlement enacted in 1648. This treaty ended the war between
Spain, the Dutch, and Germany and introduced international legal doctrine that is premised on noninterventionist concepts including sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity, and consent. Leo
Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 25 (Leo Gross ed., 1969) [hereinafter The Peace of Westphalia].
7
After the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the French, the German, and the Swedish princes to form a slack
confederation of independent states. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 8 (Oceana Publications, Inc., 1st ed. 1980).
8
Taslim O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 285 (1980).
9
The Positive school of thoughts displaced the Naturalist school of thoughts comprising legal
commentators such as Hugo Grotius, Francisco de Vitoria, and Francisco Suraez in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. According to the Naturalist school of thoughts, law was “found, not made” as it was
derived from abstract and universal principles of justice. Consequently, there was little distinction, if any,
between national and international law because the same principles were supposed to bind all people in all
places. See Peter Malanczuk, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 15-16 (Routledge, 7th rev. ed. 1997).
10
Id., 118; Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 4, at 4.
11
Id.
6

3

normal, and nationality the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. 12 Under
this scheme, States have the primary responsibility to prosecute those responsible for
grave breach of human rights abuses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes violations in their own courts. 13
While it is settled that States are the primary subject of international law,
international law scholars have continued to query whether international law as a legal
system recognizes other individuals and non-state actors as persons or subjects of
international law. 14 As noted above, during the early stages of the development of
international law, States were generally regarded as the only entity capable of possessing
international legal personality. And international law was traditionally defined as the law
that governs relations between States. 15 International law commentators were unwilling
to accept that a non-state actor can be a subject of the international legal system. 16 On
the other hand, where they acknowledge that non-state actors possess rights and
obligations under international law, this was considered as emanating from their relation
or dependence upon a State, that is, such rights and obligations are purely derivative. 17

12

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, § 402 cmt. (American Law Institute,
1987). Note however that some states’ legislative practice including the U.S. also recognize that a state
may exercise universal jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses of universal concern which are
recognized by the community of nations, such as piracy, the slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of an
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated
in section 402 are present.
13
Jules Deschenes, Toward International Criminal Justice, in PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES, 29, 32 (Rogers Clark & Madeleine Sann, eds., Transnational Publishers, 1st ed. 1996).
14
Hugh M. Kindred et al. eds., INTERNATIONAL LAW AS CHIEFLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
IN CANADA 4th ed. 271(1987).
15
See L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 5 (7th ed. 1948); S.S. Lotus (France v.
Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
16
See D.P. O’Connell, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (2nd ed. 1970) (observing that “a half century ago the
international lawyers could content themselves with the proposition that States only are subjects of
international law”).
17
See Thomas Buergenthal & Harold G. Maier, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1
(1990).

4

States played a pivotal role towards the formation of the international legal order,
and international society was organized as a matter of law around the existence of
States. 18 However, in the past 75 years, there have been increased opportunities for
interaction between States and individuals mainly due to the improvement in technology
especially in the area of computerized information; the end of World War II; and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union which led to the end of the Communist government. 19
As States became to take active interest in commercial activities, States began to
gradually embrace the concept of restrictive sovereign immunity. 20 Similarly, these
period have witnessed increase in global problems in areas such as the environment,
energy, migration, overpopulation, human rights and international crimes, natural
resources, and trade. Also, from the early twentieth century, the grip of the positive
school of thoughts’ idea on the inviolability of State sovereignty began to dwindle. 21
Thus, the continued propagation of the view that public international law applies
only to States and therefore only States could be persons or subjects of international legal
system is misleading and erroneous. 22 Equally mistaken is the argument that the rights
and duties conferred on non-state entities under international law are solely derivative. 23

18

Ian Brownlie, A Rebirth of Statehood, in Malcolm D. Evans, ed., ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND
INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 5 (1996).
19
James E. Hickey, Jr., The Source of International Legal Personality in the 21st Century, 2 HOFSTRA L
POL’Y SYM 1, 2 (1997).
20
Peter Malanczuk, supra note 9, at 119. Restrictive sovereign immunity is generally referred to as
qualified sovereign immunity under which a State retains immunity from lawsuits based on its official
public acts, but may be subject to a foreign State’s jurisdiction regarding claims arising out of its private
acts, such as commercial behavior. See, Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State
Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 173 (1986).
21
Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 4.
22
See, Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 342 (Anders Wedberg Trans., 1949);
Barry Carter & Philip R. Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW 411 (1991).
23
See, Pasquale Fiore, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED AND ITS LEGAL SANCTION OR THE
LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF STATES 36, 51, 109 (5th ed. 1918) (noting as early as
1890 that the rights of the individual at international law are not solely those rights the individual enjoys as
a citizen of a State. Fiore referred with approval Article 40 of the Act of Berlin of July 13, 1878 (which

5

As aptly observed by Oliver W. Holmes in 1881, “the life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience.” 24 And as noted by one of the leading authority on
international criminal law:
the history of international criminal law is one derived by
facts, characterized by practical experiences, dominated by
pragmatism, and constantly gripped by the conflicting
demands of realpolitic on the one hand, and those of justice on
the other. 25
The facts are that “more than 250 conflicts have occurred since the end of World
War II, causing anywhere between 70 and 170 million casualties.” 26 It is also a fact that
States have largely failed since the end of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials to fulfill the
responsibility to prosecute the perpetrators of these heinous crimes. 27 As a result, history
is illustrative of the fact that those individuals responsible for committing crimes against
mankind are rarely held accountable for their actions. 28
On the other hand, experience has shown that the act of an individual in one
country especially with respect to atrocious crimes has the capacity to resonate beyond
the boundaries of his or her State of nationality. Also, experience has shown that some of
the atrocious crimes are committed by individuals with the authority of the State.29
Experience has equally shown that with exception of few examples, States have been
reluctant to hold such individuals accountable for their actions. 30 Hence:

extended rights to subjects of Serbia and argued that some rights at international law ran directly to the
individual human being) Id. See also, Hans Kelsen, supra note 21 at 345-48.
24
Oliver W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 1(Little, Brown & Co.1881).
25
M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 18 (2003).
26
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Need for International Accountability, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
27
Jules Deschenes, supra note 13, at 32.
28
Id.
29
Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 1.
30
Id.
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for centuries, in tyrannical states, governmental officials could
act with impunity; and while the rise of liberal government
over the past some 300 years has led to an overall
improvement in the human rights records of some states, it has
not, until very recently, opened the door to punishment of
those officials who might continue to violate fundamental
individual rights. 31
Therefore, there have been persistent and concerted agitation for international
criminal justice founded on the principle of individual accountability for egregious
conducts considered crimes under international law. This agitation for international
criminal justice propels the development of international criminal law. The movement
for international criminal justice is comprised of individuals from all walks of life,
nongovernmental organizations with varied interests, and governments from different
systems and parts of the world. The champions for this movement varied from time to
time but at any time, there were always sufficient groups to keep the movement alive. At
some point, champions of the movement include but are not limited to victims of
atrocious crimes, survivors of genocidal wars, victor super powers, human rights nongovernmental organizations, and international governmental organizations.
Thus, notwithstanding States’ initial rejection of international criminal law and
creation

of

international

criminal

institution,

nongovernmental

organizations,

international organizations, and other like minded institutions have continued to demand
that justice be done to those responsible for egregious international crimes. As a result,
the last decade has witnessed unprecedented determination to create norms and establish
institutions of international criminal law of accountability for individuals responsible for
violations of the most egregious crimes recognized by international law. As has been
aptly stated by a commentator:
31

Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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in these fields, the individual state is powerless, or at least
limited, in its capacity to preserve peace and human rights
effectively. Interstate cooperation in the form of international
governmental organization has increased rapidly since the end
of World War II. This international cooperation is reflected
by the progressive formulation of an international public
interest and by states acting “in the public interest.” 32
The growing concerns of the international community resulted in a demand for
international criminal prosecution in an international criminal tribunal for crimes
recognized under customary international law as a threat to international peace and
security. Due to the unending quest for justice, individual accountability for certain
crimes, which is the catalyst for international criminal law, became established as general
principle of international law.

One area where the efforts to hold non-state actors

accountable for violations of international law has been persistent and is now becoming
successful is individual accountability to certain egregious crimes recognized under
international law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Evidently, the influence of non-state actors in the last five decades towards the
shaping of international law has resulted in a reconsideration of the view that under
international law, States enjoy monopoly of international legal personality to the
complete exclusion of all other entities operating on the international plane. 33

Many

international law scholars are now willing to concede that non-state entities such as
intergovernmental organizations,34 non-governmental organizations, 35 human begins,36

32

Stephan Hobb, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental
Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 191, 192 (1997).
33
As separately observed by Justice Titunov and Dr. Okeke, early Soviet international law scholars held
tenaciously to this view. See Oleg I. Titunov, The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and
Solutions, 37 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 323, 326-327 (1993); Christian N. Okeke, International Law in the
Nigerian Legal System, 27 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 311, 318-319 (1997).
34
Intergovernmental organizations refer to organizations whose membership is reserved exclusively to
States. This will include intergovernmental organizations of international character such as the United

8

and corporations 37 may be endowed with varying degrees of international legal
personality. 38

Also, States have recognized the concept of individual criminal

responsibility39 even while rejecting that of State criminal responsibility. 40
Modern definition of international law now recognizes the fact that it is no longer
a legal system that concerns itself solely with affairs of States. But that it is a law that
deals “with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their
relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical.” 41 Therefore, as noted by one of the commentators on subjects of international
law, “to continue to maintain that international law regulates the affairs and relations of

Nations and its specialized agencies. It also includes regional organizations such as the European Union,
Organization of African Unity, Organization of American States, etc.
35
Nongovernmental Organizations (more commonly referred to as NGOs) is an association of like minded
individuals directed towards pursuing a common objective. Examples of NGOs will include the
International Red Cross Society; The International Olympic Committee; Amnesty International, and
Greenpeace International. See generally, Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The
Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.
579 (1999); Stephan Hobb, supra note 32; David J. Ettinger, The Legal Status of the International Olympic
Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 97 (1992).
36
Myres S. Mcdougal et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 96 (1980), P.K. Menon, The
International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 151 (1992)
37
Corporations here will refer to multinational and/or transnational private business companies operating in
more than two or more countries. It has been observed that these kinds of corporations exert great
influence in shaping international law and policies. Thus, it is been argued that such corporations should
enjoy international personality under international law and that they should be registered by the United
Nations. See, Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing International Law, 1983
Duke L.J. 748 (1983). For a contrary opinion, see Francois Rigaux, Transnational Corporations, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 121, 129.
38
Louis Henkin, et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1993), Christian N. Okeke, CONTROVERSIAL
SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEW
ENTITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY 18 (1974);
James E. Hickey, supra note 19, at 2-3.
39
Prakash Sinha, The Position of the Individual in an International Criminal Law in, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 122-34 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
40
Fritz Munch, Criminal Responsibility of States, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 25, at 122-29; Farhad
Malekian, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1985).
41
See ALI, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Third), s. 101 (1987).
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states alone, that states are therefore the sole subjects of international law ... ignores both
reason and reality.” 42
Consequently, the notion that international law should regulate only the behavior
of States is no longer tenable. Rather, the realities of the global nature of the new world
order favors the suggestion that international law should proscribe accountability for
individuals accused of criminal infractions. 43 No where is this trend more pronounced
and entrenched than in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
which was signed on July 17, 1998, by 120 countries 44 and entered into force on June 20,
2002. 45
The ICC Statute established a permanent international criminal court to prosecute
individuals accused of committing the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity which occurred after July 01, 2002. 46 The idea behind the establishment of
ICC is to bring an end to the culture of impunity by holding individuals criminally
accountable for committing crimes prohibited under international law. Thus, this study
focuses on the 1998 Rome Statute of the international criminal court with respect to its
ability to ferment the principle of individual criminal accountability under international
criminal law.

The objective of this study is to critically examine the personal

jurisdictional scope of the ICC with a view to determine whether the ICC is capable of
achieving the objective behind its establishment.

42

Christian N. Okeke, supra note 38, at 18.
Ratner & Abrams, supra note 4, at 4-5.
44
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
45
Id., art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by 60 countries.
46
Id., art. 1.
43
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This study is divided into four major parts. Part I examines the evolution of the
principle of individual criminal accountability in international criminal law. It traces the
historical development of the principle of individual criminal accountability through the
examination of the jurisdictional frameworks within which ad hoc tribunals were
established up to World War II. In this wise, part one will include an examination of
early attempts to try war criminals. Also, Part II includes a discussion on World War II
trials by ad hoc tribunals such as the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, 47 the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 48 and trials before the Military Tribunals
in Germany and the Far East Countries. 49 Part II also discusses the development that
followed the aftermath of World War II trials such as the conclusion of international
criminal law conventions that include the Genocide Convention 50 and the four Geneva
Conventions 51 and its additional protocols. 52

47

See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals
(Nuremberg, September 30 - October 1, 1946), 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg
Judgment].
48
Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No.
1589, at 11, 4 Bevans 27 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter].
49 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace and against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No.
3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in Benjamin B. Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter CCL No. 10].
50
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
51
The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; The Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members of the
Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II)’; The
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 972
(entered into force on October 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; The Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
52
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 ILM
1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions].
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Part II will briefly discuss the establishment and the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 53 and Rwanda
(ICTR) 54 respectively. Furthermore, it will examine the establishment and jurisdiction of
the Special and Mixed International Tribunals in Sierra-Leone, 55 Timor-Leste, 56 and
Cambodia. 57
Part III examines the history, the enabling environments, and the dynamics that
lead to the creation of the international criminal court. It focuses on the subject matter
and personal jurisdiction of the ICC. It examines the procedures for triggering the
jurisdiction of the Court. Also, the study will discuss the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction
and the grounds for challenging the admissibility of a case and ICC’s personal
jurisdiction.
Part IV highlights the inherent bottlenecks to the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction.
In particular, this part of the study will analyze the principle of complementarity between
the ICC and States Parties to the ICC Statute. Inevitable issues to be examined under the
complementarity discussion will include the rationale for the primacy of a State’s first
53

See The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute was
unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, May 25, 1993, for the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia. See also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
54
See Security Council Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598
(1194) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those responsible for the genocidal
war in Rwanda.
55
The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement], annexed to the
Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf
56
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious
Criminal Offences, UNTAET, 1.1, 1.3, 2.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) [hereinafter
Regulation 2000/15].
57
Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b) U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter
March Agreement].
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option to exercise jurisdiction; the bases for holding that a State is unable and/or
unwilling to prosecute. Additionally, the legality of the so called article 98 immunity
agreement will be discussed.
In conclusion, this study will argue that while the establishment of the ICC is one
of the remarkable events of the twentieth century, the highlighted obstacles are capable of
restricting the reach and effectiveness of the ICC as an institution designed to bring an
end to the culture of impunity. Consequentially, this study will advocate the elimination
of the said bottlenecks. Also, this study takes the position that while the idea behind the
establishment of the ICC is laudable, a pursuit of retributive justice alone through the
ICC may not bring about sustainable justice and political stability to the affected States or
regions. The study takes the position that in deserving situations, military action may be
necessary to end the killing of innocent civilians cut up in armed conflicts.
Lastly, this study argues that article 98 immunity agreement runs contrary to the
spirit and purpose of the ICC Statute. Additionally, this study without equivocation
contends that the conclusion of article 98 immunity agreement by ICC States Parties is a
clear violation of their obligation to cooperate with the Court and to arrest and surrender
suspects to the Court.
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PART I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL
CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
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CHAPTER TWO
===============================================================
2.0.

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
________________________________________
crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 1

2.1.

INTRODUCTION
The development of international criminal law first emanated from customs which

were later transformed and elaborated into international legal frameworks. As would be
discussed shortly, certain acts were considered abhorrent to mankind that individuals
accused of committing such acts were prosecuted without a prior legal instrument
detailing such acts as crimes. However, shortly after the early recorded trials, efforts
were made to conclude legal instruments which detailed that certain acts are considered
crimes against mankind and that individuals who commit these acts would be prosecuted.
While the concept of individual criminal accountability was included in early
international legal instruments, the contours of the principle of individual criminal
accountability have been delineated and expanded by the decisions of ad hoc
international tribunals, the agitation for the protection of human rights, and recent
international legal frameworks.
During the early development of international law, States were initially the only
subjects of international law.

As such, only States were possessors of rights and

obligations under international law. One major obligation of a State under international
law is to prosecute individuals accused of committing crimes within its territory before its
1

International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 220-21
(1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
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national courts. However, even under this prevailing arrangement, allied States or States
acting under the umbrella of the United Nations, had sometimes, set up an ad hoc tribunal
comprised of nationals of two or more countries to prosecute individuals from other
States who were accused of committing crimes that shock the conscience of the
international community at the material time.
This part of the study analyzes the development of the principle of individual
criminal accountability for acts which are considered as crimes within the international
legal community. It is largely a discussion of the legal history of the establishment of ad
hoc criminal tribunals. The analysis will be discussed in three major sections. The most
doubtful precedents are discussed in section one. In section two, the discussion will
concentrate primarily on the establishment and the trials of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
International Military Tribunals. The circumstances and the judgments of these Tribunals
marked the commencement of an important legal evolution of individual criminal
accountability. 2 Section three discusses post Nuremberg and Tokyo era, and how the
principles enunciated in those tribunals influenced the development of international
criminal law, particularly, the principle of individual criminal accountability. In this
respect, the discussion will examine how the principle of individual criminal
accountability contributed to establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia.

2

Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 835, pp. 531-553 (1999) available at:
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList106/911763EAA63170C0C1256B66005D85D0.
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2.2.

The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach
Commentators refer to the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 for war crimes

before a tribunal of judges consisting of the 26 representatives of States compromising
the Holy Roman Empire as the forerunner of individual criminal accountability on the
international plane. 3 Von Hagenbach served as the governor of the fortified city of
Breisach, on the Upper Rhine, under Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (1433-1477),
known to his enemies as Charles the Terrible. 4 Hagenbach ruled the occupied territory
with brutal force in attempt to force the submission of the Breisach population to
Burgundian rule. 5

In the process, murder, rape, illegal taxation and the wanton

confiscation of private property became generalized practices. 6
The revolt of Hagenbach German mercenaries and local citizens as well as the
siege of the city of Breisach by a large coalition made up of Austria, France, Bern and the
towns and knights of the Upper Rhine lead to the defeat of Hagenbach. 7

Upon

Hagenbach defeat, the Archduke of Austria, under whose authority von Hagenbach was
captured, ordered the trial of Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal consisting of 28 judges of

3

See Georg Schwarzenberger, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS, Volume II: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 462 (Stevens, London, 1968); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197
(1992). It has however been noted that von Hagenbach atrocities cannot be labeled “war crimes” since the
war did not start until 1476. See, Jordan J. Paust, Selective History of International Tribunals and Efforts
Prior to Nuremberg, 10 ILSA J INT’L & COMP. L. 207 (2003); Timothy L.H. McCormack,
Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudication
Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 690-91 (1997).
4
Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted).
5
William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1973) (discussing
the Hagenbach trial and the historical background of military tribunals).
6
See, Georg Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 462-66 (noting that Hagenbach was so cruel that both the
local population and his own mercenaries revolted and took him into custody).
7
Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted).
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the allied coalition of States and towns. 8 In his capacity as sovereign of the city of
Breisach, the Archduke of Austria appointed the presiding judge. Given the composition
of the ad hoc court, it can be argued that it was a real international tribunal. 9
The prosecution charged Hagenbach for actions against the “laws of God and
man,” including responsibility for murder, rape, perjury, and pillage arguing that he had
“trampled under foot the laws of God and man”. 10 Hagenbach argued that he was
complying with superior orders from the Duke and that he did not recognize any other
judge and master but the Duke of Burgundy, whose orders he could not dispute.
Hagenbach further argued that it is settled fact that “soldiers owe absolute obedience to
their superiors?” and requested for an adjournment to ask for confirmation from the
Duke. 11
At the time of Hagenbach trial, punishment of the accused hinged on the question
of compliance with superior orders. There was no question that a successful defense of
superior order would have exonerated Hagenbach because the Duke himself had
personally confirmed and ratified ex post factum “all that had been done in his name”. 12
The tribunal rejected von Hagenbach defense and request for an adjournment to ask for
confirmation from the Duke because this request was considered contrary to the laws of
God. 13 The tribunal noted that Hagenbach had committed crimes which he had the duty

8

See Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 462-66; M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1-2.
The tribunal included judges from Alsace, Switzerland, and other States within the Holy Roman Empire.
See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that “it can be said that the first international criminal
court was established in 1474 in Breisach, Germany, where 27 judges of the Holy Roman Empire judged
and condemned Peter von Hagenbach for his violations of the “laws of God and man” because he allowed
his troops to rape and kill innocent civilians and pillage their property”); Jordan J. Paust, M. Cherif
Bassiouni et al., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 622 (2d ed. 2000).
10
Georg Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 465.
11
Jordan J. Paust, supra note 3, at 207.
12
Edoardo Greppi, supra note 2 (citation omitted).
13
Jordan J. Paust, supra note 3, at 207.
9
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to prevent. Therefore, the tribunal found him guilty and sentenced him to death and also
stripped him of his rank of knighthood and related privileges. 14 Von Hagenbach was
executed following the Marshal’s order: “Let justice be done”. 15

2.3.

The Leipzig Trials
The first real international but unsuccessful attempt to prosecute individuals

accused of war crimes occurred after the end of the World War I. In November 1918,
after Germany had lost the war, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and fled to Netherlands,
which had remained neutral to the war and whose monarch then was the Kaiser’s
cousin. 16 After World War I, there was an enormous public outcry among the victims
that those responsible for the war and commission of atrocities that violates the Hague
Conventions and customs of war should be held to criminal account.

As such, a

Preliminary Peace Conference was convened in Paris in 1919 by the victorious “Great
Powers”, the Allied and the Associated Powers. 17 Germany was considered the principal
perpetrator of the war and the objective of the Peace conference was to negotiate the
terms of a peace treaty which will include the terms of Germany’s surrender. 18 Also, the
Allies saw the Peace Conference as an opportunity to prosecute German war criminals
and particularly, Kaiser Wilhelm II, for war crimes and for starting the war. 19
14

Schwarzenberger, supra note 3, at 465.
Id.
16
M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 18 (1997).
17
The five great powers were the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.
The additional states composing the Allied and Associated Powers were Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China,
Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Uruguay. See, THE
TREATIES OF PEACE 1919-1923, Vol. I, at 3 (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New York,
1924 ).
18
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 15.
19
Id. See also, James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 37, (1982).
15
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The Allied powers appointed a committee of legal experts known as the
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of
Penalties. 20 The Commission was charged with the task of investigating and gathering
information concerning those responsible for initiating the war and for committing war
crimes to aid their criminal prosecution. 21

For about two months, the Commission

investigated various acts of war crimes and in 1920 submitted its report which
recommended 895 alleged war criminals to the Allied powers to be tried by the Allied
tribunal. 22
Meanwhile, on June 28, 1919, in Versailles, representatives of the Allied Powers
concluded the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany. 23

The treaty mandated German disarmament and war reparations, and

established the League of Nations. 24 Articles 228 and 229 of the treaty established the
right of the Allied Powers to try and punish individuals responsible for “violations of the
laws and customs of war” before Allied Military Tribunals or before the Military Courts
of any of the Allies. 25 Specifically, Article 228 contains clear acceptance of the German
20

The Commission was comprised of two members from each of the five Great Powers and one member
from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia to represent the states having a special interest in the
matter. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties,
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 96 (1920)
[hereinafter 1919 Commission Report].
21
Id.
22
Id. But see, M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 16, n. 12 (wherein he noted that there was conflict as
to the number of alleged war criminals listed for prosecution); Telford Taylor, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS 17 (1992) (stating that the Allies presented a list of 854 individuals, including
political and military figures); M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 200 (stating that the Allies submitted a
list of 895 named war criminals); Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29, 36 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3 vols., 1987) [hereinafter ICL]
(stating that 901 names appeared on the list).
23
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 23, 1919, 2 BEVANS 43,
13 AM. J.I.L. (Supp) 151 (1919) (although the treaty was signed in Versailles, initial groundwork for the
treaty was established at the Preliminary Peace Conference in Paris earlier that year) [hereinafter Treaty of
Versailles].
24
Id.
25
Id., art. 228 & 229.
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government’s recognition of the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring
before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the
laws and customs of war. 26 Furthermore, it stated that the German government had the
duty to hand over “all persons accused”, in order to permit them to be brought before an
allied military tribunal. 27
Where a person is accused of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the
Allied and Associated Powers, the individual will be brought before the military tribunals
of that Power concerned. 28 On the other hand, persons accused of criminal acts against
the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought
before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers
concerned. 29 Thus, by implication, Article 229 provided for the possibility of setting up
an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute persons who are accused of criminal acts
against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers.
Also, article 227 of the Treaty provided for the creation of an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal solely to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II for waging a war of aggression
over Belgium. 30 Realizing its inability to prosecute the Kaiser for aggression, 31 the

26

Treaty of Versailles, supra note 23, art. 228.
Id.
28
Id., art. 229.
29
Id.
30
Id., art. 227.
31
The Allies diplomatically requested that the Netherlands “make the Kaiser available for trial.” Noting
that there was no international court competent to try a sovereign Head of State and no one had ever been
convicted for the crime of aggression before, the Dutch refused to extradite Kaiser. See Benjamin A.
Ferencz, The Evolution of International Criminal Law, at http://www.benferencz.org/hamburg.htm (last
visited August 31, 2005). Also, it has been suggested that the Netherlands reportedly denied that request,
allegedly speculating that it was made as a political formality and that the Allies would not exert effort to
secure his surrender. See, Telford Taylor, supra note 22, at 16. The legal grounds for denying the request
were that the “offense charged against the Kaiser was unknown to Dutch law, was not mentioned in any
treaties to which Holland was a party, and appeared to be of a political rather than a criminal character.” Id.
See also, Quincy Wright, The Legality of the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121 (1919). The
Netherlands discouraged formal extradition requests because extradition treaties applied only to cases in
27
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Allied Nations agreed to a face saving nebulous provision in article 227 of the Treaty of
Versailles requiring Germany to hand the Kaiser over to stand trial for “a supreme
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 32
The Allied Powers agreed to constitute a special tribunal composed of judges
appointed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to try the
accused. 33 In arriving at its decision, the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives
of international policy, with a view of vindicating the solemn obligations of international
undertakings and the validity of international morality. 34 The Powers agreed to submit a
formal request to the government of the Netherlands for the ex-Emperor’s surrender for
trial. 35 Perhaps because the Allied Powers knew that the Dutch government would not
oblige a request to surrender the ex-Emperor, no such request was ever made and he lived
famously as “the woodchopper of Doorn.” 36
Similarly, the prosecution of the individuals envisioned in Article 228 did not
materialize. By 1921, the goal of setting up joint or separate military tribunals was
overtaken by the concerns for regional stability and political interest. 37 As a result, the
Allied Powers decided not to undertake the prosecution of Germans accused of war
crimes, rather, they transferred jurisdiction to the German Supreme Court

which a criminal act occurred. The Netherlands viewed the charge against the Kaiser as a “political
offence” because a Head of State’s decision to go to war is within the prerogative of national sovereignty
and, therefore, not a crime under Dutch Law. See, James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the
Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM. J. INT’L. L. 70, 91 (1920). For a discussion of the political offense
exception to extradition, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE Ch. VIII (3d ed. 1996); Christine Van Den Wingaert, THE POLITICAL
OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE
RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
32
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 23, art. 227.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31 (citation omitted).
37
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 19.
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(Reichsgericht). 38 This meant that the war criminals would be tried under German law.
Thus, my implication, the Prosecutor General of the Court had the discretion to decide
which cases would be tried. 39 Therefore, the Allied Powers had to turn over the cases
and the evidence to the Prosecutor General. 40
As a result of the concerns expressed by the German government regarding the
difficulty of trying its citizens for war crimes, the Allied Powers agreed to submit only
forty-five cases to the Prosecutor General out of the original list of 895 submitted by the
Commission established in 1919 by the Allied Powers. 41 Out of the 48 cases submitted,
the Prosecutor General tried only twelve. Those convicted received lenient sentences
ranging from six months to four years, and only few actually served those sentences in
prison. 42
Although the Allied Powers had argued that while they deferred to the German
Supreme Court the trials of the accused war criminals, that they reserved the right to set
aside the German judgments and carry out the provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of
Versailles, they never exercised this option. 43 Thus, while World War I claimed the lives
of hundreds of thousands individuals, only twelve were ostensibly held accountable for
such degree of atrocity. The conduct of the Leipzig trials therefore “exemplified the
sacrifice of justice on the altars of international and domestic politics of the Allies”, 44 and

38

M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 19.
Id., at 21.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id, at 21, n.24.
44
Id., at 20.
39
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a missed opportunity to establish an international system of justice that would have
functioned independently of political considerations to ensure uncompromised justice.” 45

2.4.

The Trials of World War II Criminals
With the apparent failure of the Allied Powers to hold World War I criminals

accountable for their criminal acts, and their complete abandonment of the objective of
the League of Nations as a forum that would bring about a new world order that would
prevent future wars, it was not entirely surprising that the world was soon engulfed in a
World War II. 46 The Covenant of the League of Nations envisaged the use of economic
sanctions to deter nations from war. 47 However, enforcement of the economic sanctions
required consent of all the member States to the League. 48 It soon became clear that
nations were still not ready to yield their sovereign prerogatives and thus remained
unwilling to give up their right to go to war and to decide for themselves when sanctions
against aggressors should be applied. 49 Thus, when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931
and Italy brazenly attacked Ethiopia in 1935 in clear violation of the League’s covenant,
member States to the League failed to take collective economic or military measures to
halt the aggression. 50
Similarly, the international community signaled its unwillingness to act when in
1931 Hitler defied the Peace Treaty of Versailles and marched his troops into the
Rhineland and Japan launched another aggression against China in 1937. 51 The next

45

M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 21.
Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31.
47
Covenant of the League of Nations, adopted December 1924, art. 16., available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm (last visited August 31, 2005).
48
Id., art. 5.
49
Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 31.
50
Id.
51
Id.
46

24

year, Germany continued its defiance of the Treaty of Versailles when it annexed Austria
and moved against Czechoslovakia. World political leaders were still reluctant to act
until September 1, 1939, when German planes launched a massive bombardment against
Poland before Polish allies, France and the United Kingdom reluctantly declared that they
were at war with Germany. The world soon became engulfed in World War II. 52
The horrible crimes committed during World War II led to a swift conclusion of
agreements among the Allied Powers to provide a forum to hold the individuals involved
in committing such atrocities to account. Towards this objective, on January 13, 1942,
representatives of the Allied Powers comprising nine European nations met at St. James
Palace wherein they formulated the St. James Declaration. 53 A highlight of the
declaration is the statement of the represented States that “international solidarity [is]
necessary in order to avoid the repression of these acts of violence simply by acts of
vengeance on the part of the general public, and in order to satisfy the sense of justice of
the civilized world.” 54
In furtherance of this commitment, on October 7, 1942, the four Major Allies
announced that a United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) would be set up
for the investigation of war crimes. However, the Commission was not established until
October 20, 1943. 55 The UNWCC was saddled with the responsibility of investigating

52

Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 18.
The Inter-Allied Declaration, Jan. 13, 1942, reprinted in PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES: THE
INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION, signed at St. James’ Palace, London, on January 13, 1942, (InterAllied Information Committee, London, undated). See also, UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89-92 (1948) [hereinafter History of the UNWCC].
54
See the Resolution by the Allied Governments Condemning German terror and Demanding Retribution
(January 13, 1942), reprinted in 144 Brit. & Foreign Papers, 1940-1942, at 1072 (Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1952).
55
Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cessation:
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 301 (1994). Even though
53
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and collating evidence of war crimes. 56 Notwithstanding the obstacles faced by the
UNWCC such as limited financing and inadequate staff, 57 it managed to compile a decent
record of war criminals, evidence, witnesses, and became a reference center among
governments that later conducted their own investigation. 58
At a meeting of the three Major Allied Powers (United Kingdom, United States,
and USSR.) in Moscow, the Allied Powers reached an agreement to prosecute and punish
war criminals, particularly the leaders of the Nazi regime. The agreement was contained
in the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt of United
States, Prime Minister Churchill of Britain, and Premier Stalin of Soviet Union. 59 In
signing the Moscow Declaration, the aforesaid three Allied powers, noting that they were
speaking in the interest of the thirty-two member State of the United Nations, solemnly
declared and gave full warning of their declaration as follows:
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which
may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and
members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have
taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions will be sent back to the countries in which their
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged
and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries
and of free governments which will be erected therein …. for
most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the
uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusors
in order that justice may be done…without prejudice to the case
this Commission’s name was preceded by “United Nations,” it was unrelated to the world body founded in
San Francisco in 1945. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at n. 33.
56
Since the UNWCC was limited to investigating war crimes only, it could not investigate the allegations
of atrocities committed against the Jews, because such acts constituted “crimes against humanity” and not
war crimes. M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Ann Tusa & John Tusa, THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL 22 (1984).
57
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22 (citing UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAWS OF WAR 89-92 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UNWCC].
58
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 22-23.
59
Declaration of German Atrocities, Nov. 1, 1943, 3 BEVANS 816, 834; 9 DEP’T ST. BULL. 308 (1943),
reprinted in 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (1944) [hereinafter “Declaration of German Atrocities”].
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of German criminals whose offenses have no particular
geographical localization and who will be punished by joint
decision of the government of the Allies. 60
Although the Allied Powers agreed that “the major criminals, whose offences
have no particular geographical localization,” would be punished “by the joint decision of
the Governments of the Allies”, they disagreed on the method by which the prosecution
should be carried out. 61 The proposal by Britain that major war criminals should simply
be taken out and shot because their guilt was taken for granted and “beyond the scope of
any judicial process” 62 was rejected by the United States and France which insisted upon
fair trials for the war criminals before an international tribunal. 63 But Britain was afraid
that the war criminals may hijack the prosecution as a forum for propaganda and selfjustification. 64 On the other hand, the United States and France were mindful of the
historical implication of the proposal by Britain and wanted to set a precedent of judicial
fairness. 65 In the end, Allies agreed to try the war criminals before an international
criminal tribunal.

2.4.1. Trials of World War II Criminals by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (IMT)
The agreement to establish an international criminal tribunal was drafted at a
conference held in London from June 26 to August 8, 1945.

At the end of the

conference, the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, was signed by the representatives

60

See Declaration of German Atrocities, supra note 59.
See John F. Murphy, NORMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AT THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (Ginsburgs &
Kudriavstev eds., 1990).
62
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Telford Taylor, supra note 22, at 32.
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 24.
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of the four Allied Powers. 66 The London Agreement provided for the establishment of
an international military tribunal “for the trial of war criminals whose offences have no
particular geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity
as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.” 67 The Charter creating the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) was annexed to the London Agreement. 68

2.4.1.a.

The Ratione Materiae of the International Military Tribunal
Article 6 of the IMT Charter conferred jurisdiction on the IMT to try individuals

accused of (i) crimes against peace, (ii) war crimes, and (iii) crimes against humanity.
(i)
Crimes Against Peace:
This is defined as the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing. 69

Perhaps, other than the article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles which

provided for the failed prosecution of the Kaiser, there was no other legal precedent in
international law for the prosecution of individuals for crimes against peace, which meant
the preparation and waging of a war of aggression. 70
However, in contrast to the ambiguity inherent in article 227 of the Treaty of
Versailles reference to “international morality and the sanctity of treaties”, Article 6(a) of

66

Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter the London Agreement]. The London Agreement was
signed by Robert H. Jackson, U.S.A.; Robert Falco, French Republic; Jowitt C., United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and I. T. NIKITCHENKO, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
67
Id., art. 1.
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Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8,
1945, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546
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Id., art. 6(a).
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Benjamin B. Ferencz, supra note 31.
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the IMT Charter referred to the waging of war in violation of “international treaties.” 71
This was a remarkable clarification in that it explained the basis of the crime against
peace. Also, by prohibiting the waging of war in violation of international treaty, article
6(a) made the crime of aggression a universal crime which can be applied against any
nation. 72
It is however noteworthy that no international convention has explicitly made
aggression an international crime. 73 The main reason for this development has been
attributed to the inability of States to agree definitively on what constitutes aggression,74
as States continue to shift positions based on political expediency. 75 The last attempt at
defining aggression was made during the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court. 76

The effort proved unsuccessful resulting in the

exclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. 77
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IMT Charter, supra note 68, art. 6(a).
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 29 (citing the REPORT OF Robert H. Jackson, United States
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(ii)
War crimes:
War crimes are defined as violations of the laws and customs of war. 78 Article
6(b) of the IMT Charter lists war crimes to include, murder, ill-treatment or deportation
into slave labor or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in occupied
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, the killing of
hostages, the plunder of public or private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 79
From the list of crimes, it is evident that the IMT Charter set out to prohibit acts
which violate the traditional laws and customs of war. In compiling the list of war
crimes, the drafters of the IMT Charter looked to The Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907 on the Laws and Customs of War 80 and the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 81 However, it should be noted that the referenced
Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention had no provisions on the punishment of
individuals who violated their rules. Originally, prisoners of war were considered as war
booty, treated as slaves, and oftentimes slaughtered. The 1899 Hague Peace Conference
which was widened by the 1907 Hague Convention was directed at ensuring a humane
treatment of prisoners of war. These rules proved insufficient in World War I, and were
elaborated in the 1929 Geneva Convention.
(iii) Crimes Against Humanity:
This is defined as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
78
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persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 82
The objective of the crimes against humanity was to protect the civilian
population from extermination and enslavement. Until the IMT Charter, crime against
humanity was not a treaty law and it is doubtful whether they originated from
international conventions, custom, and/or general principles of law. 83 Thus, while article
6(c) of the IMT Charter conferred the IMT with jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity committed “before or during the war” the fact that crimes against humanity has
not been proscribed before the war led the drafters of the Charter to circumscribe the
application of Article 6(c) only in situations where it could be linked to war crimes. 84
The connection of crimes against humanity to war crimes was necessary to
obviate the possibility of a successful attack of crimes against humanity committed
before the war as ex post facto law. 85 However, this requirement eviscerated the scope
of Article 6(c) because it effectively excluded the prosecution of individuals for crimes
committed before the outbreak of the war in 1939. 86 Also, in some instances, the IMT
was not able to differentiate between the crimes against humanity and war crimes. 87

2.4.1.b.
The Ratione Personae of the International Military Tribunal
The International Military Tribunal exercised personal jurisdiction over the
“leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices” who participated in the formulation or
82
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execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of crimes under the IMT’s
Charter. 88 The IMT Charter stated that all of them are responsible for all acts performed
by any persons in execution of such plan. 89
Article 7 of the IMT Charter stripped the accused of any immunity they may
enjoy as a result of their official position, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in government departments. 90 In addition, the IMT Charter for the first time
abrogated the defense of “obedience to superior” order as an absolute defense from
liability. 91 Rather, the IMT Charter provided that it may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 92
Although the IMT Charter limited “obedience to superior order” as a mitigating
factor, it should be noted that in some instances, the IMT did not follow the proscription
of the defense of obedience to superior order to the letter of article 8. In those instances,
the IMT allowed the defense as a complete bar to responsibility in situations where the
junior officer had no alternative moral choice in refusing to carry out the superior order. 93
This approach may be rationalized on the basis that the abrogation of the defense of
obedience to superior order was contrary to what most military laws provided for at the
time World War II started. 94
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As a result of the agreement between the Allies that the IMT will only prosecute
the major war criminals and that the German municipal and military courts would try the
minor war criminals in the jurisdiction where the crime took place, only twenty-four war
criminals were brought before the IMT. 95 Eventually, only twenty-two of the twentyfour war criminals stood trial before the IMT. 96 The Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg,
Germany commenced trial on November 20, 1945, and completed on October 1, 1946. 97
Twelve of the war criminals were convicted and sentence to death by hanging, 98 three
were sentenced to life imprisonment, 99 four were sentenced to serve between ten to
twenty years in prison, 100 and the other three were acquitted. 101 However, there freedom

FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956). For a historical evolution of the
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was short-lived as each of them were subsequently tried and convicted to various prison
terms by the German court. 102
The IMT judgment was not subject to appeals and at trial some defendants were
frequently denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses that were relied upon
by the prosecution. 103 Also, IMT has been criticized for its failure to indict or prosecute
non German war criminals, especially Allied Military personnel, an omission which has
dogged the IMT proceedings as a “victor’s justice.” 104

Notwithstanding these

deficiencies, “that four great nations flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the
law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason”. 105
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2.4.2. Trials of World War II criminals by the International Military Tribunal For
The Far East, 1946-1948 (IMTFE)
Pursuant to the request of the U.S.S.R. which was acceded to by the other three
Allied Powers, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was established in Moscow in
December 1945. 106 The FEC was comprised of representatives of the eleven Allied
States including the four Major Allies having veto powers. 107 The FEC was based in
Washington and was responsible for the formulation and coordination of Allied
occupational policies for Japan. 108 General Douglas MacArthur who was the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was in charge of occupational matters and
therefore controlled the activities of the FEC.109 The Allied Council for Japan located in
Tokyo which was comprised by the four Major Allies was responsible for carrying out
the directives of the FEC. 110
Although the FEC was a political body without any investigative powers, it
however, was instrumental to the prosecution of suspected Japanese war criminals. 111 It
was evident that the U.S.S.R. interest in Japan went beyond a say in occupational control,
but included a desire to prosecute suspected Japanese war criminals. 112

Thus, in

furtherance of this objective, on January 19, 1946, General McArthur promulgated the
Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). 113 The
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Tribunal was comprised of the representatives of the Allied powers that defeated Japan
and members of the FEC. 114
With few exceptions, the IMTFE Charter like the IMT Charter conferred on the
IMTFE jurisdiction over individuals accused of committing (a) crimes against peace, (b)
war crimes, and (c) crimes against humanity. Some of the exceptions are found in article
5(c) of the IMTFE Charter which limited “crimes against humanity” to persecution on
political and racial grounds, thereby omitting persecution on religious ground which is
included in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter. Such an inclusion was factually necessary in
the IMT Charter because of the Holocaust. 115 Also while the IMT Charter provided that
inhumane acts committed “against any civilian population” constitute “crimes against
humanity,” that phrase was deleted from Article 5(c) of the IMTFE Charter, thereby
expanding the class of persons beyond civilians only. The expansion was influenced by
the desire “to make punishment possible for large-scale killing of military personnel in an
unlawful war.” 116
The IMTFE trials lasted two and a half years, from May 3, 1946, to November 11,
1948.

In all, 28 Japanese officials who had overseen Japanese military aggression

throughout Asia in World War II were arraigned before the Tribunal on 55 counts of
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‘Class A’ crimes. 117 Seven of the 28 defendants were sentenced to death while the
remaining defendants received prison sentences. The defendants include individuals
accused of crimes stemming from their political positions in Japan during the Second
World War. They also include foreign ministers, chiefs of staff, prime ministers, etc.
The one notable exemption was the Emperor of Japan, who was excluded because he was
regarded as a kind constitutional monarch whose only intention was to establish peace
and prosperity for his people.

2.4.3. Trials of World War II Criminals Before Military Tribunals in Germany
and the Far East Countries (Control Council Law No. 10 Tribunals)
Other war criminals were tried in the respective victim countries. Pursuant to the
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 which was promulgated by the Allies as the
sovereign powers in Germany, each of the Allies had jurisdiction to try German nationals
in the territory under their control. 118 Each of the four Major Allies proceeded separately
to try the German war criminals as they deem fit. 119 The Tribunals set up under the CCL
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No. 10 like the IMT and IMTFE had jurisdiction to try individuals accused of “crimes
against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity.” 120
However, the category, requirement, and scope of the “crimes against humanity”
in Article II(c) of the CCL No. 10 differed from the IMT and IMTFE Charters. 121 The
categories of “crimes against humanity” under Article II(c) were expanded to include
imprisonment, torture, and rape. Also, article II(c) removed the requirement that “crimes
against humanity” be connected to war by omitting the words “before or during the war”
contained in Article 6(c) of the IMT’s Charter. 122 Finally, by eliminating the requirement
that “persecution,” as a crime against humanity should be in the “execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,” article II(c) ostensibly
extended the scope of the Tribunals to cover persecutions not executed or connected with
any crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Be that as it may, there is no evidence that
the Tribunal utilized this provision to extend its jurisdiction but it has been suggested that
such extension of the Tribunals’ jurisdiction “strained the principles of legality.” 123
Lastly, war criminals were tried throughout the Far East before separate military
tribunals which were sanctioned by the FEC.

Each Allied Power which include

Australia, China, France, the Netherlands, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the U.S.S.R. set up its own military tribunal and invested it with the
powers of prosecuting its prisoners of war who were Japanese and persons of other

120

CCL No. 10, supra note 118, art. II(c).
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 38.
122
Id.
123
Id.
121

38

nationalities. 124 The field military tribunals dispensed justice to the war criminals in
accordance with the military laws and/or practice of the constituting States.
Although these trials were supposed to be controlled by the individual Allied
Powers, the FEC still exerted some form of control on the activities of the Military
Tribunals. Thus, in 1949, the FEC issued a formal advisory to all nineteen Allied powers
in the Far East that Japanese war crimes trials should be concluded by September 30,
1949. 125 Thereafter, on September 8, 1951, forty-eight States signed the Treaty of Peace
with Japan at San Francisco. Article II of the Treaty of Peace provided that all convicted
war criminals should be repatriated to Japan to serve the remainder of their sentences
under the SCAP’s control. 126 In consonance with Article II of the Treaty of Peace, Japan
passed Law No. 103 of 1952 which established a commission to supervise the
repatriation and release of Japanese convicted war criminals. 127

Like the IMTFE

convicted war criminals, all the convicted war criminals by the Allied military tribunals
in the Far East had their sentences commuted or were released between 1951 and 1957
before they could complete their sentence. 128

2.5.

Observations and Commentary
By way of comparison, the IMT was a treaty creation while the IMTFE was

promulgated by General MacArthur. While no official reason was supplied for this

124

For example, from 1946 to 1948, the British Army held 305 war crimes trials in the Pacific Theater. A
total of 889 suspected war criminals were tried in 931 prosecutions, of whom 553 were convicted. See, M.
Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 35-6.
125
R. John Pritchard, The Gift of Clemency Following British War Crimes Trials in the Far East, 19461947, 7 CRIM. L.F. 15, 18 (1996).
126
Id., at 37.
127
Id., at 38.
128
Id., at 37-49; John Mendelsohn, War Crimes Trials and Clemency in Germany and Japan, in
AMERICANS AS PROCONSULS: UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
AND JAPAN, 1944-1952, 226 (Robert Wolfe ed., 1984).

39

difference in approach, it has been suggested that it was borne out of the United States
desire to checkmate the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East and the prosecution
of Japanese war criminals. 129 In addition, it was also suggested that the United States
was equally concerned about Japan’s post-World War II course of conduct. 130 It is also
plausible to suggest that the United States considered it politically expedient to maintain
control of post World War II Japan.

In order to achieve these objectives, General

MacArthur exerted undue influence and control over the activities of the FEC and the
IMTFE. 131

General MacArthur’s influence was also visible in the “United States

Military Commissions that tried Japanese Military personnel in the Philippines and other
areas of the Far East Military Theater of Operations that he subsequently established
pursuant to his authority as the SCAP in that Pacific Japan Theater.” 132
The end result of General MacArthur’s overbearing control was that the
proceedings of the IMTFE were a mockery of the IMT. First, the IMTFE lasted three
times longer than the IMT trial of the Major German War Criminals. Secondly, the
objectivity of the FEC and the IMTFE members was compromised by the fact that they
were not chosen in there individual capacity but as representative of their country’s
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government. 133 As political representatives of their respective country’s government, it
was impossible for them to act as impartial arbiters of justice. Consequently, there were
glaring abuses of procedural due process in the proceedings of the FEC and the
IMTFE. 134 For instance, on April 3, 1946, the FEC issued a policy decision on the
“Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East.” Article 6(a) of
the FEC’s policy decision empowered General MacArthur, to establish an agency, acting
under his command, to investigate reports of war crimes, collect and analyze evidence,
and arrange for the apprehension of suspects. Pursuant to the authority conferred on
General MacArthur by Article 6(a), he created the International Prosecution Section
charged with the responsibility of preparing documents for the indictment of the War
Criminals. Also, by virtue of Article 6(a), General MacArthur had the sole discretion to
decide what individuals or organizations would be prosecuted and before which court
they would appear. 135
It was apparent that this arrangement would create room for subjective decision as
to which of the war criminals should be selected for prosecution. 136 In the end, no Allied
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military personnel were prosecuted for war crimes. Also conspicuously absent from
prosecution is Emperor Hirohito of Japan which was effectuated by the FEC policy
decision on February 3, 1950, not to prosecute him for war criminal. 137 The FEC sought
to rationalize the decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito on the basis that it was
necessary to preserve his image as Japan’s Emperor and as a reward for his unconditional
surrender of Japan. It was believed that the decision not to prosecute the Emperor would
ensure better political cooperation by the post-World War II Japanese ruling elite and
obtain their support for the administration of the occupied Japanese territories. 138 This
“exemplifies how political considerations resulted in the release of convicted war
criminals and in condemnation of those whose role in the atrocities was negligible or
non-existent.” 139
Similarly, the IMTFE arbitrarily set its own rules and standards by deciding what
evidence may or may not be entered as exhibits. The trials were generally marred by
procedural irregularities and abuse of judicial discretion. 140 An example of such travesty
of justice that permeated the IMTFE proceedings is the fact that while it was mandatory
for the accused to make a written application in advance before seeking to produce any
evidence in the form of documents or witnesses, the prosecution was not required to
make similar prior disclosure. Also, the application of the law to some of the defendants
was at least dubious, if not erroneous. 141 For instance, the execution of sentences was
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36 (citing 22 DEP’T ST. BULL. 244 (1950) (suggesting that
MacArthur reportedly instigated the decision because he felt that prosecuting the Emperor would make
pacification of Japan a difficult task, costing the United States many casualties at the hands of Japanese
guerrillas).
138
William Manchester, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880-1964, 484-91 (1978).
139
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140
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CRIMES, 239-58 (1954).
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 34 (Citing Bernard V.A. Roling, supra note 116, at 605-07.
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inconsistent, and could be unilaterally reduced or competently discharged by General
MacArthur. 142
Thus, unlike the IMT convicts, none of the twenty-five convicted war criminals
by the IMTFE served their full prison term as they were all released by the end of the
1950s. 143 Just as some critics regard the IMT trials as victor’s justice, the Japanese
considered the IMTFE and the Military tribunals’ trials in the Far East as victors’
vengeance couched in terms of victors’ justice. 144 On the other hand, while the convicted
German war criminals “were for the most, pariahs in their society, the Japanese did not
view such persons as criminals but as victims.” 145
On the other hand, a remarkable difference between the Allied Military
prosecutions in the Far East and the trials by the IMT, IMTFE, and the Tribunals under
CCL No. 10, was that the Military Tribunals proceedings in the Far East had jurisdiction
only for war crimes. 146 Also, the IMT and IMTFE are considered international in nature
due to their composition. However, the CCL No. 10 Tribunal and the Allied Military
142

Howard Levie, supra note 102, at 142.
See John Mendelsohn, supra note 128, at 226.
144
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TRIAL (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986); Philip R. Piccigallo, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR
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Tribunals for the Far East are domestic in nature because the Tribunals were individually
constituted by the Allied Powers in exercise of sovereign rights over the territory that
they control following the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. 147
Regardless of the shortcomings highlighted above, the Nuremberg and subsequent
war crimes trials were the foundation stones on which a new world order of international
justice was to be built. The prosecutions were positive revolutionary steps because they
represented the first organized attempt to apply principles of international law to punish
people accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Before the Nuremberg trials,
jurisdiction over such offenses was limited to individual countries’ military courts. The
Nuremberg trials therefore, confirmed that when cruelties, such as genocide, reached a
magnitude that shocked the conscience of humankind, it should and could be punished as
a crime against all of humankind.

According to Justice Jackson, “crimes against

International law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the promise of international law be
enforced.” 148
The Nuremberg trials (and, with a minor impact, the Tokyo trials) produced a
large number of judgments, which have greatly contributed to the forming of case law
regarding individual criminal responsibility under international law. 149

147
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CHAPTER THREE
===============================================================
3.0.

3.1.

THE FOUNDATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR MODERN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
___________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

One of the visible aftermaths of World War II experiences and trials was the rapid
development of international criminal law. The Nuremberg trials helped to expose the
degree of atrocities committed by the Germans during World War II. It also exposed the
lack of and/or inadequate legal instruments proscribing such conducts as crimes under
international law. These revelations galvanized the development of the legal frameworks
for modern international criminal law. The International Committee of the Red Cross
and the newly formed United Nations 1 became the vanguard for codification of rules of
armed conflict and prohibition of certain conducts as crimes against humanity into
treaties and other legal instruments. 2

3.2.

The United Nations Adoption of the Nuremberg Principles
Shortly after the completion of the Nuremberg trials, the UN General Assembly

on December 11, 1946, adopted by unanimous vote Resolution 95(I), entitled

1

See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 51, 59, Stat. 1031, 1044, 3 Bevans 1153, 1165.
With the demise of the League of Nations for its failure to prevent the World War II, the United Nations
was established on October 24, 1945, as an international organization to maintain peace and security. On
April 25, 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco to draft the United Nations Charter
which established the UN. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 by the representatives of the 50
countries that took part in the San Francisco Conference. Poland which was not represented at the
Conference later signed the Charter and became one of the original 51 Member States of the United
Nations. The United Nations officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, and has currently 199
Member States. See http://www.un.org [visited on February 9, 2005) [hereinafter the
2
For a detailed discussion of international criminal law conventions see M. Cherrif Bassiouni,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS (1997).

“Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.” 3 Through Resolution 95(1), the UN affirmed the principles of
international law recognized by both the IMT Charter 4 and espoused in the Judgment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal. 5 This meant that in the General Assembly’s view, the IMT had
taken into account already existing principles of international law, which the tribunal had
only to “recognize”.

Thus, by Resolution 95, the UN confirmed the principle of

individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law.

Also, through

Resolution 95, the UN General Assembly mandated the International Law Commission
(ILC), a subsidiary organ of the United Nations to codify the Nuremberg Principles into a
criminal code and to create an international criminal jurisdiction where such offenses,
including the crime of genocide, could be punished. 6
By adopting Resolution 95, the United Nations confirmed that there were a
number of general principles, belonging to customary law, which the Nuremberg Charter
and Judgment had “recognized”.

Also, the United Nations expressed the need to

incorporate the principles into a major instrument of codification either by way of a
“general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind” or as an

3

Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add Sess. 1, pt. 2, 55th Plen. Mtg. at 188 (1946) [hereinafter
UN Resolution 95]. For a discussion of the legislative history of this resolution, see The Charter and
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and Analysis, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/5, at 11-33.
4
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8,
1945, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546
[hereinafter the IMT Charter].
5
The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract
entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law
be enforced.” See Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,
Judgement, Nuremberg, 14.11.1945 – 1.10.1946, Official Documents, 1947, Vol. I, s. 223.
6
UN Resolution 95, supra note 3, at 188.
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“international criminal code”.

By the same token the resolution recognized the

customary law nature of the provisions contained in the London Agreement. 7
In 1950, the ILC followed up the U.N. affirmation with its report entitled the
“Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal.” 8

Principle I which expressly recognizes the

principle of individual criminal responsibility, states that “any person who commits an
act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to
punishment”. 9 In essence, Principle 1 constitutes official recognition of the fact that an
individual in the broadest sense (“any person”) may be held responsible for having
committed a crime. And this may be the case even if the act is not considered a crime
under domestic law. 10
Principles III and IV provide that a person who acts in his capacity as Head of
State or as a government official and one who acts on the orders of the government or of
a superior are not thereby relieved of responsibility. 11 These two principles affirm what
was established in Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter regarding the prohibition of
the defense of superior order as absolute defense. 12 However, while article 8 of IMT
Charter on superior orders, accepted the possibility of mitigation of punishment “if the
Tribunal determines that justice so requires”, Principle IV of the ILC text modifies the

7

“Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter has since come to represent general international law.” See Ian
Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (Oxford, 1991); M. Shaw,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (Cambridge, 1998).
8
See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950),
reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 364, 374-78, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (reporting
the Commission’s findings for The Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles].
9
Id., Principle I.
10
Id., Principle II.
11
Id., Principles III & IV.
12
IMT Charter, supra note 4, arts. 7 & 8.
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approach by stating that the individual is not relieved of responsibility “provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him”. 13 Thus, unlike article 8 of the IMT Charter, Principle
IV leaves a great discretionary power to the tribunals that are called upon to decide
whether or not the individual had a “moral choice” to refuse to comply with an order
given by a superior.
Principle VI codifies the three categories of crime established by article 6 of the
Nuremberg Charter. What was defined in the London Agreement as “crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” has now been formulated as “crimes under
international law”, using the same wording found in article 6 of the IMT Charter. 14 To
this extent, Principle VI represents the core of a possible international criminal code.
The affirmation of the Nuremberg principles by the 1946 General Assembly
resolution and their formulation by the ILC were important steps toward the
establishment of a code of international crimes entailing individual responsibility.15
Thus, individual criminal responsibility for violations of the international crimes is now

13

Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8, Principle IV.
See discussions and accompanying text on IMT subject matter jurisdiction in Chapter two.
15
See article 2 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind which
provides:
14

Individual responsibility
1. A crime against the peace and security of mankind entails individual responsibility.
2. An individual shall be responsible for the crime of aggression in accordance with article 16.
3. An individual shall be responsible for a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that individual:
(a) Intentionally commits such a crime;
(b) Orders the commission of such a crime, which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) Fails to prevent or repress the commission of such a crime in the circumstances set out in article 6;
(d) Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of
such a crime, including providing the means for its commission;
(e) Directly participates in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs;
(f) Directly and publicly incites another individual to commit such a crime which in fact occurs;
(g) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action commencing the execution of a crime which
does not in fact occur because of circumstances independent of his intentions.
See, International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 1996, art. 2, available at: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm.
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undisputed part of contemporary customary international law. 16 Criminal responsibility
now extends to individual combatants, government officials, and Heads of State. 17
Furthermore, it is now a recognized principle of international law that “leaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit … [crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity] are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan.” 18

3.3.

The Genocide Convention of 1948
On December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 19

The

Genocide Convention was an agreement which condemned genocide as an international
crime, regardless of where it took place. It sought to prevent and punish genocides and
actions leading to genocide.

Importantly, the Genocide convention severed the

connection of genocide with war by declaring that genocide is a crime under international
law “whether committed in time of peace or in time of war”. 20
The convention defined genocide by listing prohibited genocidal acts which if
committed with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group” is punishable as genocide under international law. 21 The criminal acts of

16

See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 8, Principle I.
Id., Principles III-IV.
18
Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Sept. 30, 1946, 22 T.M.W.C.
411.
19
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force on January 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
20
Genocide Convention, art. 1.
21
Id., art. 2. Such acts are: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
17
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genocide which are punishable under the Genocide Convention include the act of
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. 22
Thus, it is a crime to plan or incite genocide, even before killing starts, and to aid
or abet genocide. 23 It follows that genocidal acts need not kill or cause the death of
members of a group. Causing serious bodily or mental harm, prevention of births and
transfer of children are acts of genocide when committed as part of a policy to destroy a
group’s existence. 24 Similarly, perpetrators need not intend to destroy the entire group,
an intention to destroy only part of a group will suffice as genocide. It is disputable
whether there is a requirement of intent to destroy a substantial number of group
members or whether an individual may be guilty of genocide even if he or she kills only
one person. It would appear that the individual is guilty of genocide so long as the person
knew that he or she was participating in a larger plan to destroy the group. 25
The protected groups under the genocide Convention are national, ethnical, racial
or religious groups. 26 A national group means a set of individuals whose identity is
defined by a common country of nationality or national origin. On the other hand, an
ethnical group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by common cultural
traditions, language or heritage. A racial group means a set of individuals whose identity
is defined by physical characteristics. And a religious group is a set of individuals whose
identity is defined by common religious creeds, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals.

its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
22
Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 3.
23
Id.
24
Id., art. 2.
25
For further discussion on genocide, see part II, chapter six, infra.
26
Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 2.
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Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention. 27 Also, because the Convention did not provide
the penalties for persons convicted of genocide, Contracting Parties are free to enact
domestic legislation which should provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3. 28 It follows that the punishment
of genocide in one Contracting Party may be more or less severe than is provided in
another Contracting Party.
The Genocide Convention applies equally to “rulers”, “public officials” and
“private individuals”, 29 thereby reinforcing the principle of individual criminal liability.
The jurisdiction to try individuals charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article 3 is placed on the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or on such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 30 However, the
International Court of Justice has jurisdiction between Contracting Parties with respect to
the interpretation or application or responsibilities of Contracting Parties under the
Convention. 31
The Genocide Convention which was adopted on the eve of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly was an important

27

Genocide Convention, supra note 19, art. 5.
Id.
29
Id., art. 4.
30
Id., art. 6.
31
Id., art. 9.
28
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development in the proscription of acts against humanity. 32 The customary nature of the
principles which form the basis of the Convention has been recognized by the
International Court of Justice. 33 The Convention introduced genocide as a new crime
under international law distinct from its classification as crimes against humanity under
article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. 34

However, in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko

Tadic, 35 the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia held that “genocide [is] itself a specific form of crime against humanity”. 36
This has led to the suggestion that in future cases it may be necessary only to charge
perpetrators with crimes against humanity with genocide as part of the res gestae. 37 This
suggestion is inappropriate because elements of the crime against humanity and genocide
are not the same at least as contained under the Elements of Crimes for the International
Criminal Court. 38

3.4.

The Geneva Conventions on Laws and Customs of War, 1949
Shortly after the Genocide Convention, the International Committee of the Red

Cross conscious of the atrocities of World War II initiated the drafting of four
Conventions in Geneva on August 12, 1949, aimed at strengthening the rights of civilians
and prisoners of war during armed conflict. The Conventions were adopted on August
12, 1949, by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International

32

Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J.I.L., 145 (1947); Josef L.
Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J.I.L., 738 (1949); Nehemiah Robinson, THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (New York, 1960).
33
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion of 18 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 23 (1951).
34
See discussions on the subject matter jurisdiction of the IMT, supra chapter two, at pp 15-18.
35
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Sentencing Judgment) Case No. IT-94-1-T, July 14, 1997.
36
Id., at para. 8.
37
Leslie C. Green, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 2nd Ed., 43 (2000).
38
See discussions on the International Criminal Court, infra at Part III.
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Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from April 12, to
August 12, 1949. The four Geneva Conventions are: the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 39;
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked members of the Armed Forces at Sea 40; the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 41; and the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 42
World War II highlighted the lack of clarity and inadequacy of the existing laws
of armed conflict that protected victims of war and the need for more specific provisions
on punishing violations of the law. 43 Thus, Geneva Conventions I, II, and III revised the
ffirst Geneva Convention of 1864 on the treatment of battlefield casualties, the Second
Geneva Convention of 1906 which extended the principles from the first convention to
apply also to war at sea, and the third Geneva Convention of 1929 on the treatment of
prisoners of war respectively. On the other hand, Geneva Convention IV of 1949 for the
first time, provided for the protection of civilians in enemy territory during armed
conflict. Convention IV was as a result of the treatment suffered by civilian populations
of occupied territories during World War II. 44

Together, the Geneva Conventions

reshaped the entire treaty-based system dealing with the protection of war victims and a

39

The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I].
40
The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked
members of the Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
II).
41
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
972 (entered into force on October 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
42
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
43
See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 169 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989).
44
Leslie C. Green, supra note 37, at 43.
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significant development in the law of armed conflict since 1907 and have been adhered to
by more States than any other agreement on the laws of armed conflict. 45
The extensive provisions of the Geneva Conventions are linked by certain general
principles and “common articles” which are applicable to all four Conventions. Under
Common article 1 applicable to all four Conventions, the High Contracting Parties (used
to refer to member States to the Geneva Conventions), to these Conventions undertake
the basic general treaty obligation “to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Conventions in all circumstances”. 46 Common Article 1 is reflective of the principles of
good faith and pacta sunt servanda, 47 which have deep historical and jurisprudential
roots in international law. The principle imposes on a State party to a convention not
only a duty to perform its own obligations as a party to the convention but also a duty not
to encourage others to violate the convention. 48 Hence, in the merits phase of Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 49 the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) concluded that:
[T]here is an obligation on the United States Government, in the
terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” the
Conventions and even “to ensure respect” for them “in all
circumstances”, …. the United States is thus under an obligation
not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in
Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3
common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions . . . . 50

45

Currently, there are 191 States Parties to the Conventions. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and
Successions, at < http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc> (documenting 191 ratifications as of October 2004).
46
Geneva Conventions, common Article 3.
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See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
UNTS Regis. No. 18,232, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679
(1969).
48
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. I. L. 348, 354-5 (1987).
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(Judgment of June 27).
50
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The Geneva Conventions created two types of armed conflicts: international and
non-international. The bulk of the Conventions apply to international armed conflicts
whether declared or not. 51 International armed conflict exists between two States even if
one of the parties does not recognize the existence of a state of war. 52 Also, international
armed conflict exists whenever there is a partial or total occupation of another State’s
territory and even when the occupation has met with no armed resistance. 53 Furthermore,
the Geneva Conventions are applicable as between Contracting Parties in all international
armed conflicts even where one of the States to the conflict is not a party to the
Conventions. In addition, the Contracting Parties shall be bound to observe the
Convention in their relation to the said State if the latter subsequently accepts and applies
the Convention. 54 Thus, under common article 2, the Geneva Conventions apply to
almost every armed conflict between States. 55
On the other hand, common article 3 applies to “armed conflict not of an
international character”. 56 Non-international armed conflict refers to conflicts that are
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See the Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.
The Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.
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The Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.
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Geneva Conventions, common Article 2.
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David D. Caron & David L. Sloss, Availability of U.S. Courts to Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base - Reach of Habeas Corpus - Executive Power in War on Terror 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 788, 789 (2004).
56
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, provides that:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a)
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b)
taking of hostages;
(c)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
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not between States and includes conflicts between a State and a non-state entity. 57
Article 3 marks a new step in the development of humanitarian law as it was without
antecedent because international law and prior conventions relating to armed conflict
generally did not regulate the conduct of internal armed conflict. 58

However, in 1949,

the ICRC considered it necessary to adopt minimum rules of protection for the parties
involved in a non-international conflict. 59

In the merits phase of the Military and

Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 60 the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) noted that common Article 3 defines:
certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a noninternational character. . . . [I]n the event of international armed
conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in
addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to
international conflicts; . . . they . . . reflect what the Court in 1949
called “elementary considerations of humanity” (Corfu
Channel..). 61
The ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention No. I states that common article 3
demands respect for rules “already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and
enacted in the municipal law of the States in question, long before the Convention was
signed.” 62 The ICRC’s position has received judicial support from the ICJ which noted
that the Geneva Conventions are part of “the general principles of humanitarian law to

(d)
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for . . .
57
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which the Conventions merely give specific expression”. 63 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, 64 the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia upheld
the decision of the Trial Chamber 1 65 which held that common article 3 applies to both
international and internal armed conflicts. 66 The Appeals Chamber further observed that
common article 3 covered “all violations of international humanitarian law other than the
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions.” 67
Another remarkable novation of the Geneva Conventions is the introduction of a
clear obligation on Contracting Parties to prosecute those who commit “greave
breaches” 68 of the Convention. 69 Common articles 49, 50,129, and 146 provide that:
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Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 49, at 114, para. 220
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (May 7, 1997) reprinted in I.H.R.R. vol. 4, No. 3 (1997).
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See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT94-1-T (August 10, 1995).
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See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-AR72 (October 2, 1995) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter
Decision of the Appeals Chamber].
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Id, 87.
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See Geoffrey Best, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, 166 (1994); Leslie Green, supra note 37, at 43. Each
of the four Conventions lists what constitutes grave breaches which are identical and only differs in context
of the specific subject matter addressed by each convention.
64

Art. 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention I and Art. 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention II contain identical
provisions that define grave breaches with respect to the wounded and sick in the field and at sea. These
two articles provide as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 51.
Art. 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III defines grave breaches with respect to the protection of
prisoners of war as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a
prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
Id. art. 130.
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Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. 70
The Commentary to the Geneva Convention IV, Article 146 elaborates on the
obligation imposed on Contracting States to prosecute persons accused of grave breaches
of the Conventions. The Commentary provides as follows:
The obligation on the High Contracting Parties to search for
persons accused to have committed grave breaches imposes an
active duty on them. As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that
there is on its territory a person who has committed such a
breach, its duty is to ensure that the person concerned is arrested
and prosecuted with all speed. The necessary police action
should be taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in
pursuance of a request from another State. 71
The text of common articles 49, 50, 129, & 146 did not place any jurisdictional
limit on the obligation of States to apprehend and prosecute individuals who commit

Art. 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV defines grave breaches with respect to the protection of
civilians as follows:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
Id. art. 147.
69
See Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 50, Geneva
Convention III, supra note 41, art. 129, and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 146.
70
Id.
71
See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION of 12 August, 1949: GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 593
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention IV Commentary].
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great breaches of the Conventions. 72 On the contrary, the Geneva Conventions clearly
obligate States to search for and prosecute any person accused of violating common
articles 49, 50, 129, & 146 without regard to the person’s nationality. 73 However, a State
may in accordance with its laws, differ jurisdiction to another Contracting State that has
made out a prima facie case against the accused. 74 While the Geneva Conventions did
not expressly provide that a Contracting State may demand from another Contracting
State to fulfill its obligation to prosecute or surrender the accused to a willing State, the
Commentary to common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions appears to support this
proposition. 75 Furthermore, the 1958 Commentary on the Geneva Convention IV added
that:
[t]he proper working of the system of protection provided by the
Convention demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should
not be content merely to apply its provisions themselves, but
should do everything in their power to ensure that the
humanitarian principles underlying the Conventions are applied
universally. 76
In view of the above, it has been suggested that since war crimes are universal
crimes, suspected war criminals may be prosecuted by any State. 77 Thus, by implication,
Contracting States’ obligation to prosecute is absolute for grave breaches of the Geneva
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See Geneva Convention I, supra note 39, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 40, art. 50, Geneva
Convention III, supra note 41, art. 129, and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 4, art. 146.
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Id.
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Id.
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COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK
IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 26 (J. Picted ed. 1952) (emphasis added). The Commentary adds
that “in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties . . . may, and
should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention.”
76
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 16
(O. Uhler & H. Coursier eds. 1958).
77
See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (3d ed. 1979).
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Conventions. 78

Furthermore, it has also been advocated by commentators that the

Geneva Conventions introduced the concept of universal jurisdiction through common
articles 49, 50, 129, & 146. 79 According to one commentator:
… under the 1949 Geneva Conventions ... all States Parties to the
Conventions ... are currently obligated to search out persons who
have committed “grave breaches” of the Conventions and to
either try them or extradite them for trial pursuant to the
Conventions. This obligation is a major procedural mechanism
under the Conventions for enforcement of their important
humanitarian principles. The obligation applies to all States
Parties whether or not they were parties to the conflict or the
“grave breaches” took place in their jurisdiction, and it applies
now with no need for further legal predicates. 80
However, the obligation to search for and arrest persons suspected of committing
grave breaches should not be construed to bestow on a State the universal obligation or
carte blanche to search for alleged war criminals in the sovereign territory of foreign
countries. 81 Rather, the obligation to prosecute persons accused of grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions must be exercised within the limits of international law. 82

3.5.

Additional Protocols I & II to the Geneva Conventions
While the Geneva Conventions were considered a major legal framework for the

development of rules of war, with time, it was noted that the Conventions did not provide
adequate protection in certain areas such as the conduct of combatants and protection of
78

See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International
Crimes in Haiti? 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 20 (1996).
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Leslie Green, supra note 37, at 43; Geoffrey Best, supra note 68, at 165 (1994); John Norton Moore,
CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 302-03, 310 (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 503-26 (1992); See Ian
Brownlie, supra note 77, at 563; Denise Plattner, The Penal Repression of Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 278 INT’L REV. of the RED CROSS
409, 413 (1990).
80
John Norton Moore, supra note 79, at 299.
81
See Paul S. Stevens, An Interview with Defense Department General Counsel Judith A. Miller, (Standing
Comm. on Law and Nat. Security, Washington D.C.), 18 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 1 (1996).
82
See Ian Brownlie, supra note 77, at 243-57
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civilians from the effects of hostilities. In other to address the deficiency, the
International Conference on Human Rights after its meeting in Tehran in 1968 invited the
ICRC to study the possibility of updating the Conventions. 83 Accepting the invitation,
the ICRC organized and chaired the consultations between experts drawn from
governments and from National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 84 The ICRC used
the reports of these conferences to prepare the draft of the Additional Protocols. 85 The
ICRC presented the reports of the conferences on Additional Protocols to the TwentySecond International Conference of the Red Cross. 86
Thereafter the draft Protocols were considered by the Diplomatic Conference on
the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977. 87 The Conference was convened by the Swiss
government in February, 1974 and was attended by 115 States that signed the Geneva

83

International Conference on Human Rights (Tehran, Apr 22-May 13, 1968), Resolution XXIII, in Final
Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Doc A/CONF 32/41 at 18 (UN 1968).
84
Conference of Red Cross Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law applicable in Armed Conflicts (The Hague, Mar 1-6, 1971), Report on the Work of the Conference,
Doc D-O-1195b (ICRC 1971) (cyclostyled document); Conference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts
(Geneva, May 24-June 12, 1971), Report on the Work of the Conference (ICRC 1971); Conference of Red
Cross Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts, 2d Sess (Vienna, Mar 20-24, 1972), Report on the Work of the Conference, Doc D-1254b
(ICRC 1972) (cyclostyled document); Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 2d Sess (Geneva, May 3June 3, 1972), Report on the Work of the Conference (ICRC 1972) (two volumes).
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International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 (1973); International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: Commentary (1973).
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Resolution XIII, in Resolutions Adopted by the XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross, 14
Intl Rev Red Cross 19, 30 (1974); International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Study by the
XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross of the Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, Doc CDDH/6 (1974) (cyclostyled document).
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See Resolutions of The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, available at: ICRC,
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Conventions and/or are member States of United Nations Organization. 88

The

Conference was also observed by national liberation organizations as well as
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. 89 The Diplomatic Conference
ended on June 8, 1977 with the adoption of two additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions. 90
Protocol I extends the Geneva Conventions’ definition of international armed
conflict to include wars of national liberation. 91 By clearly prohibiting what constitutes
indiscriminate attacks, Protocol I specifies what constitutes a legitimate target of military
attack. 92

Attacks or other acts carried out in violation of the prohibition against

indiscriminate attacks and attacks or reprisals directed against the civilian population and
individual civilians or civilian objects or objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population are, subject to certain provisos, considered grave breaches of
humanitarian law and classified as war crimes. 93 Article 90 of Protocol I provides for the
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Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974-1977) (Federal Political Department,
Bern 1978) (seventeen volumes).
89
Id.
90
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 16 ILM 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 16 ILM
1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions].
91
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 1(4).
92
Specifically, Protocol I:
a) prohibits indiscriminate attacks and attacks or reprisals directed against: the civilian population and
individual civilians (art. 48 and 51); civilian objects (art. 48 and 52); objects indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population (art. 54);cultural objects and places of worship (art. 53); works and installations
containing dangerous forces (art. 56); and the natural environment (art. 55);
b) extends the protection accorded under the Geneva Conventions to all medical personnel, units and
means of transport, both civilian and military (art. 8-31);
c) lays down an obligation to search for missing persons (art. 33);
d) strengthens the provisions concerning relief for the civilian population (art. 68-71);
e) protects the activities of civil defence organizations (art. 61-67);
f) specifies measures that must be taken by the States to facilitate the implementation of humanitarian law
(art 80-91).
93
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 85.
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establishment of an International Fact-Finding Commission to investigate alleged grave
breaches or other serious violations of the Conventions and of Protocol I. 94 All States
Parties to Protocol I may accept the competence of this Commission.95
Protocol I was necessary to strengthen the Geneva Conventions because new
methods of combat had been developed and the rules applicable to the conduct of
hostilities had become outdated. Protocol I provides a reminder that the right of the
parties to a conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited and that it is
prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, material or tactics of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 96
Protocol II seeks to extend the application of the main rules of the law of war to
internal conflicts. 97 This was in recognition of the fact that most conflicts since World
War II have been non-international. 98 Prior to Protocol II, the only provision in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which is applicable to non-international armed conflict is
article 3 common to all four Conventions. Although common article 3 sets out basic
principles for protecting people in wartime, it was not enough to solve the serious
problems of humanitarian concern that arise in internal conflicts. Thus, while common
article 3 planted the seed of humanitarian considerations in law relating to civil war,
Protocol II expanded the scope of prohibitions and protections. 99
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Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 90.
Id.
96
Id., art. 35.
97
See, Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 3.
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Lindsay Moir, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002). The Red Cross estimates that
eighty percent of victims of violence are victims of “non-international armed conflicts.” available at
www.icrc.org.
99
For example, Protocol II:
(a) strengthens the fundamental guarantees enjoyed by all persons not, or no longer, taking part in the
hostilities (Art. 4);
95
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Also, unlike common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which fails to set
criteria for the definition of internal conflict to which it applies, Protocol II describes its
own field of application in considerable detail, excluding situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other
acts of a similar nature. 100 Thus, the kind of internal armed conflict covered by Protocol
II are non-international conflicts that take place on the territory of a State between the
armed forces of that state and rebel armed forces that are under responsible command and
control part of the national territory. 101 However, Protocol II unlike Protocol I failed to
expressly provide for individual criminal responsibility for persons in a position of
authority during an armed conflict and do not criminalize omissions by persons in
authority to prevent crimes being committed under their command. 102

3.6.

Observations and Commentary
The Genocide Convention and the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol

I & II laid the foundation for international criminal law.

These legal instruments

pioneered the codification of international prohibition of acts which are repugnant to a
civilized society and inimical to the survival of humankind. As discussed in chapters

b) lays down rights for persons deprived of their freedom and provides judicial guarantees for those
prosecuted in connection with an armed conflict (art. 5-6);
c) prohibits attacks on the civilian population and individual civilians (art. 13);
d) prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (art. 14);
e) prohibits attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces (art. 15);
f) prohibits attacks on cultural objects and places of worship (art. 16);
g) regulates the forced movement of civilians (art. 17);
h) protects the wounded, sick and shipwrecked (art. 7);
i) protects religious personnel and all medical personnel, units and means of transport (art. 9-11);
j) limits the use of the red cross and red crescent emblems to those persons and objects duly authorized to
display it (art. 12).
100
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 1.
101
Id., art. 1(1).
102
See, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 90, art. 86 applicable to international
conflicts criminalizes omissions and provide for individual criminal responsibility.
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four and six of this study, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions have
been incorporated wholly or with modifications in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, the Statutes of the special or mixed
tribunals for Sierra-Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia as well as the ICC Statute.
The two Additional Protocols were intended to supplement, but do not replace,
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Protocols have strengthened the rules governing
the conduct of hostilities by the addition of more precise rules aimed at limiting the use of
violence and protecting the civilian population. 103 However, these instruments are not
without limitations, prominent of which is the failure to provide an effective enforcement
mechanism and in some situations, limited protection. Therefore, in spite of these rules,
States rarely fulfilled their duty to provide for or exercise their jurisdiction. While
concerned organizations such as the ICRC and others have appealed to States to comply
with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I & II, the
situation remained static. Thus, until the mid-1990s, the vast majority of war crimes
trials were limited to crimes committed during the World War II. 104
Apart from the legal instruments discussed above, there are other conventions
which have been adopted over the years that contribute directly or indirectly to the
development of international criminal law. The Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954, 105 which was adopted
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Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski & B. Zimmermann, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff,
Geneva, 1987).
104
Knut Dormann and Louis Maresca, The Role of the Red Cross in the Development of International
Humanitarian Law: The International Committee of the Red Cross and Its Contribution to the Development
of International Humanitarian Law in Specialized Instruments, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 217, 225 (2004).
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The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May
14, 1954, (entered into force on August 7, 1956). The Convention has been ratified or acceded to by 114
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in the wake of massive destruction of the cultural heritage in World War II, commits the
contracting parties to protect the “cultural heritage of all mankind” in the event of armed
conflict. 106 The Convention obligates contracting parties “to take, within the framework
of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal
or disciplinary sanctions” upon those persons “who commit or order to be committed a
breach” of the Convention. 107
Also, the the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of December 10,
1948,

108

adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in response to World War II,

outlined United Nations’ view on the human rights guaranteed to all mankind. 109 The
formation of the United Nations (“U.N.”) and the passing of the UDHR were important
milestones in the contemporary history of human rights. 110 The UDHR was conceived as
a statement of objectives to be followed by governments, and therefore not legally
binding. 111 The UDHR however, served as the foundation for the adoption of two

States. See http://erc.unesco.org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E#1 (last visited March 9,
2006).
106
The Hague Convention, supra note 105, preamble, art. 4.
107
Id., art. 28. Note also that Article . 85(4)(d) of the 1977 Protocol I makes also attacks against historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship under certain conditions a war crime. See, Additional
Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 85(4)(d). See also, J. Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict (Paris, 1996).
108
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
109
See, Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290 (1996) (suggesting that the UDHR remains the
primary source of global human rights standards and is the basis for most human rights instruments).
110
See, Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 705
(Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2000) (reviewing the formation of international human rights); Anne Gallagher,
Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Partners, in THE
FUTURE OF U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 201 (Philip Alston & James Crawford,
eds., 2000) (expressing that the effectiveness of the U.N. human rights treaty system rests on “its ability to
encourage and cultivate national implementation of, and compliance with, international human rights
standards”).
111
Note however that in 1968 United Nations International Conference on Human Rights decided it
“constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community” to all persons. See also,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 262, (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 3rd ed. 1999) (noting scholars’
recognition of the UDHR as “binding, customary international law”); and at 848 (observing that “One oft-
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legally-binding UN human rights Covenants; 112 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 113 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. 114 The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ISESCR which are jointly referred to as the
International Bill of Human Rights provides for and sets forth general standard for
fundamental human rights protection. 115
The ICCPR offers in more detail the civil and political rights enumerated earlier
in the UDHR and is legally binding on those countries that have ratified it. 116 The ICCPR
includes inter alia, the right to life, 117 to be free from torture and slavery, 118 to liberty and
security, to freedoms of movement and association, thought, religion and expression, to

stated argument is that at least some standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although
initially only recommendatory and nonbinding, have now become legally binding as customary law
through their wide acceptance by nations as having normative effect.”). Thus, some scholars have argued
that the UDHR has a legally binding effect on all United Nations members since it is “an authoritative
interpretation of the general human rights commitments contained in the [United Nations] Charter.” Id., at
848.
112
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights could not garner the international consensus necessary to
become a binding treaty because it contained both first-generation civil and political rights and secondgeneration economic, social, and cultural rights. This led to a divide between developed capitalist nations
such as the USA, which favored civil and political rights, and communist nations which favored economic,
social and cultural rights. To solve this problem, two binding Covenants were created instead of one: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.
113
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. As at January 26, 2006, about 155 members of the
international community are States Parties to the ICCPR, making it one of the most fundamental
expressions of human rights at the international level. See Office of the United Nations Commissioner for
Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (visited March 10, 2006).
114
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966),
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. As at January 26, 2006, the ICESCR has been
ratified by 152 States. http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm (visited March 10, 2006).
115
See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1153, 1164 N.53 (1998) (explaining how the UDHR formed the foundations of human rights law).
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See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 111 cmt. h (2002).
117
ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 6
118
Id., art. 7
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equality before the law, 119 to privacy, to equality within marriage, to the enjoyment of
culture, the right to a fair trial 120 and provides for principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 121
States Parties to the ICCPR are obligated to adopt legislative, administrative, and
other measures necessary for ensuring that individuals within their jurisdiction enjoy the
rights and freedoms contained in the ICCPR without discrimination.122 The Covenant
establishes the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) 123 to monitor its implementation
by considering periodic reports from States Parties. 124 Should a State Party violate an
individual’s rights and fails to provide an effective remedy, that person may
communicate a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Committee pursuant to
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 125 In certain circumstances, the HRC may consider
119

Id., art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law.”).
120
Id., art. 14
121
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence
was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the
imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 15.
122
ICCPR, supra note 113, art. 2(1).
123
Id., art. 28 (providing for the establishing the Human Rights Committee).
124
The Human Rights Committee is comprised of 18 experts who meet three times a year to consider
periodic reports submitted by member States on their compliance with the treaty. Members of the Human
Rights Committee are elected by member states, but do not represent any State. Id., art. 28. See Louis
Henkin et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 491-92 (1999) observing that the Human Rights Committee:
may be described as the guardian of the [ICCPR], with responsibility for monitoring its implementation. Its
two main functions ... are to consider reports from, and complaints against, the State Parties. The former is
obligatory for all State Parties, while the latter is optional and exists in two forms: interstate
“communications’ under the Covenant, as well as individual “communications’ under the Optional
Protocol. The basic obligation of States Parties is to implement the rights provided for in Parts I and III of
the [ICCPR].
Id.
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Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 999
U.N.T.S. 302 (1966) [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (establishing a committee with authority to review
alleged human rights violations). As at January 26, 2006, the Protocol has been ratified by 105 States
Parties. See Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations,
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/5.htm (visited March 10, 2006). Article 1
of the Protocol provides that:
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complaints from other countries that have ratified the Covenant and from individuals who
believe their rights under the Convention have been violated. The HRC also formulates
General Comments (GC) that may help to clarify what countries must do to comply with
the ICCPR. 126
The ICESCR is a legally binding treaty that protects in more detail, a range of
economic, social, and cultural rights without discrimination based on creed, political
affiliation, gender, or race enumerated earlier in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights. 127 The ICESCR obligates States Parties to work toward the granting of
economic, social, and cultural rights to individuals. 128 In 1987, the U.N. Economic and
Social Council established the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) to monitor the progress of countries towards fully implementing their
obligations under the ICESCR. 129 The Committee also formulates General Comments
(GC) that clarifies what countries must do to comply with the ICESCR.

A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of
the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who
claim to be victims of a violation by the State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not
a Party to the present Protocol.
Id.
126

See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudications, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 338-40 (1997) (explaining how the UNHCR monitors States’
adherence to the ICCPR).
127
The ICESCR includes the right to work, to just and favorable conditions of work, to form and join trade
unions, to family life, to an adequate standard of living, to the highest attainable standard of health, to
education, and to take part in cultural life. It prohibits all forms of discrimination in the enjoyment of these
rights, including on the basis of sex, and requires that countries ensure the equal rights of women and men.
See ICESCR, supra note 114.
128
Id., art. 2.
129
The Committee is composed of eighteen independent experts, chosen with regard to equitable
geographical distribution, who serve in their personal capacities. See E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. ESCOR,
para. B, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (1985). See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1987).
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In addition to the above international legal frameworks is the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 130 The
Torture Convention establishes a complete ban on any form of torture or other inhuman
or degrading treatment. 131 The Torture Convention defines torture as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. 132
The Committee Against Torture (Committee) acts as an oversight of the
Convention. 133 The Committee is authorized to receive complaints from individuals
against States for alleged violations of the Convention. 134 Also, the Committee reviews
communications submitted by a State Party alleging that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Torture Convention. 135

On receipt of reliable

information that torture is being practiced within the territory of a State Party, the
Committee may initiate an investigation to determine whether the Convention has or is

130

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. The
Torture Convention has been ratified by 141 States Parties as at January 26, 2006, see Office of the United
Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (visited March 10, 2006).
131
Torture Convention, supra note 130, art. 2.
132
Id., art. 1(1).
133
Id., art. 17 (creating a Committee Against Torture and establishing selection procedures). See generally
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture, Fact Sheet No. 17
(providing committee materials, including sessions, notes, complaints, and press releases), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs17.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
134
See id. at art. 22 (explaining the individual complaint process); see also Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee Against Torture: Overview and Procedure, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/overcat.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
135
See id. at art. 21 (delineating the requirements for State Party complaints regarding another State Party's
failure to abide by CAT provisions).
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being violated. 136 A dispute between the States Parties concerning the interpretation of
the Convention which cannot be resolved through arbitration may be referred to the
International Court of Justice by either party. 137
Furthermore, there are other legal instruments that have been adopted at the
regional level that reflects the spirit of the International Bill of Rights. These legal
frameworks include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), 138 the American Convention on Human Rights
(“ACHR”), 139 together with the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Inter-American Convention
on Violence Against Women”), 140 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (“African Charter”). 141 The following is a summary of applicable provisions from
the aforementioned documents as well as a brief explanation of how the various human
rights bodies operate.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“ECHR”) guarantees and seeks to provide the same protection contained in
the international bill of rights to all persons within the its jurisdiction. 142

The

enforcement and oversight of the ECHR is carried out by the European Court of Human
136
See Torture Convention, supra note 130, art. 20 (outlining investigatory procedures comprised of
confidential inquiries, reports, and visits). The Committee’s decision is not binding on States Parties to the
Convention. However, the Committee’s decision serves as important points of reference for State Parties
as they enforce the Torture Convention domestically.
137
Id., art. 30(1).
138
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
139
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
140
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, [hereinafter Inter-American Convention on Violence Against
Women].
141
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1981) (entered into force
on October 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
142
ECHR, supra note 138, art 1 (requiring all States Parties to secure the rights and freedoms delineated
within the ECHR “to everyone within their jurisdiction”).
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Rights

(“ECtHR”)

European

Commission

of

Human

Rights

(“European

Commission”), 143 respectively.
Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and InterAmerican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women (“Inter-American Convention on Violence Against Women”) recognize
and extend the rights guaranteed under the international bill of rights to persons within its
jurisdiction. 144 Both the ACHR and the Inter-American Convention on Violence Against
Women are interpreted and enforced by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (“IACHR”) 145 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”)146
with respect to members of the Organization of American States 147 who are States Parties
to the two instruments.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”) 148 is
another regional instrument which implements the rights guaranteed under the
international bill of rights and imposes a general duty upon its States Parties to
“recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in [the] Charter and ... to adopt

143

See The European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organization and Procedure (2003)
[hereinafter ECtHR Background] (explaining how the European Commission of Human Rights (“European
Commission”) and the original European Court of Human Rights were replaced by a full-time court on
Nov. 1, 1998), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited May 18,
2004).
144
ACHR imposes upon its State Parties the obligation to respect and ensure the rights and freedoms
included in the convention, for “all persons subject to their jurisdiction ... without any discrimination for
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic
status, birth, or any other social condition.” Furthermore, the ACHR guarantees that “all persons are equal
before the law”. See ACHR, supra note 139, arts. 1, 24.
145
See generally Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”), at http://www.oas.org/ (last
visited March 10, 2006). See Louis Henkin et al., HUMAN RIGHTS 319 (1999)
146
See generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), at http://www.oas.org/ (last visited
March 10, 2006).
147
See ACHR, supra note 139, at pmbl.
148
See African Charter, supra note 141.
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legislative or other measures to give effect to them.” 149 The African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights (“African Commission”) 150 and the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights 151 were established in order to protect the rights delineated in the
African Charter (as well as in other pertinent documents). 152
Although the international bill of rights and the regional human rights treaties
essentially address and belong to international human rights law, they however impact
international criminal law. 153 The Human Rights Commission established by the above
named regional human rights treaties are assisted in their works by National Human
Rights Institutions (NHRIs). 154 While it is the primary reasonability of States to observe

149

See African Charter, supra note 141, art 1. Article 2 of the ACH which provides that “every individual
shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present
Charter,” while Article 3 declares that “every individual shall be equal before the law” and “every
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.” The AFC guarantees the right to life and
integrity of the person in Article 4 of the Charter. Article 5 guarantees the right to be free from torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
150
Id., art. 30 (providing for the establishment of the Commission.). The Commission’s three central
functions include the promotion and protection of human rights, and the interpretation of the provisions of
the African Charter. Id., art. 45. Also, the Commission is charged with overseeing inter-State complaints
and “other communications,” which include individual petitions. Id., arts. 47-58.
151
See Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
available at: http://www.africa-union.org/organs/orgCourt_of_Justice.htm (visited March 10, 2006). The
protocol received the requisite number of ratifications and came into force on January 25, 2004. See, Press
Release, African Union, The Protocol on the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights to Come
Into Force Soon (Dec. 30, 2003), at http://www.pict-pcti.org/pdf/APHRC%20coming%20into%20force.pdf
(last visited March 10, 2006).
152
See, Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 319 (1999) (stating that customary human rights law is slightly
different from customary international law); see also infra Part II.E (discussing the incorporation of
domestic violence norms within customary international law).
153
See, Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 319 (1999) (stating that customary human rights law is slightly
different from customary international law); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1977-78 (2002) (observing that countries that have ratified human rights
treaties have better human rights ratings then those countries that have not).
154
See generally, Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights
Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 10 (2000)
(explaining the role of NHRIs suggested that the “human rights commission has as its express mandate the
protection and promotion of human rights.”).
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and enforce human rights, non-governmental organizations, and individuals should also
ensure that these rights are observed. 155

155

See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 140816 (1999) (noting how States, non-governmental organizations, and individuals all play a role in enforcing
international human rights).
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PART II

INDIVIDUAL CRIMIANL ACCOUNTABILITY AND AD HOC
INTERNATIONAL AND SPECIAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

CHAPTER FOUR
===============================================================
4.0.

4.1.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AD HOC INTERNATIONAL AND
SPECIAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
_____________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapter three, the horrific experiences of World War I & II and the

trials that followed lead to the adoption of international conventions proscribing rules of
armed conflict and prohibiting certain conducts. The expectation therefore was that
States and the international community at large are now poised to ensure that such
atrocious conducts reminiscent of World War I & II should never be repeated.
Conversely, where such atrocity is committed, that States and the international
community will move swiftly to checkmate the situation and promptly hold the
perpetrators criminally responsible. Unfortunately, when it came time for States and the
international community to make good on this expectation, they neglected to do so.
Rather, States and the international community showed a preference for self preservation
and a lack of political will to prosecute individuals accused of committing egregious
crimes. In the same vein, attempts to create a permanent international court to hold war
criminals individually accountable were sometimes truncated and at other times
proceeded at a snail speed. 1
Thus, while international human rights law did develop quickly, its monitoring
mechanisms at the international level remained primarily political or quasi-judicial at
best. Consequently, armed conflicts and genocidal acts in violations of international law
particularly, the Geneva and the Genocide conventions progressed openly with impunity
1

See Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1-31 August 1951, UN Doc. A/2136
(1952); Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July 27- August 20, 1953,
UN Doc. A/2645 (1954).
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in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 2 However, with the unrelenting activities of the print and
electronic media that brought the genocide in the former Republic Yugoslavia into our
homes, 3 the international community realized that it can no longer bury its ostrich head in
the sand and decided to respond to public outcry against the despicable acts of ignoble
conducts. 4
Thus, after several decades of hardly any progress, the UN Security Council in
1993 and 1994 respectively, established two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) to punish those responsible for the situations in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In essence, it took about four decades after the end of the
prosecutions of World War II to set up another international criminal tribunal in the
former Yugoslavia. However, once the jinx of inaction was broken, 5 it took only 10
years to establish one more ad hoc tribunal and three special tribunals as well as a
permanent criminal court. The ad hoc tribunals and the special tribunals are briefly

2

See Gideon A. Moor, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzogovia and Article 51: Inherent Rights and Unmet
Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 870, 897-98 (1995) (“Taking note of the continued reports of
human rights atrocities within Bosnia ... the Security Council expressed alarm at continuing reports of
human rights violations.”); Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former
Yugoslavia, 22 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 235 (1994), and Human Rights Watch, Rwanda - Human
Rights Developments (observing that the international community was shamefully absent at the moment
of the killings in Rwanda and is moving slowly to bring those guilty to justice]; available at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AFRICA-08.htm; (last visited September 1, 2005).
3
See Roy Gutman, Prisoners of Serbia’s War: Tales of Hunger, Torture at Camp in North Bosnia,
Newsday (N.Y.), July 19, 1992, at 7. Gutman’s report helped to expose the horrible treatment of Croat and
Muslim detainees in Serb camps in the Bosnian cities of Banja Luka and Trnopolje and in the Manjaca and
Omarska camps. Id.; Physicians for Human Rights, MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: 1991-1995 24 (1996) [hereinafter Medicine Under Siege] (noting that television cameras
showed pictures of “hundreds of emaciated men behind barbed wire, their eyes hollow from hunger and
despair”).
4
Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
xxi (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995) [hereinafter Insider’s Guide Volume One]. See also
David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401
(1994).
5
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity For International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 420
(2000).
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examined in this part of the study while the creation of the permanent international
criminal court will be discussed in Part II.

4.2.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA

4.2.1. History of the Conflict in former Yugoslavia
The former Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of three major
ethnic/political/religious groups; the Croats, Bosnian, and Serbs, who harbored historical
hatreds among themselves. 6 This deep rooted ethnic animosity was a potential threat to
peace in the Balkans which became apparent with collapse of the Soviet threat 7and the
death of Croatian Marshal Tito (who had ruled the Republic since 1945 and had managed
to suppress opposition from the Serbs and Bosnians) in 1980. 8

In 1989, Slobodan

Milosevic became president of Serbia and Montenegro, the truncated Yugoslavia. 9 His
nationalist quest for a greater Serbia incited anti-Serb sentiments and support for the
secession of Serbians in Croatia and Bosnia which eventually led to the dissolution of the
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. 10
Fighting in Yugoslavia broke out in June 1991 when the predominantly Serb
forces of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) invaded Slovenia and Croatia after both

6

Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL 14 (The Continuum International
Publishing Group, Inc., 2002).
7
Id., at 18.
8
Roger Thurow, Tito’s Legacy: Political Drifting, An Economy in Chaos Prevail in Yugoslavia; Question
is Whether Nation Will Turn More to Soviets Out of Economic Need; Sharpening Ethnic Rivalries, Wall
St. J., May 8, 1986, available in 1986 WL-WSJ 258991.
9
Makau Mutua, Open Forum: Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 167, 173 (1997).
10
Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 11-19 (noting that Franjo Tudjman and Milian
Kucan, leaders of Croatia and Slovenia respectively, sought to weaken Serbian influence in Yugoslavia by
pursing for the creation of a loose federation of States, leading to the dissolution of Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1991), see also MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3, at 15-17.
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Republics declared independence on June 25, 1991. 11 The fighting ended temporarily on
July 7, 1991, but resumed into a “full-scale warfare in August 1991 and continued until 2
January 1992, when a ceasefire was signed in Sarajevo under the auspices of the United
Nations.” 12 Meanwhile, the UN Security Council had invited all States to impose a
“general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to
Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise.” 13 Subsequently, after the
ceasefire of January 2, 1992, the Security Council on February 21, 1992, adopted
Resolution 743 which authorized the deployment of United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) to carry out peacekeeping operations in the region. 14
The UNPROFOR was established on March 13, 1992, but was largely ineffective
as it was unable to stop Serbian forces from attacking the Croats and Bosnian Muslims in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in April 1992 following the recognition of their independence
by the European Community and the United States of America on April 6 & 7, 1992,
respectively. 15

On May 10, 1992, the JNA reluctantly withdrew from Bosnia and

Herzegovina but continued to provide military, financial, logistic, and other kinds of
support to Serbian forces (BSA) made up largely of Bosnian Serbs who reside in the Serb
dominated area of BiH which the Serbs referred to as the “Republika Srpska.” 16

11

Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 19; MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3,
at 16. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, at para. 10.,
Gen. Ass. 54 Sess. November 15, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, at www.un.org/peace/srebrenica/pdf. (visited
March 2, 2005) [hereinafter The Fall of Srebrenica].
12
See the Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para. 11.
13
See Security Council Resolution 713 adopted in September 1991, S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991).
14
See S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/743 (1992).
15
Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 22; MEDICINE UNDER SIEGE, supra note 3,
at 16-17; The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para.15.
16
See The Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, at para.18; Norman Cigar & Paul Williams, INDICTMENT
AT THE HAGUE: THE MILOSEVIC REGIME AND CRIMES OF THE BALKAN WAR 25 (New York
University Press 2002); Steve Terret, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER
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For the next three years, the BSA and the Serb paramilitary groups sporadically
mounted pockets of attacks on the civilian population with the objective of terrorizing
and forcing them to flee the self declared territory of the Republika Srpska. 17 This
deliberate arms attack on the civilian population was infamously referred to as “ethnic
cleansing” wherein Bosnian Muslims and Croats are either forced into exile as refugees,
held as hostages for use in prisoner exchanges, or placed in concentration camps and
many summarily executed. 18 An estimated 20,000 Muslim women and girls were thrown
into rape camps. Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Croat political leaders were arrested,
imprisoned and in many cases murdered. It is estimated that the war in Bosnia led to the
death of 200,000 or more lives, as many as three million people displaced, and tens of
thousands missing. 19
Although it was apparent that the peacekeeping mission and embargo has failed to
stop the war, the Security Council was hesitant to take decisive action to end JNA’s
military action and the attendant human casualty. Rather, the UN Security Council
decided to continue the failed political action by voting to impose another round of
sanctions on Serbia. 20 However, when in July 1992 the scale of atrocities occurring in
the former Yugoslavia was published in the print and television media all over the world,
public opinion was stimulated and pressure was mounted on the international community
to take decisive action to hold those responsible for the atrocities to account. 21

ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD 33 (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000).
17
See the Fall of Srebrenica, supra note 11, para. 19.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Paul Lewis, UN Votes 13-0 for Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia; Air Travel and Oil Curbed, N.Y.
Times, May 31, 1992, at 1.
21
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 416-417.
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Consequently, UN Security Council passed Resolution 771 which invited States
to collect and present to the Security Council with information regarding the violations in
the former Yugoslavia. 22 On October 6, 1992, the UN Security Council established the
Commission of Experts charged with the responsibility of investigating and collecting
evidence of “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
international humanitarian law” committed during the conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia. 23 The Commission eventual chairman was Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni,
who at that time, directed the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) of
DePaul University in Chicago, U.S.A. 24

The Commission submitted its First Interim

Report on February 22, 1993. 25
While the process of establishing an international criminal tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia was ongoing and even after the tribunal was established, fighting continued

22

S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 3106th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1476
(1992) [hereinafter SC Resolution 780]. Resolution 780 provides as follows:
[The Security Council r]equests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial
Commission of Experts, to examine and analyze the information submitted pursuant to resolution 771
(1992) and the present resolution, together with such further information as the Commission of Experts
may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, of other persons or bodies pursuant to Resolution 771
(1992), with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Id. at para. 2
24
On October 25, 1992, the UN Secretary-General appointed five members to the Commission of Experts.
Initial members of the Commission were: Professor Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) as Chairman; Professor
M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt); Commander William J. Fenrick (Canada); Judge Keba M’Baye (Senegal);
and Professor Torkel Opsahl (Norway). In August 1993 Professor Kalshoven resigned from the
Commission due to medical reasons and Professor Opsahl who acted as Chairman from July-August died in
September. Thus, on October 19, 1993, the UN Secretary-General appointed Professor Bassiouni as
Chairman and also appointed Professor Christine Cleiren (Netherlands) and Judge Hanne Sophie Greve
(Norway) to replace Professors Kalshoven and Opsahl respectively. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 5,
at n. 128.
25
See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 20, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993).
23
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over the Serb dominated area in BiH and the United Nations designated “safe areas”. 26
In March 1994, Bosnia and Croatia reached an agreement to form a joint federation and
end their hostilities. Thereafter, in April 1994, the Croatian and Bosnian-Muslim forces
joined in opposition to the Serbs, launching an offensive in April and May. However, it
was not until December 1994 that temporary relief came to Bosnia as a result of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces enforced a cease-fire and the
withdrawal of the Serbian artillery. 27
The cease-fire lasted only until March 1995 because the Serb forces refused to
comply with a UN ultimatum to remove all heavy weapons from a 12-mile exclusion
zone around Sarajevo. Bosnian-Serb militias led by Mladic and aided by Yugoslav Army
troops took over the UN “safe areas” of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Yugoslav Army
expelled over 40,000 Bosnian-Muslims who had sought safety at Srebrenica. Between
5,000 and 8,000 were executed, allegedly on Mladic’s order. Eventually, in May 1995,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the support of the United States
launched air strikes against Serb targets in the area. Simulatenously, a joint CroatianBosnian forces operation against the Serbian forces was also on-going. 28
After several months of air strikes, the Serbian forces were ejected from large
areas of western Bosnia. This led to the Dayton Peace Accords which was signed on
December 14, 1995, in Paris. 29

The Accord established BiH as a sovereign State,

consisting of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand,
26

Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 26-27. The “safe areas” for Bosnian-Muslims
are: Bihac, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and Sarajevo. The UN peacekeeping soldiers were deployed
to defend the areas.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
The Dayton Peace Accord was signed by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija
Izetbegović, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. Id.

82

and on the other hand, the Republika Srpska (RS). 30 It was expected that the Dayton
Peace Accords would end the violence in the area but this hope was short lived when in
1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) actuated with the desire for self-determination
attacked Serbian positions. 31

The Serbian government responded by killing and

relocating ethnic Albanians from the territory of Kosovo. 32

NATO responded with

another round of air strikes against Serbia to end the forced evacuation of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo. 33

The Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic

responded by ordering a program of ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo-Albanian, forcing
hundreds of thousands to flee as refugees. 34 In June 1999, Milosevic finally surrendered
to the superior firing power of NATO and ended his attack on the Albanians. 35

4.2.2. Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
After the Commission of Experts submitted its first Interim Report, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 808 which authorized the creation of an international
criminal tribunal to prosecute those individuals responsible for serious violations of
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 36

30

See Steve Terrett, supra note 16, at 96.
Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 33.
32
See Todd A Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural and Ethical
Responses to Rape Victim in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 363 (1998).
33
Michael P. Scharf & William A Schabas, supra note 6, at 34.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 11631205 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 808]. Resolution 808 states that the UN Security Council:
31

Decided that an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.
Resolution 808 further mandated the UN Secretary-General to within 60 days submit a report on the
establishment of an ad hoc international tribunal to the Security Council.
Id, at preamble.
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Pursuant to Resolution 808, UN Secretary-General on May 3, 1993, submitted his report
on the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal and a draft Statute for the tribunal to the
Security Council. 37
Following the submission of the Secretary-General’s report, the Security Council
pursuant to article 39 of the United Nations Charter unanimously adoption Resolution
827 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
on May 25, 1993. 38 Also, the Security Council approved the draft Statute of the Tribunal
as presented by the Secretary-General. 39 According to Resolution 827, the Security
Council determined that the “situation [in Yugoslavia] continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security” and in order to put an end to the crimes, is convinced
that the “establishment of an … international tribunal and the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable this aim
to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” 40

37

See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
38
See Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1192 [hereinafter Resolution 827]. See also Peter Burns, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL: THE DIFFICULT UNION OF PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS, 125 (for insights into the
establishment of the ICTFY and the politics surrounding it); David P. Forsythe, POLITICS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 185; Roman A. Kolodkin, An Ad
Hoc International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 165, 165-66 (Roger S.
Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996) (analyzing the legal aspects of prosecution in the ICTY); Patricia M.
Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations
on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 87 (2001) (discussing the
ICTY from a firsthand perspective).
39
Resolution 827, at paras 1-2. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, appended to the Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTFY Statute].
40
Resolution 827, supra note 38, at preamble.
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4.2.3. Scope of the ICTY Jurisdiction and Composition
Recognizing that conflict in the former Yugoslavia was on-going at the time of
establishing the ICTY, the Tribunal was granted temporal jurisdiction “to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.” 41 The Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction covers grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, 42 violations of the laws or customs of war, 43 genocide, 44 and
crimes against humanity. 45
The Statute established individual criminal responsibility, including that of a
Head of State for violations of any of the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction during the
existence of the tribunal. 46

The ICTY Statute also grants the Tribunal primacy

jurisdiction over national courts with respect to the prosecution of individuals concerning
the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal. 47

Where a national court has begun

prosecution, the tribunal may request the national court to defer jurisdiction to the
tribunal. 48 However, unlike the Nuremberg trials, the ICTY cannot try accused persons
in absentia and recognizes that defendants may choose not to testify. 49
The ICTY is structured to ensure its independence and impartiality. The tribunal
consists of three branches: (1) the judicial chambers; (2) the office of the prosecutor and;

41

ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, arts. 1, 8.
Id., art. 2.
43
Id., art. 3.
44
Id., art. 4.
45
Id., art.5.
46
Id., art. 7. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 43 (1997).
47
ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, art. 9.
48
Id., art. 9(2)..
49
Id., art. 20 which requires that an accused should be in custody before the commencement of a trial. Id.
See also Ruth Wedgewood, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 267 (1994); Patricia
Wald, supra note 38, at 98
42
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(3) the Registry. 50

The judicial chamber composed of sixteen permanent judges is

divided into two trial chambers and one appeals chamber.

The trial chambers are

composed of three judges each while the appeals chamber is composed of 5 judges at
each sitting. 51 The judges are elected by the UN General Assembly, with no more than
one judge from any single country. 52 The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY is appointed by
the Security Council for a four year term. Remarkably, the ICTY Statute clearly provides
that the Prosecutor shall be independent of the Security Council and the General
Assembly. 53 Thus, the Prosecutor has absolute discretion to bring charges against any
person provided that the Prosecutor has “reasonable grounds for believing that a subject
has committed a crime.” 54 However, while the tribunal is independent of the Security
Council, the tribunal’s Registry is subject to the U.N.’s administrative rules. 55

4.2.4. Assessment of the ICTY
The ICTY through its judgments has contributed to the development of the
jurisprudence of international criminal law system. The tribunal has helped to clarify
certain legal principles and is spearheading the shift from impunity to accountability by
holding individuals accountable regardless of their position. On May 24, 1999, the ICTY
made history as the first international criminal tribunal to indict a serving Head of State,
former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, for violations of the laws and customs of

50

ICTFY Statute, supra note 39, art.11.
Id., art. 12.
52
Id., art. 12(1) and 13(bis).
53
Id., arts. 16 - 20.
54
Id., art. 18; Patricia Wald, supra note 38, at 100 (quoting ICTY Rule of Procedure and Evidence 47, U.N.
Doc. IT/32 (1994)).
55
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 46, at 43; Patricia Wald, supra note 38, at 88.
51
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war and crimes against humanity committed against the Kosovo Albanian population in
1998-99. 56
The tribunal’s high point has been the arrest and well-publicized transfer of
Milosevic to the Detention Unit at The Hague on June 29, 2001, for prosecution by the
ICTY for his role in the atrocities committed by Serbian forces during the Kosovo
conflict.

Milosevic is charged with the murder of 900 Kosovo-Albanians and the

deportation of 740,000 more. Since then he has also been separately indicted for grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war and crimes
against humanity committed against the Croatian and other non-Serb populations in the
Republic of Croatia. In addition, Milosevic is also charged with genocide and complicity
in genocide during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 57
As at March 3, 2006, of about 161 persons were indicted by the tribunal for
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, 133 have appeared in proceedings before the ICTFY. 58 Of this number, 40
have been found guilty, 44 accused persons are at pre-trial stage, 9 accused persons are
currently at trial, and 48 of the accused are currently in custody at the Tribunal’s
detention unit. 59
Despite the achievements recorded by the ICTY, the tribunal has been criticized
for its slow progress and for the fact that some of the highest ranking government

56

See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT-99-37, May 24, 1999, available at:
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm.
57
See Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, April 21 and July 28, 2004; Prosecutor v.
Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, May 24, 1999, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/casese/index-e.htm.
58
See ICTY at a Glance, Key Figures, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm. (visited
March 10, 2006) [hereinafter ICTY at a Glance].
59
Id.
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officials indicted by the tribunal have yet to be taken into custody. 60 The ICTY judges
were all elected by November 1993 with Antonio Cassese, an Italian professor of
international law, as its first President. 61 However, it was not until July 1994 that Judge
Richard Goldstone of South African was elected the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY. 62
While the appointment of the officers of the tribunal was completed in July 1994, the
ICTFY did not start sitting until November 1994 when it held its first public hearing. 63
Apart from structural shortcomings, the delay may not be unconnected with the
tribunal’s financial reliance on the United Nations. 64 Also, as noted by the former ICTY
Prosecutor Louise Arbour, the ICTY’s limitations are based, in part, on the uncertain and
developing nature of international criminal law. 65
60

Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, Progress on War Crimes Accountability, the Rule of Law,
and Minority Rights in Serbia and Montenegro, HRW Statement to the U.S. Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (June 4, 2003), at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/serbiatestimony060403.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (stating:
“The past year has seen continued stutter-step progress toward cooperation with the ICTY and
accountability for war-time atrocities. Still missing is the clear political leadership to ensure that all those
responsible for war crimes are held accountable”).
61
Id. at 148. The current president is Fausto Pocar of Italy. See ICTY at a Glance, supra note 58, at
Organs of the Tribunal.
62
See INSIDER’S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 161-63 (suggesting that the embarrassing delay was occasioned
by the interest shown by different states to have their nationals appointed for the job). Even though the
ICTY Statute provided that the Prosecutor shall serve for a four year term, there has been two change of
guards within five years. On October 1, 1996, Judge Louise Arbour of Canada succeeded Judge Goldstone.
On September 15, 1999, Carla Del Ponte, former Switzerland’s attorney general and chief federal
prosecutor, who was unanimously approved by the U.N Security Council in the summer of 1999 succeeded
Judge Arbour.
63
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA - THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, NATIONAL COURTS AND CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION: A GUIDE TO APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL LEGISLATION
AND ITS RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS iii (May 1995)
[hereinafter Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia].
64
ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 32 which provides that the UN is obligated to fund the tribunal. Id. See
also Craig Topper, And Justice for All? An Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 8 N. Y. INT’L L.
REV. 48 (1995); See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33 (April 1995) [hereinafter “Criminal Tribunal in
Yugoslavia] (noting the inability of the UN to appropriate funds for the tribunal thereby compelling the UN
Secretary General to allocate money without the proper appropriations processes). Id.
65
Jordan J. Paust, Book Review, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 1006 (2002) (reviewing SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman
eds., 2000)).
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Furthermore, the difficulties in surrendering indictees and other forms of noncooperation of national authorities remain one of the major obstacles to the fulfillment of
the Tribunal’s mandate of trying key figures in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. 66 As at
March 3, 2006, 6 arrest warrants have been issued against accused persons that are
currently at large including former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and former
Bosnian Serb army commander General Ratko Mladic. 67
However, it should be noted that the ICTY depends on the cooperation of UN
member States to arrest indictees and gain access to evidence. 68 UN member States have
not shown demonstrable enthusiasm in tracking down suspects. In some cases, States
have explicitly refused to cooperate. 69 Unfortunately, there is no established independent
enforcement mechanism by which the ICTY Prosecutor can rely to bring apprehend
indictees. Short of imposing economic or other sanctions, a course of action that is
unlikely, the United Nations cannot force compliance by a recalcitrant State. Thus, the
tribunal’s greatest failure has been its inability to apprehend major suspects and bring
them to trial. Given the fact that the tribunal cannot try a suspect in absentia, 70 some
commentators have suggested that shaming through identification could turn indicted war

66

See Address to the United Nations Security Council by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, 27 November 2001,
http://www.ictr.org/ ENGLISH/speeches/delponte271101sc.htm.
67
Others include Stojan Zupljanin, Vlastimir Djordjevic, Goran Hadzic, and Zdravko Tolimir. See ICTY
at a Glance, supra note 58, at Key Figures.
68
ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 29.
69
Croatia Defies Tribunal, Independent (London), Feb. 20, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (stating that Croatia recently refused to turn over information on suspects). See also
Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humanitarian Law: Reflections on the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (1995); Jeri Laber &
Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Problems and Prospects, 18
FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 7 (1994).
70
ICTY Statute, supra note 39, art. 20. Article 20 require an accused person to be in custody before the
commencement of a trial. Id. See also Ruth Wedgewood, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond,

89

criminals into pariahs and deprive them of the freedom of movement. 71

On the other

hand, the better approach is for the international community to take the step from having
established international accountability mechanisms to endowing them with enforcement
capacity.
Another recent development that threatens the credibility of the Tribunal is the
deaths of Milan Babic and Slobodan Milosevic. On 5 March, 2006, Milan Babic, the
Serb nationalist war criminal who pleaded guilty on January 27, 2004, and testified
against Slobodan Milosevic, was found dead in his prison cell at the United Nations
Detention Unit in Scheveningen. After conducting an investigation, Mr. Babic was
presumed to have committed suicide. 72 On, March 11, 2006, Slobodan Milosevic was
found dead in his cell at the U.N. Detention Unit in Scheveningen. The circumstances
surrounding his death are still uncertain. 73
The death of Mr. Milosevic before the completion of his trial is a profound
disappointment which calls to question the credibility of the Tribunal. 74 Mr. Milosevic’s

71
Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 243-44 (1995). See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217
(1993) (Madeleine Albright, then US ambassador to the UN, declaring that war crimes suspects will
become international pariahs and prisoners in their own lands - Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia - even if their
own states do not hand them over for trial). See also War Criminals to Become International Pariahs,
Agence France Presse, May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
72
Press Release, Milan Babic Found Dead in Detention Unit, The Hague, AM/MOW/1046e, March 6,
2006, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1046-e.htm (visited March 12, 2006).
73
Press Release, Slobodan Milosevic Found Dead in His Cell at the Detention Unit The Hague,
CC/MOW/1050ef, March 11, 2006, available at: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1050-e.htm
74
See Jon Silverman, Worst Outcome for Milosevic Tribunal, 11 March 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4797696.stm (visited March 12, 2006) (Mr. Silverman, BBC Legal
Affairs Analyst, suggesting that Mr. Milosevic’s death raises questions which may tarnish the reputation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and undermine confidence in war crimes justice
generally).
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death forecloses the opportunity for victims and their families to have a final answer in
this case on his criminal responsibility. 75
The tribunal is expected to complete its sitting by 2008. 76

The completion

strategy is predicated on ICTY focusing on trials involving “the highest-ranking political,
military, paramilitary and civilian leaders and . . . referring certain cases to national
courts.” 77 Pursuant to the strategy, the ICTY must complete its investigations by the end
of 2004, and all trials and appeals must be completed by December 31, 2008. Thus,
ICTY need to focus its efforts towards the trial of senior perpetrators while strengthening
the local courts so that they are in a position to assume responsibility for trying relatively
minor offenders. 78 However, the courts in the former Yugoslavia, including the war
crimes chamber of the State Court of BiH are not yet in a position to assume
responsibility for trying large numbers of cases. 79
The ICTY is expected to adhere to its completion strategy, notwithstanding any
judicial and practical challenges that may arise in fulfilling them as it is unlikely that the
Security Council will extend the deadline. For the common strategy to work, it would be
75

See Statement of the President of the Tribunal, The Hague, March 12, 2006, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/speech/poc- 060312e.htm (visited March 12, 2006).
76
ICTY President Claude Jorda submitted the ICTY completion strategy on June 10, 2002. Report on the
Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Prospects for
Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, UN Doc. S/2002/678 (2002) enclosure [hereinafter Jorda
Report]. On February 23, 2003, Judge Theodor Meron was elected president of the ICTY. Judge Theodor
Meron and Judge Fausto Pocar Elected as President and Vice-President Respectively, ICTY Press Release
CC/PIS/735-e (Feb. 27, 2003). See also the remarks delivered by ICTY president Meron and ICTY
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, respectively, to the Security Council on October 9, 2003. UN Doc. S/PV.4838,
at 3-7, 9-13 (2003) [hereinafter Meron Speech and Del Ponte], also available as Statement of Judge
Theodor Meron to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release JL/P.I.S./788-e (Oct. 9, 2003),
and Address by Ms. Carla Del Ponte to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release
FH/PIS/791-e (Oct. 10, 2003). ICTY press releases are available at the ICTY Website,
<http://www.un.org/icty>.
77
Judge Claude Jorda, Address to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/690e, at 1 (July 23, 2002).
78
Daryl A. Mundis, Note and Comment: The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L.L. 142, 158 (2005).
79
Id.
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necessary for the international community to ensure timely arrests of outstanding
indictees and timely access to evidence if the indictees were to be prosecuted within time
frame of the completion strategy. 80

4.3.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

4.3.1. Background on the Rwandan Genocide
Ethnic and political rivalry between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis of
Rwanda was a product of Belgium colonial mal-administration. 81 As at February 10,
2005, Rwanda population which is estimated at about eight million people is made up of
eighty-four percent Hutus, fourteen percent Tutsis, and one percent of Twas. 82 Although
the Hutus and the Tutsis have distinct physical characteristics which made them
distinguishable, they did not exist as segregated tribes, commonly intermarried and spoke
the same language (Kinyarwanda). 83 However, the Belgium colonial government of
Rwanda considered it necessary to introduce ethnic classifications for its administration

80

Jorda Report, supra note 76, para. 15 (the ICTY prosecutor noting that it would not be possible to
complete the ICTY’s mandate by the anticipated date unless those indicted individuals at liberty were
arrested); see also Del Ponte, Address to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Press Release
JJJ/PIS/709-e, 3-4 (Oct. 30, 2002); Judge Claude Jorda, Address to the United Nations Security Council,
ICTY Press Release JDH/PIS/708-e 1, 2 (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Jorda, Oct. 2002 Speech].
81
For an in-depth history of the ethnic, social and political factors leading to Rwandan genocidal war of
1994, see generally Gerard Prunier, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE
(1995); Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm (visited March 3, 2005) [hereinafter History of
Genocide in Rwanda].
82
See CIA: The World Factbook, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html
(visited March 3, 2005) [hereinafter World Factbook]. The Hutus has always been the majority tribe and
the population distribution in 2005 is the same as at 1994. See Letter Dated 9 December 1994 from the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, P 59, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1405 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of the Commission of Experts].
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Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 5; also see History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2.
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of Rwanda. 84 Also, the Belgian colonial government preferred the Tutsis for political
positions almost at the exclusion of the majority Hutus. 85
With these colonial policies, the seed of ethnic hatred was advertently or
inadvertently planted in the physic of average Rwandan. 86 Thus, even after the exit of
the colonial government, succeeding Rwandan governments especially that of President
Juvenal Habyarimana pursued policies that highlighted ethnic differences such as the
classification of Rwandans according to their ethnicity87 and recordation of their ethnicity
on their identity cards and in the census. 88

As a result of the established ethnic

categorization, violent ethnic rivalry manifested itself in 1959, three years before
independence from Belgium when the Hutus attacked the Tutsis in retaliation of Tutsis
attack on a Hutu sub-chief. 89 Over the next several years, thousands of Tutsis were either
killed or driven into exile in neighboring countries. 90
For the next 30 years or so, the exiled Tutsis were unable to return to Rwanda. In
the meantime, the Hutus have taken control of the governance of Rwanda. General
Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, who came to power in 1973 through a coup d’etat,
transformed himself into a civilian president. 91 President Habyarimana resorted to a one
party system and abhorred any opposition effectively precluding the integration of Tutsis
84

See History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2
Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 26-27.
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See Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 35 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana] (developing a historical background on the conflict prior to the
proceedings).
87
Rwandans are considered to have the ethnicity of their father, despite the heritage of their mother. See
Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 59.
88
See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 61.
89
See World Factbook supra 82; Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 48-54; United States Institute for Peace,
Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide (1995), available at
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/rwanda1.hmtl (visited March 4, 2005) [hereinafter Accountability for War
Crimes and Genocide].
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See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 55; Gerard Prunier, supra note 78, at
61-64.
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Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 86, at 41.
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in Rwandan politics. 92 While in exile, the Tutsis formed a rebel group, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), to champion their cause with a military wing, the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA). On October 1, 1990, the RPF launched an attacked on Rwanda
from Uganda in an attempt to invade Rwanda by force. 93
The invasion started a three year civil war between the Hutus and the Tutsis.
President Habyarimana who was becoming increasingly unpopular took advantage of the
situation to arrest or exterminate his political opponents. 94

Also, by early 1992,

Habyarimana and the extremist elements in Rwanda who rejected the Arusha Accords,
allowed the creation of a militia groups known as the “Interahamwe” (those who stand
together or those who attack together) 95 and the “Impuzamugambi” (“those with a single
purpose”). The Rwandan army and the Interahamwe were instrumental to the several
attacks and massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus opposed to Habyarimana’s
government or sympathetic to the cause of RPF. 96 On the other hand, ordinary Hutus
whose patriotic zeal was famed by the propaganda of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLM) quickly identified with the mass movement called the “Hutu Power.” 97
The message of the Hutu power was built on the platform of a possible renewed
Tutsi political dominance and attendant consequences to the Hutus. 98 This message
resonated with rigor following the October 21, 1993, assassination of Burundian
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Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 93.
94
Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide, supra note 89, at 2.
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History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2; also see William A. Shabas, Justice, Democracy,
and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F.
523, 524 (1996); Human Rights Watch/Africa, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA APRIL-MAY 1994, vol. 6, no
4, at 2 (May 1994), available at http://hrw.org/reports/world/rwanda-pubs.php [hereinafter Genocide in
Rwanda].
96
Id.
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Id.
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president Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, by Tutsi soldiers in Burundi. 99

President

Ndadaye’s assassination sparked off another round of massive killings of both Hutu and
Tutsi. 100 In the face of all these massacres, none of those implicated in the killings were
prosecuted. On the contrary, they continued to exercise power as they had before. 101
In a last attempt at a peaceful resolution of the civil war, the Rwandan
government and the RPF agreed to a negotiated political settlement, the Arusha Peace
Accords, which they signed on August 4, 1993. 102 The Accords includes a cease-fire
agreement and six detailed Protocols which provided for power-sharing, repatriation of
refugees and resettlement of displaced persons, integration of armed forces, establishment
of demilitarized zone, and miscellaneous issues were painstakingly negotiated between
1990 and 1993 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
United Nations. 103 In the spirit of the Accords, on October 5, 1993, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 872 which established the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Rwanda (“UNAMIR”) to supervise the implementation of the Accords. 104
Within months of the signing of the Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR,
there were obvious signs that Hutu extremists were less enthusiastic about honoring the
terms of the Accords. 105 On the other hand, the RPF anticipating that the Rwandan
government may renege on the Accords increased the number of their soldiers and
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See Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 95.
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101
Id; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission Resolution
E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, P
25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/71 (1995) [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda].
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Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 349, 351 (1997);
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See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993).
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Madeline H. Morris, supra note 102, at 351.
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firearms in Kigali in violation of the Arusha Peace Accords. 106 All hopes for a peaceful
resolution of the civil war ended on April 6, 1994, when the plane carrying presidents
Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, a Hutu, was shot down in mysterious
circumstances as it was about to land in Rwanda, killing both presidents and others on
board. 107 Both presidents were returning from a meeting of African Heads of States in
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania where president Habyarimana had allegedly agreed to form a
broad-based transitional government in compliance with the Accords. 108
The death of president Habyarimana provided the “spark” for the Rwandan army,
presidential guards, the Interahamwe, and those Hutus who identified with the message of
“Hutu power” to renew the killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 109 On the other hand,
the RPF continued its advancement to Kigali and in the process the RPF permitted its
soldiers to kill persons whom they took to be Interahamwe, “genocidaires”, or other
supposed participants in the genocide and persons close to Habyarimana’s political
party. 110 RPF soldiers also “massacred unarmed civilians, many of them women and
children, who had assembled for a meeting on their orders.” 111
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History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 3.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 1995, 41 (1994) [hereinafter World Report].
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110
Id.
111
Id. Human Watch notes that:
The RPF was commonly acknowledged by military experts to be a highly disciplined force, with clear lines
of command and adequate communication. Although it may have become less disciplined during the
months of the genocide due to the incorporation of new recruits, RPF commanding officers like General
Paul Kagame maintained the authority necessary to ensure compliance with their orders. The crimes
committed by RPF soldiers were so systematic and widespread and took place over so long a period of time
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Amidst the skirmish, the international community failed to take decisive measure
to end the atrocity. 112 On the contrary, 2,500 soldiers attached to the UNAMIR forces
began to pull out and within weeks were left with only about 450 troops, with no mandate
to stop the violence or protect the civilians. 113 The killings finally ended on July 17,
1994, after the RPF defeated the Rwandan army and took control of the government.
However, by the time the killings stopped, between half a million and a million men,
women and children were killed on both sides, the Tutsis accounting for majority of the
dead. 114 Also, about two million Hutu refugees many fearing Tutsi retribution fled to
neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic
of the Congo). 115 The Rwandan prison facilities were also filled three times beyond
normal capacity. 116
On July 19, 1994, RPF established a transitional government of National Unity
together with seven other political parties. The transitional government named Pasteur
112

Madeline H. Morris, supra note 102, at 351.
See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 336th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (1994); World Report,
supra note 107, at 46. See also History of Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2. United Nations
inactivity and acquiescence to genocide was equally damning. There were credible reports that the United
Nations peace-keeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which had been present to facilitate the peace
negotiations between the Hutu government and the RPF, apparently knew that a genocide might take place
but the UN took no preventive action. See World Report, supra note 107, at 41. See generally Joint
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Vols. I-V (March 1996).
114
Sources differ on estimates of the number of people killed in 1994. The independent Commission of
Experts established by the U.N. Security Council reported that on the conservative side, 500,000 people
were killed. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 82, at 57. The Special Rapporteur
of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights stated that some reliable sources estimate that close to one
million people were killed. See Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, supra note 101, at 24; History of
Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 81, at 2; World Report, supra note 107, at 39-48.
115
See Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, supra note 101, at 38; John Prendergast & David Smock,
Postgenocidal Reconstruction: Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi (1999), available at
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/sr990915/ sr990915.html (visited March 5, 2005). See Comm. on Int’l Relations
U.S. House of Representatives and the Comm. on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1995, at 211 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Country Reports on
Human Rights].
116
See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, The
Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda 3, para. 18, U.N. Doc. HRFOR/JUSTICE/June 1996/E
(1996) [hereinafter Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda].
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Bizimungu, a moderate Hutu and RPF member, the President while General Paul
Kagame, a Tutsi and RPF leader, was appointed Vice-President and Minister of
Defense. 117

4.3.2. The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)
The groundwork for the creation of an international criminal court for Rwanda
started with the Security Council Resolution 935 which established a Commission of
Experts to investigate grave violations of international humanitarian law committed
during the Rwandan genocidal civil war. 118 While the Commission was conducting its
investigation, the Rwandese government on September 28, 1994, formally requested for
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try those responsible for the
atrocities in Rwanda. 119 The Commission’s preliminary report was submitted to the
Security Council on October 4, 1994, 120 and the final report on December 9, 1994. 121
Meanwhile, on October 6, 1994, the President of Rwanda while addressing the
U.N. General Assembly reiterated its government request to the Security Council to
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Gerard Prunier, supra note 81, at 300. On March 23, 2000, Mr. Bizimungu resigned as president of
Rwanda following a disagreement with General Kagame. In April 2000, General Kagame was appointed
the new president. In June 2000, Bizimungu formed his own political Party for Democracy and Renewal
(PDR). The Rwandan government banned the party and arrested Bizimungu. On June 7, 2004, he was
found guilty of embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals but cleared on charges of
threatening state security. See, From President to Prison, BBC News World Edition, Monday, 7 June, 2004,
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm., (visited March 14, 2005). Meanwhile, on August 26,
2003, General Kagame won the first presidential election since the 1994 genocide. See Rwandan President
Claims Landslide, BBC News World Edition, 26 August, 2003, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3178611.stm., (visited March 14, 2005).
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See S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
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See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council (Sept. 28, 1994), UN Doc. S/1994/1115.
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See Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).
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See Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994).
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establish an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda as a matter of urgency. 122 The
Rwandan government considered an international criminal tribunal a necessary tool for
justice, in view of the fact that most of the criminals had sought refuge in other
countries. 123 In that statement, the President stated that:
Rwanda requests the Security Council to adopt a resolution to
facilitate the arrest and trial of the murderers who were hiding in
the refugee camps outside the country. The resolution will grant
authority to hold persons who are suspected in the genocide.
Six months after the crimes were committed, there must be
action. 124
Both the Commission’s preliminary and final reports as well as the October 13,
1994, report of Rene Degni-Sequi (special rapporteur appointed on recommendation of
the Commission of Human Rights) concerning human rights situation in Rwanda,
recommended the establishment of an international criminal tribunal. 125

Thus, in

November 1994, the Security Council by thirteen votes to two (China abstained, while
Rwanda voted against) adopted Resolution 955 establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 126 The ICTR was created to prosecute serious violations of
international humanitarian law, to establish law and order, and thereby to contribute to
the restoration and maintenance of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda. 127
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See Underlying Problems in Caribbean Continue To Be ‘Unnoticed and Unattended,’ Prime Minister of
Antigua and Barbados Tells General Assembly, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, ALLWLD File [hereinafter Underlying Problems Continue] (indicating that Rwandan President
Pasteur Bizimungo expressed to the General Assembly the “urgency” of prosecuting through an
international tribunal those responsible for genocide).
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Id.
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See, Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 81, at 177-80; Situation of Human Rights in
Rwanda, supra note 101, at 75; Christina M. Cerna, A Small Step Forward for Human Rights: The Creation
of the Post of United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, 10 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
1265, 1270 (1995).
126
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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4.3.3.

Jurisdiction and Composition of the ICTR
The ICTR has the jurisdictional competence to prosecute “persons responsible for

serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.” 128 The ICTR
subject matter jurisdiction covers the crimes of genocide, 129 crimes against humanity, 130
and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II131
committed during the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal. 132 Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR
has no jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 regarding international conflicts because the Rwandan civil war was
considered an internal conflict. 133
Following the precedents of the IMT Charter and the Statute of the ICTY, article
6 of the Statute of the ICTR provided for the principle of individual criminal
responsibility. 134

The ICTR jurisdiction is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the
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ICTR Statute, supra note 126, art. 1.
Id., art. 2.
130
Id., art. 3.
131
Id., art. 4.
132
Id., art. 7 provides that “the temporal jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall extend
to a period beginning on 1 January 1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.”
133
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 431-32
(Transnational Publishers, 2003).
134
See ICTR Statute, supra note 126, art. 6 which provides as follows:
(1). A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime.
(2). The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
(3). The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
(4). The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.
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Rwandan national courts. 135

However, ICTR has primacy over Rwandan national

courts. 136 Consequently, at any stage before judgment is rendered, the ICTR may
formally request Rwandan national courts to defer its jurisdiction to the ICTR. 137
The ICTR is composed of the Tribunal Chambers, the office of the Prosecutor and
the Registry. The Chambers is comprised of three Trial Chambers with three judges each
and a five member Appeals Chamber. 138 The ICTR share the same Appeals Chamber
and Prosecutor with the ICTY which are based in The Hague. 139 The ICTR however has
its own Registry located at Arusha, Tanzania. 140 The decision by the Security Council
that the ICTR and ICTY should share some common personnel and infrastructure was
based on the Secretary-General’s report that such institutional links would “ensure a unity
of legal approach, as well as economy and efficiency of resources.” 141 The decision to
link the two tribunals has however been criticized as lacking legal reasoning and that it
was based mainly on political convenience and cost saving consideration. 142 On August
28, 2003, the UN Security Council citing the need to ensure adherence to the completion
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accommodate the large caseload. See S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1165 (1998).
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See ICTR Statute, supra note 126, arts. 12(2) & 15(3).
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Id., art. 16.
141
See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955 (1994),
P 9, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995) (The report argued that “The establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal at a
time when the Yugoslav Tribunal was already in existence, dictated a similar legal approach to the
establishment of the Tribunal. It also mandated that certain organizational and institutional links be
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efficiency of resources.”).
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M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra 133, at 432.
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strategies as a primary reason, passed Resolution 1503 which bifurcated the Office of the
Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR. 143

4.3.4. Rwandan Government Opposition to the ICTR
Although the Rwandan government supported the creation of the ICTR, it voted
against Security Council Resolution 955 which established the ICTR. 144 At the time of
negotiation of the ICTR Statute, Rwanda was a non permanent member of the Security
Council and was therefore fortunate to participate in the deliberation of the Security
Council regarding the creation of the ICTR. 145 In the course of the negotiations over the
provisions of the ICTR, the Rwandan government disagreed with a number of the
provisions of the ICTR Statute. 146
The Rwandan government opposed the ICTR because it considered the dates set
for the ratione temporis competence of the tribunal from January 1994 to December 1994
inadequate as it leaves out those individuals who had for a long time planed the
extermination that finally began on April 1994. 147 Also, the Rwandese government was
not in support of the idea that the ICTR and the ICTY should have a common Appeals
143

See, S.C Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 4817th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503, para. 8 (Aug. 28, 2003). But see
UN Doc. S/2003/794, in which Rwanda indicated that it preferred that the ICTR be given a separate
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supra, Annex 1
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See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 126.
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See Raymond Bonner, Shattered Nation: A Special Report; Rwanda Now Faces Painful Ordeal of
Rebirth, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29 1994, at A1.
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For a detail discussion on the grounds for the Rwandan government objection to the ICTR, see Payam
Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90
AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (1996); see also, Ambassador Manzi Bakuramutsa, Why the Government of Rwanda
Called for an International Tribunal and Yet Opposed the United Nations Security Council Resolution, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 640 (1995) (paper delivered by Ambassador Bakuramutsa to the Fifth
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Manzi Bakuramutsa, supra note 146, at 640.

102

Chamber and Prosecutor because in its view, this arrangement will not facilitate quick
dispensation of justice. 148
Furthermore, the Rwandese government wanted the Security Council to prohibit
some States that allegedly took a very active part in the civil war in Rwanda from
participating in the nomination and election of ICTR judges. 149 The location of ICTR
outside of Rwanda was also not acceptable to the Rwanda government. 150 In addition,
the Rwandese government objected to the ICTR Statute because of its inability to impose
the death sentence. 151

Under Article 23 of the ICTR Statute, the tribunal is only

authorized to impose imprisonment. 152 The Rwandese government stressed that the
absence of the death penalty against those guilty of genocide was the main reason for its
opposition to the ICTR. 153
None of the above stated objection of the Rwandan government was acceded to
by the Security Council. 154 In some situations, such as the issue of death penalty, the
Security Council has its hands tied because having previously decided that the ICTY
cannot impose death penalty, it found itself in a difficult position acceding to the
Rwandan government’s request that the ICTR should be allowed to impose the death
148
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Philippe Naughton, Rwandan Minister Defends “No” Vote on Tribunal, Reuters World Service, Nov. 9,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File. Alphonse Nkubito, the Rwandan Minister of
Justice emphasized that those guilty of genocide must suffer the death penalty since it was part of Rwandan
law. He cited public pressure among the Rwandese for the death penalty as the primary reason for RPF’s
opposition to the tribunal. Id. See also, Raymond Bonner, Rwandan Leader, Calling U.S. Envoy “A
Disaster,’ Hopes for a Replacement, Int’l Herald Trib., Nov. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
PAPERS File (arguing that unequal justice will result from tribunal’s lack of power to impose death
penalty); Raymond Bonner, Rwandans Divided on War-Crimes Plan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1994, at A10
(noting that defendants tried before the tribunal will get lighter sentences than those tried before Rwandan
courts).
154
However, on the issue of the trial chamber, the Security Council has increased the trial chambers to
three. See S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (1998).
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penalty. 155 Notwithstanding the decision of the Rwandan government to vote against the
ICTR Statute, the government pledged its willingness to cooperate with the United
Nations on the matter and assist the ICTR with its work. 156

4.3.5. Assessment of the ICTR
The tribunal was established in November 1994 but it was not until June 1995 that
its judges were sworn in at The Hague. 157 An administrator for the tribunal was not
appointed until September 1995. 158 Six months after the judges were sworn in and just
one year after the tribunal was established, the ICTR on December 12, 1995, issued its
first indictments. 159

The indictments accused eight Rwandans of genocide and

conspiracy to commit genocide in the mass killing of several thousand men, women and
children in the Kibuye Prefecture of western Rwanda. 160 Unlike ICTY, the Rwandan
tribunal, through the assistance of the Rwandan government and neighboring States, has
many of its indictees including several high-ranking officials of the former regime in
custody. 161 However, nine of the accused remain at large. 162
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CURNWS File. Andronico Adede, a Kenyan UN bureaucrat was appointed the tribunal’s register on
September 12, 1995. Id.
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Prosecutor v. Kayishema, et al, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I (1995).
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Payam Akhavan, supra note 146 at 509. See also Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: the Efficacy of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217 (1995).
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Payam Akhavan, supra note 146, at 509. As at March 1997, it was estimated that about 90,000
genocide suspects were held in Rwandan jails. See Corinne Dufka, Irish Leader Expresses Concern at
Rwanda Justice, Reuters, Mar. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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The ICTR does not have the resources to try even a substantial number of the
reported ninety-thousand suspects in Rwandan jails. Thus, as at March 9, 2006, the ICTR
assumed jurisdiction for only 81 detainees. 163 Of these detainees, 28 are on trial while 15
are awaiting trial. 164 The trial chamber has concluded 23 cases, 8 of which are currently
on appeals. 165 Of the 15 convicted, 6 have been sent to Mali to serve their prison
sentences and 9 are awaiting transfer. 166 The trial chamber handed out 14 life sentences
and between 6 to 35 years prison sentences. 167 One of the detainees was acquitted, two
has their charges dropped and were released, one died in detention, and the other two
were conditionally released. 168 With the Prosecutor v. Akayesu 169 decision, the ICTR
became the first international war crimes tribunal to convict an official for genocide and
to declare that rape could constitute genocide. 170
Thus, from a practical standpoint, many of the suspects will have to be tried by
the national courts of Rwanda, although those trials raise serious questions of due process
protections. 171 On February 23, 2005, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, the Prosecutor of the

NTAGANZWA Ladislas (ICTR-96-9); NZABONIMANA, Callixte (ICTR-98-44); RYANDIKAYO
(ICTR-95-1); and SIKUBWABO Charles (ICTR-95-1). See Accused at Large, available at:
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/inprogress.htm
163
See Status of Detainees, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm (visited
March 11, 2005).
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available at: www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/indictment/actamond.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
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See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Amnesty International Welcomes Historic
Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Sept. 4, 1998, available at:
www.amnestyusa.org/news/1998/14703098.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (explaining that Akayesu’s
conviction was the first time an international court had applied the Genocide Convention of 1948).
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February 1997. See Corinne Dufka, supra note 161; Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans to Try Suspects
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ICTR during a visit to the Rwandan capital handed 15 of its cases under investigation to
the Rwandan state prosecutor in a first such move since the establishment of the
tribunal. 172
In order to speedy the prosecution of other accused persons who took less
significant role in the civil war, the Rwandan government has turn to community courts,
known as the gacaca. 173 So far 118 of such courts have been established and by the time
the gacaca system is up and running, there will be 12,000 of the courts. 174 Each gacaca
court is comprised of nine judge panel elected among the local people and the court can
imposed prison sentences up to life imprisonment. 175 Suspects who confess and seek
forgiveness from surviving victims receive lighter sentences. On March 10, 2005, the
first gacaca judgment of 30 years imprisonment was handed to Saddam Nshimiyimana
who was accused of killing people stopped at a roadblock during the genocide and others
who sought refuge from the slaughter in a Roman Catholic Church in central Kigali. 176
Some survivors have expressed concerned about the slow pace of gacaca trials
and what they say are lenient sentences for those who confess. 177 On the other hand,
human rights groups are worried that the proceedings do not meet international standards
for criminal courts. 178 However, the Rwandan officials have argued that if the national
courts are going to handle all the people accused of taking part in the genocide, about

for War Crimes, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1994, at A6. A Rwandan official estimated in 1994 that
national courts could try as many as 30,000 suspects. Id.
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63,000 of them, it could take decades before their cases would be heard. 179 The Rwandan
officials also suggest that gacaca courts, by bringing together survivors and perpetrators,
will promote reconciliation. 180
The ICTR has come under serious criticism for its failure to charge Tutsis
suspected of killing Hutus in the 1994 genocide. 181 Thus, Filip Reyntjens, a Belgian
historian and expert witness on genocide has said he would stop cooperating with the
tribunal because no Tutsis from the RPF rebel army had been indicted. 182 Professor
Reyntjens stated that prosecuting only Hutus amounted to victor’s justice, because the
Tutsi force which ended the genocide by overthrowing the extremist Hutu regime also
committed atrocities. He noted that the tribunal was supposed to foster reconciliation but
was doing the opposite because its one-sided approach alienated ordinary Hutus. 183
Before Carla del Ponte was removed as the prosecutor of the ICTR, she had promised to
charge members of the RPF. 184

Unfortunately, Ms. Del Ponte’s successor, Hassan

Bubacar Jallow has not shown any zeal in going after members of the RPF. 185
The ICTR is expected to complete its sitting by 2010. 186 Pursuant to the strategy,
the ICTR must complete its investigations by the end of 2004, and all trials and appeals
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See ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at
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the ICTR completion strategy was submitted to the UN on July 14, 2003. See ICTR, for the Biennium
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must be completed by December 31, 2010. In order to achieve the completion date, the
ICTR on March 1, 2005, inaugurated its fourth courtroom which is expected to boast its
judicial output and ensure that the Tribunal will meet its projected completion date. 187
With this move, the ICTR hopes to complete the remainder of the cases before the
Tribunal within the estimated completion date. 188

4.4.

SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT

4.4.1. History of the Sierra Leonean Conflict
The Sierra Leone conflict was triggered by decades of misrule and corruption on
the part of the government of President Joseph Momoh and the desire by the rebel forces
to control the Sierra Leonean diamond market. The conflict which quickly degenerated
into a civil war began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) headed
by Foday Sankoh (a former Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army), aided by President
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked Sierra Leone from

General Assembly resolution 57/289 (2003) para. 15 (a), which provided that the proposed budget of the
ICTR for 2004-2005 should include “detailed information as to how the resources requested for the
biennium would support the development of a sound and realistic completion strategy”. A second version
of the ICTR Completion Strategy was submitted to UN September 29, 2003, the ICTR president Erik
Mose. See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, enclosure, in Letter
Dated 29 September 2003 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Addressed
to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/946 (2003) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy]. This
document formed the basis of the request to increase the number of ad litem judges sitting “at any one
time” from four to nine. By resolution 1512 (2003), the Security Council granted the request. See also
remarks made by President Mose and ICTR prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, respectively, before the
Security Council on October 9, 2003. UN Doc. S/PV.4838, supra note 5, at 7-9, 13-16. Following his
address to the Security Council, Prosecutor Jallow undertook to review all cases and investigations pursued
by his office and compiled a document on February 28, 2004, entitled, Completion Strategy of the Office of
the Prosecutor, UN Doc. S/2004/341, at 1 n.2. The third version of the document was submitted to the
President of the Security Council on 30 April 2004 and formed the basis of the assessments provided by the
ICTR President and Prosecutor during the Council’s meeting on 29 June 2004.
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See Fourth ICTR Courtroom Inaugurated, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2005/421.htm, (visited March 11, 2005).
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See ICTR Completion Strategy dated 19 November, 2004, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/completionstrat/191104.pdf, (visited March 11, 2005).

108

Liberia. 189

The Sierra Leonean government responded by drafting young men and

children to counter the RUF offensive. The highly unmotivated Sierra Leonean army in
April 1992 staged a successful coup against the government of President Joseph Momoh
and named a young army captain, Valentine Strasser as the new Head of State of Sierra
Leone. 190
After the coup, RUF continued to attack the government of Captain Strasser and
other successive Sierra Leonean governments as well as regional and international forces.
Child soldiers, mass killings, signature mutilations, and sex crimes were symbolic of the
civil war which went on sporadically between 1991 and 2002. 191 In 1994, Nigeria led a
peacekeeping force of West African States known as the Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to repel the RUF forces from overrunning
the Sierra Leonean government.

In February 1995, the United Nations appointed

Berhanu Dinka as its Special envoy to work with the then Organization of African Unity
(“OAU”) and the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) to return
Sierra Leone to a democratic government. 192
A multi party election was held in 1996 and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former U.N.
official was elected president under the Sierra Leone People’s Party. In order to appease
the RUF which did not participate in the election and refused to recognize the election
result, president Kabbah entered into negotiations with RUF which resulted in the
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The RUF is a loosely organized guerrilla group that started the war in 1991, seeking to topple the
government of Sierra Leone and to retain control of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the
country. It was headed by a former Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh.
190
See Karen Gallagher, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 156, (2000).
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Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 393 (2001).
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See United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background, available at:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html), (last visited March 15, 2005).
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November 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. 193 The Abidjan Accord offered amnesty to RUF
members in return to RUF agreement to an immediate cease-fire, disarmament, and
demobilization.194 Before the parties’ commitment to the Abidjan Accord could be
tested, president Kabbah’s government was overthrown in May 1997 by the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 195 Major Johnny Paul Koroma became the next
Head of State of Sierra Leone and invited the RUF to share power with his ARFC. Thus,
rather than establish peace, the hallmark of the coalition government of the AFRC/RUF
was the breakdown of the rule of law evidenced by killings and looting of public and
private properties. 196
The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1132 which imposed an
oil and arms embargo as well as travel restrictions against the military government of
Major Koroma. 197 In February 1998, ECOMOG responded to an attack by the AFRC
forces and in the process depose the military junta and restored president Kabbah to
office. However, president Kabbah’s government and the ECOMOG only controlled
Freetown while the RUF by the end of 1998, controlled well over half the country,
particularly in the major diamond mining areas.
In 1999, RUF and members of the AFRC launched an offensive towards
Freetown code-named “Operation No Living Thing.” 198 Although ECOMOG was able to
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See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), November 30, 1996 (hereinafter Abidjan Accord), available at: http://www.sierraleone.org/abidjanaccord.html.(lasted visited March 15, 2005).
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Karen Gallagher, supra note 190, at 157.
195
The AFRC is a group of senior military officers lead by Major Johnny Paul Koroma.
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Abdul Tejan-Cole, Note From the Field: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J.
139, 141 (2003).
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See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997).
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See Steve Coll, The Other War: The Gratuitous Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone Last Year
Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time, Washington Post Magazine, January 9, 2000, at
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push the rebel forces out of Freetown, the resulting human rights violations and casualties
lived up to the code name of the offensive. It was estimated that about six thousand
civilians were killed, thousands more were displaced, mutilated and limbless, raped, and
much of Freetown was destroyed. 199 Also, about 3,000 children were taken captive by
RUF during its retreat from Freetown. 200
After the retreat, ECOMOG facilitated a peace negotiation between the Sierra
Leonean government and the RUF which resulted in the Lome Peace Accord signed in
Lome, Togo on July 7, 1999. 201 The Lome Accord offered complete amnesty to RUF
members including its leader Foday Sankoh, who had been convicted and sentenced to
death for treason. 202

Mr. Sankoh was appointed vice-president of Sierra Leone and

Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources,
National Reconstruction and Development which oversee the diamond mines.203
However, the U.N. added a reservation to the amnesty provision which precluded the
amnesty from applying to “international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” 204 The Lome
Accord also provided for immediate cessation of all hostilities and disarmament as well

W8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/photo/galleries/sierraleone; Abdul Tejan-Cole,
supra note 196, at 141.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lome Accord], available at http://www.sierraleone.org/Lomeaccord.html.
202
Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196, at 141.
203
Id., at 142.
204
See Human Rights Watch, The Sierra Leone Amnesty Under International Law (August 3 1999),
available at: http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/int-law2.htm.
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as the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to facilitate the healing
process for all Sierra Leoneans. 205
In October 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1270 which established
the United Nation’s Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to monitor the implementation
of the Lome Accord. 206 The RUF refused to abate all hostilities as required by the Lome
Accord, responded to the disarmament with less enthusiasm and took about 500
UNAMSIL peacekeeping troops hostage when they attempted to take control of the
diamond-rich areas of the country in accordance with the Lome Accord. 207 Also, the
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Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196, at 142. Pursuant to On February 22, 2000, Article XXVI of the
Lome Peace Agreement, the President and Members of Parliament of Sierra Leone established the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, section 2(1) (2000),
(Sierra Leone) [hereinafter TRC Act], at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html (last visited March
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human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the
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impunity, respond to the needs of the victims, promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a
repetition of the violations and abuses. Id., sec. 6(1). It is expected that the TRC will create an opportunity
for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their
experiences in a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators with the
aim that such arrangement will help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation. Id.,
sec. (6)(2)(b). On April 14, 2003, President Kabbah launched the commencement of the public hearings of
TRC. See President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah Kabbah - Speech on Launch of TRC Public Hearings Phase,
available at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/trc-documents.html, (last visited March 24, 2005). In the course
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investigations, and presented its final report to President Kabbah on October 5, 2004, and to the United
Nations Security Council October 27, 2004. See Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final
Report, available at: http://www.ictj.org, (last visited March 24, 2005); Marian Samu, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Presents Report, available at: http://www.statehouse-sl.org/trc-fin-repoct5.html., (last visited March 24, 2005); Final Report on ten-year Sierra Leone conflict published; seeks to
set out historical record, offer guidance for future, Press Release ECOSOC/6140 GA/10287 SC/8227,
available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ecosoc6140.doc.htm, (last visited March 24, 2005).
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See S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999).
207
See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation, Rape-New testimony
from Sierra Leone, in World Report 1999 (July 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/sierra;
Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Says Leone Rebels Now Hold 92 Peacekeepers, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2000, at
A14; James Rupert and Douglas Farah, Liberian Leader Urges Sierra Leone Rebels to Free Hostages,
Wash. Post, May 20, 2000, at A20; see also Sierra Leone Web News Archives, May 5, 2000, available at
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RUF renewed its offensive against the government and Sankoh’s security guards did not
hesitate to kill several civilians during a demonstration in front of Sankoh’ residence. 208
As a result of RUF breach of the Lome Accord, the Sierra Leonean government
authorized the arrest of several RUF leaders including the arrest of Mr. Sankoh on May
17, 2000. 209 Also, in June 2000, President Kabbah wrote to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, requesting the assistance of the United Nations to establish a court to try
people who have committed atrocities in Sierra Leone. 210

4.4.2. Establishment of the Sierra Leonean Special Court
Following President Kabbah’s request, the Security Council in August 2000
passed Resolution 1315 which recognized “that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region” and therefore
mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra
Leone to create an independent Special Court. 211 Also, the Security Council requested
the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation the recommendations of
the Resolution. 212 Pursuant to Resolution 1315, the Secretary-General on October 4,
2000, forwarded his report to the Security Council on October 4, 2000, 213 with the draft
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See Norimitsu Onishi, Gunmen Fire on Protesters in Sierra Leone, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2000, at A6. The
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55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone
Special Court], available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.
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agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone 214 and the draft statute
for the court annexed thereto. 215 The Secretary-General’s report recommended a treatybased sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition would have the power to
prosecute persons “most responsible” for serious violations of “international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory” of that country
since November 1996. 216
From December 2000 to July 2001, the Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral exchanged correspondence which contained suggested amendments and
revisions to the draft statute of the court submitted by the Secretary-General. 217 By letter
dated February 9, 2001, the Sierra Leonean government conveyed its acceptance of the
amendments to the Secretary-General who in-turn, communicated this acceptance to the
Security Council. 218 Thus, by July 2001, the final text of the Sierra Leone Court statute
was accepted by all parties and on January 16, 2002, the government of Sierra Leone and
the United Nations signed the Agreement establishing the Special Court and officially
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The Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement], annexed to the
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215
The draft Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as amended [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special
Court Statute], annexed to the Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf, also available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
216
Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, supra note 213, at para. 9.
217
See Annex to the Letter Dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council Addressed
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ending the civil war. 219 The agreement was ratified in March 2002 by the Parliament of
Sierra Leone.
Thus, unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, which were established under Security
Council resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and have jurisdiction only
over international offenses, the Sierra Leone Special Court (Special Court) is a “treatybased sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition having jurisdiction over
violations of international humanitarian law and cognate Sierra Leonean law.” 220

4.4.3. Jurisdiction and Composition of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
Although the Sierra Leonean civil war started in 1991, the Special Court has
jurisdiction to prosecute only “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.” 221 Financial consideration and the
desire not to overburden the Special Court’s Prosecutor were instrumental for the
decision not to extend the Court’s temporal jurisdiction to March 23, 1991, which was the
date the civil war started. 222 On the other hand, May 25, 1997, the date of the AFRC
coup was rejected to avoid the impression that the Special Court was created to target the
coupsits. 223 Similarly, January 6, 1999, the date of RUF last incursion into Freetown was
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rejected because it would exclude the period within which serious crimes were committed
in the rural and provincial areas. 224
In the end, the Secretary-General recommended November 30, 1996, the date
which corresponds with the first failure of the Abidjan Peace Accord between the
government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. According to the Secretary-General, the
November 30, 1996 date “would have the benefit of putting the Sierra Leone conflict in
perspective without unnecessarily extending the temporal jurisdiction of the Special
Court.” 225 Also, while the Court’s temporal jurisdiction is based on the fact that all
hostilities has not ceased at the time of drafting the Statute of the Court, it may be argued
that the Court’s jurisdiction covers only November 30, 1996 to January 12, 2002, which
is the date hostilities was officially declared over.
In view of the fact that child soldiers played a significant part in the Sierra
Leonean civil war, the question whether the Court should exercise jurisdiction over
children was considered during the drafting stages of the Court’s Statute. 226 In the end, it
was agreed that the “Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was
under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.” 227 With respect
to any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime between 15
and 18 years of age, the Special Court’s objective should be to rehabilitate and reintegrate
the juvenile offender back to the society. 228 Also, article 19 of the Statute precludes the
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Special Court from imposing any prison term on a juvenile offender. 229 Thus, under this
arrangement, the prosecution of child soldiers is highly unlikely. 230 They would also
probably not qualify under the express personal jurisdiction of the Special Court to
prosecute only those “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.” 231 Thus, the Prosecutor has
declared that he does not intend to indict anyone for crimes committed while under the
age of 18. 232
The Special Court subject matter jurisdiction covers crimes against humanity; 233
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II; 234
and other serious violations of international humanitarian laws. 235 Also, in consideration

appropriate, resort should be had to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their
availability.”
229
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of the nature of the conflict, and giving the hybrid character 236 of the Special Court’s
applicable law, the Special Court has jurisdiction to prosecute persons who have
committed crimes relating to the abuse of girls under 14 years of age as provided under
the Sierra Leonean Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31). 237 In addition,
teh Court has jurisdiction to try those accused of committing crimes relating to the
wanton destruction of property under the Sierra Leonean Malicious Damage Act,
1861. 238 Significantly, the Special Court unlike the ICTY and ICTR does not have
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide because there was no evidence that the killings in
Sierra Leone targeted individuals based on national, ethnic, racial or religious group nor
was there any intent to annihilate persons belonging to any of the above groups.
In consonance with the IMT, ICTY, and ICTR, the Statute of the Special Court
provides for the principle of individual criminal responsibility. 239 However, the Statute

(c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or
using them to participate actively in hostilities. Id.
236
The Special Court is often referred to as a “hybrid tribunal” because of its mixed jurisdiction and
composition. UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor have established other hybrid tribunals, but
the Court is the first example of this particular model. See discussion on Cambodia Court, infra.
237
Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 5(a). Offences relating to the abuse of girls
under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31) for which the Special Court may prosecute
are:
(i) Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6; (ii) Abusing a girl between 13 and
14 years of age, contrary to section 7; and (iii) Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section
12.
238

Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 5(b). Offences relating to the wanton destruction
of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861 for which the Special Court may prosecute are:
(i) Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, contrary to section 2; (ii) Setting fire to
public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6; and (iii) Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to
section 6. Id.
239
See Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 6 which provides as follows:
(1). A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually
responsible for the crime.
(2). The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.
(3). The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to
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notes that the “individual criminal responsibility for the crimes under the Sierra Leonean
law shall be determined in accordance with the respective laws of Sierra Leone.”240
Also, the Special Court Statute invalidated “an amnesty granted to any person falling
within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles
2 to 4 of the present Statute...” 241 On the other hand, the Statute did not indicate whether
the blanket amnesty given to all parties by the 1999 Lomé Accord should be recognized
by the Court for crimes under the Sierra Leonean law. In view of the limitation of article
10 to international crimes under articles 2-4 and in accordance with statutory
construction, it seems that the application of the amnesty to crimes under the Sierra
Leonean law should be determined also by resort to the respective laws of Sierra Leone.
Also, like the ICTY and the ICTR, the Special Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the domestic courts of Sierra Leone. 242 However, the Special Court has primacy
over Sierra Leonean national courts 243 and by implication, the Sierra Leonean Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Consequently, at any stage before judgment is

rendered, the Special Court may request Sierra Leonean national courts and the TRC to
defer their jurisdiction to the Special Court. 244
By contrast, the Special Court primacy over the Sierra Leonean national courts
and the TRC is not over reaching like the power of the ICTY and ICTR which can assert
primacy over national courts of third States or order the surrender of an accused located
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
(4). The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not
relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
Special Court determines that justice so requires.
240
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241
Id., art. 10.
242
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in any third State. This is because unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court was not
established by the Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII powers but by an
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone. 245 However, the implication of
this on the Court’s jurisdiction is negligible since most of the accused are already in
custody in Sierra Leone. Besides, the mere effect of an indictment by the Court will put
pressure on third States harboring the indicted person(s) to surrender him or her to the
Court even without the inherent power of the Security Council. 246
The Special Court is comprised of two Trial Chambers, one Appeals Chamber,
the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. 247 Each trial chamber shall be composed of
two judges appointed by the Secretary-General and one judge appointed by the
government of Sierra Leone. 248 The five-member Appeals Chamber shall be composed
of three judges appointed by the Secretary-General and two judges appointed by the
government of Sierra Leone. 249 The Secretary-General appoints the Prosecutor and the
Registrar, while the Deputy Prosecutor who should be Sierra Leonean is appointed by the
government of Sierra Leone in consultation with the United Nations. 250
Thus, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which are composed exclusively of third State
nationals elected by the U.N. General Assembly, and a Prosecutor selected by the
Security Council, the Special Court is to be composed of both international and Sierra
245

See Sierra Leone Special Court Agreement, supra note 214.
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Taylor to Sierra Leone for trial despite pressure from the international committee. Charles Taylor was
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Leonean judges, prosecutors and staff. 251 Also, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special
Court will be seated at the headquarters of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Freetown,
Sierra Leone’s capital city. However, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court is
funded by voluntary contributions from a group of interested States, 252 and a
Management Committee comprising a small number of States oversees all non-judicial
activities of the Court. 253 Matters of cooperation with the government of Sierra Leone
are regulated by the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act, 2002. 254

4.4.4. Assessment of the Sierra Leonean Special Court
In April 2002, three months after the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN
signed the agreement establishing the Special Court, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
appointed the Registrar and the Chief Prosecutor. The Registrar and the Prosecutor
arrived in Freetown in late July and early August 2002, respectively.

They began

operations in difficult conditions. The Special Court had to build its own staff offices,
courtrooms, and prison facilities because there were no convenient pre-existing offices
for the Court to use. 255

251

The decision to create a mixed tribunal of national and international judges was due primarily to
practical considerations and fears about the neutrality of national trials. The Sierra Leonean judicial system
has been largely decimated as a result of the war. It is only functional in Freetown and lacks the enormous
human and financial resources required to undertake post-conflict trials. For the effect of the war on the
Sierra Leone judiciary see, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, In Pursuit of Justice: A Report on
the Judiciary in Sierra Leone Report, (2002) at:
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/Sierra%20Leone%20Report.pdf.
252
This model of funding was opted for in the wake of the ICTY and ICTR, each of which costs the
international community in excess of $100 million in assessed contributions yearly.
253
The management committee comprises representatives from Canada (chair), the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Lesotho, Nigeria, the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and the Government
of Sierra Leone.
254
See The Special Court Agreement 2002 (RATIFICATION) ACT, (2002) (Sierra Leone) [hereinafter
Special Court Agreement], available at: www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAct.html (last
visited March 24, 2005).
255
Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, supra note 232, at 2 (noting that until January 2003, the
Registry had to work in provisional offices owned by the Bank of Sierra Leone, while the Office of the
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On March 10, 2003, the Court issued its first set of indictments and arrests known
by the Office of the Prosecutor as “Operation Justice,” and by November 2003, 13
individuals had been indicted. 256 From its outset, the jurisdiction of the Special Court
was restricted to “those who bear the greatest responsibility.” 257 Thus, the indictments
targeted individuals on the highest level command positions in the three main armed
groups - the AFRC, the RUF, and the CDF involved in the Sierra Leone civil war. 258 By
virtue of their leadership positions, the indictees allegedly knew or should had reason to
know about the commission of the crimes and may have also participated in directly
committing atrocities. With Sankoh and Bockarie dead, Koroma allegedly dead or
missing, and Taylor presently out of reach, the Court may be unable to try its four most
prominent suspects. Unlike the other ad hoc tribunals, it has no procedure for hearing

Prosecutor operated from a private residence a few kilometers away until August 2003 when it was
transferred to the permanent site).
256
The individuals indicted include 10 of those in the Special Court’s custody: Foday Sankoh, the RUF
founder and former leader (Sankoh died on July 29, 2003); Issa Sesay, who succeeded Foday Sankoh as
leader of the RUF; Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, senior RUF commanders; Alex Tamba Brima,
Ibrahim “Bazzy” Kamara, and Santigie Kanu, senior members of the AFRC; Sam Hinga Norman, national
coordinator of the CDF and Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security at the time of this arrest;
Moinina Fofanah, Director of War for the CDF; and Allieu Kondewa, Chief Initiator and High Priest of the
Kamajors. The other three accused who were at large, dead, or allegedly dead are: Sam “Mosquito”
Bockarie, former Battlefield commander of the RUF (On June 1, 2003, Bockarie’s body was flown to
Freetown by the government of Liberia and given to the Special Court for final identification and he was
positively identified); Johnny Paul Koroma, head of the AFRC; and Charles Taylor, former President of
Liberia (who was granted asylum in Nigeria). Thierry Cruvellier and Marieke Wierda, supra note 484, at
4-5. The CDF is largely composed of traditional hunters, some of whom are known as Kamajors. President
Kabbah called on the CDF to assist in fighting the RUF.
257
Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 1. Also see, War Crimes Court Loses Steam,
The Analyst (Monrovia) March 2, 2005, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200503020699.html
(noting that “It was always recognized by the UN and the Sierra Leone government - and, indeed, by
Amnesty International - that the court proposed by the UN Security Council in August 2000 would not be
able to try all those who had committed crimes under international law).
258
See Bringing Justice: the Special Court for Sierra Leone Accomplishments, Shortcomings, and Needed
Support, at Limited Interpretation of “Those Who Bear the Greatest Responsibility”, Human Rights
Publication available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sierraleone0904/ (last visited March 29, 2005)
[hereinafter Brining Justice].
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evidence in cases where the accused is not in custody. 259 Thus, the prosecutorial strategy
to narrowly construe the Court’s jurisdiction has come under attack. 260
Although the Special Court is supposed to be staffed by a mixture of domestic and
international personnel, all key personnel of the Court are internationals. Judge Geoffrey
Robertson who serves as the first President of the Court is an Australian national. The
current president Justice A. Raja N. Fernando is from Sri Lanka. 261 The Office of the
Prosecutor 262 was initially headed by an American, David Crane and from May 2005, by
Desmond de Silva, from the United Kingdom who was Mr. Crane’s deputy. 263 Until
October 3, 2005, the Registry264 was led by Robin Vincent, a British national who was
succeeded by Lovemore G. Munlo. 265 During the Court’s start-up period, most of the
key posts in the Office of the Prosecutor were filled by U.S. nationals, which attracted
some criticism. Although the Prosecutor explained that his key motivation in selecting
his staff was to get to work quickly, critics perceived the Special Court as under undue
American influence.
The Special Court limited temporal jurisdiction has also been criticized because it
will not be able to try the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law that

259

Special Court Statute, supra note 215, art. 17(4)(d).
For instance, Human Rights Watch has expressed the believe that the mandate should be interpreted to
include other perpetrators who, while not at the top of the chain of command, were regional or mid-level
commanders who stood out above similarly ranking colleagues for the exceedingly brutal nature of the
crimes they committed that terrorized civilians. See Bringing Justice, supra note 512.
261
See The Chambers, available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html (visited March 12, 2006).
262
The Office of the Prosecutor has about 40 staff members, including investigators and trial and appeals
counsel.
263
See Office of the Prosecutor, available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/prosecution.html (visited March 12,
2006).
264
The Registry performs the following functions: management of detention; witness protection; court
management; legal support to the Chambers; filing of court records and exhibits; public information and
outreach; security; financial and procurement matters; support to the Defence Office; and witness support
and protection.
265
See The Registry, avialble at: http://www.sc-sl.org/registry.html (visited March 12, 2006).
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were committed by all the parties to the conflict between March 23, 1991 and November
30, 1996. 266

4.5.

TIMOR-LESTE HYBRID SPECIAL PANEL

4.5.1. Background of the Conflict
East Timor was a Portuguese colony for more than four centuries. After the
overthrow of Portuguese dictator Marecello Caetano by a group of Portuguese army
officers in 1974, the military junta began to divest Portugal of its colonies including East
Timor. 267 In readiness for self rule, the Portuguese Colonial government in East Timor
authorized the formation of political parties and the conduct of some local government
elections. The neighboring Indonesian government considered the possibility of self rule
in East Timor as a threat to its influence in the region and decided to pursue the
integration of East Timor with Indonesia. 268

The integration of East Timor with

Indonesia was resisted by some of the political parties resulting in Indonesia invasion of
East Timor in December 1975. 269 By July 1976, Indonesia completed its annexure of
East Timor by declaring it as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province. 270 Between 1975 and
1980, about 200,000 East Timorese were killed as a result of the invasion of East Timor
by the Indonesian military. 271
266

For a critique of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, supra note 196.
Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, DELIVERANCE: THE INSIDE STORY OF EAST TIMOR’S FIGHT
FOR FREEDOM 4 (2002).
268
Jose Ramos-Horta, FUNU: THE UNFINISHED SAGA OF EAST TIMOR 64-71 (1987).
269
Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 10-15.
270
Id., at 15. See generally Australian National Command Element, Department of Defence, “A Short
History of East Timor,” available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/army/asnce/history.htm.
271
Damien Kingsbury, East Timor to 1999, in GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST TIMOR’S VOTE
FOR INDEPENDENCE, 17, 20 (Damien Kingsbury ed., 2000); Richard Tanter et al., East Timor Faces the
Future, in BITTER FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 243, 260 (Richard Tanter et al. eds., 2001). See JUDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING
PROGRAMME, THE GENERAL PROSECUTOR v. JONI MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS (THE LOS
PALOS CASE) 4 (Mar. 2002), available at: http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm [hereinafter
267
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The Indonesian government continued to govern East Timor as a province of
Indonesia until the fall of Haji Mohammad Soeharto (Suharto) regime in 1998. On
January 27, 1999, the new government of Indonesia headed by President B. J. Habibie
announced its intention to hold a referendum which would allow the East Timorese to
choose between broad autonomy within Indonesia and transition to independence. 272 On
May 5, 1999, the UN, Indonesia and Portugal entered into a Tripartite Agreement which
detailed the conditions for the referendum. 273 In furtherance of the Tripartite Agreement,
the United Nations Mission in East Timor (“UNAMET”) arrived in East Timor in May
1999 to prepare for the referendum. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military and the civilian
leadership that were opposed to the referendum began a campaign of intimidation and
violence aimed at disruption of the referendum. 274 Notwithstanding the intimidation and
violence by the Indonesian military and the East Timorese militias that it commanded, on
September 5, 1999, the East Timorese turned out in a record 98.5% for the referendum. 275
By an overwhelming majority of 78.5%, the East Timorese choose self independence in
place of special autonomy under the Indonesian government. 276
Within hours of the announcement of the referendum results, the Indonesian
military and the militias responded by launching a systematic destruction of East
Timorese infrastructure, killing of civilians and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to

JSMP, LOS PALOS]. See also, East Timor Action Network, “Backgrounder for East Timor’s May 20
Independence Day” (May 2002), available at: http://etan.org/news/2002a/05back.htm (noting that scarce
food and medical supplies led to thousands of deaths in forced resettlement camps).
272
See Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 101.
273
Id. at 147.
274
Damien Kingsbury, supra note 271, at 189-90.
275
Geoffrey Robinson, With UNAMET in East Timor - An Historian’s Personal View, in BITTER
FLOWERS, SWEET FLOWERS: EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY,
supra note 271, at 55, 58.
276
Id.
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the hills and across the Indonesian. 277 On September 20, 1999, the United Nations
dispatched a peacekeeping force called the International Force in East Timor
(“INTERFET”), which was led by Australian soldiers to maintain law and order in East
Timor. 278

After East Timor came under the effective control of INTERFET, 279 on

October 25, 1999, the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Chapter
passed

Resolution

1272,

which

established

the United

Nations

Transitional

Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”). 280
UNTAET was charged with the responsibility of administering East Timor for
three years within which time East Timor will transition to self-rule. 281

East Timor

transition to a sovereign State was completed on April 14, 2002, when it conducted its
presidential elections and was formally declared an independent Sate on May 20, 2002.
Following Timor-Leste’s independence, 282 UNTAET’s mandate was terminated and
replaced by the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (“UNMISET”). 283 The
UNMISET is responsible for transitioning United Nations gradual withdrawal from East
Timor and provide support to the East Timorese authorities in the areas of stability,

277

“This was no spontaneous outburst or flare-up of civil war but a one-sided campaign of terror and
destruction aimed at those who voted for succession from Indonesia.” Human Rights Watch,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: JUSTICE FOR EAST TIMOR 5 (August 2000), at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/timor/etimor-back0829.htm. See Don Greenlees & Robert Garran,
supra note 267 at 202.
278
U.N. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999), at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/UntaetDrs.htm (authorizing the creation of a multinational force for
East Timor). Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 270.
279
See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration In East Timor,
U.N. S.C., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000) (reporting on the restoration of law and order following
the arrival of INTERFET). Don Greenlees & Robert Garran, supra note 267, at 270.
280
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th
Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1272].
281
Id.
282
On May 20, 2002, East Timor swore in its first government and held an inaugural session of Parliament
which changed the name of the country to Timor-Leste.
283
See United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, U.N. S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4534th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1410].
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democracy, justice, internal and external security, law enforcement and border control. 284
Also, the UNMISET took over UNTAET’s mandate for prosecuting serious crimes and
assisting the judicial sector. 285
UNMISET mandate which was for an initial period of one year was extended by
the Security Council successively for another two years to permit Timor-Leste, to attain
self-sufficiency. 286 On May 20, 2005, UNMISET completed its mandate in Timor-Leste.
The Security Council replaced UNMISET with a small follow-on political mission – the
United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) which was established to ensure that
the foundations of a viable State are firmly in place in Timor-Leste. 287

4.5.2. Establishment, Jurisdiction and Composition of Timor-Leste
Hybrid Special Panel
In June 2000, the UNTAET passed Regulation 2000/15 which established the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes, a hybrid tribunal comprised of two international and
one Timor-Leste panels of judges. 288

Regulation 2000/15 conferred exclusive

jurisdiction on the Special Panels to try anyone accused of committing serious crimes of
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, including torture, murder, and sexual
offenses between January 1 and October 25, 1999. 289

284

S.C. Res. 1410, supra note 283.
Id.
286
On May 19, 2003, the Security Council by Resolution 1480 extended UNMISET mandate for another
year until May 20, 2004. On May 14, 2004, the Security Council in its Resolution 1543 again extended
UNMISET mandate to six months with a view to subsequently extending it for a further and final six
months. The final extension was made through Security Council Resolution 1573 on November 16, 2004,
which extended UNMISET mandate to May 20, 2005.
287
See United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor – Mandate, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/mandate.html (visited September 10, 2005).
288
Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious
Criminal Offences, UNTAET, 1.1, 1.3, 2.3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) [hereinafter
Regulation 2000/15].
289
Regulation No. 2000/15, para 2.3. See also, Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 298 (2003).
285
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There are presently two Special Panels; one panel is English speaking, the other
Portuguese, both operating from the Dili District Court. Each of the Special Panel is
composed of three judges made up of two international judges and one Timor-Leste
judge. 290

Also, there is an Appeals Chamber which is similarly composed of two

international judges and one Timor-Leste judge. The Appeals Chamber sits at the Dili
Court of Appeals to hear appeals to decisions rendered by the Special Panels.
International law norms, customs, and treaties control with respect to these international
crimes and jurisdiction of the tribunal. 291

Timor-Leste law, to the extent that it is not

inconsistent with customary international law, applies to all other legal matters of the
tribunal. 292
In addition to the Special Panels, UNTAET by Regulation 2000/16 established the
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Special Panels. 293 Although Regulation 2000/16 called for the creation of SCU that is
staffed by Timor-Leste nationals and international experts “as necessary”, 294 the SCU
was in fact staffed mostly by international prosecutors, investigators, case managers,
forensic personnel and translators. The other arm of the hybrid tribunal, the legal aid
service was not created until September 2001 when the UNTAET passed Regulation

290

Regulation No. 2000/15, supra note 288, paras. 1.1, 1.2, 22.1, 22.2.
See Daryl Mundis, supra note 230, at 943.
292
Id.
293
Regulation No. 2000/16 on the Organization of the Public Prosecution Service in East Timor, UNTAET,
U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/16 (June 6, 2000), available at:
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources.htm.
294
Id. 14.6.
291
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2001/24. 295

The legal aid service provides legal assistance to those accused of

committing human rights offenses. 296

4.5.3. Assessment of the Timor-Leste Special Panel
The Timor-Leste internationalized domestic tribunal presents a model that could
potentially be of benefit in other situations. However, researchers have pointed out that
the tribunal’s main failings have been its link to a very weak domestic criminal justice
system and lack of adequate resources and funding for the Special Panels. 297 Also, the
tribunal has been criticized for failing to observe minimal standards of due process. 298
There were also concerns regarding the impartiality of the Special Panels, the
competence of the defense counsels, trial delays and interruptions, and questionable
interpretation and translation. 299
The Special Panel began operating in June 2000 at a slow pace. On December 11,
the Special Panel rendered its first judgment against ten militiamen accused of crimes
against humanity, including torture, murder, and forced expulsion. 300 By October 2003,
the Prosecutor has issued seventy-eight indictments against both former East Timorese
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See Regulation No. 2001/24 on the Establishment of a Legal Aid Service in East Timor, UNTAET, 1-3,
6, U.N.Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/24 (2001), at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/2001-24.pdf (last
visited Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Regulation 2001/24].
296
Id.
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For a detailed assessment of the achievements and failings of the tribunal, see David Cohen, Seeking
Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, 63 ASIA PACIFIC
ISSUES, Aug. 2002, at 3-4, available at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api061.pdf; Suzannah
Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court of Dili, 2 Melb. J. INT’L L. 414 (2001); Suzanne
Katzenstein, NOTE: Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245
(2003); Press Release, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, Court of Appeal Decision Raises National
and International Concern (July 17, 2003), at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/17nb-7_03nb.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2004) and Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, EAST TIMOR, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asia5.html (last visited April 27, 2005).
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militiamen and Indonesian military officers, accusing 350 individuals of serious crimes
committed in 1999 and secured thirty-five convictions. 301 The low rate of conviction is
attributed to the fact that out of the 350 individuals indicted by the SCU, 263 remain at
large, possibly enjoying safe heaven in Indonesia because the Indonesian government has
refused to recognize the court and refuses to extradite the accused. 302

Thus, with

Indonesia reluctance to extradite or cooperate with the tribunal, the possibility that those
most responsible for the violence in 1999 will ever stand before the Special Panels is very
bleak. 303
The fear that many of the indictees may not face justice is strengthened by the
early termination of the activities of the Special Panel and the SCU by the Security
Council without any arrangement to ensure the completion of the outstanding trials and
appeals. 304 Consequently, over 300 people indicted for serious crimes before the Special
Panels have not yet been tried because they could not be brought within the jurisdiction
of the Special Panels before the UN prematurely closed the tribunal and the SCU.305
There are reports that indictees have begun returning to Timor-Leste. 306

Amnesty

301
See East Timor, Asia-Pacific Daily Rep. (Ctr. of Excellence in Disaster Mgmt. and Humanitarian
Assistance, Tripler AMC, Hawaii), Sept. 30, 2003, at 2, at http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/10959.pdf
[hereinafter Asia-Pacific Rep.].
302
Id., at 2.
303
Herbert D. Bowman, Letting The Big Fish Get Away: The United Nations Justice Effort In East Timor
18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 371, 389 (2004).
304
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International has stated that the result of this development “is legal uncertainty, potential
instability and continuing impunity”. 307
Thus, human rights groups and victims have continued to call on the U.N.
Security Council to establish an international tribunal to try the masterminds of war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Timor-Leste from 1975 to 1999.308
On the other hand, Timor-Leste and Indonesian political leaders oppose the establishment
of such tribunal and instead support the pursuit of “justice” through the Truth and
Friendship Commission (TFC). 309

Critics argue that the Truth and Friendship

Commission is a means of preventing the establishment of an International Tribunal in
Timor-Leste. 310

4.6.

THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR CAMBODIA

4.6.1. Background
At Cambodia’s independence in 1954, France handed over the governance of
Cambodia to King Norodom Sihanouk who ruled until March 18, 1970, when he was
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overthrown by General Lon Nol. 311 On April 17, 1975, General Nol’s fragile hold to
power came to an end when the Khmer Rouge entered the city of Phnom Penh ousting
General Nol. 312 The Khmer Rogue and its leader Pol Pot vowing to “turn Cambodia back
to the Year Zero” 313 immediately emptied the capital of its residents and brought King
Sihanouk back, only to hold him under house arrest. Under the political and ideological
leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge regime desired to “build a socially and ethnically
homogeneous society.” 314 Consequently, Pol Pot’s democratic Kampuchea abolished all
preexisting economic, social, and cultural institutions with a view of transforming
Cambodians into a collective workforce. The manner of achieving this transformation
resulted in a reign of terror anchored on a systematic and deliberate torture and murder of
Cambodian citizens, which, along with the disease and starvation that accompanied the
regime’s policies, led to the death of about 1.7 million Cambodians during the Khmer
Rogue four years in power. 315
The Tuol Sleng prison which was a site of interrogation, torture, and execution,
best exemplifies the brutal nature of the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1970s. 316 It has
311
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been suggested that of the 16,000-20,000 people “treated” there, only seven survivors are
known to be alive. 317 The Khmer Rouge guards at Tuol Sleng subjected the prisoners to
various methods of torture, culminating in the forced written confessions of over 4,000
Cambodians. 318 Tuol Sleng prison was a microcosm for the Khmer Rouge atrocities.
Methods of interrogation included, but were not limited to, electric shocks, severe
beatings, removal of toenails and fingernails, submersion in water, cigarette burnings,
needling, suffocation, suspension, and forced consumption of human waste. 319

The

accurate and meticulous records maintained by its guards will undoubtedly serve as
significant evidence during any criminal adjudication.
The U.N. Human Rights Commission’s Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities considered Cambodia’s human rights record
in March 1979, describing the events between 1975 and 1979 as “the most serious
[human rights violations] that had occurred anywhere in the world since nazism,” and
concluded that they “constituted nothing less than autogenocide.” 320
The Khmer Rouge’s efforts to exercise complete control over the territory and
population of Cambodia met severe opposition on December 25, 1978, when Vietnamese
army invaded Cambodia and stormed Phnom Penh. With the fall of the Democratic
Kampuchea regime on January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese-backed People’s Republic of
Kampuchea established complete control of the country, forcing the Khmer Rouge into
the jungles of Cambodia and nearby Thailand where they continued to fight, supported
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mainly by China. 321 A new Cambodian government was then installed by the
Vietnamese.
After the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, the Vietnamese backed
Cambodian government in 1979 carried out a farcical trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, the
Standing Committee Member and Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. They were
tried in absentia, found guilty of the commission of genocide, and sentenced to death by a
domestic tribunal. 322

Whilst the trial of members of the Khmer Rouge regime is

necessary, the trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary by the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal was
neither normatively fair nor in conformity with prevailing international law. Thus, the
international community refused to recognize these trials as legitimate for several
reasons. First, the two leaders were tried in absentia, a violation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 323 Second, the Decree Law which
established the “People’s Revolutionary Tribunal” contained language denouncing the
two defendants, functionally assuming their guilt, a violation of the international norm of
the “presumption of innocence.” 324 Third, the definition of genocide used at the trial did
not comport with the internationally accepted definition, and it was crafted to virtually
ensure the guilt of the defendants. 325
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On the other hand, decades following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge, the
international community was apathetical to holding the Khmer Rouge regime accountable
for their various international human rights violations. Rather, the international
community limited its attention to the establishment of a non-communist government. 326
As such, the United States supported the Khmer Rouge exiles and assured their
continuing seat in the United Nations. United States support for the Khmer Rouge kept
Cambodian politics in a turmoil and prevented the pursuit of justice for the mass
killings. 327 Thus, the international community was predominantly focused on ensuring
Cambodian territorial sovereignty and stability, at the expense of a thorough and
adequate investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities. The U.N.
was involved in the settlement agreements terminating the Khmer Rouge leadership and
establishing transitional Vietnamese occupation. 328
In 1989 the Vietnamese withdrew the last of their troops and the government
renamed the country State of Cambodia. At this time, the international community began
to play a prominent role in the restoration of full self rule to Cambodia. Consequently,
on October 23, 1991, a multilateral Paris Peace Accords was signed which restored
independence to Cambodia and ended Vietnamese administration of Cambodia. 329 The
Paris peace Accords also created the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC).
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Although the 1989 mandate establishing the conference did not reference justice,
human rights, or tribunals, 330 the U.N. considered proposals for an international criminal
tribunal or a case before the International Court of Justice, but rejected both options.331
According to Professor Steven R. Ratner, who represented the United States during the
negotiations at the Paris Conference, “although all the participants believed that human
rights should be mentioned, it was harder to reach consensus on how to . . . punish Khmer
Rouge officials responsible for the atrocities and to prevent the repetition of these acts.
As a result, the human rights obligations at times appear opaque.” 332 However, the
international community attempted to find an indirect route by addressing the human
rights concerns in Article 15 of the Paris Peace Accords, emphasizing the Cambodian
government’s present-time obligations to human rights treaties and standards. 333 In May
1993, the UNTAC helped supervise Cambodia’s general elections.

4.6.2. Establishment of the Special Tribunal for Cambodia – “Khmer Rouge
Tribunal”
On June 21, 1997, the government of Cambodia submitted a request to the U.N.
Secretary-General requesting the United Nations to extend the kind of assistance it
offered to the establishment of ICTY and ICTR to Cambodia towards “brining justice to
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those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of
the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.” 334 The Cambodian government noted that:
crimes of this magnitude are of concern to all persons in the
world, as they greatly diminish respect for the most basic right,
the right to life. We hope that the United Nations and the
international community can assist the Cambodian people in
establishing the truth about this period and bringing those
responsible to justice. Only in this way can this tragedy be
brought to a full and final conclusion. 335
Before the UN could respond to the Cambodian government request, Hun Sen,
one of the author’s of the request, seized power through a bloody coup detat on July 5,
1997, and in the process executed about forty of his perceived political opponents.336
However, on December 12, 1997, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
directing the Secretary-General to examine the Cambodian government’s request and
consider establishing an investigative commission. 337 Consequently, U.N. SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan established a “Group of Experts” with three main goals: “(1) to
evaluate the existing evidence and determine the nature of the crimes committed; (2) to
assess the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore
options for trials before international or domestic courts.” 338
Between July 1998 and February 1999, the U.N. Group of Experts (“the Group”)
traveled through Cambodia interviewing government officials, survivors of the Khmer
Rouge regime, and current Cambodian citizens, hoping not only to obtain information
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regarding the atrocities, but also to assess the emotional climate of the country. 339 On
February 22, 1999, the Group submitted its report to both the Security Council and
General Assembly. 340 The report inter alia stated that there were sufficient evidence
which support the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders for international crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, forced labor, torture, and crimes against
internationally protected persons. 341 However, the Group recommended that prosecutions
be limited to “those persons most responsible for the most serious violations of human
rights [in Cambodia] . . . including senior leaders with responsibility over the abuses as
well as those at lower levels who are directly implicated in the most serious atrocities.” 342
Furthermore, because of the precarious state of the Cambodian domestic judicial
system, the risk of political influence on the domestic courts, and the contentious
international law issues involved, the Group recommended the establishment of an ad hoc
U.N. tribunal seated in an Asia-Pacific nation-State other than Cambodia to try the
accused. 343 In addition, the Group recommended the appointment of an independent
prosecutor for the tribunal. 344 The Group was also of the opinion that such tribunal
would promote the goal of achieving retributive justice with the goal of rehabilitation of
Cambodia, because the process would not be politically or socially destabilizing to the
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country. 345 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan accepted the Groups recommendations
and noted that “if the international standards of justice, fairness and the process of law are
to be met . . . the tribunal in question must be international in character.” 346
The Cambodian government disagreed with the Group’s recommendation for an
ad hoc international tribunal. 347 A few days after the release of the Group’s report, the
Cambodian government ordered the arrest of Khmer Rouge leader Ta Mok, and
suggested that with Ta Mok’s arrest, there was no longer a need for any international
assistance. 348 In September 1999, the Cambodian government also rejected a second
U.N. proposal for a “mixed tribunal” with a majority of international judges and an
international prosecutor and limited number of Cambodian judges and prosecutors that
would not allow the Cambodian government to control and manipulate the process. The
Cambodian government rejected the proposal because it did not conform to Hun Sen’s
position that the international community should only provide legal expertise. 349 Hun
Sen maintained that U.N. intention “to create a special tribunal, to implement special
laws in Cambodia, which in reality is outside the umbrella of the Cambodian constitution
and laws, will not be applicable.” 350
Beginning with the Groups report, the “Khmer Rouge tribunal”, as it is
colloquially called, became the object of lengthy and rather complicated negotiations
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between the Cambodian authorities and the United Nations. 351 Finally, on March 17,
2003, the United Nations reached a draft agreement with the Cambodian government for
an international criminal tribunal to try former Khmer Rouge leaders. 352 On May 13,
2003, the U.N. General Assembly approved the March Agreement. 353 The approval
authorized the UN to help Cambodia set up and run two Extraordinary Chambers in the
new tribunal to “prosecute those most responsible for crimes and serious violations of
Cambodian and international law between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.” 354 On
October 4, 2004, Cambodian National Assembly voted by 107-0 to ratify the legislation
setting-up the tribunal. 355 The agreement came after five years of negotiations and 24
years after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power.

4.6.3. Composition and Jurisdiction of the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”
The March Agreement created a mixed tribunal with only two extraordinary
chambers, the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber which serves as the
appellate chamber. 356 The Trial Chamber will be comprised of three Cambodian judges

351 Stumbling blocks in the negotiations between the Cambodian government and the UN have included
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and two international judges, 357 while the Supreme Court Chamber will consist of four
Cambodian judges and three international judges. 358 Unlike previous ad hoc tribunals
where

the

U.N.

Secretary

General

appoints

the

international

judges,

the

Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy (CSCM) will select the international
judges from a list generated by the U.N. Secretary-General. 359 According to the March
Agreement, decisions in the two Chambers would be taken by a “supermajority” of the
judges. Thus a decision in the Trial and Supreme Chambers must be supported by four
judges and five judges respectively. 360 This requirement ensures that decisions in both
chambers must be supported by at least one international judge and is meant to address
international concerns over Cambodian control over the tribunal. 361
The prosecutor and investigator’s offices include one Cambodian and one
international prosecutor and co-prosecutor on the one hand, and one Cambodian and one
international investigator and co-investigator on the other hand. 362

Similar to the

appointment of the international judges for the Chambers, the CSCM selects the
international prosecutor and investigator from nominees of U.N. Secretary-General. 363 In
the event of a disagreement between the domestic and international personnel regarding
whether to prosecute a case, the case advances. 364 However, the dissenting prosecutor
may appeal the decision to a Pre-Trial Chamber of five judges, whose decision is final.365
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The CSCM appoints three Cambodians as judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the
remaining two judges from a list of nominations provided by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral. 366 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision requires a supermajority vote and in the
absence of the required supermajority the investigation or prosecution proceeds. 367
The tribunal has personal jurisdiction over those most responsible for crimes and
serious violations of Cambodian and international law between April 17, 1975 and
January 6, 1979. The tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction include the crime of genocide
as defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, crimes against humanity as defined in the
1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and
additional crimes defined in Chapter II of the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 368
The tribunal will be seated in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 369 with Khmer as the
official language. 370 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia governs both the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the
agreed-upon tribunals. 371 The tribunal procedures will be in accordance with Cambodian
law. Where Cambodian law does not deal with a particular matter, or where there is
uncertainty regarding a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or where there is a question
regarding the consistency of such a rule with international standards, the tribunal may
seek guidance from international law. 372 Consequently, domestic norms, rather than
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international precedents, shall govern the procedural law followed by both Cambodian
and international judges.

4.6.3. Assessment of the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”
Although the amount so far pledged by U.N. member States is enough for more
than one year of the tribunal’s operations, at the time of this writing, the tribunal is yet to
start sitting. 373 However, the March Agreement under which the tribunal is to operate has
been severally criticized by human rights NGOs who fear that trial under the Agreement
may not take place in accordance with international law and standards for fair trial.374
Although the Cambodian government finally agreed to the inclusion of foreign judges
and prosecutors to work with their Cambodian counterparts, critics are skeptical that the
holding of the tribunal within Cambodia’s present court system, which is weak, corrupt
and susceptible to political influence, will undermine the objective of the tribunal. 375
Besides the inherent flaws of the March Agreement, the continued delay in the
take off of the tribunal dims the possibility of brining the Khmer Rouge to trial. In 1998,
Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, died in a camp along the border with Thailand.
373
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Presently, only five or so of the former leaders of Khmer Rouge are expected to stand
trial. Of the five, only two are in jail, Ta Mok 78, known as “the Butcher” who was the
commander of the south-western region of Cambodia during the time of the Khmer
Rouge and Kang Kek Ieu 62, nicknamed “Duch” commander of the notorious Tuol Sleng
prison where thousands of people were killed during the Khmer Rouge regime. The
other three are living freely in Cambodia following the grant of pardon to them by Prime
Minister Hun Sen after they defected from Khmer Rouge between 1996 and 1998. They
include Iang Sary 74, Pol Pot’s brother-in-law who served as minister of foreign affairs
during the Khmer Rouge regime and was referred to as “brother number three”; Khieu
Samphan 73, the Khmer Rouge regime’s Head of State and public face, and Nuon Chea,
Pol Pot’s second in command, often referred to as “brother number two”.
While the United Nations takes the position that such a pardon cannot protect
someone from prosecution, Prime Minister Hun Sen suggested that going after Ieng Sary
could reignite civil unrest in Cambodia.

Unlike the law establishing other ad hoc

tribunals, the March Agreement did not clearly state that such pardon would not be a bar
to prosecution. Rather, the March Agreement merely mandates that the Cambodian
government will not grant any additional amnesties or pardons to the Khmer Rouge. 376
On the implication of the pardon, the Agreement suggested that the Extraordinary
Chambers will have the exclusive authority to determine whether the scope of the pardon
precludes potential prosecution. 377

In light of the above, it is anybody’s guess whether

at the end of the day, the Cambodian Criminal Tribunal would succeed in brining justice
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to the victims of the Khmer Rouge government and bring an end to the culture of
impunity.

4.7.

Observations and Commentary
This part of the study has attempted an examination of the historical efforts at

bringing an end to the culture of impunity through the establishment of ad hoc
international and mixed criminal tribunals. The enthusiastic development of normative
rules of individual accountability which was prompted by the appalling legacy of the
World War II died down soon thereafter when it came to establishing permanent
international court that would prosecute individuals accused of crimes under international
law. After several decades of hardly any progress, the breakthrough came in 1993 and
1994 respectively, with the establishment of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
The establishment of the ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals rekindled the
negotiations on a permanent criminal court and made it possible to pursue work on the
creation of three other ad hoc tribunals dealing with crimes committed in Sierra-Leone,
Timor-Leste and Cambodia. The setting-up of the ad hoc tribunals especially, the ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) and in Rwanda (ICTR) were no doubt
important step in the lengthy process of developing rules on individual criminal
responsibility under international law.
However, a scathing analysis of the history of these tribunals reveal that the
establishment of each tribunal followed a disturbing trend of a period of passivity by the
international community while the atrocities were been carried out. The international
community only responds towards the end or at the end of the atrocities and in some
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cases many years after the perpetrators of the atrocities have completed their heinous
crimes unchallenged. This trend affects the quality of justice in the sense that justice
delayed is justice denied.

Additionally, a timely intervention on the part of the

international community may have gone a long way to reduce the number of casualties of
such brutal regimes.
Another disturbing trend that permeates in trials conducted by ad hoc criminal
tribunals is the seemingly desire to prosecute only the vanquished. This is prevalent in
the refusal of the Nuremberg tribunal to try any national of the allied powers, the
continued failure by the Rwandan tribunal to prosecute any member of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front. The inability of the Sierra Leonean tribunal to prosecute any member of
the government and the Timor-Leste Special court failure to prosecute members of the
Indonesian army are yet another example.
Also, the inability of the international community to fully fund the tribunals made
it impossible for the wheel of justice to turn full circle against all the perceived
perpetrators of atrocious crimes. The effect of this is that the success of the fight against
impunity has been severely hamstringed by the unwillingness of the international
community to put their money where their mouth is. Be that as it may, the establishment
of the ad hoc tribunals showed that international adjudicatory mechanisms were not only
necessary but also possible, thus paving the way for the adoption, several years later, of a
treaty for the world’s first permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). 378 Hopefully,
the international community and the ICC will both learn from the mistakes made by the
ad hoc tribunals.
378
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The next segment of this study discusses the establishment of the ICC. Part II
examines the jurisdictional scope of the ICC with a view to evaluating the provisions
relating to the entrenchment of the principle of individual criminal responsibility. A
critical analysis of ICC jurisdictional provisions will expose some inherent bottlenecks to
the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction. This study takes the position that the highlighted
obstacles are capable of restricting the reach and effectiveness of the ICC as an institution
designed to bring an end to the culture of impunity.
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PART III

THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT

148

CHAPTER FIVE
===============================================================

5.0.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
_____________________________________

5.1.

Historical Background to the Creation of the International Criminal Court
Numerous suggestions for the creation of a permanent international criminal court

to punish individuals responsible for committing crimes against mankind in violations of
norms of international law have been made over the years, but, have generally failed
because States lacked the political will to establish such institution.1
As Dr. Koffi Annan UN Secretary-General observed:
For nearly half a Century … almost as long as the United Nations
has been in existence… the General Assembly has recognized the
need to establish such a court to prosecute and punish persons
responsible for crimes such as genocide. Many thought … that the
horrors of the Second World War … the camps, the cruelty, the
exterminations, the Holocaust … could never happen again. And
yet they have. In Cambodia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
Rwanda. Our time … this decade even … has shown us that man’s
capacity for evil knows no limits. Genocide … is now a word of our
time, too, a heinous reality that calls for a historic response. 2
Commentators however traced the history of an international criminal court to
early nineteenth century, when in January 1872, Gustav Moynier, a Swiss and one of the
founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed a permanent court in
response to the crimes of the Franco-Prussian War. 3 Mr. Moynier was shocked by the
atrocities committed by parties to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 and dismayed that
1
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there was no mechanism to bring them to justice. Thus, in January 1872, Mr. Moynier
proposed the establishment of an international criminal court to deter violations of the
Geneva Convention of 1864 and to bring to justice anyone responsible for such
violations. 4

Until Mr. Moynier suggested a permanent court, almost all trials for

violations of the laws of war were by ad hoc tribunals constituted by one of the
belligerents, usually the victor State, rather than by ordinary courts or by an international
criminal court. 5 Only one European government reportedly declared that it was ready to
sign a convention establishing such a court.

There was little interest by other

governments and many of the leading international experts on humanitarian law criticized
the proposal as unrealistic. 6
In 1899, the first International Peace Conference was convened at the initiation of
the Czar of Russia who found himself in a financially unbearable arms race with France. 7
The Conference was attended by delegates from 26 self styled “civilized states” for about
10 weeks at The Hague. At the end of the conference, they drew up three Conventions,
three Declarations and six Voeux or wishes. But these conventions, declarations and
wishes were carefully laced with ambiguities and exceptions.

In the end, signatory

States merely agreed to “use their best efforts”... “as far as possible” and to disregard the
rules if national honor or “essential interests” might be endangered. 8 To that extent, it

4

See Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 3.
Christopher Keith Hall, The first proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 57 (1998) available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList320/
BFF1AE58DAA8E25AC1256B66005B8BB3 (visited September 28, 2005).
6
Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 5 (citing Pierre Bossier, FROM SOLFERINO TO
TSUSHIMA: HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS 283-284
(Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute 1985).
7
See Benjamin A. Ferencz, The Evolution of International Criminal Law, at http://www.benferencz.org/
hamburg.htm (last visited September 28, 2005).
8
Id.
5

150

was more a wish list than a binding accord. The problem of enforcement was not even
mentioned. 9
In 1907, about 50 participants attended a follow-up Second Hague Conference at
The Hague. The 1907 Hague Conference improved some of the earlier texts of the 1899
Conference but was not significantly different. It reflected the fact that leading
participants were not ready to accept major changes in the world legal order. 10 Nations
were still pretending to conclude an effective peace treaty and rules of war when in 1914
they found themselves in the midst of the unparalleled tragedy that became known as
World War I. 11
After the end of World War I, another Peace Conference of the “Great Powers”
was held in Paris in 1919. 12 The Paris Peace Conference established a commission of
legal experts to determine the “responsibility of the author’s of the war.”

The

Commission known as the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War
proposed that an ad hoc tribunal be established to try nationals of the Central Powers for
violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity. 13 This proposal for an ad hoc
tribunal was rejected by the “Great Powers.” Rather, they agreed to include provisions in
the Versailles Treaty which will allow for the establishment of a special tribunal
composed of five judges from the “Great Powers” to try the Kaiser for “a supreme
9

Benjamin A. Ferencz, supra note 7.
Id.
11
Id.
12
The great powers included States that were triumphant during the war particularly, the United States
of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
13
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report
Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1919 Peace Conference Report), Versailles, March 1919,
Conference of Paris 1919, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law,
Pamphlet No. 32, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 123-124 (1920 Supp.);
10
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offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” and for Allied military
tribunals to try other persons for war crimes. 14
Beyond the inclusion of the said provisions in the Versailles Treaty, the Allies
were nonchalant about the prosecution of First World War criminals. 15 Thus, amidst
national opposition, the Allies lost interest in the prosecution of those responsible for
violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity in the Ottoman Empire. 16 Another
proposal made in 1920 to establish a permanent international criminal court as part of the
League of Nations was rejected by the Assembly as premature. 17

In 1934, France

proposed that the League of Nations establish a permanent court to try terrorist offences.
However, the treaties adopted in 1937 defining the crimes and including the statute of the
court never entered into force. 18
After these failed attempts, there was little effort in this regard until the events of
World War II and its aftermath reminded the international community that a permanent
criminal court is a requirement of our society. However, proposals made to set up a
permanent international criminal court following the World War II were rejected in favor

14

Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Versailles Treaty), Versailles,
28 June 1919, Article 227, 11 Martens (3d) 323. Article 229 of the Versailles Treaty also allow for the
establishment of military tribunals by each Allied and Associated Powers to try persons accused of
committing crimes against their nationals and were the accused person committed crimes against nationals
of more than one Allied and Associated Powers, the affected states will constitute a joint military tribunal
to try the accused persons. Versailles Treaty, Art. 229. See generally James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO
NUREMBERG (1982).
15
See discussions on the Leipzig trials in Chapter two, supra at pp 5-10. Also see Claude Mullins, THE
LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921).
16
See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I
Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 221 (1989); David
Matas, Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I, 13 FORD. INT’L L. J. 86
(1989).
17
Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction (Historical Survey), UN Doc.A/CN.4/7/Rev. 8-12 (1949). The Assembly only agreed to
establish a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear and determine any dispute of an international
character which the parties thereto submit to it. See The Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 14 (1929).
18
Historical Survey, supra, note 17, at 16-18.
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of ad hoc international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, followed by Allied national
military tribunals, to try Axis defendants. 19
At the end of the Nuremberg Judgment in 1946 there was renewed interest to
create a permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity, serious violations of humanitarian law and crimes against peace. This time,
the proposal for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court was made
May 13, 1947 by France representative on the UN Committee on the Progressive
Development of International Law and its Codification, Judge Henri Donnedieu de
Vabres, formerly a judge on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 20
Although the UN General Assembly considered the proposal in 1948 during the
negotiations for a treaty prohibiting genocide, it abandoned efforts to establish a
permanent international criminal court to try cases of genocide as part of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).
Instead, the UN General Assembly simply agreed to a provision in the Genocide
Convention that cases of genocide to be tried “by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction”. 21
However, as a result of the proposal, the UN General Assembly established the
International Law Commission (ILC). 22 Through resolution 260 of December 9, 1948,

19

Making the Right Choices, supra note 1, at 5.
He submitted the French proposal, which provided that certain matters would be tried by a special
international criminal chamber of the International Court of Justice and others in a permanent international
criminal court, two days later. See Memorandum submitted to the Committee on the Progressive
Development of International Law and its Codification by the representative of France, UN Doc.
A/AC.10/21, 15 May 1947.
21
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 78 UNTS 277, December 9,
1948, art. VI. [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
22
U.N.G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948).
20
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the UN General Assembly invited the ILC “to study the desirability and possibility of
establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with
genocide.” 23 The ILC studied this question at its 1949 and 1950 sessions and came to the
conclusion that the establishment of an international court to try persons charged with
genocide or other crimes of similar gravity was both “desirable” and “possible”.24
Thereafter, the UN General Assembly established two successive committees to prepare
proposals relating to the establishment of such court and its jurisdiction.
In 1951, the first committee prepared a draft statute for an International Criminal
Court which was revised in 1953 by the second committee. In 1954, the ILC adopted a
draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954 draft Code of
Offences) but no consensus could be reached on either Code or Court. Notwithstanding
these efforts, the UN General Assembly in 1954 decided to postpone consideration of the
draft statute ostensibly pending the adoption of a definition of aggression and an
international code of crimes. 25

There was also the suggestion that the Cold War

prevailing at that period stymied efforts at moving ahead with such a project. 26
In 1974, the General Assembly agreed on a definition of aggression. 27 Also,
between 1982 and 1991, the ILC has done considerable work on a draft code of crimes
under international law based on the work of its Rapporteur, Doudou Thiam (Senegal).
23

U.N.G.A Res. 260(III), supra note 22.
See Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session 5 June-29 July 1950, 5
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at para. 140, UN Doc. A/1316.
25
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on its session held from 1 to 31 August
1951, 7 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 21, UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); Report of the 1953 Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction 27 July-20 August 1953, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12), UN Doc. A/2645
(1954); Report of the International Law Commission, 9 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11, UN Doc. A/2693
(1954).
26
Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 L & CONT.
PROBS. 3 (2001).
27
See U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of
December 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975)
[hereinafter Res. 3314].
24
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However, the UN General Assembly neglected to resume the work on the creation of a
permanent international criminal court. The concept of an international criminal court
was place back on the agenda of the UN General Assembly with the invitation in 1987 by
President Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR who called for an international criminal court
to try cases of terrorism and a proposal in 1989 by Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson of
Trinidad and Tobago for the establishment of an international criminal court to try cases
of drug trafficking. 28 In response to these requests, the General Assembly in December
1989, mandated the ILC to recommence its work on the proposed court with jurisdiction
to include drug trafficking. 29
Meanwhile, gross acts of ethnic cleansing were taking place in the former
Republic of Yugoslavia, while genocidal war continued unabated in Rwanda.

The

several conflicts that took place within the last decade which are primarily internal,
demonstrated tragically that there was a continuing need to take measures to put an end to
these abominable crimes. 30

These developments shocked the conscience of the

international community and jolted them to action. Thus, in an effort to bring an end to
widespread disregard to the laws of war which lead to unprecedented war crimes, crimes
28

See John Quigley, “Perestroika and International Law”, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 788, 794 (1988). These
government initiatives followed extensive work by non-governmental organizations, particularly the World
Federalist Movement and the International Association for Penal Law (Association Internationale de Droit
Pénal), and tireless efforts by independent experts to demonstrate the feasibility of an international criminal
court, in particular, by Benjamin B. Ferencz, a member of the United States prosecution team at the
Nuremberg trial, in his book, An International Criminal Court, A Step Toward Peace: A Documentary
History (London: Oceana Publications 1980), and by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni. See, for example,
among his extensive writings, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Tribunal (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987).
29
GA Res. 44/39 of 4 December 1989 (requesting the International Law Commission “to address the
question of establishing an international criminal court” with jurisdiction over crimes under the draft Code
of Crimes then being prepared, “including persons engaged in illicit narcotics drugs across national
frontiers”). The General Assembly renewed the request to study the question of an international criminal
court the following year. GA Res. 45/41 of 28 November 1990. See also, Jelena Pejic, Creating a
Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 297 (1998).
30
Phillippe Kirsch, supra note 26, at 4.
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against humanity, and genocide, the UN Security Council established ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in
1994, to hold individuals accountable for those atrocities and, deter similar crimes in the
future. 31
On the other hand, the United Nations has to deal with agitations for the creation
of criminal tribunals to prosecute those responsible for international crimes committed in
Cambodia during the Pol Pot regime of 1975 – 79, 32 during the factional and guerilla
warfare for the ouster and the replacement of Samuel Doe in Sierra Leone from 1996, 33
and the killings that followed Timor-Leste referendum for independence in 1999.34
These agitations resulted in what has been described as “tribunal fatigue” for the United
31

See Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1192 [hereinafter Resolution 827]. See also The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), appended to SC Resolution 827 (hereinafter
ICTY Statute]. The ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting,
May 25, 1993, for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Also see, Security Council
Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1194) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those responsible for the genocidal war in Rwanda. See
discussions on ICTY and ICTR in part I, supra at 61, 74.
32
See G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/52/644/Add.2 (1997), at
http://www.un.org/ga/documents/gares52/res52135.htm. The resolution requested the UN Secretary
General and the Cambodian government work together in order to address past serious violations of
Cambodian and international law. See also Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, at 21- 32 (1999) at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-1999.html . The Report recommended that members of the Pol
Pot regime could be held criminally responsible through domestic trials, a tribunal under Cambodian law, a
United Nations tribunal, and a Cambodian tribunal under United Nations administration.
33
See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). The Resolution
requested the UN Secretary General to issue a report concerning the establishment of a special court in
order to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Sierra Leone. See also Report of the UN
Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915
(2000) providing the legal framework and requisite administrative elements for the creation of a Sierra
Leonean special court. Also see Res. 1370, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1370 (2001).
The Resolution encourages the UN Secretary General, the government of Sierra Leone and others involved
“to expedite the establishment of … the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August
2000.
34
See Reg. 2000/15, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) establishing a special panel of judges to address serious criminal offences
committed in East Timor. See http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg0015E.pdf.
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Nations. 35 The difficulties that followed the creation of hybrid tribunal and Special
Courts to prosecute the said crimes suggested that ad hoc tribunals may not always be
available when needed. 36
These developments engendered a state of urgency on the part of the UN General
Assembly which then directed the ILC to accelerate the completion of its work on the
draft statute of a permanent international criminal court “as a matter of priority” by July
1994. 37 Thus, in 1994 the ILC presented a draft statute on an international criminal court
(ICC) to the UN General Assembly and recommended that it be transmitted to a
diplomatic conference. 38

But the recommendation to forward the draft statute to a

diplomatic conference was defeated in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. As
a result, the UN General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court to consider major substantive issues arising from the ILC
draft, which met in two sessions in 1995. 39
During this time, the attempt to create an effective permanent international
criminal court benefited from a new wave of widespread and growing support around the
world for such a court. In an address to the Commencement Class of 1996 of the
Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, the UN High Commissioner for

35

Michael P. Scharf, Comment: The Politics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 167, 169 (1995) (defining “tribunal fatigue” as “the process of reaching a consensus
on the tribunal’s statute, electing judges, selecting a prosecutor, and appropriating funds [that] has turned
out to be extremely time consuming and politically exhausting for the members of the Security Council.”).
36
Various reasons were offered for the failure – financial burden to lack of cooperation from successive
governments in these countries.
37
U.N.G.A. Res. 48/31 of December 9, 1993.
38
Jelena Pejic, supra note 29, at 298.
39
GA Res. 49/53 of 9 December 1994. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 49 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 22), UN Doc. A/50/22 (1995); see also Christopher
Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 117 (1997); Jelena Pejic, supra note 29, at 298.
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Human Rights has repeatedly endorsed the establishment of such a court. 40 Similarly, the
UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions endorsed it in
his November 1996 report to the General Assembly. 41 Also, the UN Special Rapporteur
on the independence of judges and lawyers endorsed it in his 1996 report to the UN
Commission on Human Rights. 42
Likewise, regional intergovernmental organizations also strongly supported the
establishment of such a court, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, 43 the European Parliament, 44 the ACP-EU Joint Assembly45 and the Third
Conference of Ministers of Justice of Francophone Countries. 46 Also, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that it gives “its full support to the work of
the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an international criminal court”. 47 It

40

Address by José Ayala-Lasso, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the
Commencement Class of 1996 of the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, 14 May 1996;
Towards a Permanent International Criminal Court, Turin address, 12 October 1996 (available on the
Amnesty International Italian section’s web site: http://www.amnesty.it/eventi/icc/confer/lasso.htm);
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. A/51/36, 18 October 1996, para. 41.
41
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN Doc. A/51/457
(1996), para. 160.
42
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Dato’Param
Cumaraswamy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/37 (1996), para. 79.
43
Council of Europe, Parl. Ass. Rec. 1189 (1992), para. 9 (“The Assembly, therefore, recommends that the
Committee of Ministers call upon member states to act through the United Nations to secure the convening
of an international diplomatic conference to prepare a convention on the setting up of a criminal court, and
support such action.”).
44
European Parl., Resolution on the establishment of the Permanent International Criminal Court, B40992/96, 9 September 1996.
45
ACP-EU Joint Assembly, Resolution ACP-EU 1866/96/fin. on the establishment of the Permanent
International Criminal Court, adopted on 26 September 1996, para. 1 (“Formally invites the ACP-EU
Council and its Member States to support the need to establish the Permanent International Criminal Court,
and to act in concert at the 51st General Assembly of the UN to ensure that it renews the mandate of the
Preparatory Committee and take the decision to convene a Plenipotentiary Diplomatic Conference to
establish an International Criminal Court before the end of 1998[.]”).
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In the Conference Declaration on November 1, 1995, para. 4, the Ministers stated that “we undertake the
following commitments . . . to participate actively in the continuing efforts concerning the establishment of
a permanent international criminal court”).
47
ICRC, Statement at the Sixth Committee, General Assembly, 28 October 1996, p. 2.
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was endorsed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union 48 and supported by the Non-Aligned
Movement. 49
Further, the international legal community also endorsed the establishment of an
international criminal court, including the International Bar Association, 50 the
International Association of Lawyers (Union Internationale des Avocats), 51 the AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Committee, 52 local lawyers groups 53 and former prosecutors
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 54 These supporters added to the
broad international coalition of over 180 nongovernmental organizations around the
globe, which have consistently at one time or the other called for the creation of a
permanent criminal court. 55 Newspapers throughout the world also called for the prompt
establishment of an international criminal court. 56

48

Inter-Parliamentary Union, 86th sess., October 1991, Santiago, Chile.
NAM, Final Document, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (14 to 20 October 1995), para. 122 (“Further
progress is necessary to achieve full respect for international law and . . . a system of international criminal
justice with respect to crimes against humanity as well as other international offences.”).
50
International Bar Association, Resolution on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal
Court, June 1995.
51
International Association of Lawyers, Resolution, Paris, 18 November 1995 (“The International
Association of Lawyers . . . Urges State governments to favour the rapid and effective establishment of the
Permanent International Criminal Court.”).
52
Recommendation at meeting in October 1996.
53
See, for example, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report on the Proposed
International Criminal Court, 20 December 1996.
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Washington, D.C., 23 March 1996; Lord Hartley Shawcross, Life Sentence (London: Constable 1995), p.
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Federation of Human Rights Leagues, Justice for Humanity: Towards the Creation of a Permanent
International Criminal Court, La lettre Hebdomadaire de la FIDH, No. 613-614/2 (November 1995)
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After the ad hoc Committee’s report, the General Assembly set up a Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PreCom) to study
the issues further and to draft texts, based on the ILC draft statute, government comments
and contributions of relevant organizations and prepare a generally accepted consolidated
draft text for submission to a diplomatic conference. 57 The PreCom met in two sessions
in 1996. 58 Meanwhile, in July 1996, the International Law Commission completed its
second reading of the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
(draft Code of Crimes) and sent its report (1996 ILC Report) with the draft Code to the
General Assembly. 59
In view of the completion of the ILC work on the draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1996,
decided that the PreCom should meet in four sessions of up to nine weeks in 1997 and
1998 “in order to complete the drafting of a widely acceptable consolidated text of a
convention, to be submitted to the diplomatic conference” and that “a diplomatic
conference of plenipotentiaries will be held in 1998, with a view to finalizing and

57

GA Res. 50/46 of 11 December 1995. The term “other relevant organizations” was intended to include
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Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. GA/51/10 (1996), [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes].
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adopting a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court”. 60 Thus,
the PreCom organized several meetings from 1996 to 1998 which was attended by
governments, international law experts, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In
its final session which was held in March and April of 1998, the Committee completed
the drafting of the ICC text.
Since Italy had in 1996 offered to host an international criminal court conference,
the U.N. General Assembly, at its fifty-second session decided to convene the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17 1998, “to finalize
and adopt a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court”. 61 In his
opening speech to the Conference, the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kofi Annan, noted as
follows:
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of
universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision.
We are close to its realization. We will do our part to see it through
till the end. We ask you … to do yours in our struggle to ensure that
no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human
rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant wars
and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of
justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those
rights will be punished.” 62
Unlike the previous ad hoc tribunals – the Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
the groundwork for the ICC treaty was done by the UN General Assembly and the
International Law Commission rather than individual States. Their aim was to develop a

60
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code of offences and to elaborate a statute for an independent international criminal
jurisdiction. 63
About 160 countries and a wide representation of nongovernmental organizations
converged at the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries (held in Rome, Italy,
from June 15 to July 17, 1998) to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an international
criminal court. 64 At the end of the conference, on July 17, 1998, members of the
diplomatic conference voted 120 to 7 in favor of adopting the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).

65

The U.S. was not in favor of signing the

statute and therefore voted against it, along with six other states, including China, India,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya. 66 There has been tremendous success in the signing and
ratification of the ICC Statute. To date, 139 countries have signed and 100 countries,
encompassing countries from all regions of the globe, have ratified the statute, 67 which
came into effect on July 1, 2002, after being ratified by more than 66 countries. 68
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http://untreaty.un.org/English/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (visited March 13,
2006) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties]. For analysis of the U.S. opposition to the Court, see Remigius
Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring
Freedom”, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19 (2003).
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As at October 31, 2005, the countries that have ratified the Statute are: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra,
Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BosniaHerzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina-Faso, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Central African
Republic, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia,
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,
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The tenuous but fruitful conference marks the end of more than 50 years of
attenuated efforts by the United Nations to create a permanent international criminal
court. 69 On the other hand, the coming into effect of the ICC Statute signifies the
beginning of a new era of individual criminal responsibility for those who commit
egregious international crimes. It is the hopeful expectation of supporters of the Court
that it serve as “a deterrent to future international crimes, a contributor to stable
international order, and a reaffirmation of international law.” 70 This remarkable support
for the ICC demonstrates the direction of a new world order and the recognition that
international justice and the fight against impunity require the cooperation and consensus
of nations. The Court will seat permanently at The Hague, Netherlands, and may sit in
other countries when necessary. 71

5.2.

The Objectives of the International Criminal Court
According to the Statute of the ICC, the Court was established to ensure that “the

most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished”. 72

Also, the ICC was created to realize the determination of the

Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Venezuela, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 64.
68
ICC Statute, supra note 65, Article 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by
60 countries.
69
See Cherif Bassiouni, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Documentary History], where he note that
“since the end of World War 1 (1919), the world community has sought to establish a permanent
international criminal court.”
70
Alison McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get It: The United States and
the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 249, 259 (2001).
71
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 3.
72
Id., preamble, para. 4.
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international community “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
[of concern to the international community], and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes”. 73

Similarly, the United Nations had suggested that the international

criminal court is needed inter alia, “to achieve justice for all”, 74 “to end impunity”, 75 “to
help end conflicts”, 76 “to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals”, 77 “to take over
when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act”, 78 and “to deter
future war criminals”. 79
In order to achieve the objectives of the ICC, effective prosecution of the
perpetrators “must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation”. 80 While the ICC is there to assist, it remains the primary
“duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for the
prevention of such crimes”. 81

73

ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble, para. 5.
See, ICC Overview, supra note 2 (noting that the International Court of Justice at The Hague handles
only cases between States, not individuals and that the ICC will provide an avenue for dealing with
individual responsibility).
75
Id., (quoting the Nuremberg judgment that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced”).
76
Id. (citing Benjamin B. Ferencz, a former Nürnberg prosecutor who observed that “there can be no peace
without justice, no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just and
lawful under any given circumstance”).
77
Id. (pointing out the deficiencies of the ad hoc tribunal to include allegations of “selective justice”,
“tribunal fatigue”, and that the ad hoc tribunals are subject to limits of time or place, making it impossible
to cover all crimes and prosecute all criminals).
78
Id. (referring to situations where the State lack the political will to prosecute their own citizens, or even
high-level officials, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia or where national institutions may have
collapsed, as in the case of Rwanda).
79
Id. (expressing the view that once it is clear that the international community will no longer tolerate
violations of international crimes without assigning responsibility and meting out appropriate punishment
to heads of State and commanding officers as well as to the lowliest soldiers in the field or militia recruits,
it is hoped that those who would incite a genocide; embark on a campaign of ethnic cleansing; murder, rape
and brutalize civilians caught in an armed conflict; or use children for barbarous medical experiments will
no longer find willing helpers).
80
ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble, para. 4
81
Id., para. 6.
74
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While it may be too soon to judge the ICC’s ability to achieve its objective, it
should be noted that in spite of the coming into force of the ICC Statute in June 2002, the
possibility of a prosecution by the Court has not had the desired effect of deterring
perpetrators of international crimes. Thus, notwithstanding the United Nations’ Security
Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, the violence in Sudan
remains unabated. 82 Also, the war crimes and crimes against humanity in the territory of
DR Congo, parts of Uganda, and the Central African Republic has not waned in spite of
the fact that the Court is currently investigating the violations in these States. Thus, the
mere creation of the Court is not sufficient to stem the tide of the culture of impunity.
There is the need for sustained effective prosecution of individuals directly or indirectly
responsible for these atrocities especially those in positions of governmental authority or
military command.

5.3.

Overview of the Organizational Structure of the International Criminal
Court
The ICC is composed of four organs: the Presidency, the Judiciary (comprised of

an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division), the Office of the
Prosecutor, and the Office of the Registrar. 83 These organs will not be subject to the
instruction of States Parties but will operate independently in their respective fields of
action.

In addition to the above organs, the ICC Statute made provision for the

establishment of an institution to be known as the Assembly of States Parties. 84 Before
82

See, Reuters, Sudan Unable to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, March 6, 2006, available at:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD652175.htm (quoting Sima Samar, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Sudan, who noted after a 10-day visit to Sudan that intelligence services continue to carry
out arbitrary arrests, detention and torture with impunity, and that “freedom of expression and association
unfortunately continue to be abused by the national intelligence services or military intelligence”).
83
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 34.
84
Id., art. 112.
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examining the organizational structure of the ICC, it is necessary to understand the legal
nature of the ICC because legal personality is a conditio sine qua non for the participation
of an entity in a legal system. 85 Also, given the pivotal role assigned to the Assembly of
States Parties in the composition of the Court’s personnel and its managerial oversight,
examination of the Assembly of States Parties will precede the overview of the Court’s
organizational structure. 86

5.3.1. The Legal Personality of the International Criminal Court
Unlike ad hoc tribunals which were established by the UN Security Council or
the UN General Assembly independently and/or in collaboration with concerned State(s),
the ICC is a creation of a multilateral treaty. Also, unlike the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), which is an organ of the United Nations, the ICC is not an organ of the
UN. 87 Rather, the ICC Statute provides that the Court “shall be brought into relationship
with the United Nations. 88
International legal personality is the ability to possess rights and obligations with
the capacity to exercise those rights and duties at the international sphere. Thus, the
conferment of international legal personality must be based on international law. While
States are the primary possessors of international legal personality, international
organizations and other entities have been accorded international legal personality.
Generally, there are two prevailing views on international legal personality to non-state
entities. Under the State-oriented view of legal personality, the rights and duties that the

85

A.S. Muller, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 75 (1995).
See ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 9, 36, 42, 46, 51, 112 respectively.
87
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, article 1.
88
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 2.
86
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founding States of an organization give to it in its constitution are the determining factor
in deciding whether legal personality on the international level exists. The more
acceptable view is the functional theory and the objective approach, otherwise known as
the doctrine of implied powers which was advanced by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion
on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. 89 The ICJ
noting that the United Nations possessed “a large measure of international personality,”90
observed as follows:
The organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in
fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only
be explained on the basis of the possession of large measure of
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an
international plane. It is at present the supreme type of
international organization, and it could not carry out the
intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international
personality. It must be acknowledged that its members, by
entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and
responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to
enable those functions to be effectively discharged. 91
Thus, the ICJ concluded that “under international law, the Organization must be deemed
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” 92
The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Reparation case is applicable to other
international organizations. 93 It follows that the reasoning in the Reparation case can be
applied to the ICC in the sense that the Court satisfies the criteria of an international
89

Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
174 (1949) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries”].
90
Id., at 179. See also Quincy Wright, The Jural Personality of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L.
509 (1949).
91
Reparations for Injuries, supra note 89, at 179.
92
Id., at 182.
93
Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 (1995)
(where he rhetorically questioned “if organizations are empowered to conclude treaties to exchange
diplomats, and to mobilize international forces, ... how can such powers be exercised without having the
status of international legal person?”).
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organization under general international law. 94 Thus, applying the opinion of the ICJ in
the Reparation case, the ICC will undoubtedly qualify as an international legal
personality. 95 However, the ICC Statute in a bid to clarify its legal personality expressly
stated that:
the Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also
have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes. 96
Also, the United Nations has recognized that the Court possess international legal
personality and has such capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions
and the fulfillment of its purposes. 97 Similarly, the Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Court (APIC) also acknowledges the Court’s international legal
personality. 98 Furthermore, the APIC specifically recognizes that the Court has the

94

Under general international law, the criteria for an international organization include: (a) a lasting
association of states, (b) an organic structure, (c) a sufficiently clear distinction between the organization
and its member states, (d) the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international level, and (e)
lawful purposes. See Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ED., 678981 (Oxford University Press 1998). See ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 1 & 34.
95
Several provisions in the ICC Statute confer treaty making powers on the Court. For instance, article 2
of the ICC Statute requires the Court to conclude a relationship agreement with the UN. Similarly, under
article 3(2) of the ICC Statute, the Court is to enter into a headquarters agreement with the host state, the
Netherlands. And article 87(5)(a) empowers the Court to enter into agreement with non party States on
international cooperation and legal assistance.
96
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 4.
97
See Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, Article 2,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1. The Agreement was signed on October 4, 2004, by Judge Philippe
Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the
United Nations (UN). The Agreement which provides a framework for the relationship between the UN
and the Court entered into force upon signature. See Press Release, Agreement Between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations, October 4, 2004, at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/47.html [hereinafter Relationship Agreement].
98
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC), Article 2, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2001/1/Add.3 (January 2002) [hereinafter “Agreement on Privileges and Immunities”]. The
Agreement was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its First Session, September 3-10, 2002. See
ICC-ASP/1/3. As at January 31, 2005, 21 States are now party to the Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the ICC while 62 States have signed the Agreement. States who are party to the Agreement
are, Austria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Trinidad and Tobago have
ratified the Agreement. Finland is party to the Agreement through acceptance, France through approval and
Liechtenstein through accession. See http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/90.html (visited October 4,
2005).
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“capacity to contract, to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property and to
participate in legal proceedings.” 99 Also, the APIC which extends and elaborates upon
article 48 of the ICC Statute, confers on the Court the privileges and immunities usually
accorded to an international legal personality necessary for the effective discharge of the
Court’s purposes. 100
In addition, the Court which will be based permanently in The Hague,
Netherlands is expected to conclude a headquarters agreement with the host State. 101
Under the basic principles governing such headquarters agreement, the host State is
obliged to ensure that the Court “enjoy privileges, immunities and treatment that are no
less favorable than those accorded to any international organization or tribunal located in
the host country.” 102 Also, the headquarters agreement should recognize the Court’s
international legal personality and the legal capacity to exercise its functions and fulfill
its purposes as stated in Article 4 of the ICC Statute. 103

99

Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 98, art. 2. See also Phillipe Sands & Pierre Klein,
BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 471 (2001) (concluding that the explicit
attribution of international legal personality to the Court reflects the change in international society, which
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100
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Completing the Work of the Preparatory Commission: The Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 638 (2002); Stuart Beresford, The Privileges and
Immunities of the International Criminal Court: Are They Sufficient for the Proper Functioning of the
Court or Is There Still Room for Improvement? 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 83 (2002)
101
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 3. Pending the entry into force of the permanent Headquarters
Agreement, it has been agreed that the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement with the
Yugoslavia Tribunal applies, mutatis mutandis to the Court. The interim Headquarters Agreement was
agreed to by an exchange of notes between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Court on 19
November 2002. See Press Release, Exchange of Notes between the Netherlands and the ICC, The Hague,
November 19, 2002, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/4.html (visited October 4, 2005).
102
See Draft Basic Principles Governing a Headquarters Agreement to be Negotiated Between the Court
and the Host Country, Principle 1(j), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/1/Add.1 (hereinafter “Basic Principles
Governing a Headquarters Agreement”). The said Agreement was drafted by the ICC Preparatory
Commission and adopted by the Assembly in September 2002.
103
Id., Principle 6.
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It follows from the above summation that the Court is endowered with the
capacity to conclude agreements with States and make claims in respect of the rights
contained therein. Consequentially, the Court can institute legal proceedings, and acquire
and dispose of property under the national law of the States concerned. Therefore, the
above instruments will ensure that the Court has sufficient legal standing for the
independent exercise of its functions.

5.3.2. Assembly of States Parties
The Rome Statute provides for the establishment of an Assembly of States Parties
which will be open to States that have ratified the ICC Statute as members and to States
that have signed but have not ratified the ICC Statute as observers. 104 During its first
session, the Assembly of States Parties adopted the work of the Preparatory Commission
and elected the members of the Bureau, consisting of its President, H.R.H. Prince Zeid
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, of Jordan, two Vice Presidents and 18 members elected by the
Assembly for a three-year term. 105 In electing the members of the Bureau, the Assembly
must take into consideration principles of equitable geographic distribution and adequate
representation of the principal legal systems of the world. 106 On its second session in
September 2003, the Assembly of States Parties adopted Resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.3

104

ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112. See generally, S. Rama Rao, Article 112: Assembly of State
Parties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1201-13 (Otto Trifferer ed., 1999) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
105
For a summary of the work of the Assembly of States Parties, see Progress Report, on the Ratification
and National Implementing Legislation of the Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, The International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law 13 (10th ed.
2003) [hereinafter Progress Report].
106
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(2).

170

establishing the Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly. 107

Each State Party is

represented by a representative who is proposed to the Credential Committee by the Head
of State of government or the Minister of Foreign Affairs 108
The Assembly of States Parties is the management oversight and legislative body
of the Court. The Assembly’s duties include adopting recommendations of the
Preparatory Commission; providing oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor, and the
Registrar; taking action pursuant to reports; making decisions regarding the Court’s
budget; and considering questions related to non-cooperation. 109 This list is by no means
exhaustive. 110 Thus, the Assembly is also responsible for approving the budget of the
Court and providing the necessary funds to operate the Court. 111 The United Nations
may also contribute funds, 112 and voluntary contributions will be allowed. 113

The

Assembly is also responsible for the election and removal of the Judges, the Prosecutor
and the Deputy Prosecutor(s). 114
According to Article 112 (7), each State Party has one vote, however, every effort
has to be made to reach decisions by consensus both in the Assembly and the Bureau and
where consensus cannot be reached, decisions are made on the basis of either a two-thirds

107
The Permanent Secretariat of the Assembly commenced its work in 2004 in The Hague and is headed by
Dr. Medard Rwelamira (South Africa). See Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties, at http://www.icccpi.int/asp.html (visited October 5, 2005).
108
See Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of States Parties, chapter iv, ICC-Asp/1/3 (2002), adopted by
the Assembly of States Parties at its First Session at The Hague, September 3-20, 2002, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/report/first_report_contents.htm (visited October 11, 2005).
109
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(2)(a-f).
110
Id., art. 112(2)(g) (stating that in addition to the list included in Article 112 (a)-(f), the Assembly shall,
“[p]erform any other function consistent with this Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”).
111
Id., art. 115(a).
112
Id., art 115(b) provides that the Court shall receive “[f]unds provided by the United Nations, subject to
the approval of the General Assembly, in particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by
the Security Council.”
113
Id., art 116.
114
Id., arts. 36, 42(4), & 46(2).

171

or simple majority depending on the issues in question. 115 To ensure that the Assembly
of States carry out their duties independently without interference by either the host
country or third parties, the APIC provides that the representatives of States participating
in the proceedings of the Assembly and its subsidiary organs as well as representatives of
observer States and intergovernmental organizations invited to attend such meetings
enjoy privileges and immunities for their official acts. 116
Disputes between two or more States parties concerning the interpretation of the
Statute that do not involve the “judicial functions of the Court” that cannot be resolved by
negotiation or by the Assembly may be referred to the ICJ for resolution. 117 Perhaps,
resort to the ICJ instead of the Court is in recognition of the fact that the Court’s
jurisdiction is limited to criminal acts committed by individuals. Also, it is remarkable
that ICJ jurisdiction to interpret the ICC Statute does not include the interpretations that
border on the Court’s judicial functions as this may subject the Court to judicial review
by the ICJ. Be that as it may, it is suggested that ICJ Article 119 jurisdiction should be
narrowly construed and every efforts should be made by States parties to discourage
resort to the ICJ.

5.3.3. The Presidency
The Presidency is one of the four Organs of the Court and is composed of the
President and First and Second Vice-Presidents, all of whom were first elected as Judges
of the ICC on a full-time basis. 118 The judges composing of the Presidency are then

115

ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 112(7).
See Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 98, art. 14.
117
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 119.
118
Id., art. 38.
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172

elected by an absolute majority of the eighteen judges of the Court for a three year
renewable term. 119 On March 11, 2003, the ICC judges elected Judge Philippe Kirsch
(Canada) as its first President, Judge Akua Kuenyehia (Ghana) as First Vice-President,
and Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) as Second Vice-President of the Court. 120
With the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Presidency is responsible
for the general administration of the Court, particularly, the judicial administration of the
Court. 121 However, the Presidency will coordinate and seek the concurrence of the
Prosecutor on all matters of mutual concern. 122

5.3.4. The ICC Judiciary
The judiciary of the Court is composed of three divisions: Appeals Division, Trial
Division, and Pre-Trial Division.

Each division is responsible for carrying out the

judicial functions of the Court. The Court’s bench will comprise of 18 judges, sitting on
the Pre-trial, Trial and Appeal benches. 123 All the judges must be persons of “high moral
character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their
respective Sates for appointment to the highest judicial offices” 124 and must be nationals
of States parties to the ICC Statute. 125 In addition, each candidate for the judgeship must
possess cognate experience in criminal law and procedures as a judge, a prosecutor, an

119

ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 38.
See International Criminal Court: The Presidency, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/presidency.html
(visited on October 7, 2005); Jeff Sallot, Canadian First to Lead War-Crimes Court , Globe and Mail,
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121
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123
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36(2).
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advocate, or in other similar capacity. 126 On the other hand, the candidate may establish
“competence in relevant areas of international law, such as international humanitarian
law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal
capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court.” 127
The judges are elected by the countries that have ratified the Statute of the ICC
using secret ballots. 128 Nominations for judges may be made by any State party. 129
Judges are elected by a two-thirds majority of States’ parties. 130 In electing judges, the
Assembly of States Parties are enjoined to take into consideration “[t]he representation of
the principal legal systems of the world; [e]quitable geographical representation; and [a]
fair representation of female and male judges.” 131 The Assembly is also encouraged to
consider the need to include “judges with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but
not limited to, violence against women or children.” 132 Furthermore, the Assembly of
States Parties must elect at least nine judges from “List A” and at least five judges from
“List B.” 133
During first session of the Assembly of States Parties held in New York from 3 to
7 February 2003, the Assembly elected the eighteen judges of the Court for a term of
office of three, six, and nine years. 134 The judges constitute a forum of international
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experts that represents the world’s principal legal systems. 135 Judges will hold their
offices for a term of nine years and will not be eligible for re-election. 136 However,
judges selected for a term of three years are eligible for re-election for a full term of nine
years. 137 Also, a judge involved in an on-going trial or appeal may conclude the trial or
appeal before his or her retirement. 138 Article 36(10) will ensure that a trial or an appeal
is not interrupted mid-way with the withdrawal of a judge before the completion of the
trial or appeal.
After the election of the judges, the Court organized itself into Appeals, Pre-Trial
and Trial Divisions and Chambers in accordance with Article 39 of the ICC Statute.139
The Appeals Division consists of one appeals chamber of five judges. The Appeals
Chamber is composed of judges primarily elected from List B including the President and
four other judges. 140 The judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in this
Division for the entire term of their office. 141 The Trial Division is composed of six
judges with predominantly criminal trial experience and consists of the Second Vice
President and five other judges. 142

Africa); Karl T. Hudson-Phillips (Trinidad and Tobago); and Sang- Adrian Fulford (United Kingdom). For
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The Trial Division is divided into two Trial Chambers of three judges each.
Three judges of the Division form a quorum and can carry out the judicial functions of
the Trial Chamber. 143 The Trial Chamber judges shall serve in this Division for a period
of three years, and thereafter until the completion of any case if the hearing has already
started. 144 The major role of the Trial Chamber, expressed in article 64 of the ICC
Statute, is adopting all the necessary procedures to ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious, and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused with regard
for the protection of victims and witnesses. 145
The Pre-Trial Division which is composed of judges with predominantly criminal
trial experience consists of the First Vice President and six other judges. 146 They shall
serve in this Division for a period of three years, and thereafter until the completion of
any case if the hearing has already started. 147 The functions of the Pre-Trial Division
may be carried out by Pre-Trial Chambers composed of either a single judge or of a
bench of three judges. 148 The Pre-Trial Chamber inter alia, confirms or rejects the
authorization to commence an investigation by the Prosecutor and makes a preliminary
determination on admissibility and jurisdiction of the Court, without prejudice to
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to challenge on the jurisdiction and

Fulford, and Judge Karl Hudson-Phillips. See International Criminal Court: Trial Division at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/chambers/trial.html (visited October 7, 2005).
143
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 39(2)(b)(ii).
144
Id., art. 39((3)(a).
145
Id., art. 64(2).
146
Id., art. 39(1). The judges assigned to the Pre-Trial Division are the First Vice-President, Judge Akua
Kuenyehia, Judge Fatoumata Diarra, Judge Claude Jorda, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, Judge Mauro Politi,
Judge Tuiloma Neroni Slade, and Judge Sylvia Steiner. See International Criminal Court: Pre-Trial
Division at http://www.icc-cpi.int/chambers/pretrial.html (visited October 7, 2005).
147
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 36(3)(a).
148
Id., art. 39(2)(b)(iii).
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admissibility of a case. 149 Also, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms the charge(s) against the
accused person before commencement of trial. 150
Although all judges are to be elected on the basis of their nationality to one of the
States Parties to the ICC Statute, once elected, a judge cannot be automatically
disqualified from sitting on a case solely on the basis that he or she is of the same
nationality with the accused. Rather, a judge may recuse his or herself 151 or may be
disqualified from a particular case on the subjective ground that his or her “impartiality
might reasonably be doubted” or on the objective ground that he or she was previously
involved in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level. 152
Contrast with the 1994 International Law Commission’s draft Statute which disqualifies a
judge from sitting in a case if he or she is a national of a complainant State or of the
accused person. 153

Article 41 of the ICC Statute presents a better approach to

disqualification of a judge as opposed to the 1994 ILC draft because it allows for
disqualification only in circumstances that suggests judge impartiality. 154
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ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 53 & 57.
Id., art. 61.
151
Id., art. 41(1).
152
Id., art. 41(2)(a).
153
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Article
9(7), U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft
Statute].
154
Note however that Article 41(2)(a) also provides that a judge may also be disqualified on other grounds
as may be included in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. For instance see Rule 34 RPE which added
additional bases for disqualification on grounds of conflict of interest or bias. See Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002,
ICC-ASP/1/3 at www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf
(visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
150

177

5.3.5. The Office of the Prosecutor
The Office of the Prosecutor is headed by a Chief Prosecutor and assisted by two
Deputy Prosecutors who must be of different nationalities. 155 The Chief Prosecutor has
full authority over the management and the administration of the Office, including the
staff, facilities and other resources of the Office. 156 The principal mandate of the Office
of the Prosecutor is to receive referrals and substantiated information and conduct
investigations and prosecutions of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. 157
For efficient discharge of its mandate, the ICC Statute provides that the Office of the
Prosecutor shall act independently. 158 Consequently, a member of the Office of the
Prosecutor must not seek or act on instructions from any external source, such as States,
international organizations, NGOs or individuals. 159
The Chief Prosecutor and the two Deputy Prosecutors are elected by the
Assembly of States Parties for a non renewable term of nine years unless a shorter term is
decided at the time of their election. 160 Like the judges, the Chief Prosecutor and the
Deputy Prosecutors shall not participate in any matter in which their “impartiality may
reasonably be doubted on any ground.” 161 Also, they shall be disqualified from a case if
they had previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a
related criminal case at the national level concerning the accused person. 162
Article 42(7) of the ICC Statute represents a departure from the 1994 ILC draft
which recommended automatic disqualification of the Chief Prosecutor and Deputy
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ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 42(2).
Id..
157
Id., arts. 42(1) & 54.
158
Id., art. 41(1).
159
Id.
160
Id., art. 42(4).
161
Id., art. 42(7).
162
Id., art 42(7).
156

178

Prosecutors from participating in any case involving an accused person of their own
nationality. 163
On April 21, 2003, the Assembly of States unanimously elected Luis Moreno
Ocampo (Argentina) 164 as the first Chief Prosecutor of the Court for a term of nine
years. 165 On June 16 2003, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo took office and pledged to solemnly
undertake the duties of his Office as provided in the ICC Statute. 166 Also, on September
10, 2003, the Assembly of States Parties elected Serge Brammertz (Belgium) as Deputy
Prosecutor (Investigations), for a term of six years and was sworn in on November 3,
2003. 167

On September 8, 2004, Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) was elected Deputy

Prosecutor (Prosecutions), for a full term of nine years. 168 Ms. Bensouda was sworn in
on November 1, 2004, at The Hague. 169
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1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 153, art. 12(5).
Moreno Ocampo had established his reputation as a prosecutor during several high profile trials
involving leading figures from Argentina’s military junta. He is also a renowned academic in the field of
human rights, and is the Robert F. Kennedy Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School. See Curriculum
vitae Luis Moreno Ocampo, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/ otp/moreno ocampo cve revised.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005).
165
See Election of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (last modified Apr. 21, 2003), at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/elections/results/prosecutor<uscore>results.htm. Also see, Media Alert,
International Criminal Court, Election of the Prosecutor (Apr. 24, 2003), available at: http://www.icccpi.int/php/news/details.php?id=3 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). In a move to usher confidence on the Chief
Prosecutor, The ASP decided that the prosecutor should be elected “by consensus,” and encouraged States
Parties to consult with each other before nominating a candidate for prosecutor. On March 24, 2003, the
President of the Assembly of States Parties announced that the States Parties to the Rome Statute had
“informally, and on the basis of consensus” selected the Argentine Luis Moreno Ocampo to serve as the
court’s first prosecutor. See Press Release, Election of the Prosecutor - Statement by the President of the
Assembly of States Parties Prince Zeid Raad Al Hussein (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.icccpi.int/news/details.php?id=2.
166
International Criminal Court: Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor (June 16,
2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_ceremony.html (visited October 7, 2005).
167
ICC Press Release, Election of the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 10,
2003), at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/aspfra.htm
168
ICC Press Release, States Parties to International Criminal Court elect Ms. Fatou Bensouda of the
Gambia Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) [Sept. 10, 2003], at http://www.icccpi.int/statesparties/third_session.html (visited October 7, 2005).
169
ICC Press Release, Solemn Undertaking of Deputy Prosecutor (Prosecutions) (Nov. 1, 2004), at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=83.html .
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In order to efficiently discharge the functions of the Office of the Prosecutor, the
Office is subdivided into three operational divisions. 170 The Investigation Division
headed by Deputy Prosecutor Brammertz, is responsible for carrying out the actual
investigations, such as collecting and examining evidence, questioning persons being
investigated as well as victims and witnesses. The Investigation Division is composed of
several interdisciplinary investigative teams, including forensic, military, political,
financial, and other analysts. 171 The Investigation Division may carry out its work at the
seat of the ICC and, if necessary on the territory of the State concerned. 172 The ICC
Statute requires the Office to extend the investigation to cover both incriminating and
exonerating facts in order to establish the truth. 173
The Prosecution Division headed by Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has a
role in the investigative process, but its principal responsibility is the litigation of cases
before the various Chambers of the Court. The Prosecution Division comprises the trial
and appeals counsel who will present cases before the Court. 174
The Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCCD) headed by
Mrs. Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, analyses referrals and communications, with support
from the Investigation Division and makes recommendations on issues of jurisdiction,
complementarity, and cooperation related to the situations under analysis or

170

See International Criminal Court – Office of the Prosecutor: General Organization, at http://www.icccpi.int/organs/otp.html (visited October 10, 2005).
171
Hans-Peter Kau Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice:
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J.INT’L L. 370, 373 (2005).
172
ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 54(2).
173
Id., art. 54(1)(a).
174
It is noteworthy that while the U.S. continues its opposition to the ICC, one of the senior trial attorneys
for the ICC is former New York federal prosecutor Christine Chung, a U.S. national. See Jess Bravin,
International Criminal Court Picks US Lawyer to Lead First Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2004.
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investigation. 175 The JCCD also helps to negotiate and secure cooperation agreements
with relevant States, entities, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations
needed for the activities of the Office of the Prosecutor. 176
While the ICC Statute provides that the Office of the Prosecutor should act
independently, 177 the Statute nevertheless provided some checks on the investigation
power of the Prosecutor in order to assuage the fears of some States on the implication of
an independent Prosecutor with absolute power.

Thus, the ICC Statute contains a

graduated procedure by which the Pre-Trial Chamber would have to approve the
investigation of cases in situations where the Office of the Prosecutor wishes to exercise
its prosecution powers proprio motu. 178

5.3.6. The Office of the Registrar
The Office of the Registrar is one of the four organs of the Court and is
responsible for the administration of non-judicial aspects of the Court. 179 The Registry is
headed by the Registrar who as the principal administrative officer of the Court shall
exercise his or her functions under the authority of the President. 180 The Registrar and
Deputy Registrar are elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of judges meeting in
plenary session. 181 Following the recommendation from the Bureau of the Assembly of
States Parties, on June 24, 2003, Mr. Bruno Cathala (France) was appointed first
Registrar of the Court for a renewable term of five years. 182
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ICC Statute, supra note 65, arts. 15 & 53.
Id., art. 54(3)(c) & (d).
177
Id., art. 41(1).
178
Id., art., 15.
179
Id., art. 43(1).
180
Id., art. 43(2).
181
Id., art. 43(3).
182
Id., art. 42(5).
176
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Apart from general administration of the Court, the Registry provides
administrative support to the judges and the Secretariat of the Assembly of States Parties.
Also, the Registry, through the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry is responsible
for providing protective measures to victims and witnesses who appear before the
Court. 183 The Registrar is also to serve as the channel of communication between the
Court

and

States,

Inter-governmental

Organizations

and

Non-Governmental

Organizations. 184

5.4.

Observations and Commentary
The twentieth century witnessed atrocities of a truly unprecedented nature. It is

estimated that 170 million died in 250 conflicts that have occurred since World War II
evidencing a testament of the failure of the international community to create a viable
mechanism to prevent aggression and enforce international humanitarian law. 185
Fortunately, the apathy that the international community showed to various proposals for
a permanent international court gave way to a purposeful deliberation at the Rome
Conference which established the ICC. The ICC Statute is an expression of the
compromises that have to be made at the Rome Conference to ensure that the Court is
created.
The main objective of ICC is to end the impunity of perpetrators who commit
crimes that are of concern to the international community as a whole. 186 By holding
individuals criminally responsible for the crime sunder the ICC Statute, the ICC will
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ICC Statute, supra note 65, art. 42(6).
See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 154, Rule 13(1).
185
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution,
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 (2000).
186
ICC Statute, supra note 65, preamble.
184
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deter other perpetrators from committing atrocities against their own people by sending a
strong message that these crimes will not go unpunished. 187 Further, the ICC serves as
effective replacement of ad hoc tribunals and unlike ad hoc tribunals, the ICC will have a
broader jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes. Additionally, with the establishment of the ICC, the United Nations is
relieved from the financial burden and international politics that the United Nations faces
when requested to set up ad hoc tribunals for every conflict.
The ICC Statute has already entered into force in 2002 having been ratified by
more than the required sixty States Parties within a record time. Also, with the election
and appointment of the judicial and administrative officers of the ICC, the Court is ready
to commence work. The qualification and the professional competence of the judges and
the Prosecutor signals desire of the Assembly of States Parties to properly equip the ICC
to take off on a proper footing. These first set of appointments have received the
approval of majority of he international community.
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U.N. Dep’t of Public Information, The Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court: Background
Information (May 1998), at http:/www.un.org/icc/statute.htm.
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CHAPTER SIX
===============================================================

6.0.

6.1.

THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
___________________________________

Introduction
The Court will exercise complementary jurisdiction 1 with national courts over

individuals accused of committing egregious “crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.” 2 Such crimes include the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and the crime of aggression. 3 The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression is however deferred to a later day when “a provision is adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.” 4 Under this
process, the earliest time aggression could be included in the Court’s jurisdiction as a
crime is seven years after the statute entered into force. 5 Terrorism and drug related
crimes were adopted into the text in an annexed resolution and will become part of the

1

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble para.10, arts. 1, 17(1), & 19(2)(b). U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The
ICC Statute does not define the term complementarity, but a combined reading of the provisions of the ICC
Statute indicated herein suggests that it means the Court should only exercise jurisdiction if state(s) that has
jurisdiction over the individual(s) is “unable” or “unwilling” to initiate criminal prosecution. See further
discussion on the Principle of Complementarity, infra Chapter 8.
2
ICC Statute, supra note 1, at Preamble para. 9 & arts. 1,5.
3
Id., art. 5(1). arts. 6-8 (defining the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
4
Id., art. 5(2).
5
Articles 121 and 123 of the ICC Statute detail the process of amending the Statute. In particular, under
articles 121(1) & 123(1), proposal to amend the Rome Statute may be made seven years after its entry into
force. Id.

crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction once it is defined at a review conference in the
future. 6
The above categories of crimes over which the Court will exercise jurisdiction
were considered to be jus cogens norms 7 by majority of States involved in the Rome
Conference. 8 Article 6 of the Rome Statute confirms, in the same words, the provisions
of the 1948 Genocide Convention and represents a further step towards the codification
of principles and rules of the crimes of genocide which appear to be generally accepted.
On the other hand, articles 7 and 8 represent an evolution of the crimes against humanity
and war crimes.

Here, detailed provisions have replaced those of article 6 of the

Nuremberg Charter and of their successive formulations.
During the drafting of the ICC Statute, there was the question whether the Court’s
subject matter should be limited to those crimes which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law or whether it should also include all crimes or offences codified in
international instruments. 9 As the discussion progressed, it became clear that the more

6

See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Annex 1, Res. E, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998) {hereinafter Final
Act].
7
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) defines jus cogens as “norms accepted
and recognized by the international community of States from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The ICJ made this clear when it considered the effect of reservations to the Genocide
Convention and stated that “the prohibition of genocide is binding on states, even without any contractual
obligation.” See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Adv. Op.), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 23 (1951) (discussing genocide as a jus cogens norm);
Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (5 Feb.) (Second Phase) (discussing
genocide as an obligation erga omnes). The term jus cogens norms refer to customary international laws
which gives rise to obligations erga omnes, that is, obligations owing to the international community as a
whole. See Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique
of the U.S. Position, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 80, n. 60 (2001).
8
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and
Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 201-202 (1998); Michael P. Scharf, supra
note 7, at 80.
9
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, Article 20, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute]. While the
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punishable conducts included in the jurisdiction, the fewer the States that are willing to
accept the Court’s jurisdiction. The Committee then suggested referring all crimes that
are recognized by treaty to an ad hoc jurisdiction with the consequence that the parties to
the statute can still decide whether they are willing to accept an ICC’s jurisdiction on a
case by case basis, while the more important exclusive jurisdiction implying an automatic
acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction upon becoming party to the statute should be limited
to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. 10
At the end, a practical compromise was reached to establish a court with a modest
jurisdictional scope which jurisdiction will be generally acceptable by the majority of the
States Parties. Thus, as noted by Judge Philippe Kirsch, President of the Court who was
then, the Rome Diplomatic Conferences Chairman, “[i]t was understood that the [Rome]
statute was not to create new substantive law, but only to include crimes already
prohibited under international law.” 11
It has been argued that while the above approach limited the Court’s jurisdiction,
it was desirable to achieve the more expedient goal of making the Court’s jurisdiction
automatic and compulsory to States Parties instead of an optional or case by case

conferment of jurisdiction to the Court over all treaty crimes may expand the jurisdiction of the Court, it
could also minimize the Court’s efficiency as it may be over burden with cases. Besides, unlike the ILC
Draft which merely lists the crimes, a decision had earlier been reached by the Committee to include the
definition of the crimes in the Statute, the Committee therefore recognized that it may encounter problem of
definition because there are no uniformity of definition to some of the treaty crimes.
10
This was the position of the ILC and many of the States involved in the Conference. See 1994 ILC
Draft, supra note 9, at Preamble para. 2,: “Emphasizing that such a court is intended to exercise jurisdiction
only over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” Also see,
Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 5 (1999).
11
Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, supra note 10, at 7 n.19 (citing 1 Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22,
at 16, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996)).
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jurisdiction envisioned by the ILC. 12 Therefore, a State upon becoming a State Party to
the ICC Statute automatically accepts the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to crimes
referred to in Article 5 13 but subject to the deferred jurisdiction over the crimes of
aggression. 14 Articles 6-8 of the ICC Statute contains detailed definition of the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes respectively. These crimes have been
specifically addressed and carefully described in the Statute and will be examined below
shortly.

6.2.

Guidelines for Interpreting and Applying the Definitions.
Before examining the definition of the crimes of genocide, crimes against

humanity and war crimes, it is apposite to precede the examination with the guidelines
underlying the interpretation and application of the definitions.

In interpreting the

definition, it is important to bear in mind the caveat that the definition is supplied only for
“the purpose of this Statute”. 15 It appears that the basis for the express limitation of the
application of the definition to the purpose of the Statute is to avoid the impression that
the Statute purports to serve as an international codification of the said crimes and
thereby preclude the further development of these crimes for other purposes, especially as
crimes under customary international law.
Article 10 of the ICC Statute offers another guideline to the effect that the
definition of the crimes proffered in this Part of the Statute shall not be “interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for

12

See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 665, 669 (1995).
13
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
14
Id. art. 5(2).
15
Id., arts. 6(1), 7(1), & 8(1).
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purposes other than this Statute.” 16 Obviously, the purposes of the ICC Statute will be
better served with the progressive advancement of rules of international law as the Court
may apply these rules in the interpretation of the Statute. 17
Further, other than the definition of the crimes, the Court may look to the
Elements of Crimes 18 and the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 19 for assistance
in “the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, & 8. 20 Also, the Court should
endeavor to interpret the definitions in consonance with the other parts of the Statute21
especially Part III of the Statute on General Principles of Criminal Law. Specifically, the
Court should adhere strictly to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as formulated by
article 22 which obligates the Court to strictly construe the definitions and not to extend it
by analogy. 22

6.3.

ICC Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae

6.3.1. The Crime of Genocide
The term genocide and its eventual criminalization are attributed to Raphael
Lemkin. 23 The Polish-Jewish scholar and jurist coined the word “genocide” from a
combination of the ancient Greek word genos, meaning, according Lemkin, “race” or

16

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 10.
Id., art. 20(1)(b).
18
Article 9(1) of the ICC Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes “shall be adopted by two-thirds
majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties.” Id. See Elements of Crimes, adopted by the
Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at
www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/ report/english/part_ii_b_e.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter
ICC Elements of Crimes].
19
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties at its first session in
New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/
Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure
and Evidence].
20
ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts 9 & 20(1)(a).
21
Id., art. 20(1)(a).
22
Id., art. 22(2).
23
See Samantha Power, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 4260 (2002).
17
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“tribe” and the derivative cide from the Latin word caedere, which means “killing”. 24
According to Lemkin, genocide is “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves.” 25 In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which
criminalized the acts of genocide as defined in article II of the Convention. 26
By 1951, the crime and definition of Genocide were already generally
acknowledged as reflecting customary international law. 27

Attempts to expand or

otherwise restrict the definition of genocide at the Preparatory Committee meetings to
reflect changing circumstances of the twenty-first century proved unsuccessful. 28 Thus,
the provisions of Article II of the Geneva Convention were adopted mutatis mutandis in
the Statute of the ICC 29 as was the case with the Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (ICTY) 30 and the International Criminal Tribunal for

24

Raphael Lemkin, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, LAWS OF OCCUPATION: ANALYSIS OF
GOVERNMENT: PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1944); Samantha Power, supra note 23, at 42.
25
Id., at 79.
26
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
280, approved and opened for signature and ratification or accession on December 9, 1948, (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. As at October 7, 2005, 137 States have ratified the
Genocide Convention. Information on ratification, reservations and declarations of the Genocide
Convention are available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/1.htm (visited October 10,
2005).
27
See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep., 15, 23 (May 28, 1951) (ICJ noted that “the principles underlying the
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
conventional obligation”); Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb 5, 1970)
(Second Phase) (discussing genocide as an obligation erga omnes).
28
Preparatory Committee for Establishment of International Criminal Court Discusses Definitions of
“Genocide”, “Crime Against Humanity”, March 26, 1996, U.N. Press Release L/2762 (1996); Herman von
Hebel and Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE – ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 79-126, 89 (R.S. Lee Ed. The Hague/Boston/London: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
29
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6.
30
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 4, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993), appended to SC Resolution 827, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) (hereinafter ICTY
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Rwanda (ICTR). 31 Therefore, article 6 of the ICC Statute which replicates the definition
of genocide in the Geneva Convention provides that:
For the purposes of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 32
Article 6(a-e) lists the various ways in which a protected group may be targeted
for destruction, but it has been suggested that killing represents one manifestation of
genocidal intent. 33 Therefore, the sine qua non of genocide is the intent to destroy the
group and not the act of killing itself which is just one way of achieving the objective.34
In addition to the crime of genocide, article 25 of the ICC Statute enlarges punishable
acts, adding soliciting or inducing the commission of a crime of genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, attempted genocide, and
complicity in genocide as punishable crimes. 35 For an act to be considered as genocide,
it is necessary that one of the acts listed above has been committed, with the special

Statute]. The ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, May
25, 1993, for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
31
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., Art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES 955, (1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994).
32
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6.
33
By stating that perpetrators’ objectives include “the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health,
dignity and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups,” Lemkin clearly suggests that
“killing” is but one among other unspecified acts that may constitute genocide. See Raphael Lemkin, supra
note 24, at 42.
34
Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 244-47 (1996) (proposing killing as
critical element in definition of genocide).
35
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25, Genocide Convention, supra note 26, art. III.
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intent to destroy in whole or in part one of the protected groups covered under article 6.
These three elements are briefly considered below.

6.3.1.a.

The Mental Element of the Crime of Genocide
Article 6 of the ICC Statute provides that an accused shall be guilty of the crime

of genocide as defined in the Statute if committed with “intent to destroy …a group.”
The requirement of the “intent to destroy” in article 6 is consistent with the general
requirement in article 30 of the ICC Statute to the effect that:
Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge. 36
Thus, in order for the Court to convict an individual for a crime of genocide, the
Prosecutor must establish that the accused committed one or more of the acts listed in
article 6(a-e) with a culpable mens rea. 37 It is probably easier to establish the occurrence
of any of the prohibited acts than it is to establish the intent requirement. As noted by the
International Law Commission, the actus reus of genocide:
are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts
which an individual could not usually commit without knowing
that certain consequences were likely to result. These are not the
type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a
result of mere negligence. However, a general intent to commit
one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of
the probable consequences of such an act with respect to the
immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of
genocide. The definition of this crime requires a particular state
of mind or a specific intent with respect to the overall
consequences of the prohibited act. 38
36

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 30(1) [emphasis added].
Id., art. 6.
38
See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session May 6 –July 26, 1996, p 88, U.N. GAOR. 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. GA/51/10 (1996), [hereinafter 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes].
37
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The ICC Statute did not offer general guidelines for deciphering intent, however,
article 30 suggests that intent will be found “in relation to conduct [where] that person
means to engage in the conduct” 39 and “in relation to a consequence, [where] that person
means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events.” 40 On the other hand, ‘“knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.” 41 For the actus reus to
amount to genocide, the mens rea to destroy a group must be established, the outcome of
the act is of no consequence in itself. 42 Thus, the intent of the perpetrator is paramount in
a finding of genocide because it is that intent to destroy a particular protected group in
whole or in part, that makes crimes of mass murder and crimes against humanity qualify
as genocide. 43
Taken together therefore, the question of intent must be interpreted against the
background that “genocide is a crime of specific or special intent, involving a perpetrator
who specifically targets victims on the basis of their group identity with a deliberate
desire to inflict destruction upon the group itself.” 44 Thus, attacks on moderate Hutus
during the Rwandan hostilities cannot constitute genocide under the Convention, 45 even
though many of those crimes were an essential part of the overall scheme to destroy
39

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(a).
Id., art. 30(2)(b).
41
Id., art. 30(3).
42
Nehemiah Robinson, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 59 (New York, 1960).
43
See Final Report of the Commission of Experts, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, par. 97 (May 5, 1994). Also see
1996 Draft Code of Crimes, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, p. 88 (1996) [noting that the intent of the perpetrator must
be to destroy a group and not merely individuals who are coincidentally members of a particular group].
44
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocide Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based
Interpretation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2264 (1999).
45
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T 710 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial
Chamber I, September 2, 1998), available at:
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm [hereinafter Akayesu
Judgment].
40
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Tutsis as a group because there was no intent to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in whole
or in part. 46
While the Court is yet to be confronted with the interpretation of the intent
requirement, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have addressed the issue. In each case, the tribunals attempted to formulate
general guidelines for inferring genocidal intent absent an admission of intent to commit
genocide by the accused. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 47 the first case to convict an accused
for genocide, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR noted that the specific intent of the accused
is a mental factor which is difficult, if not impossible to determine. 48 Notwithstanding,
the Trial Chamber suggested that “in the absence of a confession from the accused, intent
can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact.” 49 The ICTR then
proceeded to establish that genocidal intent may be inferred from the following factors:
The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal
intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general
context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group, whether these acts were
committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such
as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a
region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a
particular act. 50

46

Atrocities against moderate Hutu probably constitute crimes against humanity. See ICTR Statute, supra
note 31, art. 3.
47
Prosecutor v. Akayesu Judgment, supra note 45, p.523.
48
Id., at 523.
49
Id.
50
Id.

193

Prior to Akayesu judgment, the Trial Chamber 1 of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Karazic and Mladic 51 had suggested
that genocidal “intent derives from the combined effect of speeches or projects laying the
groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the massive scale of their destructive effect
and from their specific nature, which aims at undermining what is considered to be the
foundation of the group.” 52 Also, the “general political doctrine that gave rise to the acts”
is relevant just as the “repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.” 53 In addition,
acts which “violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the very
foundation of the group” may also give rise to the inference. 54
In another ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 55 Trial
Chamber II opined that “intent can be inferred either from words or deed and may be
demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action.” 56 Apart from “words” or “deed”, the
Trial Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana suggested that the Chamber may also
consider “evidence such as the physical targeting of the group or their property to the
exclusion of other groups; 57 the use of derogatory language toward members of the
targeted group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury; 58 the methodical

51

Prosecutor v. Karazic and Mladic, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and
IT-95-18-R61 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, July 11, 1996) in 1 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998, at 679 (Andre Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 1999) [hereinafter Karazic and Mladic].
52
Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 51, p 94-95, at 711.
53
Id., p 94, at 711.
54
Id. The Trial Chamber cited Serbian destruction of Muslim libraries and religious institutions as
evidence of genocidal intent toward Muslims. Id., at 95.
55
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda,
Trial Chamber II, May 21, 1999) available at:
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/KayRuz/judgement/index.htm [hereinafter Kayishema and
Ruzindana].
56
Id., p 93.
57
Id., p.94.
58
Id.
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way of planning, the systematic manner of killing. 59 Further, the scale and general nature
of the atrocities committed is also important. 60
While the Kayishema and Ruzindana case suggested that “words” or “deed” may
suffice to infer genocidal intent, in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 61 the Trial
Chamber seems to suggest that words alone without the existence of a plan to destroy a
protected group as such may make it impossible for the prosecution to proof genocidal
intent. In this case, Jelisic had openly remarked his hatred for and desire to kill all
Muslims, a protected religious group. 62 The Trial Chamber decided that the Prosecutor
has not discharged its burden of proof regarding Jelisic’s genocidal intent because the
“Prosecutor has not provided sufficient evidence allowing it to be established beyond all
reasonable doubt that there existed a plan to destroy the Muslim group … within which
the murders committed by the accused would allegedly fit.” 63 On appeal, the Appeals
Chamber rejected the requirement of a plan as an ingredient of the crime. 64
Additional factors have also been proffered by the prosecution in Prosecutor v.
Sikirica. 65 The prosecution in Sikirica offered seven factors which it considered relevant
to prove the defendant’s mental culpability for genocide. 66
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Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, p.94.
Id.
61
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10-T P 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber, Dec. 14, 1999), http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/trialc1/judgement/jel-tj991214e.pdf [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment].
62
Id., at p 93.
63
Id., at p 98.
64
See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeal, Case No. IT-95-10-A Pp 47, 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Appeals
Chamber, July 5, 2001) where the Appeals Chamber common to both the ICTR and ICTY upheld the
inferability of intent and stated that “The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the existence of a plan or
policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime.” P 48, available at:
http://www.un.org/icty/brcko/appeal/judgement/jel-aj010705.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals
Chamber].
65
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-8-T PP 86, 90 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial
Chamber, Sept. 3, 2001), http://www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgement/010903r98bis-e.pdf [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment].
60
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The above factors that have been put forward by the Tribunals and the
prosecution are obviously offered as guidelines and were based on the consideration of
the facts of each case. While the guidelines may differ from one case to the other, the
Tribunals’ appear to agree that a court could infer genocidal intent from a methodological
examination of the factual record before the court on a case by case basis. 67 In any event,
the underlying motivations for the crime of genocide are irrelevant. 68
Note however the decision of the ICTY Prosecutor in Prosecutor v. Erdemovic 69
not to charge Erdemovic with genocide ostensibly on the basis that Erdemovic does not
have genocidal intent when he and his detachment were ordered to a farm where they
shot and killed unarmed Bosnian Muslim men because he acted pursuant to superior
orders and under threat of death. 70 This case should not stand for the proposition that
subordinates who acted pursuant to superior orders cannot form genocidal intent. As
explained in the comment to article 17 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, the
66

The seven factors, which apparently derived from the prosecutor’s brief before the Appeals Chamber in
Jelisic, were:
(a) The general and widespread nature of the atrocities committed;
(b) The general political doctrine giving rise to the acts;
(c) The scale of the actual or attempted destruction;
(d) Methodical way of planning the killings;
(e) The systematic manner of killing and disposal of bodies;
(f) The discriminatory nature of the acts;
(g) The discriminatory intent of the accused.
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 46 & n.123.
67
See Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T P 167 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial
Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000) at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Musema/judgement/index.htm;
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-3 P 63 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber,
Dec. 6, 1999), http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm; The
Appeals Chamber common to both the ICTR and ICTY upheld the inferability of intent in Prosecutor v.
Jelisic. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals Chamber, supra note 64, p 47. See also William A. Schabas,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 222-25 (2000).
68
Note, however, that it is not always clear whether specific evidence relates to motive or intent at trial.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 Nat’l Black L.J. 144, 156-57
(1999) (noting that motive and intent are not always analytically distinct).
69
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (Int’l Crim.
Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, March 5, 1998) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Erdemovic].
70
Id., p 14.
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definition of genocide applies to subordinates who carry out the order as well as those
who plan or order the genocide, even though the subordinate may not have the same level
of knowledge as the planner or superior. The ILC noted that:
The definition of genocide requires a degree of knowledge of the
ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than knowledge
of every detail of a comprehensive plan or policy of genocide. A
subordinate is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors
when he receives orders to commit the prohibited acts against
individuals belonging to a particular group. For example, a
soldier who is ordered to go from house to house and kill only
persons who are members of a particular group cannot be
unaware of the irrelevance of the identity of the victims and the
significance of their membership in a particular group. He
cannot be unaware of the relevance of the destructive effect of
this criminal conduct on the group itself. Thus the necessary
degree of knowledge and intent may be inferred from the nature
of the order to commit the prohibited acts of destruction against
individuals who belong to particular group and are therefore
singled out as the immediate victims of the massive criminal
conduct. He cannot escape responsibility if he carries out the
orders to commit the destructive acts against victims who are
selected because of their membership in a particular group by
claiming that he was not privy to all aspects of the
comprehensive genocidal plan or policy. The law does not
permit an individual to shield himself from the obvious. 71
It is also necessary to distinguish between intent to destroy a community as such
because they belong to a protected group from intent to persecute individuals because
they belong to a specific community without the intent to destroy the community. While
the former is genocide, the latter is a crime against humanity, the underlying difference
being that a discriminatory murder is not proof of genocidal intent. 72 Thus, in Prosecutor
v. Jelisic, 73 the ICTY noted that the crime of “genocide … differs from the crime of
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1996 ILC Report, supra note 9, at p 60.
See William A. Schabas, supra note 67, at 230-38 (discussing quantitative elements in determining
requisite intent); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 523 (1999) (reiterating necessity of intent).
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Persecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 21.
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persecution in which the perpetrator chooses his [or her] victims because they belong to a
specific community but does not necessarily seek to destroy the community as such.” 74
The ICTY opined that the intent to discriminatorily persecute individuals of a particular
group without the objective to destroy the entire group qualifies as a crime against
humanity while intent to destroy the entire group is genocide. 75 On the other hand, it is
the intent to destroy a group, in whole or in part, that differentiates genocide from
homicide. 76
Another related issue to genocidal intent is the question of motive. Although the
draft of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Genocide Convention included motives, 77 the final
text of the Convention is silent on the question of genocidal motive. 78 However, it
remains a source of contention whether the words “as such” require the prosecutor to
establish the perpetrator’s motive as well as the perpetrator’s intent. 79 It appears that the
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Persecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 79.
Id., pp 67, 68.
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Mathew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty
Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 415, 455 (1998).
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Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, UN ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, U.N. Doc.
E/794/Corr.1 (1948), art. 2 (defined genocide as a crime committed “on grounds of the national or racial
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Final Report of the Commission of Experts for the former Yugoslavia, para. 97, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674
(1994); P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 33 (noting that the Genocide Convention final text “does not mention
motive beside the definition of the protected group which as such must be the object of persecution.”);
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeal Chamber, supra note 64, at p 49 (“The existence of a personal motive does
not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.”).
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See Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 59-61; M. Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 3 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 41 (1985) (arguing that it is
clear that under article II [of the Convention] the requisite intent to commit genocide must be accompanied
by proof of motive … ”). See however, Lawrence Leblanc, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION 80 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1991) (noting that “[n]either
article 2 or any other article of the Convention refers to the motives that must lie behind the commission of
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general consensus is that since the ultimate objective of genocide is to destroy a protected
group, the motive for such objective is irrelevant. 80
Adopting the Genocide Convention definition of the crime of genocide, the ICC
Statute does not require the existence of motive for the crime of genocide. No doubt,
requiring the existence of motive would provide perpetrators with a defense to argue that
their actions had been actuated by motives other than those enumerated. 81 Once the
requisite intent exists, it should make no difference whether that intent was fueled by
personal animus toward the protected group, by hopes of financial gain, by political
reasons, by a personal grudge against individual group members, by ideological
resistance, to win a war, or indeed by any reason whatsoever. 82 Thus, the underlying
motives for the crime of genocide are irrelevant. Motive can, however, serve as evidence
toward proving the existence of genocidal intent, 83 as well as nature and duration of
punishment. 84

6.3.1.b.
Extent of Intended Destruction
Article 6 of the ICC Statute provides that an accused shall be guilty of the crime
of genocide as defined by the Statute if committed with intent to destroy “in whole or in

80
P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 84; John Webb, Genocide Treaty: Ethnic Cleansing, Substantive and
Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 377, 391 (1993), cited with approval in Final Report of the
Commission of Experts for Rwanda established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), Dec.
9, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994) at paras. 158-59, (where the Commission opined that if the intent
to destroy a group is established, the absence or presence of a political motive would not negate the intent
to commit genocide); Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence,
11 HUM. RTS. Q. 82, 108-12 (1989); Lawrence LeBlanc, supra note 79, at 289-90; Paul Starkman,
Genocide and International Law: Is There a Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS INT’L L.J. 1, 7 n.14 (1984).
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Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 454. In any event, the line between motive and intent is often time
blurred. See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J.
144, 156-57 (1999) (noting that motive and intent are not always analytically distinct).
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See, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals Chamber, supra note 64, p 49; P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 83-84.
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See Kayishema and Ruzindana, supra note 55, p 93; Karadzic and Mladic, supra note 51, pp 94-95.
84
P.N. Drost, supra note 69, at 83; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 78.
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part …”, The meaning of the words “in part” has been a source of controversy. On the
one hand are those who express the view that proportionate scale and total number of
victims should be read into the definition of genocide in order to prevent trivializing the
gravity of the concept behind the crime of genocide. 85

Other proponents of the

“substantial part” test argue that the test is satisfied if it is the intent of the perpetrator to
destroy a multitude of persons of the same group because of their belonging to this group,
even though those persons constitute only part of a group either within a country or
within a region or within a single community, provided the number is substantial. 86 The
Convention, they argue, is intended to deal with action against large numbers, not
individuals even if they happen to possess the same group characteristics. 87

The

underlying argument being that the perpetrator need not target the entire group wherever
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See Benjamin Whitaker (U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Commission), Whitaker Report,
Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned: Revised
and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 16, 2930, Jul. 2, 1985, 38 UN ESCOR, Human Rights Sub-Comm’n on the Prevent. of Discrim. and Protect. of
Minorities, 38th Sess. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (1985) [hereinafter Whitaker Report]; Malcolm
Shaw, Genocide and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 797, 806 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) (expressing the
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Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(8) (2001). Similarly, the ILC had suggested that “the crime of genocide by its very
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Code of Crimes, supra note 38, at 89.
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Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 62-63, (arguing that the word “in part” suggests that genocide
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(emphasis added)). In the same vein, Raphael Lemkin seems to suggest that the Convention was designed
to apply to large numbers of people and that the “destruction in part must be of such a substantial nature …
so as to affect the entirety” (cited by Lawrence J. Leblanc, supra note 80, at 44, referring to a Hearing on
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they may exist, provided the perpetrator targets a substantial part of the group within a
geographic location. 88
In furtherance of the above position, two ICTY cases have required that the
alleged acts for which a defendant stands trial affect a “reasonably substantial number of
the group relative to its total population” prior to making any inference of the “intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.” 89 In
Sikirica, the ICTY referred to this as a “quantitative criterion.” 90 Similarly, the ICTR in
Kayishema’s case interpreted the “in part” language as mandating “the intention to
destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of that group.” 91

In

Kayishema and Ruzindana, the court held that destroying a group “in part” required
intent to “destroy a considerable number of individuals.” 92

However, while the

Kayishema and Ruzindana court considered the number of victims significant, it did not
consider it to be a threshold issue. 93
Under this approach, the court must determine whether the number of victims
constitute a significant number of victims or a significant percentage of the targeted
group. The court may do this by comparing the number of victims to the size of the
overall group or by inquiring whether the number of victims alone, is sufficiently large to
determine whether the victimization was “substantial”. 94

This exercise must be

conducted within the context of a particular geographical area, be it a city, a state, a
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region or a country taken into consideration the composition and size of that group within
the particular geographical area. 95
Invariably, what constitutes a “substantial part” becomes relative and to that
extent is fluid.

In situations where the group is broadly defined, the number or

percentage of victims that would constitute a “significant part” will obviously be higher
than where the group is narrowly defined. For example, the Trial Chamber in Kayishema
found the accused guilty of genocide, inter alia for the killing of at least 8,000 Tutsi at
the Gatwaro Stadium in Kibuye Town and another 4,000-5,500 at a Church in Mubuga. 96
Both killings took place within the Kibuye prefecture, (one of eleven regional areas in
Rwanda), which was in turn divided into nine communities. 97 Because the Trial
Chamber considered these killings within the limited geographical area of Kibuye
prefecture, it found that the killings constitute “substantial part” of the Tusti ethnic group.
Evidently, the result would be different if the Trial Chamber adopted a wider
conception of the geographic area which looks at genocide as an act intended to destroy a
substantial part of the protected group within a nation. 98 If Kayishema intended only to
rid the Kibuye prefect of Tutsi, he probably could not be convicted of genocide because
the killings of over 13,500 individuals would probably not constitute acts against a
“substantial part” of the overall Tutsi population in Rwanda, where minimum estimates
of the number killed exceed 800,000.

The implication of this approach is that a

perpetrator who deliberately targeted and killed more than 13,500 persons because of
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their membership to a protected group would be found not guilty of genocide. This
outcome is nothing but judicial absurdity.
Opposing the “substantial part” approach, are those who argue that the
perpetrator’s genocidal intent may manifest from a deliberate desire to target only a
limited number of individuals within a protected group because of the impact the
destruction of those persons may have on the survival of the group as such. 99 It is noted
that the targeting of some group members is more harmful because their loss contributes
more significantly to the destruction of the group. 100 Thus, as suggested by the U.N.
Commission of Experts, a focused attack on a specific segment of a protected group (i.e.,
political, business, or intellectual leaders or military or law enforcement personnel) “may
be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the numbers killed.” 101 This view
recognizes the impact the elimination of the selected persons would have not just on the
physical and biological survival of the group but also in the area of the group’s economic,
social and cultural preservation. 102
The approach has been criticized for its underlying presumption that some human
beings are inherently more valuable than others and therefore somewhat elitist. 103
However, suffice it to suggest that the evaluation if any, is not what their lives worth
99
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780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F.
279, 323-24 (1994) (arguing that the concept of genocide “is sufficiently pliable to encompass not only the
targeting of an entire group, as stated in the Convention, but also the targeting of certain segments of a
given group, such as the Muslim elite or the Muslim women”).
100
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, supra note 61, p 81 (noting that the extermination of the group’s
leadership may make the reminder of the group more vulnerable to further victimization)
101
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780
(1992), U.N. Doc. A/1994/674 at P 94 (1994). See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33T, p 587 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Aug. 2, 2001),
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 65.
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personally, but its worth to the continued existence of the group. Therefore, where the
dislodgment of some selected individuals within the group will affect the foundational
structure of the group such that the reminder of the group becomes endangered species,
the court should find that the perpetrator possess the necessary genocidal intent.
Adopting this reasoning, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Krstic 104 after
analyzing the effect on the group of an attack on all Bosnian Muslims men of military
aged in Srebenica concluded that the intent to kill them constituted an intent to destroy in
part the Bosnian Muslim group. 105
On the other hand, it has been argued that the number of victims should not be a
threshold issue in defining the crime of genocide because it is the genocidal intent which
makes the act genocide that is paramount, not the result of the act. 106 It is sufficient to
impose criminal responsibility for genocide if the accused aimed to destroy a large
number of the group in a particular community even if the accused was unable to
accomplish that objective. 107 It follows therefore that a perpetrator can be guilty of
genocide even in cases where the genocidal conduct resulted in the death of one victim
provided the intent of the perpetrator is directed at the destruction of the entire group or
part of it. 108
Thus, regardless of the approach adopted, the application should not apply to
actual destruction but to the intent of the perpetrator. In other words, if the intent of the
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Id., p 595.
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perpetrator is to destroy a “substantial” or “large” or “considerable” or “selected” part of
the group, the perpetrator is guilty of genocide. The extent to which the perpetrator was
successful in his or her design is inconsequential to determine whether genocide has
occurred. To ascribe a threshold number will result in situations where genocidal victims
would be left without justice.
In Sikirica, the ICTY in acquitting the accused on the charges of genocide for
allegedly killing 1,000-1,400 Muslims held that “this would represent between 2% and
2.8% of the Muslims in the Prijedor municipality and would hardly qualify as a
‘reasonably substantial’ part of the Bosnian Muslim group in Prijedor.” 109 Such decision
is disturbing in light of the Trial Chamber’s observation that “the fact that the evidence
does not establish that a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats were
victims ... does not necessarily negate the inference that there was an intent to destroy in
part the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat group.” The Trial Chamber consigned itself
with the number of victims and therefore concluded that when the quantitative figures are
“considered long with other aspects of the evidence, it becomes clear that this is not a
case in which the intent to destroy a substantial number of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian
Croats can properly be inferred.” 110
If the ICTR Trial Chamber in Kayishema adopted the ICTY Trial Chamber’s
approach in Sikirica’s case, Kayishema probably would not be convicted of genocide
because the killings of over 13,500 individuals would probably not constitute a
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Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment, supra note 65, p 72.
Id., p 75.
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“substantial part” of the overall Tutsi population in Rwanda, where minimum estimates
of the number killed exceeds 800,000. 111
The ICC Preparatory Committee considered whether the words “intent to destroy,
in whole or in part … [a] group” includes a specific intent to destroy more than a small
number of individuals who are members of the group and rejected the idea of ascribing
quantitative criteria to genocide because it would prohibit the application of genocide to
attacks against small number of individuals carried out within a broader context. 112 Thus,
article 6 expressly requires only that the acts be committed with the “intent to destroy, in
whole or in part,” a protected group. 113 Therefore, adopting a literal interpretation of the
plain meaning of article 6, there is no requirement that the accused have intended to
destroy the whole of a group in a particular geographic region or that the aim must be the
destruction of a substantial part of that group. Adopting “quantitative criterion” as a
threshold requirement undermines the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention on
which article 6 of the ICC Statute is based. 114
Suffice it to note that the use of the plural in article 6(a-e) to enumerate the acts
which constitute genocide may support the contention that more than one victim is
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required. 115 However, the use of the singular in the ICC Elements of Crimes appears to
support the proposition that one victim suffices as genocide. 116 Thus, it may be argued
that the use of the plural in article 6(a-e) was not a deliberate attempt by ICC to require
more than one victim for genocide conviction but a result of the decision to wholly adopt
the definition of genocide from the Genocide Convention. Perhaps, it may be good
prosecution strategy to include conspiracy to commit genocide and attempted genocide as
part of the counts in a charge of genocide such that where the Court is of the opinion that
the degree of the perpetrator’s conduct is not sufficient for genocide, the Court may find
the perpetrator guilty of attempted genocide or conspiracy to commit genocide or other
associated genocidal crime. 117
While it is conceded that as a practical matter, “the evidentiary hurdles posed by
the intent requirement would seem to preclude prosecution for acts directed at a small
number of people”, 118 the utility of the quantitative element should be consigned to its
evidentiary value as a determinant to deciphering genocidal intent and making a prima
facie case of genocide. 119 It has correctly been observed that “[n]umbers do not count in
cases of genocide”, … because “we cannot defend the establishment of a threshold above
which a certain number of killings would become genocide per se”, … rather, “we must
115
See Whitaker Report, supra note 85, at 16 (discussing Article 2(a-e) of the Genocide Convention which
is impair material with Article 6(a-e) of the ICC Statute). ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(a-e) using the
words such as “members”, “measures”, “births” and “children.”
116
ICC Elements of Crimes uses the term “one or more persons”, See Elements of Crimes, adopted by the
Assembly of States Parties at its first session in New York 3-10 September 2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 at
www.un.org/law/icc/asp/1stsession/ report/english/part_ii_b_e.pdf (visited October 7, 2005) [hereinafter
ICC Elements of Crimes].
117
See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3).
118
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IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, 2nd Ed., 39 (Oxford: Clarendon
2000).
119
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note 55, p 93; Final Report of the Commission of Experts for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405, para. 166
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acknowledge that the higher the number of killings, the easier a prima facie case for
genocide may be made.” 120

Beyond this, application of quantitative criteria as a

threshold issue to determine whether genocide has occurred will result in situations where
genocidal destructions or killings which were mercifully ended by the perpetrators or
stopped by rescue force before it gets out of proportion or meets the “prevailing”
quantitative criterion may go unpunished.
The submission to either the numeric test or percentage test to determine whether
sufficient number of victims have been met in order to establish genocide is outside the
purview of the power of the ICC judges given the admonition to avoid judicial
activism. 121

Any attempt to undertake an evaluation of quantitative analysis is an

exercise in judicial activism. Once intent to destroy a group wholly or in part has been
established, it suffices that a crime of genocide has been made. After all, genocide is an
inchoate offence because it criminalizes certain acts committed with a particular mental
state, whether or not those acts actually lead to the injury contemplated (i.e., attempts).122
This is in contrast to result-oriented offenses, which require the act in question actually
achieve a specified result (i.e., murder). 123

6.3.1.c.

Protected Groups of the Crime of Genocide
Under article II of the Genocide Convention which is repeated in article 6 of the

ICC Statute, the only victims of genocide recognized under the Convention and Statute
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are persons who are members of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups. 124 Any of
the prohibited acts under article II of the Convention or article 6 of the ICC committed
against an individual only becomes a crime of genocide if the individual is a member of
one of the four protected groups and the act was done with the intent to destroy the group
in whole or in part. 125 Thus, it is only the protected groups that are considered victims of
the crime of genocide and not individual members of the group. 126

Therefore, the

prohibited acts are not genocide if carried against members of the group without the
intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. 127
During the drafting of the Genocide Convention, there were debates on whether
the protected groups should include a political, social, economic, cultural, and any other
group in the definition of genocide. Under Raphael Lemkin’s conception of genocide, an
attack directed on the various aspects of human existence such as physical, political,

124

Genocide Convention, supra note 26, art. II; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6.
Raphael Lemkin, supra note 24, at 79 (arguing that “[g]enocide is directed against the national group as
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as
members of the national group”).
126
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 521; see also 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, supra
note 38 (“The group itself is the ultimate target or intended victim of this type of massive criminal
conduct... The intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such’, meaning as a separate and distinct entity.”);
United Nations, Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the One Hand and the Formulation of
the Nuremberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security on
the Other, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3/Rev.1 (1948) (“The victim of the crime of genocide is a human group. It is
not a greater or smaller number of individuals who are affected for a particular reason but a group as
such.”), quoted in Prosecutor v. Krstic, Judgment, supra note 101, p 552 n.1222; William A. Schabas, supra
note 67, at 231; Nehemiah Robinson, supra note 42, at 58 (noting that the main characteristic of Genocide
is its object: the act must be directed toward the destruction of a group. Groups consist of individuals, and
therefore destructive action must, in the last analysis, be taken against individuals. However, these
individuals are important not per se but only as members of the group to which they belong.).
127
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL.W. INT’L L.J. 201, at 251 (1979); see also
Bunyan Bryant, Substantive Scope of the Convention, 16 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 686, 691 (1975) explaining the
scope of article II:
125

From the ordinary meaning of article II of the Genocide Convention, it would seem that the killing of a single
person could be considered genocide if the killing were done with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the
national, ethical, racial, or religious group of which the victim was a member. On the other hand, without this
intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part, mass killings of members of the group would presumably not
constitute genocide under the Convention.
Id. at 691.

209

social, biological, cultural will qualify as genocide. 128

Lemkin campaigned for the

criminalization of genocide to provide protection for racial, national, and religious groups
whose cultural, political, social, or physical existence was imperiled, regardless of
whether the acts were committed in time of peace or war. 129 Consistent with Lemkin’s
definition of genocide, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 96(1) adopted a nonexhaustive enumeration of various groups that may be protected against the crime of
genocide. 130 Resolution 96(1) stated that racial, religious, political, and other groups had
been historically targeted for genocide, and the punishment of this crime was of
international concern. 131 The resolution affirmed that genocide was an offense whether
the perpetrator committed it on religious, racial, political, or any other grounds. 132
Although these principles enunciated in Resolution 96(1) were part of the
reference submitted to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly which considered
the drafting of the Genocide Convention, the committee produced a narrow definition of
genocide that was wildly divergent from the original resolution as well as the definition
originally derived by Raphael Lemkin. 133 During the Committee’s hearing, the matter of
the groups to be included in the definition of genocide, especially the inclusion of
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political group, was one of the most debated provisions. 134 There was tension between
the desire to condemn the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the aspiration to
craft a Convention that was sufficiently expansive to anticipate and prevent future acts of
genocide. 135
The delegates opposed to broad definition of genocide wanted the definition to
include only groups that were based on perceived “homogeneity and stability.” 136 On
this basis, the USSR argued that political groups unlike a national, racial or religious
group, lacked stability or permanence and has no common characteristic features. 137
Additionally, it has been suggested that the USSR opposed the inclusion of political or
social groups because Stalin’s government had already targeted both. 138 It was suggested
that the inclusion of political and other groups may deter some States from ratifying the
Convention because States would reject “such limitations to their right to suppress
internal disturbances.” 139
Delegates in support of defining genocide to include political and other groups
questioned the “permanence and stable” criterion for inclusion of national or religious
groups under the definition of genocide arguing that the members of these groups are
usually free to leave at any time. 140 They noted that “strife between nations has now
been superseded by strife between ideologies. Men no longer destroyed for reasons of
national, racial, or religious hatred, but in the name of ideas and the faith to which they

134

Frank M. Afflitto & Margaret Vandiver, The Political Determinants of Ethnic Genocide, in ANATOMY
OF GENOCIDE: STATE SPONSORED MASS KILLINGS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7
(Alexandre Kimenyi & Otis L. Scott eds., 2001); Beth V. Schaack, supra note 133, at 2264.
135
Louis Henkin et al., International Law 448 (3d ed. 1993).
136
Id. (quoting U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 63d mtg. at 6 (1948)).
137
U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 64d mtg. at 19 (1948)).
138
M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 212.
139
U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 65th mtg. at 21 (1948).
140
Beth V. Schaack, supra note 133, at 2265.

211

gave birth.” 141 The delegates noted that while the Nazis had destroyed millions of human
beings in the Netherlands and elsewhere on account of their race or their nationality, they
had also destroyed a great many others for their political opinions. Similarly, the Nazis
had also attacked the members of the Socialist and Communist parties as well as their
parliamentary representatives in Germany. 142
The opposition view was not enough to sway the Committee which agreed to
adopt a definition of genocide that recognizes fewer groups than was contained in
Lemkin’s definition of genocide and Resolution 96(1). 143 The Committee justified the
inclusion of only a national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups on the basis that each of
the said groups have historically been target of animosity and each group is characterized
by cohesiveness, homogeneity, inevitability of membership, stability, and tradition. 144 It
noted that membership of a political group is a matter of personal choice and as such not
stable enough to be afforded protection under the statute. 145
In 1993 and 1994, attempts to expand the definition of genocide to include
political and other groups were unsuccessful as the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR
respectively, ultimately adopted the definition of genocide as contained in article II of the
Convention. 146

Similarly, during the Rome Conference, some delegates suggested
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expanding the Convention definition of genocide to include political and social groups 147
but in the end, the Preparatory Committee for the ICC Statute failed to support any
changes to article II of the Genocide Convention. 148 Roman Kolodkin, a representative
of the Russian Federation, thought that the “idea of amending the definition to include
social and political groups would be counter-productive” and John Hope of the United
Sates asserted that to “try to add to that definition would just create controversy.” 149 Mr.
Hope therefore suggested that “[t]he Preparatory Committee should resist the temptation
to add new categories to the definition included in the Genocide Convention.” 150 The
French representative thought that “the crime of genocide should be defined by adopting
the definition in the 1948 Convention. The desire to improve the wording contained in
that Convention was not appropriate at present.” 151
As a result of the above opposition, the Committee concluded that expanding the
definition of genocide would jeopardize the consensus or at least affect widespread
support for the Rome Statute. 152 With apprehensions like these in mind, the delegates at
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the preparatory committee decided not to expand the group but to treat persecution on
social and political grounds as crimes against humanity. 153 The Preparatory Committee
argued that its decision not to expand the definition of genocide is consistent with the
political pragmatism and international recognition of the peremptory status of the
prohibition of genocide. 154
Contrast with the view that the exclusion of political groups from the Genocide
Convention “contravenes the customary jus cogens prohibition of genocide, which
protects political groups in addition to national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups.”155
Beth Van Schaack pointed inter alia to Resolution 96(1) and referred to some States’
national laws as instances where genocide prohibition extended beyond the four groups
mentioned in the Convention. 156
However, in view of the reluctance of the international community to expand the
definition of genocide in the Convention and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the
ICC, it is plausible to suggest that “evidence of state practice to date appears insufficient
to support the proposition that the definition of genocide under customary international
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law is broader than that in the Convention …” 157 These international treaties more than
any other source of international law serves as clear indicators of international law
because they unequivocally bind the States that have ratified them. 158

Thus, the

prohibition of genocide that has attained the status of jus cogens is the prohibition of the
crime of genocide as defined in Article II of the Convention which is reproduced in
article 6 of the ICC Statute. 159

6.3.1.1.

Defining the Composition and Application of the Protected Groups
Within the four categories of protected national, religious, ethnic and racial

groups covered by the Statute, there has been much difficulty defining the precise
contours of each of the protected groups under the Convention. Nonetheless, attempts
have been made to define these groups based on certain characteristics that are thought to
be common to each of the group. In Nottebohm Case, the International Court of Justice
defined nationality as:
a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a
genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may
be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the
individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law
157

Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 42. See also, Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 (listing the sources of international law as;
international conventions, international custom, as evidenced by state practice; general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (where the Supreme Court of the United States demonstrated the classical
method for ascertaining international legal principles by analyzing several centuries of interactions between
individual nations); G. Schwarzenberger & E. Brown, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27
(6th ed. 1976)(describing how customary principles are ascertained).
158
Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determining
Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 Duke L.J. 876, 878 (1983). See also,
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Introductory Note at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) (listing customary law and treaties as the two principal
sources of international law).
159
Machteld Boot, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLEM CRIMEN
SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 428 (Intersentia: New York, 2002).

215

or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely
connected to the population of the State conferring nationality
than with that of any other State. 160
The Trial Chamber of the ICTR in Akayesu, adopting the definition of the ICJ
defined a “national group” as “a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal
bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.” 161 On
the other hand, the Proxmire Act defines a national group as one “whose identity as such
is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins.” 162
An ethnic group has been generally defined as “a group whose members share a
common language or culture.” 163 The idea that ethnic groups share cultural and linguistic
identity appears to find support from the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide
Convention. 164 On the other hand, a racial group has been conventionally defined on
basis of “the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region,
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.” 165 An ethnic group
differs from a racial group because ethnic groups are bonded by cultural values 166 while a
racial group is identified primarily by “external, physical features and appearance ...” 167
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The ICTR defines a religious group as one “whose members share the same
religion, denomination or mode of worship.” 168 Elsewhere, a religious group was defined
as one whose members have a “common religious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices or
rituals.” 169 It is an open question whether the definition of religious group includes
theistic, agnostic, and atheistic communities.170 For purposes of genocide, avoiding the
perplexities attending the concept of “religion” in this instance is innocuous. 171
Application of the these conventional definition nonetheless remains problematic
especially in situations where there is a congruence of characteristics between the
perpetrators and the victims which may qualify both into one or two protected groups.
As the Trial Chamber of the ICTR noted in the case of Prosecutor v. Rutaganda:
The concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups
have been researched extensively and ... at present, there are no
generally and internationally accepted precise definitions thereof.
Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a
particular political, social, and cultural context. 172
An example of such difficulty presented itself in the trial of Akayesu before the
Trial Chamber of the ICTR. The Trial Chamber had to decide whether the Rwandan
168

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p 515.
Proxmire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1093(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
170
Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 455. Also see, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, supra note 45, p
515; Mathew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century - The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of
the new Millennium, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 467, 475 (2001); See Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR,
73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, at 171, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) (“Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or
whatever belief of his choice ... .”).
171
Those perplexities appear, for example, in a South African case, Wittmann v. Deutscher Schulverein,
Pretoria and Others, identifying “religion” with a “system of faith and worship” as “the human recognition
of superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and
worship.” The judgment then mentions “Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist and other faiths practicing
their religion ....”as instances of religious communities. Buddhism is, however, a non-theistic religion and
would therefore not qualify as a “religion” under above circumscription. Wittmann v. Deutscher
Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, 1998 (4) SA 423 (T), at 449 (South Africa 1998).
172
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, P 56 (ICTR Trial Chamber Dec. 6, 1999), available at
www.ictr.org; See also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33 (ICTY Trial Chamber Aug. 2, 2001) P 557,
available at www.un.org/icty (“A group’s cultural, religious, ethnical, or national characteristics must be
identified within the socio-historic context which it inhabits.”) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Rutaganda].
169

217

Tutsis constituted a protected group under the Genocide Convention. Since it is given
that the Tutsis and the Hutus share the same nationality, race, and religion, the Trial
Chamber has to find that the Rwandan Tutsis are of a different ethnic group from the
Rwandan Hutus. To do this, the Trial Chamber would have to find that Tutsis and the
Hutus do not share a common cultural and linguistic identity. This is hardly the case
since the Tutsis could not be significantly distinguished from the Hutus in terms of
language and culture. 173 Realizing this, the Trial Chamber looked beyond the plain text
of the Genocide Convention (and its own articulation of the characteristics of an ethnic
group) and analyzed the Convention’s drafting history. The Trial Chamber argued that it
was “particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide
Convention, which according to the travaux preparatoires, was patently to ensure the
protection of any stable and permanent group.” 174
Analyzing the traveux preparatories of the Genocide Convention, the Rwandan
Tribunal proffered that the common denominator among protected groups is involuntary
membership, which must be ‘determined by birth,’ “in a continuous and often
irremediable manner.” 175 The Trial Chamber further recognized that the intent to protect
extends beyond the four enumerated groups, reaching any group similar in terms of its
stability and permanence. 176

Applying this analysis, the tribunal found that Tutsi
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constituted a distinct and stable ethnic group even though they shared language, society,
and culture with the Hutu that massacred them. 177
The Trial Chamber approach has been criticized as a contradiction of the
Genocide Convention and the conventional definition of ethnicity. 178 It is seen as an
attempt to define genocide by analogy which will include all permanent and stable
groups. 179 It has been argued that the supposed ethnic differences between the Tutsis and
the Hutus did not actually exist, 180 and that the only obvious divide between the Tutsis
and the Hutus was based on social, economic, and political factors. 181 However, a
financial or class distinction was not mentioned in the Genocide Convention as a means
of classifying groups into one of the four enumerated categories. Nevertheless, the ICTR
was determined not to let what it considers an obvious genocide to go unpunished,
therefore the ICTR used constructive ethnicity to force the two groups into different
ethnic classifications. 182
Be that as it may, it should be noted that the Trial Chamber did not create
additional group beyond the four groups stated in the Convention. Rather, the Trial
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Chamber found that Tutsi witnesses testified credibly as to their separate ethnic
identity. 183 The Trial Chamber also determined that the former Belgian colonizers in
Rwanda distinguished between Hutu and Tutsi. 184 Based on “the facts brought to its
attention during the trial,” 185 the ICTR ruled that “Tutsi did indeed constitute a stable and
permanent [ethnic] group and were identified as such by all.” 186 Thus, the Trial Chamber
did not suggest that all “permanent and stable” groups should automatically be included
in the definition of genocide. The “permanent and stable” group still has to satisfy the
requirement of involuntary membership, which must be ‘determined by birth,’ “in a
continuous and often irremediable manner. 187

However, to be consistent with the

Convention, the “permanent and stable” group must fit into one of the four groups since
the Convention’s list of protected groups is exhaustive.
Further, while the Trial Chamber’s approach appears to contradict its definition of
ethnicity, it seems that this contradiction is not so much about the limitation of the
Convention but an exposure of the inadequacy of the conventional definition of the
protected groups in general. Recognizing this limitation, the ICTR in Kayishema and
Ruzindana suggested that an ethnic group should comprise “one whose members share a
common language or culture” as well as “a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self
identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the
crimes (identification by others).” 188 In view of this obvious problem, the Trial Chamber
of the ICTY in Jelisic rejected the objective approach to determining group status. 189 It
183
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may be appropriate to adopt a subjective approach to the definition of protected groups as
suggested by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Jelisic where the Tribunal stated as
follows:
[a]lthough the objective determination of a religious group still
remains possible, to attempt to define a national, ethnical or racial
group today using objective and scientifically irresponsible
criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not
necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned
by such categorization. Therefore, it is more appropriate to
evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial group from the
point of view of those persons who wish to single that group out
from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently
elects to evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial
group using a subjective criterion. 190
The Trial Chamber was convinced that “it is the stigmatisation of a group as a
distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be
determined whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group
in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.” 191 The subjective approach was adopted by the
ICTR in the Rutagandan 192 and Musema 193 cases. The subjective theory recognizes that
perpetrators of genocide can stigmatize, and thus define, the victim group positively or
negatively. Positive stigmatization distinguishes the target group based on the
perpetrator’s assessment of the group’s peculiar characteristics (i.e., dark skin, attending
Synagogue, social and cultural traits, etc.). 194

On the other hand, by negative

stigmatization, the perpetrator defines the characteristics of his or her national, ethnical,
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racial, or religious group and disassociates others that lack those characteristics. 195 The
rejected individuals form a distinct (and protected) group by virtue of their exclusion. 196
Although the Convention does not require perpetrators to belong to a different
group than the victims, 197 a case of genocide where the victim and perpetrator belonged
to the same group may be difficult to establish because the perpetrator is likely to have
chosen the victims on grounds besides nationality, ethnicity, religion or race. 198 For
example, the killing of moderate Hutus in Rwanda by Hutus does not qualify as genocide
because the moderate Hutus were persecuted because of their perceived political
alignment or social association with the Tutsis. Negatively stigmatized or not, groups sotargeted based upon such other criteria do not qualify for protection under the
Convention. 199
Since “[g]enocide is a crime that we punish, not based upon the underlying acts
themselves (murder, assault, etc.), but based upon the special intent with which those acts
were accomplished, … [w]ithout a subjective definition, the aims of the Convention are
thwarted because the conduct and intentions of the perpetrator, which we seek to punish,
may bear no relation to an “objective” measure of the group attacked.” 200 Therefore,
neither the objective nor the subjective approach should be dispositive. As the Jelisic
court noted, the “perilous exercise” of defining groups “using objective and scientifically
irreproachable criteria” does not necessarily lead to sensible results corresponding “to the
195
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perceptions of the persons concerned by such categorization.” 201 On the other hand, the
group may exist solely because the perpetrators conceived of it as a group and not
because of a predefined description. 202 Perpetrators often irrationally and inconsistently
define the victim group. 203 Therefore, as noted by the Trial Chamber in Bagilishema:
The Chamber notes that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial,
and religious groups enjoy no generally or internationally
accepted definition. Each of these concepts must be assessed in
the light of a particular political, social, historical, and cultural
context. Although membership of the targeted group must be an
objective feature of the society in question, there is also a
subjective dimension. A group may not have precisely defined
boundaries and there may be occasions when it is difficult to give
a definitive answer as to whether or not a victim was a member
of a protected group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may
characterize the targeted group in ways that do not fully
correspond to conceptions of the group shared generally, or by
other segments of society. In such a case, the Chamber is of the
opinion that, on the evidence, if a victim was perceived by a
perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be
considered by the Chamber as a member of the protected group,
for the purposes of genocide. 204
Thus, as has been suggested by both the Trial Chambers of the ICTY and ICTR,
the determination of whether a particular group may be considered protected from the
crime of genocide should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account both the
relevant evidence proffered and the specific political, social and cultural context in which
the acts allegedly took place. 205 It is better to redefine the law than weaken it by denying
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its insufficiency. In any event, whatever approach is adopted, the inquiry should be
limited to whether the group is within any of the four protected groups under the
Convention. 206 For it is without doubt that under a strict application of the Convention
and the ICC as presently worded, the crime of genocide is only applicable to a national,
ethnical, racial and religious group. 207

6.3.2. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
6.3.2.a. The Development of the Legal Prohibition of Crimes Against Humanity
I.

Before World War II
Unlike the crime of genocide which was defined in the Genocide Convention of

1948 and remained unchanged for nearly half a century by the time the ICC Statute was
been drafted, crimes against humanity have never been consistently defined in a single
treaty. On the contrary, the definition and development of crimes against humanity has
continue to evolve and clarified in several legal international instruments since these
crimes first received international legal recognition in the St. Petersburg Declaration of
1868. 208 Noting that the Declaration was aimed at limiting the use of explosives or
incendiary projectiles as “contrary to the laws of humanity”, the parties agreed to draw up
additional instruments “in view of future improvements which science may effect in the
armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles which they have established, and
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to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.” 209

However, no

additional instrument was drawn until the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899
unanimously adopted the Martens clause. 210 The Martens clause which forms part of the
preamble to the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land
provides as follows:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity
and the requirements of the public conscience. 211
The Martens clause was reaffirmed by the Contracting Parties to the 1907 Hague
Convention IV concerning the Law and Customs of War on Land. 212 Similarly, the
Martens clause was incorporated virtually unchanged in subsequent humanitarian law
instruments such as the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols I and
II. 213

Although the Martens Clause did not contain the particular acts which are

prohibited as crimes against humanity, it is regarded as the first articulation of “the notion
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that international law encompassed transcendental humanitarian principles that existed
beyond conventional law.” 214
However, the origin of individual criminal responsibility for crimes against
humanity is traced back to the failed attempts to hold members of the Turkish
government responsible for the massacres of the Armenians during World War I. 215
After World War I, the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia on May 24,
1915, issued a joint declaration denouncing the Ottoman Empire’s massacre of the
Armenians in Turkey as “crimes against humanity and civilization,” for which the Allied
government would hold personally responsible “all members of the Ottoman government
and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” 216 On January 25, 1919,
the Allied governments set up a fifteen member Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and
Customs of War which concluded inter alia, that the Central Empires together with their
allies, Turkey and Bulgaria acted in barbarous or illegitimate methods “in violation of the
established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity”. 217
214
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The 1919 Peace Conference Commission for the first time indicated that
violations of the laws of humanity include crimes such as murders and massacres,
systematic terrorism, putting hostages to death, torture of civilians, deliberate starvation
of civilians, rape, abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution,
deportation of civilians, internment of civilians under inhuman conditions, forced labor of
civilians in connection with the military operations of the enemy, imposition of collective
penalties and deliberate bombardment of undefended places and hospitals. 218
Consequently, the 1919 Peace Conference Commission recommended that “all
persons belonging to enemy countries . . . who have been guilty of offences against the
laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”219
However, the U.S. members of the Commission argued against criminal prosecution
because in their view, the standard of laws and principles of humanity was too vague to
provide individuals adequate notice of the crime and as such, the concept of laws of
humanity was ‘not the object of punishment by a court of justice’. 220 Thus, Versailles
Treaty concluded shortly by the Allied Powers did not include any provision for the
prosecution of violators of crimes against humanity. 221

Eventually, no person was

prosecuted for violations of the laws of war and the laws of humanity in the Ottoman
Empire because of national opposition and Allied loss of interest. 222
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II.

“Crimes Against Humanity” in the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council
Law No. 10, and the Tokyo Charter
Although the 1919 Conference recommended that violations of the laws of

humanity covers offenses committed on the territory of Germany and its Allies against
their own nationals, during World War II, there was no clearly identified law of war
which protected victims who share the same nationality with the accused. However, the
degree of Germany’s atrocities against its nationals during World War II, particularly, its
desire to exterminate all persons of Jewish descent, acted as a catalyst for the first attempt
to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. After the end of World War II, the
Allied Powers in 1943 established the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC). 223 The UNWCC, bothered by the unparalleled record of atrocities by the
Nazi regime recommend to the Allied Governments that “the retributive action of the
United Nations should not be restricted to what was traditionally considered as war
crimes in the technical sense, namely, a violation of the laws and customs of war.” 224
As a result, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 225 adopted by the
Allied Powers for the trial of the Major War Criminals marked the beginning of the
modern notion of “crimes against humanity.” 226 The Nuremberg Charter became the first
international instrument to define crimes against humanity.

Article 6(c) of the

Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as follows:
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murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in the execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. 227
Article 6(c) created two types of crimes against humanity, namely crimes of the
“murder-type” such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and “other
inhuman acts” on the one hand, and “persecutions” on political, racial, or religious
grounds.” 228 Reference to the phrase “on political, racial or religious grounds” serves as
clarifying the basis of persecution, rather than imposing a requirement of discriminatory
motive for inhuman acts. 229

Also, as observed by Egon Schwelb, article 6 of the

Nuremberg Charter maintained the distinction made in 1919 between violations of the
laws and customs of war on the one hand, which is referred to as “war crimes in Article
6(b), and offences against the laws of humanity on the other, which is referred to as
“crimes against humanity” in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 230 The Nuremberg
Tribunal convicted sixteen of the eighteen Nazi leaders indicted for crimes against
humanity. 231
Also, Control Council Law No. 10, which formed the legal basis for a series of
subsequent trials at Nuremberg within each of the Allied occupation zones provided for
the prosecution of crimes against humanity. 232
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Article II(c) of the CCL offers a

Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c).
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N.GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at p 120, U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950); Egon Schwelb, supra note 216, at 190; and UNWCC, supra note 223, at p. 179.
229
Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457, 462-63 (1998).
230
Egon Schwelb, supra note 225, at 181-83.
231
Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 47.
232
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3,
228
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definition of crimes against humanity which differs slightly from the Nuremberg
Charter. 233 The definition omitted the words “in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” thereby removing the requirements that
crimes against humanity occur in connection with either “crimes against peace” or “war
crimes.” 234 Similarly, the Tokyo Charter provided for the prosecution of crimes against
humanity. 235 Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter definition of crimes against humanity
differs from the Nuremberg Charter and CCL No. 10. While it maintained the connection
between “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace” or “war crimes” it
omitted persecution on religious grounds. 236
The tribunal established pursuant to the Tokyo Charter tried twenty-five Japanese
leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the judgment of the Tribunal
addressed only war crimes. 237 Trial of major war criminals by allied tribunals or by
German courts under supervision by Allies in their occupied zones in accordance with
Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 212 at 590 [hereinafter Control Council
Law No. 10 or CCL].
233
Id. Article II (c) of CCL No. 10 defines “crimes against humanity” as:
Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the
country where perpetrated.
Id.
234

Id.
See Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4
Bevans 20 (as amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27), reprinted in 1 Benjamin B. Ferencz, DEFINING
INTERNATIONAL AGRESSION 522, 523 (1975) [hereinafter Tokyo Charter].
236
Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter states:
235

Crimes Against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.
Id.
237

Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 47-48.
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CCL No. 10 resulted in the convictions of hundreds of Nazi soldiers for crimes against
humanity. 238

III.

The International Law Commission and the Codification of “Crimes Against
Humanity”
In 1947, the United Nations through Resolution 177(II) mandated the newly

created International Law Commission (ILC) to formulate the principles of international
law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal. 239 In 1950, the ILC issued its report on the formulation of the Nuremberg
Principles. 240 Article VI of the Nuremberg Principles contained a definition of crimes
against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman
acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in
connection with any crime against peace or any war crime”. 241
The 1950 ILC definition of crimes against humanity maintained the nexus
between crimes against humanity and crimes against peace or war crimes as contained in
article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. However, it had to omit the phrase “before or
during the war” since the phrase in the Nuremberg Charter referred to a particular war,
the World War II. 242
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Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 48.
G.A. Res. 177 (II), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123rd plen. mtg., at 111, U.N. Doc A/519 (1947). See Lyal S.
Sunga, THE EMERGING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN
CODIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 8-9 (1997).
240
International Law Commission Report on the Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th
Sess., Supp. No. 12 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 225, at
624-26.
241
Id., art. VI(c). D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
4 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 445, 449-50 (1955).
242
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at para. 123, U.N.
Doc. A/1316 (1950).
239
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The next phase of the works of the ILC was directed towards the drafting of a
Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The ILC Draft Code of
Offenses codifies acts which would constitute violations of international law and entail
international responsibility if committed or tolerated by a State. The first ILC Draft Code
adopted in 1951 contained a definition of crimes against humanity. 243 The ILC 1951
Draft Code for the first time prohibited inhuman acts on cultural grounds and severed the
nexus between crimes against humanity with war crimes or crime against peace. Also, by
beginning the definition of crimes against humanity with the words “inhuman acts such
as”, the 1951 Draft Code blurred the previous distinction between “murder-type” and
“persecution” categories of crimes against humanity.
In 1954, the ILC adopted another Draft Code of Offenses which also contained a
revised definition of crimes against humanity. 244 Article 2 of the ILC 1954 Draft Code
defines crimes against humanity as:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, or persecutions, committed against any civilian
population on social, political, racial, religious, or cultural
grounds by the authorities of a state or by private individuals
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such
authorities. 245

243

Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Code of Offences Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951);
[hereinafter ILC 1951 Draft Code]. Article 2 of the 1951 Draft Code defines crimes against humanity as:
Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals against any civilian population, such as
murder, or extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on political, racial, religious, or
cultural grounds, when such acts are committed in execution of or in connection with other offences
defined in this article.
Id.
244

Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Code of Offences Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, U.N. Doc. A/2691 (1954).
[hereinafter ILC 1954 Draft Code].
245
ILC 1954 Draft Code, Id., art. 2(11).
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The 1954 Draft Code omitted the phrase “when such acts are committed in
execution of or in connection with other offences defined in this article” which was
contained in the 1951 Draft Code, to make it clear that these acts are punishable whether
or not they were committed in connection with another crime prohibited by the Draft
Code. Further, the 1954 Draft Code in addition to retaining persecution on cultural
grounds from the 1951 Draft Code, added persecution on social grounds.
Also, the 1954 Draft Code maintained the prohibition introduced by the 1951
Draft Code regarding the previous distinction between the “murder-type” and
“persecution-type” categories of crimes against humanity.

The abolition of this

distinction has been criticized because of the implication that “inhumane acts,” including
murder, extermination, enslavement and deportation, as well as persecutions are now
required to be committed on social, cultural, political, racial, and religious grounds. 246
Contrast with the previous situation in the Nuremberg principles where it was only
persecution which was required to be on “political, racial or religious grounds.” 247
In addition, under the ILC 1954 Draft Code, the Commission decided that
inhuman acts committed by individuals without State’s direction or assistance should not
be regarded as international crimes. Therefore, article 2(11) was drafted to indicate that
an individual is responsible for “inhumane acts” only if it can be shown that the
individual committed these acts “at the instigation or with the toleration” of the
authorities of a State. 248 The requirement of State involvement has been question in light
246

D.H.N. Johnson, supra note 241, at 465. For the redrafting of the 1954 Draft Code, see Doudou Thiam,
Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Agenda Item 5,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986), reprinted in 2 Year Book of Int’l L. Comm’n 53, 38th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.1 (1986). Mr. Thiam’s 1991 version was more specific and far more elaborate
than the 1954 Draft Code.
247
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c).
248
ILC 1954 Draft Code, supra note 244, art. 2(11).
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of the Genocide Convention which holds individuals responsible if they commit genocide
under any circumstances. 249
After the 1954 ILC Draft Code, ILC deactivated further works on the draft code
for several decades. However, within this interlude, particular crimes against humanity,
such as genocide, apartheid and enforced disappearance, were identified in subsequent
international instruments. 250 The next ILC Draft Code was adopted in 1991. 251 The 1991
Draft Code contained a definition of crimes against humanity under a provision entitled
“Systematic or Mass Violation of Human Rights”. 252 In 1996, the ILC adopted yet
another Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 253 Article 18
of the ILC 1996 Draft Code proclaimed an expanded definition of crimes against
humanity. 254
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D.H.N. Johnson, supra note 241, at 465.
See Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015
U.N.T.S. 243; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 47/133,
UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1992); Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, OEA Doc. AG/RES. 1256 (XXIV-0/94), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
251
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the Int’l Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 265, U.N.
Doc. A/46/10 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter 1991 Draft Code].
252
Id. Article 21 defines crimes against humanity as:
250

An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of human rights:
murder; torture; establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour;
persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, in a systematic manner or on a mass
scale; or deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced . . . .
1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21.
253
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR. 48th Sess., at 6-7, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (July 8, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Draft Code].
254
Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code states that:
A crime against humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a
large scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or group:
a) murder;
b) extermination;
c) torture;
d) enslavement;
e) persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds;
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The 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes re-established the dichotomy between “murdertype” and “persecution-type” crimes against humanity. In the 1991 Draft Code, an
individual is liable for crimes against humanity with or without State policy, but the 1996
Draft Code required the acts to have been carried out at the instigation or direction of a
“[g]overnment or by any organization or group”. 255
Further, both the 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes do not include a requirement that
crimes against humanity be committed against a civilian population.

There is no

explanation in the Commentary to the Draft Code for the elimination of the requirement
as an element of the offense of “crimes against humanity” that the acts be directed to a
civilian population. This omission leaves room for speculation whether the ILC intended
that crimes against humanity be committed against civilian and non-civilian population or
against civilian population including ex-combatants. The latter approach seems to be
consistent with the development of crimes against humanity and the ICTY opinion in the
Rule 61 Decision in the Vukovar case. 256

f) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of
fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population;
g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
h) forced disappearance of persons;
i) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse;
j) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such
as mutilation and severe bodily harm.
Id.
255

See 1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21; 1996 Draft Code, supra note 262, art. 18. For comments
on the 1991 and 1992 Draft Codes, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 225, at 186-92; Christian
Tomuschat, Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of Mankind and the Recalcitrant Third State, in
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 49-50 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996);
256
Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and Veselin Sljivancanin, (Case No. IT-95-13-R 61)
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, April 3, 1996, at
para. 29, [hereinafter Vukovar Hospital Decision], quoted in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment, at para. 643 (Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment].
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Also both Draft Codes mandated that acts constituting crimes against humanity
has to be committed in a “systematic manner or on a large scale”. 257

The words

“systematic manner” refers to acts committed as a result of methodological plan or policy
while “large scale” refers to the degree or multiplicity of victims. 258 These requirements
were imposed to distinguish isolated or random act which falls under domestic
prosecution from systematic and large scale violations which constitute crimes against
humanity. 259 The above works by the ILC may have influenced the development of
international law but none of the Draft Codes was directly developed into international
instruments.

IV.

“Crimes Against Humanity” in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR
The next major development of “crimes against humanity” was its inclusion in the

Statutes of the ICTY 260 and ICTR 261 respectively. Both Statutes contain identical list of
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See 1991 Draft Code, supra note 251, art. 21; 1996 Draft Code, supra note 253, art. 18. The ILC 1991
Draft Code used the words “systematic” or “mass violations of human rights”.
258
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. 2, art. 18, at paras. 3 & 4, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm.
259
Id.
260
ICTY Statute, supra note 30. Article 5 of the ICTY provides that:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Id.
261

ICTR Statute, supra note 31. Article 3 of the ICTR provides that:
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prohibited inhuman acts but the differences between the Statutes lie in the chapeau that
describes the circumstances under which the commission of those acts amount to a crime
against humanity. First, the ICTY Statute which is modeled after the Nuremberg Charter
suggests that a nexus to armed conflict, whether international or internal, is required,
whereas the ICTR Statute does not require proof of the existence of an armed conflict.
However, the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic’s case has noted that:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to
international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out,
customary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus,
by requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council may
have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary
under customary international law. . . . 262
On the other hand, while the ICTR requires the crimes to have been committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack, the ICTY does not expressly include such
requirement. 263

Also, the ICTR suggests that all acts constituting crimes against

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the
following crimes when committed as a part of a wide spread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Id.
262

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 141 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996), available at:
<www.un.org/icty>) (citing the Control Council Law No. 10, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1973
Apartheid Convention) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction].
263
While the ICTY definition does not include the requirement that the acts be “systematic and
widespread”, the ICTY Tribunal has observed that the term “widespread or systematic” constitutes an
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humanity must have been committed on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious
grounds, the ICTY Statute restricted this requirement to persecutions. These differences
which have been elaborated on by both Tribunals are discussed in more detail below. 264

V.

ICC Statute and Codification of the “Crimes Against Humanity”
The divergent approaches to the definitions of the crime against humanity

indicated above and the body of international jurisprudence on crimes against humanity
coming from the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda helped
shape the debate at the Preparatory Committee and at the Rome Conference. Therefore,
the ICC Statute which results from multilateral negotiations contains a more detailed
definition of crimes against humanity than any of the previous instrument discussed
above.

Hence, the most important and authoritative codification of crimes against

humanity to date is contained in article 7 of the ICC Statute. Article 7(1) defined crimes
against humanity as follows:
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g)
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity;
essential element of the notion of “crimes against humanity” under the ICTY Statute. See Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, supra note 264, p 644.
264
For a legislative history of Article 5 of the ICTY, see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, THE LAW
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 538-54
(1996).
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(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health. 265
Unlike previous instruments, article 7 elaborated on the meaning of
“imprisonment”, “persecution”, and “other inhuman acts”. While the list of criminal acts
which constitute crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute encompasses the
traditional acts which constitute crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Charter and
subsequent instruments, it also includes additional criminal acts. The new acts added by
the ICC Statute include “forcible transfer of population”; 266 “severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law”; 267 “sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity”; 268 “enforced disappearance of persons”; 269
and “the crime of apartheid”. 270 Article 7 ends the list with a broad category: “other
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or mental or physical health”. This leaves the door open to the future inclusion
of other acts within the category of crimes against humanity.

265

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
Id., art. 7(1)(d). This is added as an alternative to “deportation”.
267
Id., art. 7(1)(e). This was added to “imprisonment”, which is contained in the Statutes of the ICTY and
ICTR.
268
Id. art. 7(1)(g). This is an improvement to the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR which recognize only the
crime of rape and sexual violence.
269
Id., art. 7(1)(i).
270
Id., art. 7(1)(j).
266
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Apart from enumerating the list of criminal acts which constitutes crimes against
humanity, article 7(2) of the ICC Statute defines some of the acts such as extermination,
enslavement, deportation, torture, forced pregnancy, persecution, the crime of apartheid,
and the enforced disappearance of persons as follows:
For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred
to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population;
(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right
of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such
power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women
and children;
(d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive
acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without
grounds permitted under international law;
(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the
custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture
shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a
woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity;
(h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a
character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed
in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial
group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that
regime;
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(i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest,
detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. 271
From the above definition, the ICC Statute defines the crimes of torture and
enforced disappearance 272 more expansively than the relevant human rights
instruments 273 by dissociating them from the requirement of the perpetrator’s official
capacity. Generally, ICC definition of crimes against humanity offers a reflection of the
development of international law since Nuremberg. Thus, the ICC Statute definition
codifies the contemporary notion of crimes against humanity as it has developed from the
Nuremberg Charter through the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, and the case law of those
tribunals.

6.3.2.b.
Changes in the Crimes Against Humanity Under the ICC Statute
In furtherance of customary international law development in this area, article 7
of the ICC Statute dropped the requirement of a nexus between crime against humanity
and armed conflict as well as the requirement of a discriminatory motive. The chapeau
reveals that a nexus to an armed conflict or a discriminatory motive is no longer required.
These positive developments are discussed below while discussions on the elements of
crimes against humanity contained in the chapeau to article 7 follow thereafter.
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ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
Id., art. 7(2)(f )(i).
273
See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10
December 1984, Article 1 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture], and Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 47/133, 18 December 1992, preambular para. 3.
272
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I.

Elimination of Nexus to Armed Conflict
The Nuremberg Charter definition of crimes against humanity incorporated a

compromise which tied crimes against humanity only “in connection with crimes against
peace and war crimes.” 274 Although the UNWCC envisaged crimes against humanity
occurring independent of the existence of an armed conflict, the IMT regarded itself as
bound by its Charter to confine itself to those crimes against humanity committed after
the beginning of World War II because of a requirement to consider only those crimes
against humanity which were committed in the execution of or in connection with crimes
against peace or war crimes. 275
Control Council Law No. 10, which provided the legal basis for a series of
subsequent trials at Nuremberg, excluded the requirement that crimes against humanity
be committed in execution of or in connection with war crimes or crimes against
peace. 276 Thus, tribunals hearing cases pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 adopted
differing approaches concerning whether crimes against humanity could be committed in
peace time as well as in war. In the Einsatzgruppen Case 277 and in the Justice Case,278
the Tribunals held that crimes against humanity could be committed during peace. In the
Flick Case 279 and in the Ministries Case, 280 the Tribunals held to the contrary.
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Nuremberg Charter, supra note 225, art. 6(c).
See International Military Tribunal (Nurenberg), 1 Trial of Major War Criminals 254-5 (1948).
276
See H. Levie, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 559 (1993).
277
U.S. v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, reprinted in 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurenberg Military
Tribunals Under Council Law No. 10 (1946-48) 3, 499 (1949) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Case].
278
U.S. v. Altstoetter, Case No. 3, reprinted in 3 NMT 974 (1949) [hereinafter The Justice Case].
279
U.S. v. Flick, Case No. 5, reprinted in 6 NMT 3, 1212-13 (1949) (the court acquitted the defendant of
“crimes against humanity” for his acquisition of Jewish property before the war, finding itself without
jurisdiction) [hereinafter The Flick Case].
280
U.S. v. von Weizsaecker, Case No. 11, reprinted in 14 NMT 1, 316 (1949) (The tribunal dismissed the
counts of “crimes against humanity” against officials in the Nazi foreign ministry and other bureaucracies,
noting that CCL No. 10 was meant to go no further than the Nuremberg Tribunal itself, which codified
international law). [hereinafter The Ministries Case].
275
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The requirement of a nexus to an international armed conflict or any conflict was
dropped in the Statute of the ICTR. On the other hand, the requirement of a connection
of crimes against humanity to armed conflict was contained in article 5 of the ICTY
Statute which is similar to that of article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter which limited the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction to “crimes against humanity” committed “before or
during the war.” Although constrained by the language of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in its Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction in the Tadic’s case rightly opined that the requirement of a nexus to armed
conflict was peculiar to the Nuremberg Charter and does not appear in subsequent
instruments. 281 The Appeals Chamber while holding that “crimes against humanity” may
be committed notwithstanding the absence of any connection with an armed conflict,
observed as follows:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to
international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out,
customary international law may not require a connection
between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by
requiring that crimes against humanity be committed in either
internal or international armed conflict, the Security Council may
have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary
under customary international law. 282
At the Rome Conference, a minority of delegations expressed the view that
crimes against humanity could be committed only in the context of an armed conflict.
However, the majority of delegations believed that such a limitation would have rendered
crimes against humanity largely redundant, as they would have been subsumed in most
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Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 262, pp 140-41.
Id., para. 141.
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cases within the definition of “war crimes.” 283 In the view of the majority, such a
restriction would have been contrary to post-Nuremberg developments, as observed in
statements of the International Law Commission (ILC), judicial decisions and reflected in
instruments addressing specific crimes against humanity, such as the Genocide
Convention and the Apartheid Convention. 284
In the end, the ICC Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity made no
reference to a nexus to armed conflict thereby affirming that crimes against humanity
may be committed not only in war time but also in peacetime or during civil strife. This
outcome was essential to the practical effectiveness of the ICC in responding to largescale atrocities committed against civilian population by their government during peace
time. 285 Also, it avoids the difficulty of differentiating crimes against humanity from war
crimes.

II.

Elimination of Discriminatory Intent
Consistent with the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, CCL No. 10 and the

Statute of the ICTY, the ICC Statute does not contain an express requirement that crimes
against humanity be committed “on national, political, ethnic, racial, religious, or other
grounds.” 286 However, the ICC Statute adopted the distinction between “murder-type”
crimes against humanity and “persecution-type” crime against humanity which originated
283
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from Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 287 Thus, the ICC Statute provides that
discriminatory intent is required only for persecution on “political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court”. 288
With this approach, the ICC Statute adopted the dominant view that
discriminatory motive is relevant only to the crime of persecution. 289 Therefore, the
elimination of discriminatory intent accords with the concept of humanity as victim of
crimes against humanity which essentially characterizes this crime. As noted by the
ICTY in the Erdemovic case:
Crimes against humanity are serious acts of violence which harm
human beings by striking what is most essential to them: their
life, liberty, physical welfare, health and/or dignity. They are
inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the
limits tolerable to the international community, which must
perforce demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity
also transcend the individual because when the individual is
assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated. 290
The approach by the ICC Statute avoids the imposition of an onerous and
unnecessary burden on the prosecution to establish discriminatory intent for crimes
against humanity. Moreover, the requirement of a discriminatory motive, particularly
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when coupled with exhaustive list of prohibited grounds, could have resulted in the
inadvertent exclusion of some very serious crimes against humanity. Thus, the expansion
of the group in the ICC Statute to include “political”, “cultural”, “gender” and “other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law” is a
remarkable development that allows extension of protection to other groups subjected to
“persecution-type” crime against humanity.

6.3.2.c.

Elements of the Crime Against Humanity
The discussions contained in the various codifications of the crimes against

humanity and the case-law jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR developed the
characteristics of the crimes against humanity which is now expressed in the chapeau of
article 7 of the ICC Statute. Under the chapeau of article 7 of the ICC Statute, “crime
against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack.” 291 According to paragraph two of article 7, for “attack directed against any
civilian population” to constitute crime against humanity, it must be a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts prohibited in paragraph 1 carried out “pursuant
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”. 292
From the foregoing, to establish that crimes against humanity have taken place,
the Prosecutor in addition to establishing the occurrence of any of the prohibited acts
enumerated in article 7(1)(a-k) must also establish that the perpetrator committed the acts
as part of (1) a widespread or systematic attack, (2) directed against a civilian population,
(3) with knowledge that the attack was part of, or intended to be part of a widespread or
291
292
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systematic attack against a civilian population, and (4) was carried out pursuant to State
or organizational policy. 293

I.

Widespread or Systematic Attack
Both the Statute of the ICTR and article 7 chapeau of the ICC Statute require that

crimes against humanity be committed either as part of a “widespread” or “systematic”
attack against a civilian population. 294 The term “widespread” has been defined as
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.” 295

On the other hand,

“systematic” means “thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of
a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.” 296 In other words,
“widespread” focuses on the number or multiplicity of victims,” whereas “systematic”
refers to the existence of a pattern of conduct or methodical plan. 297
Although the ICTY Statute does not contain this requirement as a threshold
issue, 298 the ICTY has noted that the requirement that the attack be “widespread or
systematic” is an essential element of the notion of crime against humanity as it elevates
293
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ordinary common crimes from the realm of national crimes to the level of crimes under
international law. 299

Therefore, the rationale for the requirement that the attack be

widespread or systematic and directed against any civilian population is designed to
target crimes involving a course of conduct thereby excluding isolated or random acts
from the notion of crimes against humanity. 300
In view of the above, it is not the single killing that is targeted, but mass killings,
unless the single killing can be linked to a “systematic” policy or to “widespread”
attacks. 301 Once “there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity”. 302 In other
words, a “single act by a perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility
and an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable.” 303
The requirement that the attack be “widespread” or “systematic” should be read
disjunctively thereby eliminating the need to prove a cumulation of these two
elements. 304 As noted by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, “it is now well established that
the requirement that the acts be directed against a civilian ‘population’ can be fulfilled if
the acts occur on either a widespread basis or in a systematic manner. Either one of these
is sufficient to exclude isolated or random acts.” 305 Once it is convinced that either
requirement is met, the Trial Chamber is not obliged to consider whether the alternative
qualifier is also satisfied.
299
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II.

Attack Directed against Any Civilian Population
The requirement that the attack be directed against “any civilian population”

originated from the Nuremberg Charter and was adopted in the Statutes of the ICTY,
ICTR, and the ICC. 306 An attack is “directed against” any civilian population in the
context of crimes against humanity where the civilian population is the primary object of
the attack rather than an incidental target of the attack. 307 On the other hand, the word
“any” serves to clarify that crimes against humanity can be committed against civilians of
the same nationality as the perpetrator or those who are stateless, as well as those of a
different nationality. 308 The term is broad enough to support the notion that for purposes
of crimes against humanity, all civilians are protected be they nationals of the perpetrator,
foreign nationals or stateless. 309
With respect to the term “civilian” the UNWCC took the position that the term
should be construed to exclude attacks against armed forces. 310 Latter jurisprudence
however supports a more expansive definition of the term “civilian.” Thus, the
Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 noted
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that while the term “any civilian population” principally applies to noncombatants, it
does not necessarily exclude those “who at one particular point in time did bear arms.” 311
Similarly, the ICTR has construed the term “civilian population” broadly such
that “the presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the
characterization of a population as civilian and those actively involved in a resistance
movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity.” 312

In the Vukouar

Hospital Decision, civilians or resistance fighters who had laid down their arms were
considered victims of crimes against humanity. 313 And “in case of doubt as to whether a
person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be civilian . . .” 314
The term “population” ensures that what is to be alleged will not be one particular
act but, instead, a course of conduct.” 315 It places emphasis on the collective rather than
on the individual victim,316 and calls for some element of scale of the attack which will
exclude single or isolated acts. 317 The ICC Statute appears to reflect this view in article
7(2)(a) which refers to “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts
referred to in paragraph 1.” 318
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III.

Mens Rea/Knowledge of the Act
Apart from satisfying the general mental element under article 30 of the ICC

Statute, 319 the Prosecutor must also establish under article 7(1) that the perpetrator knew
the widespread or systematic nature of the attack and that his or her criminal activity
constitutes part of the attack. 320 Therefore, “the acts of the accused must comprise part of
a pattern of widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population and
that the accused must have known that his [or her] acts fit into such pattern.” 321 In other
words, “to be guilty of crimes against humanity the perpetrator must know that there is an
attack on a civilian population and that his [or her] act is part of the attack.” 322
The connection to a widespread or systematic attack is the essential and central
element that raises an “ordinary” crime to one of the most serious crimes known to
humanity. Therefore, “to convict a person of this most serious international crime, if the
person was truly unaware of this essential and central element would violate the principle
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”. 323 However, it shall not be a defense for the
accused to argue that he or she was not aware that the acts constitute crimes against
humanity. In the Canadian case of Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court noted as follows:
However, it would not be necessary to establish that the accused
knew that his or her actions were inhumane. For example, if the
jury was satisfied that Finta was aware of the conditions within
the boxcars [in which the Jews were deported] that would be
319
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sufficient to convict him for crimes against humanity even
though he did not know that his action in loading the people into
those boxcars were inhumane. 324
It is not expected that the obligation to prove the accused mens rea should impose
an inappropriate burden on the prosecution. Given the inescapable notoriety of any
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a person could commit a murder (for example) as part of such an attack
while credibly claiming to have been completely unaware of that attack. 325

IV.

State or Organizational Policy
To ensure that a spontaneous wave of widespread, but completely unrelated

crimes do not qualify as crime against humanity, an “attack directed against any civilian
population”, is further defined as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission
of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”. 326 On the other
hand, according to the Introduction to the Elements of Crimes against humanity, “it is
understood that ‘policy to commit such attack” requires that the State or organization
actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population. 327 This
understanding was further clarified in the footnote to this part of the text as follows:
A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the
attack would be implemented by State or organizational action.
Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented
by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed
at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy

324

Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 820 (Can. 1994). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 256, p 657.
Darryl Robinson, supra note 283, at 52.
326
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(2)(a).
327
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116, Introduction.
325

252

cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or
organizational action. 328
By virtue of the Elements of Crimes, it follows that the policy element includes a
policy of commission or a policy of omission to stop the commission of the attacks.
According to Professor Bassiouni, because crimes against humanity consists of a number
of crimes which may be found in many national criminal laws, the “state action or
policy”, provides the international or jurisdictional element which transforms the hitherto
domestic crimes to international crimes. 329
The policy element was not explicitly required in the Nuremberg Charter but the
travaux preparatoires of the Nuremberg Charter and the decisions of the Nuremberg
Tribunal referred to the “policy of terror” and a “policy of persecution, repression, and
murder of civilians.” 330 Also, the jurisprudence of the military tribunals suggests that the
policy element was a requisite for crimes against humanity. 331
This policy element has been adopted by decisions of national courts. In the
French cases of Barbie and Touvier respectively, the French Cour de Cassation required
that “the criminal act be affiliated with the name of a state practicing a policy of
ideological hegemony.” 332 The Netherlands Hoge Raad in the Menten case held that “the
concept of crimes against humanity also requires . . . that the crimes in question form part
328
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of a system based on terror or constitute a link in consciously pursued policy directed
against particular groups of peoples.” 333 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Finta case held that “what distinguishes a crime against humanity from any other
criminal offence under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and terrible actions
which are essential elements of the offence were undertaken in pursuance of a policy of
discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race.” 334
These cases appear to recognize the policy element of crimes against humanity,
but some commentators have criticized the traditional conception that the policy must be
that of a State 335 or the requirement of an “official policy of discrimination. 336 While it
may be the case that crimes against humanity could be committed only by States or
individuals exercising State power during World War II, events after World War II
particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have shown that multiplicity of crimes
can be committed by persons not associated with a recognized State. Consequently, the
Security Council Resolutions establishing the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR made no
reference to State policy requirement. 337 Recognizant of this development, the ICTY
observed that customary international law has evolved “to take into account forces which,
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although not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to
move freely within, defined territory.” 338
In light of the above, the ICTY expressed the view that crimes against humanity
may be committed by “entities exercising de facto control over a particular territory but
without international recognition or formal status of a de jure state, or by a terrorist group
or organization”. 339 Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the phrase “directed at any
civilian population entailed that “there must be some form of a governmental,
organizational or group policy to commit these acts”. 340 Also, in the 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security, ILC stated that “[a] crime against
humanity means any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on
a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or
group.” 341
The retention of State policy in the ICC Statute is recognition that there is still
some sort of ‘official’ action associated with the concept of crime against humanity. 342
On the other hand, inclusion of organizations is recognition that non-state actors such as
terrorist groups, de facto government or armed insurrections or other non-state entities
seeking political or ideological relevance or territorial control “can and do commit
egregious assaults on human dignity that should incur individual responsibility under
international law”. 343 However, the term “organizational policy” should be interpreted
broadly to include public and private organizational policy whether aimed at public or
338
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private gain only. Significantly, the ICTY has noted that a policy to commit crimes
against humanity need not be formal, and can be inferred from the manner of the crime.
Thus, evidence that “the acts occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates
a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not” should suffice. 344

6.3.3.

WAR CRIMES

6.3.3.a.

Introduction
The first comprehensive codification of war crimes was in the Leiber Code issued

by President Lincoln in 1863 during the American Civil War. However, as noted in part I
of this study, the origin of war crimes in international law is traced to the Hague
Conference of 1899 345 and the Hague Conference of 1907 346 as well as the 1925 Geneva
Protocol I to the 1907 Hague Convention. 347 The Hague Law as both Conventions are
known is concerned with regulating the materials and means of combat itself, such as
permissible weaponry and targets on land, sea, and air, as well as neutrality and
prohibited attacks on undefended towns, use of arms designed to cause unnecessary
suffering, use of poisonous weapons, collective penalties, and pillage; and includes
various protections for hospitals, religious and cultural sites, and family honor. 348
Following the aftermath of World War I which witnessed violations of the Hague
Law, including killings of civilian populations, bombings of nonmilitary targets,
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unnecessary destruction of private industry, sinking of merchant ships, and looting, 349 the
International Committee of the Red Cross in 1929 facilitated what would be later known
as the Geneva Law to supplement the Hague Law. 350 The Geneva Law focuses on the
protection of classes of victims of armed conflict such as wounded soldiers, prisoners of
war, and civilians.
After the end of Word War II, the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, and
Control Council Law No. 10 contain provision on “war crimes” enabling the Tribunals to
prosecute persons accused of war crimes during the war. 351 Four years later, another
codification of war crimes was carried out under the 1949 four Geneva Conventions to
update the 1929 Geneva Conventions. 352

In 1977, the four Geneva Conventions were

supplemented by Protocols I & II. 353 Protocol I applicable to international armed conflict
elaborates, clarifies, and expands on much of the Geneva Conventions. 354 Protocol II
refers to non-international armed conflict offering new rules and protections for civil
349
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conflicts meeting a certain threshold. 355 The Geneva Conventions have been universally
ratified by States and undoubtedly represent customary international law. 356 The Statutes
of ad hoc Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also contain provisions for war
crimes. 357
Unlike previous instruments which provided very brief provisions concerning war
crimes, article 8 of the ICC Statute which defines war crimes, is one of the Statute’s
longest and most comprehensive codification of war crimes to date. Article 8 of the ICC
Statute defines war crimes in four categories: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;
other serious violations of laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict;
serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 committed
during a non-international armed conflict “against persons taking no active part in the
hostilities”; and other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in noninternational armed conflicts. 358 Therefore, the application of war crimes under the ICC
will depend on whether the acts occurred in international or non-international armed
conflict.

6.3.3.b.
International Armed Conflict
War crimes occurring in international armed conflict are divided into two
categories. Article 8(2)(a) which incorporates most of the graves breaches provisions of
the four Geneva Conventions provides that for the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes”
means:
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(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of
the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of
the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture
experiments;

or

inhuman

treatment,

including

biological

(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve
in the forces of a hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person
of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages. 359
Victims of “grave breaches” must be “protected persons” under the relevant
Geneva Conventions. 360

In accordance with article 2 common to the Geneva

Conventions, an international armed conflict exists and thus triggers the application of
the Conventions in situations of declared war or of any other armed conflict between two
or more State Parties to the Conventions, even if one of the States does not recognize the
war or armed conflict. 361 Also, the Conventions apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a State party to the Conventions, even if the said occupation
meets with no armed resistance. 362

359

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a).
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Further, the fact that one of the parties to the armed conflict is not a State Party to
the Conventions does not suspend the application of the Conventions between the parties
who are States Parties to the Conventions. In the event that the non-State party accepts
and applies the Conventions, the States Parties to the Convention will then be obligated
to apply the Conventions in relation to the said State. 363
It follows that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over graves breaches of the
Geneva Convention when the victims are nationals of a State party to the Conventions
involved in the international armed conflict or nationals of a non-State party which
accepts and applies the Conventions, and the victims have become hors de combat due to
injury, shipwreck, illness, or prisoners of war or civilians who are “in the hands of a Party
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 364 However, the
ICTY has observed that “nationals” in the traditional international law sense are protected
if they cannot rely upon the protection of the State of which they are citizens especially in
situations where they belong to a national minority. 365 For purposes of nationality, the
perpetrator need not know the nationality of the victim provided the perpetrator is aware
that the victim belonged to an adverse party to the conflict. 366
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The second category of war crimes occurring during international armed conflict
is contained in Article 8(2)(b) and includes:
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is,
objects which are not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed
conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages,
dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not
military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his
arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at
discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United
Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva
Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power
of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies,
or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the
occupied territory within or outside this territory;
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(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any
kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her
interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health
of such person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the
hostile nation or army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of
law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they
were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of the
war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the
human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that
such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are
the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an
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annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the
relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting
a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person
to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from
military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material,
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided
for under the Geneva Conventions;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces or using them to participate
actively in hostilities. 367
This definition focuses on Hague Law because it consists of crimes found in the
regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Convention as well as new developments in the laws of war. 368 In all, twenty-six actions
are prohibited under this section, including some new crimes to the laws of war such as
attacks directed against humanitarian or peacekeeping missions, 369 acts that severely
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damage the environment, 370 population transfers, 371 sexual offenses, 372 and the
conscription or enlistment of child soldiers. 373
With respect to the words, “within the established framework of international
law” which is contained in subparagraphs 2(b) and (e), it has been suggested that “these
words were intended to include implicitly considerations of the jus in bello such as
military necessity and proportionality”. 374 Some delegates at the Rome Conference
however, expressed the view that these words also included requirements such as those in
article 85(3) and (4) of Protocol I, dealing with causing death or serious injury to body or
health or when committed willfully and in violation of the Geneva Conventions or the
Protocols. 375 Also, the words appears to dispel doubts as to the customary law status of
subparagraphs 2(b) and (e) thereby avoiding any requirement on the Prosecutor to
establish the nullum crimen sine lege of each of the numerated acts independent of the
Statute. 376
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Unlike grave breaches violations, there is no requirement that the victims of
“other serious violations of the laws and customs” should be “protected persons” because
the focus of the Hague Law was aimed at punishing the architects of the war. 377 Thus,
several of the provisions in this category list weapons that have been prohibited in
warfare. 378 Also, by adopting Protocol I, the ICC Statute provides for individual criminal
responsibility for violations of the Hague Law which was first introduced under Protocol
I. 379

6.3.3.c.

Non-International Armed Conflict
Until the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Convention, war crimes have been

traditionally regarded as serious violations of the law applicable to international armed
conflict. 380

States were very reluctant to accept international regulation of internal

conflict or civil war. This reluctant was manifested in the 1949 Geneva Convention
which only made provision for non-international armed conflict in common article 3 of
the four Geneva Conventions. States’ objection to the application of international law to
non-international armed conflict continued during the 1977 update of the Geneva
Conventions. Efforts to expand the scope of common article 3 were met with opposition
such that Protocol II only contained a slight improvement on common article 3 and
avoided any suggestion that grave breaches of war crime could be committed during a
non-international armed conflict. 381
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Similarly, the Statute of the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia contain
provisions proscribing grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the
laws or customs of war which limits the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to international armed
conflict. 382 On the other hand, the Statute of the ad hoc Tribunal for Rwanda provides
that ICTR shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes when committed only in noninternational armed conflict. 383

However, notwithstanding the clear provisions of the

Statute of the ICTY, the Tribunal held that the ICTY has jurisdiction to try serious
violations of laws or customs of war irrespective of whether “the serious violations has
occurred within the context of an international or internal armed conflict”. 384 While this
decision has been criticized as an attempt at “judicial law making”, it has also been
praised as reflection of customary international law development in this area of law. 385
Article 8 of the ICC Statute reflects this development by expressly providing for
the application of war crimes in non-international armed conflicts.

However, the

expansion of war crimes to include acts committed in non-international armed conflict
was by no means a foregone conclusion when the treaty negotiations began. 386 Even
though article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol Additional II of
1977 prohibit certain acts in internal armed conflict, not all governments were happy to
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see some of them defined as war crimes entailing individual criminal responsibility.
Partly as a result of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and partly due to the obvious
prevalence of internal conflicts globally, those objections were overcome. 387
The ICC Statute is thus the first international treaty to explicitly provide for
individual criminal responsibility for “serious” violations of common article 3 and for
twelve other “serious violations of the laws and customs” applicable in non-international
armed conflict, including intentional attacks against civilians, crimes of sexual and
gender violence, and forced displacement. 388
War crimes during non-international armed conflict are divided into two
categories. The first set of war crimes during non-international armed conflict which
covers serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Convention is contained
in Article 8(2)(c) which provides:
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character,
serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted

387
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court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally
recognized as indispensable. 389
Article 8(2)(c) is impari material with common article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions. However, under the ICC Statute, “serious violations of common article 3”
does not apply “…to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.” 390 This limitation
which is also contained in Protocol II is intended to ensure that only non-international
armed conflict of certain degree and intensity should trigger the application of the
Convention. 391 According to the ICTY Trial Chamber:
the test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an
armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in Common
Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the
conflict and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these closely
related criteria are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of
distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and
short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not
subject to international humanitarian law. 392
This formula has been adopted and applied in other cases by the ICTY and ICTR
tribunals to determine the existence of non-international armed conflict. 393
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The second category of war crimes during non-international armed conflict is
drawn mainly from Protocol II but also from the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and the
United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. 394
Article 8(2)(e) of the ICC Statute defines this category of war crimes as:
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material,
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed
conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions;
2002); and Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlado Radic, Zoran Zigic, Dragoljub Prcac,
Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1, P 123 (November 2, 2001).
394
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(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate
actively in hostilities;
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for
reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians
involved or imperative military reasons so demand;
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to
the conflict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical,
dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out
in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously
endanger the health of such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of the conflict; 395
Acts which constitute war crimes under this subparagraph are mainly drawn from
Protocol Additional II. 396

Article 8(2)(e) is intended to protect intentional attacks

directed against civilians, buildings belonging to non-governmental and humanitarian
organizations, and prohibits sexual and gender violence as well as child soldiers as is the
case under international armed conflict.

However, this subparagraph has a lower

threshold application than Protocol II because it applies to “armed conflicts that take
place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups”. 397
Contrast with Protocol II which requires dissident or other organized armed
groups to control territory, maintain responsible command over troops sufficient to carry
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out sustained and concerted military operations, and possess the ability to implement
international agreement. 398 The lowering of the threshold:
is important because it reduces the chances that a situation arises
in a state that can be qualified neither as an internal conflict nor
as an emergency as provided for in the human rights conventions.
A better protection of human rights may be achieved because of
this reduction. 399
Also, the use of the term “protracted” implies that hostilities need not be
continuous because interruptions in fighting do not suspend the obligations of States
Parties to the Convention. 400 On the other hand, the use of the term “governmental
authorities” broadens the scope of the parties to non-international armed conflict.
According to Zimmerman, the term “has to be understood as including not only regular
armed forces of a State but all different kinds of armed personnel provided they
participate in protracted armed violence, including, where applicable, units of national
guards, the police forces, border police or other armed authorities of a similar nature.” 401
Furthermore, Article 8(2)(f) extends the application of Protocol II to armed
conflict between warring factions without the involvement of a de jure governmental
authority.

Hitherto, such situations, irrespective of their scale, were generally not

recognized in international humanitarian law as constituting armed conflicts. 402 This
development makes it possible to apply laws of war to non-international armed conflict
between belligerent groups who are the principal parties to armed conflict especially in
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situations where State structures have disintegrated such as was the case in Somalia and
Liberia. 403 The recognition that de facto armed conflict may exist between organized
armed groups is significant in ensuring a greater degree of protection to the victims of
such situations.
In conformity with Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the ICC Statute
excludes application of “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflicts not of an international character”, from “situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
acts of a similar nature”. 404 Further, in extending the application of certain war crimes to
non-international armed conflict, the ICC Statute in conformity with the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol Additional II, reiterated that this will not affect the general
right of States “to maintain or establish law and order or to defend their unity and
territorial integrity by all legitimate means”. 405
This limitation implies that the Court has no jurisdiction over atrocities committed
during internal disturbances and tensions. This provision is intended to assure States that
the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes committed during non-international armed
conflict will not intrude on State sovereignty. 406 However, the provision generally, and
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interference in their internal affairs).
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in particular, the words “by all legitimate means” should be strictly interpreted to avoid
resort by States as a defense to war crimes.

6.3.3.d.
I.

Requirements for the Application of War Crimes

Part of a Policy or Large Scale
In a broad sense, the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes in international armed

conflict emanates “in particular” when those crimes are “committed as a part of a plan or
policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes”. 407

The words “in

particular” serves as a compromise between those in favor of a jurisdictional threshold
and those opposed to such limitation.408 This requirement has been described as a “nonthreshold threshold” 409 in the sense that while it does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction
only to cases involving large-scale commission of war crimes or cases involving plans or
policies to commit war crimes, it requires the Court to take into consideration the gravity
of the crime in determining admissibility under article 17(1)(d) of the Statute. 410
Therefore, unlike crimes against humanity, there is no requirement for the act to
be widespread or systematic or as in the case of genocide, war crimes do not require a
very high level of specific intent. 411

Thus, a war crime can be a single, isolated,

407

ICC Statute, supra note 1, Article 8(1).
Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, supra note 28, at 107-08.
409
Id., at 124.
410
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 434-35; ICC Statute, supra note 1, art.
17(1)(d) which provides that:
408

Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall determine that a case is
inadmissible where … (d) the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
411
William A. Schabas, supra note 364, at 42.
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dispersed or random act.

This means that the Court may assume jurisdiction over

isolated acts of war crimes committed by individuals. 412
However, discussing United States argument that U.S. nationals involved in
peacekeeping operations may be unwittingly charged with war crimes by a “politically”
minded Prosecutor, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, noted that a situation in which war
crimes charges were brought against U.S. military personnel on peacekeeping missions
would not hold up because the ICC Statute defines war crimes as primarily acts
committed “as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such
crimes.” 413 Therefore, he argued that isolated incident carried out by a “trigger-happy
Marine wouldn’t fall under that.” 414 Suffice it to note that to reach this desired result, the
Court would have to be guided by the purpose of the Statute which requires the Court to
prosecute only the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole”. 415

II.

The Existence of Armed Conflict
In order for an act to qualify as a war crime, the act must occur during an armed

conflict. 416 This requirement which is jurisdictional provides the essential difference
between a war crime and a crime against humanity is that “[a] war crime can only be
prosecuted if committed during a war, whereas a crime against humanity can be

412

Marie-Claude Roberge, The New International Criminal Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 325 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 671, 674 (Dec. 1998); William A. Schabas, supra note 371, at 44; Von Hebel &
Robinson, supra note 28, at 124.
413
See James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA Journal 68 (Sept.1998).
414
Id., at 68.
415
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
416
Id., art. 8 2(d).
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prosecuted during times of war or peace”. 417 Thus, the existence of an armed conflict,
international or non-international is a pre-condition for holding individuals accountable
for war crimes.
As to what constitutes an armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia proffered that:
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State. 418
The above definition encompasses international and non-international armed
conflict. 419 While international armed conflict is between two or more States, noninternational armed conflict results from a protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed group(s) on the one hand or between
organized armed groups within a State. In other words, internal armed conflict may exist
between two armed groups without the involvement of a State or governmental
authorities. The recognition that protracted armed conflict may exist between “organized

417

Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 340 (2002).
418
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 262, p 70.
419
This definition was imported into the ICC Statute with a minor change in that while the ICTY referred
to “protracted armed violence”, the ICC Statute used the words “protracted armed conflict”, see ICC
Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(f). The substitution of the word “violence” for “conflict” has been criticized
as inaccurate and capable of introducing a new crime. See Claus Kress, War Crimes Committed in NonInternational Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice, 30 ISR. Y.B.
Human Rights 103, 117-118 (2001) (arguing that “it was not the intention of the drafters to substitute
“protracted armed conflict” for “protracted armed violence.” Noting that the French version of the Rome
Statute includes the original wording of the Tadic decision, he suggested that the English version should
not give rise to misunderstanding). This is significant as Article 128(1) of the ICC Statute states that
“Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.” Thus, the ICRC has
suggested that “the addition of the word “protracted” to armed conflict seems to be redundant since
protracted violence is a constituent element of an armed conflict not of an international character. See,
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Working Paper, June 29, 1999, available at
http://www.igc.org/icc/html/icrc8_2e 19990629.html. Therefore, in view of this, it has been suggested that
the provision “should not be considered as creating yet another threshold of applicability.” See, Theodor
Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 260 (2000).
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armed groups” is “both welcome and realistic”, 420 as often times, this kind of conflict
constitutes the vast majority of contemporary internal conflicts.
It is pertinent to note that armed conflict could also “be international in character
alongside an internal armed conflict”. 421 In other words, an internal armed conflict may
become international or assume an international character. This may result in situations
where another State directly intervenes in an internal conflict through its armed force or
indirectly where a party to the internal conflict acts at the direction of the other State. In
some situations, it is difficult to ascertain when an armed group is acting at the direction
of another State. 422
Concerning the commencement of armed conflict, it has been suggested that the
“firing of weapons by soldiers of opposing sides across a contested border or the
uninvited intervention of the armed forces of one state, even in small numbers, in the
territory of another state may trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions in

420

Theodor Meron, Classification of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 236, 237 (1998).
421
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, supra note 286, p 84.
422
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J.
REP. 14, para 115 (June 27, 1986), the ICJ expressed the view that the other State must be in “effective
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed’. However, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, supra
note 286, pp 145, 156 rejected Trial Chamber II application of the test in the Nicaragua’s case, Prosecutor
v. Tadic, supra note 265, pp 584-588, Judge McDonald, dissenting. The Appeals Chamber rejected the
“effective control” test offered by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case on the basis that it would not seem to be
consonant with the logic of the law of state responsibility and because the test was at variance with judicial
and state practice. Id., at pp 115-145. See also, Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo, Trial
Chamber Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, pp 230-34 (16 November 1998) [hereinafter Prosecutor v.
Delalic]; Theodor Meron, supra note 427, at 237 (arguing that the Trial Chamber misapplied the Nicaragua
test because the “Nicaragua’s test addresses only the question of state responsibility. Conceptually, it
cannot determine whether a conflict is international or internal. In practice, applying the Nicaragua test to
the question in Tadic produces artificial and incongruous conclusions”). But see Judge McDonald
dissenting opinion where he opined that “overall control” by a foreign State over a military organization is
sufficient for considering the armed conflict to be international.” See, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Regarding the Applicability of Article 2 of the Statute, Case IT-941-T (May 7, 1997), 36 I.L.M. at 970, 979, para. 34.]
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totality”. 423 For purposes of determining the duration and territorial application of war
crimes provisions, the Appeals Chamber discussing the situation in Prijedor region of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, opined that “the temporal and geographical scope of both
internal and international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of
hostilities.” 424
With respect to the duration of armed conflict for purposes of the application of
international law, the ICTY Appeals Chamber suggests that “international humanitarian
law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation
of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved.” 425 The Appeals Chamber noted that “until
that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of
the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.” 426
Thus, international humanitarian law does not pertain only to those areas where
actual fighting takes place; it applies to the entire territory of the State involved in armed
conflict. This is also supported by the position of the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Delalic
case, holding that “whether or not the conflict is deemed to be international or internal,
there does not have to be actual combat activities in a particular location for the norms of
international humanitarian law to be applicable.” 427 This approach is consistent with

423

W.J. Fenrick, Article 8, margin No. 6 in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto
Trifferer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
424
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 271, p 67.
425
Id., p 70.
426
Id.
427
Prosecutor v. Delalic, supra note 422, p 185.
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application of international humanitarian law to situations of protracted armed violence
where hostilities are not necessarily to be characterized as continuous. 428
Regarding the awareness of the perpetrator to the existence of armed conflict, the
Prosecutor only has to establish that the perpetrator has knowledge of the factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict to satisfy the
requirement that the act(s) “took place in the context of and associated with” [an
international armed conflict]. The Prosecutor is not required to prove that the perpetrator
was aware of the existence of the armed conflict or that the perpetrator had knowledge of
whether the armed conflict is international or non-international. 429 The perpetrator’s
knowledge of the factual circumstances that led to the existence of armed conflict,
establishes the nexus between the perpetrator’s war crime violation(s) and the armed
conflict. 430

6.4.

Observations and Commentary
The reluctance to tinker with the definition of genocide prevented the possibility

of expanding the protected group to include attack on political and social groups. As a
consequence of this omission, the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia
between 1975 and 1985, which resulted in the killing of an estimated one million persons,
can be argued to have not constituted genocide because the perpetrators are of the same

428

See Andreas Zimmermann, supra note 399, at 285.
See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 116, art. 8, Introduction.
430
For what amounts to sufficient nexus between the crime and the armed conflict, see Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Opinion and Judgment, supra note 262, pp 572-73 (expressing the view that it is not necessary that “the
crime alleged takes place during combat, that it be part of a policy or of a practice officially endorsed or
tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual furtherance of a policy associated
with the conduct of war or in the actual interest of a party to the conflict”). See also, Prosecutor v. Delalic,
supra note 422, pp 193-98.
429
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ethnic group as the victims. 431 Also, the Khmer Rogue may argue that the victims were
targeted as a political, social or economic group which is not covered by the
Convention. 432 Thus, when in 1980 the United Nations General Assembly convened an
international conference, it mandated the conference to focus on Vietnam’s invasion in
Cambodia, not the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. 433 Consequently, the Khmer Rouge
would arguably avoid prosecution for genocide because of the restrictive definition of
genocide which clearly excluded political groups and other groups from protection. 434
Similarly, the crimes of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet would not meet
the definition of Genocide because he allegedly targeted individuals due to their politics
rather than their race or religion. 435 Arguably, the Soviet Union’s extermination of 15 to
20 million Soviet citizens before, during, and after the adoption of the Genocide
Convention, may not be considered as genocide as the victims were targeted because they
are “class enemies” and “enemies of the people.” 436
While it is unfortunate that an unscrupulous entity could attempt to avoid
application of the Convention and the ICC Statute in cases of discriminate killings by
labeling the victims as a political group, 437 the class of protected groups cannot be
justifiably extended without corresponding amendment of the Convention or the ICC
Statute. There is no doubt that since the Convention was concluded, there has been an
431

M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 212.
See Jason Abrams, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities and Prospects: The Atrocities in Cambodia
and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide, 35 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 303, 304-06 (2001).
433
See Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements, 87 AM .J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1993).
434
Mathew Lippman, supra note 78, at 464.
435
Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, Wash. Post, Oct. 25,
1998, at C1.
436
Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide, in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions 47, 50 (George
J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994).
437
Through the assertion of what amounts to an affirmative defense, the accused state may characterize
victims as “political” or “economic” opponents, or even deny that the group exists at all, and in doing so
avoid responsibility under the Convention. See Paul Starkman, Genocide and International Law; Is there a
Cause of Action?, 8 ASILS INT’L L.J. 1, at 13, 37 (1984).
432
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increasing number of violent crimes directed against groups that are not categorized as
national, ethnic, racial, or religious. These developments should have necessitated the
redefinition of genocide to overcome the ambiguities or limitations that plague the
current definition. 438 For “it would be reprehensible if the world could not condemn
massive slaughter of members of a group ... simply because of a preordained idea of what
types of groups qualified for coverage under the [Genocide] Convention.” 439
Crimes against humanity have developed from doubtful precedent and now forms
part of the core international crimes. The ICC Statute has overcome the uncertainty
behind the categorization of crimes against humanity by attempting to detail the contours
of the crime in the Statute. Also, the elimination of the requirement of governmental
action broadens the scope of crimes against humanity. Further, the dissociation of crimes
against humanity from armed conflict clears any doubt as to the distinct nature of the
crime. As noted by the ICTY in the Erdemovic case, crimes against humanity can best be
understood as “serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what is
most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health, or dignity”. 440
While some of the crimes prohibited under article 7 of the ICC Statute may fall
under the purview of domestic criminal law, such atrocious acts graduate to crimes
against humanity once accompanied by special elements associated with an overall attack
on a civilian population. 441 In addition, the distinction between “murder-type” and
“persecution-type” crimes against humanity expands the groups that are protected against
persecution beyond the scope of the Genocide Convention. In deed, article 7 leaves the

438

Thomas W. Simon, supra note 34, at 247.
Id.
440
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, supra note 290, para. 28
441
Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, supra note 118, at 78.
439
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group wide open to include all persecutions on “other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law …” 442 Thus, “intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity
of the group or collectivity” amounts to persecution-type crimes against humanity. 443
This will no doubt expand the application of crimes against humanity to include
violations of acts prohibited in international conventions such as the international bill of
rights and other human rights treaties. 444
As can be seen above, article 8 of the ICC Statute includes a far more
comprehensive codification of war crimes under customary international law than existed
in the statutes of previous tribunals. 445 Article 8 of the ICC Statute confers jurisdiction to
the Court over a wide range of war crimes committed during international armed conflict.
Also, article 8 of the ICC Statute reaffirms recent developments in international law by
conferring the Court with power to try war crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts, such as civil wars, which are the most common conflicts today. The ICC
Statute finds its justification for the international supervision of internal conflicts in
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II.

442

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h).
Id., art. 7(2)(g) [emphasis added].
444
See discussion and accompanying notes in Part I, chapter 3, pp 65-74.
445
For example, article 3 of the ICTY Statute provides a non-exhaustive list of five sub-clauses which
constitute violations of the laws and customs of war. By contrast, Article 8(2)(b) of the ICC Statute,
covering violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict alone, contains
twenty-six sub-clauses. Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter simply defines “violations of the laws or
customs of war” as:
443

Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 234, art. 6(b).
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The use of the word “namely” in each of the four categories of war crimes
appears to suggest that the enumerated list of acts constituting war crimes in the ICC
Statute is exhaustive rather than inclusive in nature. 446 However, while the ICC Statute
contain a list of more prohibited acts as war crimes than previous instruments, it would
have been better to list them in an inclusive form to leave open the inclusion of additional
“grave breaches” or “other serious violations” that may develop in the future without
necessarily amending the Statute.

446

Jordan J. Paust, supra note 112, at 29, Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 112, at 435.
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CHAPTER 7
===============================================================
7.0.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
__________________________________________________

7.1.

ICC Jurisdiction Ratione Personae

7.1.1. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae (Personal Jurisdiction)
The Court has jurisdiction over natural persons only and “a person who commits a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually responsible and liable
for punishment ...”. 1

Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction does not extend to States or

organizations. 2 During the preparatory phase, France proposed extending the court's
jurisdiction to organizations. The proposal was addressed at Rome but could not gather
sufficient support and was dropped. The accused person must have attained the age of
eighteen 3 and be in the custody of the Court as the ICC Statute does not allow trials in
absentia. 4 In conformity with customary international law, crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court are not subject to any statute of limitations. 5

7.1.2. Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis (Temporal Jurisdiction)
The Court’s jurisdiction will not apply retroactively because the Statute limits the
Court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after July 1, 2002, being the date the ICC
Statute entered into force. 6 With respect to States that become parties to the ICC Statute
after its entry into force, the Court will exercise its jurisdiction only for crimes committed
1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
2
Id., art. 25(4) (stating that “no provisions of this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall
affect the responsibility of States under international law”).
3
Id., art, 26.
4
Id., art. 63(1).
5
Id., art. 29.
6
Id., art. 11(1).

after the State becomes a party to the ICC Statute, unless the State has made a declaration
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction at an earlier time. 7 It has been suggested that the Court
may exercise jurisdiction over continuing crimes that began before the enactment of the
ICC Statute. 8 However, for such conduct to be included within the jurisdiction of the
Court, it must first meet the conditions for a continuing crime, and international
principles of legality, that is to say, the act must have been criminal at the time the
accused committed it. 9

7.1.3. Jurisdiction Ratione Loci (Territorial Jurisdiction)
An overwhelming majority of States at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome
supported giving the Court automatic jurisdiction regarding genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Also, a great majority of the States at
the Diplomatic Conference supported a proposal by South Korea that the Court should
exercise jurisdiction if the ICC Statute has been ratified by a State on whose territory the
crimes were committed or the State of nationality of the accused or the State of
nationality of the victim, or the State with custody of the accused. 10 However, a few
States, including the United States, wanted automatic jurisdiction only for genocide and
for other crimes, they preferred some form of a consent regime on individual cases. At
the end of the conference, a compromise arrangement was reached which ensures that

7

ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 11, 12(3).
Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 79-80 (2001). Such crimes include forced removal of
children from a specific ethnic group or disappearances. Id; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6-8
(defining the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to include continuing crimes).
9
Alan Nissel, Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 653, 663-64 (2004).
10
See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments 1, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm.
8
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States Parties to the ICC Statute accept automatic jurisdiction of the Court over all crimes
contained in the Statute. 11
With respect to the territorial scope of the Court, this varies depending on how a
situation is referred to the Court. Where a situation is referred to the Court by a State
Party or by proprio motu investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, the Court has jurisdiction
if the crimes have been committed in the territory of a State which has ratified the ICC
Statute or on its vessel and aircraft; or when the crimes have been committed by a citizen
of a State which has ratified the ICC Statute. 12

Further, the Court may exercise

jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of a non-party State or crimes
committed by a citizen of a non-party State if the State which has not ratified the ICC
Statute makes a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime. 13
On the other hand, where a situation is referred to the Court by the Security
Council pursuant to Article VII of the UN Charter, the Court’s territorial jurisdiction
literally extends to the whole world. 14 In other words, the Court has jurisdiction over
such situation whether or not the crime occurred in the territory of a State party and/or
whether or not the accused is a national of a State party. It is also immaterial that the
non-Party State in whose territory the crime occurred or whose national is accused of the
crime did not consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.

11

ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12(1). Note however that a State party may opt out of the Court’s
jurisdiction over war crimes for a period of seven (7) years after the entry into force of the Statute for the
State concerned. See Id., art. 124.
12
Id., arts. 12; 13(a)(c).
13
Id., art. 12(3).
14
Id., art. 13(b).
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7.2.

ICC and Individual Criminal Responsibility
In accordance with the principle of individual criminal responsibility firmly

established in Part III of the ICC Statute, an individual is criminally responsible for his or
her conduct. 15 The individual’s criminally responsibility extends to the commission of
the crime, whether as an individual or jointly, and includes the ordering, soliciting or
inducing the commission of a crime that in fact occurs or is attempted; or facilitating the
commission of a crime, or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in its commission or
attempted commission. 16 Also, individual criminal responsibility attaches in any other
way, where for instance, the individual intentionally contributes to the commission or the
attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose,
when that contribution is made with the “aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court,” or is “made in the knowledge of the
intention of the group to commit the crime.” 17
In cases of genocide, an individual would also have criminal responsibility for
direct and public incitement. 18 Further, an individual is criminally liable for attempt to
commit a crime so long as the individual has taken substantial steps toward commission
of the crime, even if the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of
the individual’s intention. 19 However, a timely withdrawal resulting in complete and

15

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3).
Id., art. 25(3)(a-c).
17
Id., art. 25(3)(d).
18
Id., 25(3)(e).
19
Id., 25(3)(f).
16
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voluntary abandonment of the criminal purpose shall excuse punishment under the
Statute. 20
The Court’s jurisdiction extends to all people regardless of their official
capacity. 21 This means that any member of government or Head of State shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 22 Therefore, the official position of the individual or any
immunity or special procedural rules that may attach to the individual because of his or
her official capacity will not bar the jurisdiction of the Court. 23 In essence, national
amnesties, pardons or similar measures of impunity for crimes under the Court’s
jurisdiction, which prevent the discovery of the truth and prevent accountability in a
criminal trial, cannot bind the Court. 24
However, it is not unlikely that the Court may consider the outcome of credible
alternative measures of accountability such as Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The Court may do this before or after the completion of investigation, if the Prosecutor
taking into account all circumstances including the gravity of the crimes, the interests of
victims, and other strategic factors, 25 determines that it is not “in the interests of justice”
20
21

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(f).
See, art. 27(1) which provides that the Statute:

shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as whether as a Head of State or …… [any other capacity] shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.
22
Id.
23
Id. at art. 27(2). Article 27 (2) provides that:
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under
national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
24
Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 6, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, 1 August 2000, available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 [hereinafter Checklist for
Effective Implementation].
25
Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice:
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370, 375 (2005) (observing that
examples of factors that might be considered are the protection of victims, the potential impact of
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to investigate or prosecute. 26 According to Judge Kaul, this question is not simply
theoretical because the “Prosecutor operates in the context of ongoing conflicts, often at
the same time as peace negotiations are taking place, purely legal considerations may not
always be the sole basis for deciding whether or not to prosecute”. 27 The Trial Chamber
may, on its own initiative review the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an
investigation or prosecution on the grounds that it will not serve the interest of justice. 28
Regarding command responsibility, the ICC Statute provides that command
responsibility is a form of criminal responsibility in addition to other forms of
responsibility and that military commanders are not immune from responsibility for the
acts of their subordinates. 29 Also, command responsibility extends to any superior in a
nonmilitary setting. 30

Thus, article 28 deals with the responsibility of military

commanders and other superiors with respect to the criminal acts of subordinates under
their “effective authority and control”. 31 The military commander or other superior is
liable if he or she knew or should have known that his or her subordinates were
committing or about to commit crimes prohibited by the Statute and failed to take

investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the existence of national criminal prosecution
initiatives).
26
ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c). See also, Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues
Before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Paper
on Some Policy Issues].
27
Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 19, at 375. Judge Kaul is a Judge of the International Criminal Court, and
President of the Pre-Trial Division.
28
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, para. 3(b); Regulations of the Court, Reg. 48, Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04
(May 26, 2004) [hereinafter ICC Regulations].
29
Id., art. 28(a).
30
Id., art. 28(b).
31
Id. (emphasis added). The words “effective authority and control” are intended to superimpose in a
civilian setting the requirements of the same types of relationships between superior and subordinate in the
military.
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reasonable steps to “prevent or repress . . . or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities.” 32
The ICC Statute prohibits superior orders and prescription of law as grounds for
excluding criminal responsibility unless (1) the person was under a legal obligation to
obey such orders, (2) the person did not know that the order was unlawful, and (3) the
order was not manifestly unlawful. 33 The application of this exception is limited because
the ICC Statute makes it clear that orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity
are manifestly unlawful. 34
Also, mental incapacity as a result of mental disease or defect, involuntary
intoxication, self defense, defense of others and defense of property essential for survival
during war times as well as duress are grounds for excluding criminal responsibility. 35
Also, mistake of fact or law may be grounds to exclude criminal responsibility if it
negates the mental element required by the crime. 36

However, superior orders and

prescription of law are not grounds for excluding criminal responsibility unless the
person was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, the person did not know that the
order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful. 37 The exception offers
little or no defense as orders to commit genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war
crimes are generally manifestly unlawful. 38

32

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 28(b).
Id., art. 33(1)(a-c) (emphasis in the original).
34
Id., art. 33(2)
35
Id., art. 31.
36
Id., art. 32.
37
Id., art. 33 (emphasis added).
38
Id., art. 33(2).
33
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7.3.

ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Parties
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over a national of a non-party State if he or

she commits a crime in the territory of a State party and the State party elects to surrender
the accused to the jurisdiction of the Court rather than prosecute him or her in its national
court. 39 For this to occur, the accused must remain in the territory of a State party or be
otherwise lawfully apprehended by the State party.

Also, the Court may exercise

jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States if a non-party State by declaration consents
to the Court’s jurisdiction over its national. 40
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to nationals of non-party States
if the Security Council refers a situation to the Court. 41 Article 13 paragraph (b) allows
the Security Council to refer situations to the ICC with “mandatory effect.” 42 Thus,
regardless of whether an accused is a national of a State party to the ICC Statute or not, if
a situation involving him or her is referred to the Court by the Security Council, the Court
can obtain jurisdiction over the person. 43 This provision makes it difficult for a national
of a rouge State to escape the Court’s jurisdiction but only if the Security Council gets
involve. 44

39

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(a).
Id., art. 12(3). See also art. 4(2) which provides that “the Court may exercise its functions and powers, as
provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any
other State”). Id.
41
See Id., art. 13(b).
42
John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the
Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 85, 95 (2000).
43
Id.
44
Id., at 95 (citing David J. Scheffer, Developments at Rome Treaty Conference, p. 3 (July 23, 1998)
http://www.state.gov/www/policy remarks/1998/981021/scheffer icc.html> where he stated that the
“United States believed that this was a particularly important objective in order to ensure that a rogue state
could not escape the Court’s jurisdiction”. [hereinafter “Scheffer Report”].
40
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The Court’s potential jurisdiction over nationals of non-State parties has been
raised by the United States as a basis to object to its participation in the ICC. 45 The
United States expresses the view that the ICC should require the authority of the Security
Council in order for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over non-party nationals. 46
However, as noted above, the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States in
situations referred to the ICC by a State will only materialize with the consent of a State
party in whose territory the crime was committed or with the consent of a non-State party
whose national is accused of committing the crime. 47 Absent such consent, the Court
will only exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-State parties if the situation was
referred to the Court by the Security Council. 48

7.4.

Triggering the Court’s Jurisdiction
Article 13 provides three mechanisms to trigger the Court’s exercise of

jurisdiction for the crimes listed in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute.

7.4.1. Referral by a State
Under article 14(1), a State party to the Court may refer a situation to the
Prosecutor in which one or more of the crimes covered by the Statute appears to have
been committed. 49 The Prosecutor is obliged to investigate such referrals for the purpose
of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the
commission of such crimes. 50

45

See, Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 2002-Sep Army Law. 1, 11 (2002).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
John Seguin, supra note 42, at 95-96.
49
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a).
50
Id.
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Under article 12(3) a non-party State in whose territory a crime subject to the
jurisdiction of the court occurred, or of which the accused person is a national may, by
declaration lodged with the registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with
respect to the crime in question. 51 Thus, it follows that such a non-party State may refer
on ad hoc basis, a case to the Prosecutor who shall in turn treat the referral in accordance
with article 14.

7.4.1(1).
First Sets of States’ Referrals to the Court
In accordance with article 14(1), three States Parties; Uganda, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic, have referred situations in their
respective countries to the Office of the Prosecutor. 52 Also, pursuant to article 12(3),
Cote d’Ivoire, a non-State party accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to
crimes committed on its territory since the events of September 19, 2002. 53 Already the
Chief Prosecutor has opened investigations into the situations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo 54 and Uganda 55 respectively.

51

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3).
See ICC Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) to the ICC, The Hague, January 29, 2004, available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006); Prosecutor Receives Referral of
the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 19, 2004, available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=19&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006); ICC Press Release, Prosecutor
Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic, January 7, 2005, available at http://www.icccpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html (visited February 26, 2006).
53
ICC Press Release, Registrar Confirms that the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire Has Accepted the Jurisdiction
of the Court, February 15, 2005, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/93.html (visited
February 26, 2006). (The text of the declaration remains confidential at the moment).
54
ICC Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens its First
Investigation, June 23, 2004, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=26&l=en.html (visited
February 26, 2006).
55
See ICC Press Release, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into
Northern Uganda, July 29, 2004, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=33&l=en.html (visited
February 26, 2006).
52
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On June 23, 2004, the ICC Presidency decided to set up three Pre-Trial Chambers
to prepare for the referrals. 56 On July 5, 2004, the Presidency assigned the situation in
the Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I 57 and the situation in northern Uganda to Pre-Trial
Chamber II. 58 The respective Chambers are now duly seized of the two situations and are
functioning accordingly. On January 19, 2005, the situation in the Central African
Republic was assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber III 59 in anticipation of the Prosecutor’s
decision on whether or not to open an investigation. On July 8, 2005, Pre-trial Chamber
II issued its first warrant of arrests against Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya,
Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Onguen. 60
As noted above, the Prosecutor received the three referrals from States Parties and
has initiated investigations on the first two referrals. Such referrals evince confidence in
the works of the Court and the Chief Prosecutor. Also, they facilitate the practical work
of the ICC, since cooperation with national authorities become easier when the
government in question supports the Court’s activities regarding its investigation and

56

See ICC Press Release, Decision Constituting Pre-Trial Chambers, June 23, 2004, ICC-Pres-01/04,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/presidency/decisions.html (the Presidency issued its decision to
constitute three Pre-Trial Chambers, composed of the following judges: Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Judges Akua
Kuenyehia, Claude Jorda, and Sylvia Steiner; Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judges Tuiloma Neronis Slade, Mauro
Politi, and Fatoumata Dembele Diarra; and Pre-Trial Chamber III, Judges Tuiloma Neronis Slade, HansPeter Kaul, and Sylvia Steiner.
57
See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC-01/04-1 (July 5, 2004).
58
Situation in Uganda, Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, No. ICC02/04-1 (July 5, 2004).
59
See Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Central African
Republic to Pre-Trial Chamber III, No. ICC-01/05-1 (Jan. 19, 2005).
60
Situation in Uganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Warrant of Arrests, No. ICC-02/04-01/05-53-57, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/current_situations/Uganda.html
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prosecution. In the two cases currently under investigation, no requests for deferral have
been submitted, which could be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the ICC. 61
With respect to the referral by Cote d’Ivoire, the State accepted ICC jurisdiction
to investigate in the country and requested the ICC’s help in bringing to justice rebels
who started the civil war in that country. However, since only “situations” can be
referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor will consider the actions of all individuals in groups
involved in the conflict. Consequently, on January 28, 2005, the Chief Prosecutor of the
ICC announced that an ICC team will visit the Ivory Coast. The team’s mission will be
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to open a formal investigation into
alleged war crimes that occurred during the civil war there. So far, no formal procedural
steps have followed its acceptance, and it is unclear whether the Ivorian government is
intending to refer the situation to the ICC, or whether it will be for the prosecutor to
initiate an investigation under article 15(3).

7.4.2. Proprio Motu Investigation by the ICC Prosecutor
Article 15 allows the Court’s independent Prosecutor to initiate investigations
proprio motu based on information from victims, non-governmental organizations, or any
other source. 62 This power of the Prosecutor was strenuously objected to by some States
on the grounds that the office might be overwhelmed by frivolous complaints and would
have to waste the limited resources at his or her disposal to attend to them. In addition,
concerns were expressed that the Prosecutor might be placed under political pressure to
bring a complaint even if the complaint might not be justifiable or helpful in a particular
61

Such a request must be made within one month after the Prosecutor has notified “all States Parties and
those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crimes concerned.” ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
62
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(1)(2).
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political context. But majority of States were of the view that, despite the potential for
waste and abuse, it was better to empower the Prosecutor with such independence.
Despite the controversy surrounding this provision occasioned by the United States’
objection, its advantage cannot be overemphasized because one cannot always rely on
national governments and the Security Council to bring matters to the Court.
In any event, there exist various safeguards within the ICC treaty to avoid
frivolous and politically motivated cases. For instance, the ICC Statute confers adequate
supervisory powers on the Pre-trial Chamber with regard to the power of the Prosecutor
to initiate a proprio motu investigation. Thus, investigations and indictments initiated by
the Prosecutor will have to be confirmed and approved by a Pre-Trial Chamber of three
judges, after examining the evidence. 63 The accused and/or the State will have the
opportunity to challenge the indictment during confirmation hearings before the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
In other words, the Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is subject to the approval of
the Pre-trial judges who determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the
investigation. 64 Should the Pre-trial judges conclude that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with the investigation, and that the case appears within the jurisdiction of the
Court, it shall authorize the Prosecutor to proceed with investigation. 65 On the other
hand, if the Pre-trial judges are of the opinion that there is no sufficient basis to proceed
with investigation, they would decline authorization. The Prosecutor may subsequently
represent the case based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation. 66

63

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3).
Id., art. 15(3).
65
Id., art. 15(4).
66
Id., art. 15(5).
64
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In addition, where a situation has been referred by a State or the Prosecutor has
initiated a case proprio motu, the Prosecutor must inform all States parties to the Statute,
as well as non-States parties that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
concerned. 67 This provision was proposed by the United States. Many States accepted
the provision with great reluctance and as a compromise necessary for securing the
Prosecutor’s power to bring a case on his or her own initiative. The Prosecutor would
have to defer to the State’s investigation unless the Pre-trial Chamber decided
otherwise. 68 The Prosecutor may review a State’s investigation six months after the date
of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances
indicating the State’s unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation. 69
The State or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling of the
Pre-trial Chamber regarding admissibility of the situation. 70 Where the Prosecutor has
deferred an investigation to a State, the Prosecutor may request that the State periodically
inform him or her of the progress of its investigation. 71

7.4.3. Referral by the Security Council
In a situation in which one or more of the crimes covered under the ICC Statute
appears to have been committed, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, may refer such matter to the prosecutor. 72 Since the Security Council is
exercising its power under Article VII of the UN Charter, it has been suggested that the
67

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 18(1). The one-month period is designed to permit a State that is already
investigating the alleged crimes to inform the ICC and ask the prosecutor to defer to its jurisdiction under
the complementarity principle.
68
Id., art. 18(2).
69
Id., art 18(3).
70
Id., art. 18(4).
71
Id., art. 18(5).
72
Id., art. 13(b).
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ICC, acting under Security Council’s direction, shall have jurisdiction over nationals of
States Parties and non-State parties without their consent. 73 In other words, the UN
Security Council may confer jurisdiction on the Court even when the alleged crimes
occurred in the territory of a State which has not ratified the ICC Statute or the crime was
committed by the national of a non State Party to the ICC Statute. Also, when the
Security Council refers a situation to the ICC, it is expected that it will avail the Court
with its enforcement mechanism should a State fail to cooperate with the Court. 74

7.4.3.1.

Security Council First Referral to the Court
On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Sudan,

issued its report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 75 Relying on article
13(b) of the ICC Statute, the Commission recommended that the situation in Darfur be
referred to the ICC by the Security Council because “the Sudanese judicial system has
proved incapable, and the authorities unwilling, of ensuring accountability for the crimes
committed in Darfur.” 76 Although the U.S. was instrumental to the inclusion of article
13(b) in the ICC Statute 77, the U.S. initially hesitated to support the recommendation to
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC because of the U.S. opposition to the Court.
However, after lengthy discussions, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, by Resolution 1593 decided “to refer the situation in Darfur since

73

Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and
Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 324 (1998).
74
Id., at 325.
75
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General
(Jan. 25, 2005), available at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf>.
76
Id., para. 569.
77
The former ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues and head of the U.S. delegation in Rome, David
Scheffer, even describes Article 13(b) as one of the “major [U.S.] objectives . . . achieved” in the Statute.
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47,
73 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002).
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1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.” 78 The Resolution was
adopted by a vote of 11 in favor, none against, and 4 abstentions, namely Algeria, Brazil,
China, and the United States. The Security Council enjoined the Sudanese government
and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with and provide any
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to Resolution 1593.79
Also, while recognizing that non-State parties to the ICC Statute have no obligation under
the Statute, the Resolution implores all States and concerned regional and other
international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court. 80
On April 1, 2005, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo
announced his intention to make contact with the relevant national and international
authorities, including the United Nations and the African Union, in order to establish the
necessary arrangements for his work. 81 Mr. Moreno-Ocampo noted that continuous
support will be required from the Security Council. On April 21, 2005, the Presidency
assigned the situation in the Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I. 82 On June 6, 2005, the ICC
Chief Prosecutor opened an investigation into the situation in Darfur, Sudan. 83
The referral by Resolution 1593 is the first case in which the Security Council has
used the trigger mechanism provided by article 13(b) of the ICC Statute. Resolution
1593 reflects the complex negotiation and discussions in the Security Council and the

78

U.N. Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International
Criminal Court, March 31, 2005, SC/8351, S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. SC
Res. 1593, 1 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm
(hereinafter “SC Resolution 1593”).
79
Id., para. 2.
80
Id.
81
ICC Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur to ICC Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 2005).
82
Situation in the Darfur, Decision Assigning the Situation in Darfur to Pre-Trial Chamber I, No. ICC02/05-1 (April 21, 2005).
83
See ICC Press Release, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation in Darfur, June 6, 2005, available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=107&l=en.html.
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difficult compromise that allowed the situation in Darfur to be referred to the Court. 84 It
remains to be seen how the ICC will be able to cope with the situation in Darfur.
Hopefully, the dissenting States, particularly, the United States may find it necessary to
put aside its opposition to the Court and support the decision of the Security Council to
refer the situation in Darfur to the Court to enhance the effectiveness of the Court in that
matter. 85

7.5.

Authorization of Investigation and Confirmation of Charges
Under the ICC Statute, the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any

case brought before it. 86 Therefore, regardless of how a situation is brought under the
jurisdiction of the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber has an important role to play with regard
to the investigation and preparation of the cases that may result.

With respect to

situations where the Prosecutor triggers the Court’s jurisdiction suo moto, the Prosecutor
must seek and obtain the authorization of the Pre-trial Chamber before commencing an
investigation into the situation. 87
Generally, once the Prosecutor concludes investigation in any situation whether
based on State referral, proprio motu investigation, or Security Council referral, the
Prosecutor will, before charges are brought, consider other strategic factors to determine
84

In this context, it is noteworthy that Brazil, a State party and one of the strong supporters of the Court,
reaffirmed its support for the ICC but felt unable to cast a positive vote because of doubts about the
compatibility of Resolution 1593 with the Rome Statute. On the other side, Sudan, the country most
directly concerned, expressed its opposition to the decision of the Council. See the summary of the
explanation of vote made by Ambassadors Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg of Brazil and Elfatih Mohamed
Ahmed Erwa of Sudan respectively. UN Press Release SC/8351, Security Council Refers Situation in
Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, at 6-7 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm>.
85
This possibility was proposed in the so-called Compact Between the United States and Europe, a
document signed on February 17, 2005, by fifty foreign policy experts proposing to bridge the differences
between the United States and Europe on some fundamental policy questions. The compact is available
online at <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/USEUCompact.pdf>.
86
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19.
87
Id, art. 15(3).
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whether and when, having regard to the gravity of the crimes and the interests of victims,
it is “in the interests of justice” to prosecute. 88 Should the Prosecutor decide not to
prosecute, the decision may be subject to review by the Pre-trial Chamber on application
by the referring State or the Security Council. 89 Also, the Pre-Trial Chamber on its own
may review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on
considerations of the “interests of justice.” 90 In other words, the Prosecutor’s decision
not to proceed shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 91
On the other hand, if after the commencement of an investigation, the Prosecutor
conclude that there are sufficient evidence against a person to show that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has committed a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court, the Prosecutor will apply to the Pre-trial Chamber for a warrant of arrest or
a summons to appear. 92 After the person’s surrender or voluntarily appearance before the
Court, the Prosecutor must apply to the Pre-trial Chamber for confirmation of the charges
for which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial. 93 A confirmation hearing is held by the
Pre-trial Chamber to determine whether to approve the charges. Also, the confirmation
hearing serves to define the scope of the trial in terms of the exact nature of the alleged
crimes and the precise form of participation attributed to the accused. 94

88

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53(1)(c). Examples of factors that might be considered are the protection
of victims, the potential impact of investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the
existence of national criminal prosecution initiatives.
89
Id., art. 53(3)(a).
90
Id., art. 53(3)(b); Regulation 48.
91
Id.
92
Id., art. 58.
93
Id., art. 61.
94
Regulation 52 requires the Prosecutor to provide a precise characterization of the facts, specifying the
type of crimes alleged, as well as the precise form of participation. See ICC Regulations, supra note 28,
Regulation 52. If later it becomes apparent that a different crime or a different form of participation may be
at stake, the chamber is permitted to modify the legal characterization of the facts in the document
containing the charges. Id.
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7.6.

Grounds for Challenging Admissibility of a Case or the Court’s Jurisdiction
The ICC Statute states that the Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged on grounds

of inadmissibility of a case under article 17 or on any other ground by certain entities.95
Article 19 provides that the following entities may challenge the admissibility of a case or
the jurisdiction of the Court: (1) the accused or an individual against whom a warrant of
arrest or a summons to appear has been issued, (2) a State with jurisdiction over the case,
(3) a State party in whose territory the crime was committed or the State of nationality of
the accused or a non State party which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to a particular crime. 96 In addition, the Prosecutor may request the Court to issue
a ruling regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility. 97 Further, since the ICC
Statute vests the Court with jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction,98 the Court may also
determine the admissibility of a case sua sponte. 99
Suffice it to note that the ICC Statute makes a distinction between jurisdiction and
admissibility. While a challenge on jurisdiction is an attack on the Court’s authority over
the matter and/or the accused, challenge based on admissibility recognizes the Court’s
authority over the matter and the accused but argues that the Court is precluded from
exercising that authority in that particular matter based on any of the grounds listed in
article 19. 100 Thus, a challenge of the Court’s jurisdiction should be made first before a
challenge on admissibility since the former is more fundamental because if a Court lacks

95

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2).
Id., art. 19(2)(a-c). Note however that where the Prosecutor has determined pursuant to Article 53(1) &
(2) that a case is inadmissible, the referring authority – the State or the Security Council, may request the
Court to rule on the admissibility of the case. Id., art. 53(3)(a).
97
Id., art. 19(3).
98
See id. arts. 17, 19.
99
Id., arts. 19(1), 53(3)(b).
100
See William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 68
(2nd ed. 2004) (noting that the “question of admissibility … seeks to establish whether matters over which
the Court properly has jurisdiction should be litigated before it”).
96
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jurisdiction, the issue of admissibility does not arise. 101 Hence, while the ICC Statute
mandates that the Court must satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, it only requires the
Court to discretionary determine the admissibility of a case. 102
Where the challenge is brought before the confirmation of charges, the challenge
shall be entertained by the Pre-trial Chamber. 103 On the other hand, the challenge shall
be made before the Trial Chamber if brought after the confirmation of the charges. 104
Decisions of the Pre-trial Chamber or the Trial Chamber on challenge of jurisdiction or
admissibility of a case may be appealed to the Appeals Chamber whose decision is
final. 105

7.6.1. Inadmissibility of the Case
There are two ways the admissibility of a case may be challenged. First, for
situations referred to the Court by a State or investigations initiated proprio motu by the
Prosecutor, a State may challenge the admissibility of the case under the procedure laid
down in article 18. 106 Second, admissibility of case irrespective of how it was referred to
the Court may be challenged by any party listed under article 19. 107 However, the

101

See ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session,
New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1, R. 58(4), available at:, http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited March 3, 2006)
[hereinafter ICC Rules] (providing that a challenge or question regarding jurisdiction be considered prior to
any challenge or question of admissibility).
102
ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 19(1), 53(3)(b). See also, Christopher K. Hall, Article 19, Challenges to
the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 405, 408(Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]
(noting that the Court has a duty to determine jurisdiction, but determinations as to admissibility are
discretionary).
103
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(6).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id., art. 18(1)(2).
107
Id., art. 19(2)(a-c). Article 19 expands the entities that can challenge the admissibility of a case unlike
article 18, which limits it to only a State. Also, article 19 refers to admissibility of a case while article 18
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grounds for challenging the admissibility of a case whether under article 18 or 19 are the
same. 108
A case is inadmissible by the Court where: (1) the case is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction, (2) the case has been investigated by a State with
jurisdiction and the State decided not to prosecute the person concerned, (3) the person
concerned has already been tried for the conduct which is the subject of the complaint, or
(4) the case lacks sufficient gravity to warrant further action by the Court. 109
However, the Pre-trial Chamber may determine that the case is admissible if the
Pre-trial Chamber is of the opinion that the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry
out the investigation or prosecution. 110 The ICC Statute provides guidelines on how to
determine the “unwillingness” 111 or “inability” 112 of a State to conduct an investigation
or prosecution. Note however, the position of the International Commission of Inquiry
talks about challenging the power of the Prosecutor to initiate investigation on a situation referred to the
Court by a State or initiated proprio motu. See also, ICC Rules, supra note 101, R. 133.
108
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1), art. 19(2).
109
Id., art. 17(1)(a-d).
110
Id., art. 17(1)(a)(b).
111
Id., art 17(2) provides that a State is unwilling if one or more of the following situation is applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they
were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice.
112

Id., art. 17(2).
See, Id., art. 17(3) provides that:
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain
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on Darfur, Sudan to the effect that a referral presumptively by the Security Council “is
normally based on the assumption that the territorial State is not administering justice
because it is unwilling or unable to do so”. 113
The word “genuinely” is not defined by the ICC Statute but appears to evoke a
requirement of good faith on behalf of the State. 114 In other words, a State should not
proceed to conduct investigation for the sole purpose of depriving the Court of
jurisdiction without a good faith believe in its willingness or a good faith assessment of
its ability to conduct the investigation or prosecution.
With respect to inadmissibility based on prior prosecution by a State, obviously a
re-trial of the person concerned by the Court will violate the principle of double jeopardy.
However, the Court may disregard the prior prosecution if it was conducted for the
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court. 115 Similarly, the case will be admissible if the national
prosecution was not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the
norms of due process recognized by international law and lacked a meaningful intent to
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bring the person concerned to justice. 116 In the event that the Pre-trial or Trial Chamber
determines that a State is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute the case, article
18(4) allows the requesting State to appeal an adverse ruling to the Appeals Chamber. 117
In addition, under article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-trial
Chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 on grounds of
additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances. 118
The provisions of article 17 paragraphs 2 & 3 and article 20 paragraphs 3(a-b) call
for judicial review of the decision of the State concern and/or its national judicial system.
Under article 20(3), the appropriateness of the prior prosecution by a national court is to
be determined by the ICC. 119 Ordinarily, States see judicial review of its national court
decision by an outside judicial organ as unwelcome challenge to its sovereignty. As
such, it remains to be seen how States would respond to a decision by the Court that the
State’s decision not to investigate or prosecute was based on its inability or
unwillingness. Probably, a decision based on “inability” to investigate or prosecute may
be easier to justify as it generally stems from a breakdown of or unavailability of
institutions of legal enforcement. 120 On the other hand, “unwillingness” to prosecute
involves a deliberate decision of the State not to hold the accused person accountable. 121
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Lastly, a case is inadmissible if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify
action by the Court. 122 Although not stated, it appears that the basis for this ground stems
from the fact that jurisdiction of the Court shall be reserved for “the most serious crime of
concern to the international community”. 123 Be that as it may, it is up to the Court to
determine which case meets the “sufficient gravity” test as the ICC Statute does not
define the term “gravity”. In this regard, it has been suggested that the Court may draw a
clue from the chapeau of articles 6, 7 and 8 which provide the jurisdictional threshold for
the crimes under the ICC Statute. 124
Thus, the ICC may consider whether the genocidal act was committed with intent
to destroy in part or in whole any of the protected “group”, 125 whether a crime against
humanity was “widespread or systematic”, 126 and whether the war crime was “part of a
plan or policy” or committed on a large scale basis 127 respectively. Therefore, elements
of gravity will include scale - that is, the magnitude or widespread nature of the crimes;
the heinous nature of the offense, and level of participation of the accused – with a view
to distinguish “major” war criminals from “minor” offenders who should be tried
locally. 128
On the other hand, the first three grounds for inadmissibility find support on the
Court’s complementary jurisdiction which confers primacy of jurisdiction to national
courts. 129 It follows that where the national court has assumed jurisdiction, the Court will
find the case inadmissible unless the Court determines that the domestic authorities are
122
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unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution. Article 17
firmly establishes the authority and prerogative of States to preserve their sovereign right
to prosecute these cases in their national courts, as opposed to relying on the Court. 130
It is noteworthy that under the ICC Statute, the Security Council may pursuant to
its powers under article VII of the UN Charter refer a situation in non-Party State to the
Court without the consent of the non State party. 131 This raises the question whether the
ICC Statute permits a non-Party State to challenge the admissibility of the case under
article 19 if the case was referred to the Court by the Security Council. While the consent
of a non State party is not required for referrals from the Security Council, 132 a non State
party may still challenge the admissibility of a case or the Court’s jurisdiction regarding
referrals made to the Court by the Security Council pursuant to article 19, paragraph
2(b). 133
Since article 19 is of general application, that is, it covers all cases regardless of
how it was brought before the Court, it follows that a non-State party may challenge the
admissibility of a case referred to the Court by the Security Council if the non-State party
has jurisdiction over the case. 134 This may be so in situations where the accused is a
national of the non-State party and the State wishes to exercise jurisdiction based on
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nationality principle. 135 Similarly, a non-State party may challenge the admissibility of
case against its national even where the case was referred to the Court by the territorial
State that is a State-party to the ICC Statute because the non-State party qualifies as a
“State which has jurisdiction over [the] case.” 136
In view of the above, Sudan may elect to challenge the situation in Darfur, Sudan
referred to the Court by the Security Council via Resolution 1593. 137 However, it is
debatable whether the non-State party may procedurally make such challenge without
first recognizing the ICC Statute or the Court’s jurisdiction even for the limited purpose
of challenging the admissibility of case or the Court’s jurisdiction for the said case.
It should be noted that neither the ICC Statute nor the ICC RPE provide for who
bears the burden to proof inadmissibility of a case. Generally, under the principle of
actori incumbit probation, the burden of proof rests initially on the party asserting the
existence of any of the grounds for inadmissibility or admissibility and in situations.138
With respect to admissibility based on on-going and or completed investigation or
prosecution, it appears the ICC Statute only require the State to communicate this to the
Prosecutor together with supporting information. 139 Once a State has asserted that it is
investigating or prosecuting or has investigated or prosecuted the accused, the onus is on
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the ICC Prosecutor to prove that a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or that
investigations and trials carried out by a State are fraudulent. 140 On the other hand,
where the Prosecutor has determined that the case is inadmissible, on challenge by a
party, the Prosecutor has to substantiate the grounds for determining that the case is
inadmissible. Thereafter, the challenging party has to establish the admissibility of the
case.
Apart from grounds for challenging the inadmissibility of a case, the ICC Statute
does not list grounds for challenging the Court’s jurisdiction. However, some of the
grounds by which the Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged are discussed below.

7.6.2. Age Requirement
The Court’s jurisdiction may be challenged on the ground that the accused was
under the age of eighteen at the time the crime was committed. 141 While this may appear
a non-issue, it could sometime be a knotty legal issue to determine the age of an
individual in situations where there is no proper record of birth or where the record is
otherwise unavailable. Given the increasing participation of under-aged “soldiers” in
recent armed conflicts, this may prove to be a ground for challenging the Court’s
jurisdiction. Successful challenge based on age of criminal liability means that no body
will be criminally liable for atrocities committed by individuals between the age of
fifteen and eighteen years because the ICC Statute only provides for the punishment of
persons responsible for conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years to
participate in armed conflict. 142
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Perhaps, the ICC should have adopted the position of the Sierra Leone Special
Court to the effect that where any person who was at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime between 15 and 18 years of age, the Court’s objective should be to
rehabilitate and reintegrate the juvenile offender back to the society. 143 It is however
doubtful if the Court would be confronted with a lot of offenders in this age group given
that the Court will focus on those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.

7.6.3. Security Council Deferral/Opt Out Period
The jurisdiction of the Court may be temporarily suspended by the Security
Council for a renewable period of 12 months.144 Similarly, a State party may at the time
of becoming a party to the Statute, suspend the jurisdiction of the Court for a one time
period of seven (7) years with respect to war crimes. 145 Thus, a challenge to the Court’s
jurisdiction or admissibility of a case may be based on the ground that the investigation
and/or prosecution of the case have been suspended by the Security Council or that the
territorial State or State of nationality of the accused has opted out of the Court’s
jurisdiction with respect to war crimes. 146 During the period of the deferral or opt out,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to authorize investigation or prosecution of the case.

7.6.4. Nationality
Where a crime is committed in the territory of a State that is not a party to the ICC
Statute, the accused person may challenge the Court’s jurisdiction if the State of which
143
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the accused is a national is not a State party to the ICC Statute and has not given its
consent, unless the case was referred to the Court by the Security Council 147 The State
must be a State party to the ICC Statute before the date of the commission of the crime
unless the State makes a declaration to accept the Court’s jurisdiction in accordance with
article 12 paragraph 3. 148 Such declaration must however not be for crimes committed
earlier than the date of the entry into force of the ICC Statute as “no person shall be
criminally responsible for conduct prior to entry into force of the Statute”. 149
The ICC Statute does not address the issue of dual nationality and therefore leaves
a loophole which may be exploited by an accused with dual nationality if one of the State
to which the accused is a national is not a State party to the Statute. For example, an
accused person may be a national of State A which is a State party to the Statute and
State B which is not a State party to the Statute. The act did not occur in State A but in
the territory of State B which has declined to give its consent. The situation has not been
referred to the Court by the Security Council.
In the above hypothetical situation, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction
through State A because the accused person is a national of State A and State A is a State
party to the ICC Statute. However, the accused may try to avoid the jurisdiction of the
Court by denouncing his or her citizenship of State A. In which case, the accused may
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that he or she is not a national of a State
party to the ICC Statute. It remains to be seen what the Court would do if faced with this
circumstance. It is suggested that the Court may find that it has jurisdiction since the
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accused was a national of a State party at the time the crime was committed. Also, the
Court may invoke jurisdiction if the accused normal place of residence is in State A.

7.6.5. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
The ICC Statute does not have ex post facto subject matter or personal
jurisdiction. 150 Therefore, a challenge on the Court’s jurisdiction may be made on the
basis that the conduct was committed before the entry into force of the ICC Statute 151 or
that the conduct was not a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court at the time it was
committed. 152

7.7.

Time of Challenge
In principle, article 19 provides that there can only be one challenge on the

admissibility of a case or jurisdiction of the Court and that it must take place prior to or at
the commencement of the trial unless the Court grants leave for the challenge to be made
more than once or to be brought after the beginning of a trial. 153 However, challenges to
the admissibility of a case at the commencement of the trial or with leave of the Court is
limited to challenges on grounds of neb is in idem. 154 This is so because the ICC Statute
enjoins States to make a challenge at the earliest opportunity. 155 Under the ICC Statute,
the earliest opportunity for a State to challenge the admissibility of a situation referred to
the Court by another State or by the Prosecutor proprio motu, is within one month of its
notification by the Prosecutor. 156
150
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However, a State which has unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of a
situation under article 18 may challenge the admissibility of a case under article 19 on
grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of circumstances. 157 Where
the State failed to challenge the admissibility of a situation within the stipulated time, the
Court cannot grant the State leave to initiate the challenge at the commencement of the
trial or thereafter as the Court’s authority in this regard is limited to challenges on
grounds of neb is in idem. 158
It follows that a State that failed to make the challenge within one month of its
notification by the Prosecutor has permanently waived its right to challenge the
admissibility of the case even if there are additional sufficient facts or change of
circumstance. The State can no longer challenge the admissibility of the case on the basis
that it is investigating or has investigated or prosecuted the case unless the case was
referred to the Court by the Security Council in which case there is no obligation on the
Prosecutor to notify the States before commencement of investigation. 159

7.8.

Observations and Commentary
It is commendable that three States have taken the step to refer situations in their

respective States to the ICC. However, such steps raises issues of procedural compliance
with the ICC Statute and Rules since the instruments did not anticipate a situation where
the referral State is both the territorial State and the State of nationality of the accused. 160
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First, does a State referral equal a waiver of its primacy jurisdiction and ability to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the case? In other words,
can the State open its domestic investigation and/or prosecution of the case after it had
referred the case to the Court thereby positioning itself to assert jurisdiction.

Second,

should State referral imply an expression by the State that it is unwilling or unable to
investigate or prosecute? Lastly, should the Prosecutor comply with the procedural
requirements to notify the referral State before commencing investigation?
With respect to the issue of waiver, the question first came up for discussions at
the 1995 Ad hoc Committee session without a resolution. 161 Some delegates favored an
inclusion of a provision in the ICC Statute that expressly allows a State to voluntarily
decide to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the ICC while others expressed the view
that such provision would be inconsistent with the principle of complementarity as the
ICC should in no way undermine the effectiveness of national justice systems and should
only be resorted to in exceptional cases. 162

Although the issue came up again in

subsequent Preparatory Committee sessions, no consensus was reached on this other than
to insert the proposal as a footnote. 163 When the issue came up at the Rome Conference,
the Conference suggested that the issue would be better addressed in the Rules of
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Procedure and Evidence. 164 The ICC Rules however does not address the issue and it is
now up to the Court to determine this issue if it does come up before the Court.
Should the Court determine that the referral amounts to a waiver of jurisdiction by
the referral State, such waiver may be limited only to the right to investigate because a
State referral may be for purposes of investigation to determine “whether one or more
specific persons should be charged with the commission of crimes” under the ICC
Statute. 165 Thus, the referral State may take the position that after investigation, the
Prosecutor should advise it of persons to be prosecuted and the State may decide to
commence domestic investigation and/or prosecution or give its consent for prosecution
by the Court under article 12. 166
Be that as it may, if the Court determines that a State referral amounts to a waiver
of jurisdiction, the State should regain jurisdiction where the Prosecutor determines and
the Pre-Trial Chamber concurs, that the ICC cannot investigate or prosecute the case in
accordance with article 53 because a decision not to investigate or prosecute pursuant to
article 53 does not equal a determination that a crime under the Statute has not been
committed. 167
In the event that the referral State is the territorial State where the crimes occurred
and State of nationality of the accused, as is the case with the first three States’ referrals,
this may raise the question whether the Prosecutor still has to comply with article 18
paragraph 1 and Rule 54 requiring the Prosecutor to inform all States that would
164
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generally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of the Prosecutor’s intent to commence
investigation. 168 In this situation, the State that would exercise jurisdiction is the State
that has referred the situation to the Prosecutor with a request that the Prosecutor
investigate the situation. Thus, there would be no need for the Prosecutor to notify the
State of his or her decision to commence investigation because the State requested the
investigation. Even if the Prosecutor notifies the State of his or her intent to commence
investigation, such notice should serve as an update and should not be intended to invoke
article 18 paragraph 2.
On the other hand, it may be that between the time the State made the referral and
before the Prosecutor commence investigation, there has been a change in circumstance
which positions the State to carry out the investigation domestically. In such event, the
State may argue that its referral does not amount to a waiver of their rights under article
18, paragraphs 1 and 2. On the face of article 18, paragraph 1, this argument may be
sustained since the subparagraph provides that “the Prosecutor shall notify all States
Parties and those States which … would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
concerned.” 169 In the first place, the requirement is mandatory and secondly, the notice is
to be given to all States entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the crime concerned. Thus,
to avoid a situation where the Prosecutor may be forced to terminate its investigation
prematurely as a result of a challenge by the referral State, it is suggested that the prudent
thing to do is to comply with article 18, paragraph 1, afortiori such compliance would be
innocuous.
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Should the Prosecutor notify the referral State of his or her intent to commence
investigation and the referral State fails within one month of receipt of the notification to
inform the Prosecutor that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals, or the State
fails to challenge the admissibility of the case under article 18, the State would lose its
right to challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 unless there are
“additional significant facts” or “significant change of circumstances” enabling the Court
to allow a dilatory challenge. 170 On the other hand, if the Prosecutor failed to notify the
referral State of his or her intent to commence investigation, the referral State may
challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 for the first time. 171
Also, a related issue to States referrals is whether such referrals amount to
abdication of States Parties’ duties under the ICC Statute which affirms that to realize the
Statute’s objective that crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Statute “must
not go unpunished … effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the
national level”. 172 Thus, the Statute obligates States to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes.” 173 This raises the question whether
States can discharge this obligation to “exercise its criminal jurisdiction” by simply
referring the case to the ICC. Put differently, must a State carry out domestic prosecution
of those responsible for international crimes to satisfy its obligation under the ICC
Statute?
It may be argued that a joint reading of preamble four requiring that measures be
taken at the national level and preamble six imposing a duty on States to exercise its
170
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criminal jurisdiction implies that States have an affirmative duty to first attempt domestic
prosecution. While national prosecution is desirable and appears preferable by the ICC
Statute, the Statute does not expressly require that the duty to exercise criminal
jurisdiction can only be discharged by pursuing domestic criminal prosecution. The duty
is akin to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare which requires a State to either
prosecute or extradite the accused to a third State willing to prosecute without preferring
one to the other. 174 Similarly, under the ICC Statute, the duty of a State should be to
prosecute or surrender the accused to the Court or extradite to a third party State
(territorial State or State of nationality of the accused) that is willing to prosecute the
accused.
It is submitted that where a State elects to surrender those responsible for
international crimes to the Court, the State has discharged its obligation under the Statute
because such decision to refer the matter to the ICC involves taking measures at the
national level and exercising its criminal jurisdiction to the effect that the matter should
be handled by the Court. Also, the ICC Statute expressly allows the States to refer a
situation in which one or more of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction may have
been committed to the Prosecutor for investigation without any requirement that the
States Parties must first attempt domestic prosecution. 175
With respect to referral by the Security Council referral, there is the question
whether the admissibility of the case may be challenged by the concerned State(s). The
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Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan promises to test the effect of
such referral. Already, the Sudanese government has left no one in doubt that they have
no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not surrender any of their nationals to
the Court regarding this referral. 176 As a prelude to asserting jurisdiction, after the
Security Council via Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court,
the Sudanese government established its own special court in June 2005 to allegedly try
Darfur criminals and has vehemently maintained its right to handle the case
domestically. 177 Contrast with the position of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan who
has argued that the special court is not able to try Sudanese officials responsible for
violating international crimes in Darfur, Sudan. 178
The plain language of article 19 does not take away the right of a State to
challenge the admissibility of a case, even when that case was referred to the Court by the
Security Council. Thus, the admissibility of the situation in Darfur is likely going to be
challenged by the government of Sudan on the ground that it has investigated and
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information so that means that maybe they are not able to bring anybody to justice,” she said).
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prosecuted those that it considered responsible for the situation in Darfur. 179 It remains
to be seen how the Court will deal with this challenge. It is not unlikely that the Court
may consider such prosecution as an attempt to shield the individuals from the
jurisdiction of the Court or to completely deny the Court of jurisdiction in the case. 180
Such determination will lead the Court to conclude that the Sudanese government is
unwilling and/or unable to investigate or prosecute thereby opening the door for exercise
of jurisdiction by the Court.
Hopefully, with the enforcement powers of the Security Council, the Prosecutor
will be able to carryout his investigations in the matter and that indicted individuals will
be apprehended and surrendered to the Court. However, it is suggested that if the
Security Council referral should have the anticipated boast, the ICC Statute should be
amended to clearly indicate that a referral by the Security Council should suffice as
evidence of the unwillingness or inability of the State concerned to investigate or
prosecute the case thereby removing the procedural hurdle of article 19 admissibility
challenge.

179
180

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 19(2)(b).
Id., art. 17(2).
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PART IV

OBSTACLES TO INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE ROME
STATUE
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CHAPTER EIGHT
===============================================================
8.0. BOTTLENECKS AND LIMITATIONS TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION
______________________________________________

8.1.

Introduction
The understandable euphoria surrounding the establishment of the ICC obscured

the fact that many compromises that were necessary to reach the successful conclusion
significantly diluted the original aspirations. The reality is that the ICC Statute cut down
on the ability of the Court to exercise universal jurisdiction through the principle of
complementarity. The ICC could act only in those cases where national States were
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the accused. The Prosecutor could not act
without prior approval of the Pre-trial Chamber. Also, absent U.N. Security Council
action, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after it has passed through the layer of
procedural rules requiring the Prosecutor to obtain the consent of either the State on
whose territory a crime is committed or the State of nationality of the accused. 1 Further,
the UN Security Council has authority to halt prosecutions if in its opinion such
prosecution will not be compatible with its responsibilities under Article VII of the UN
Charter. 2 Some of these compromises which severely limited the Court’s jurisdiction are
discussed below.

1
2

ICC Statute, supra note 1art. 12.
Id., art. 16.

8.2.

The Complementarity Principle
The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute confers

jurisdictional primacy on national courts over the ICC. 3 In other words, the Court has no
jurisdiction over a case when the matter “is being appropriately dealt with by a national
justice system”. 4

National sovereignty concerns informed the introduction of the

principle of complementarity in the operation of the ICC. 5 Article 17 provides that the
ICC will defer its jurisdiction to a national court except in situations where national
courts have been genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute the
accused. 6

Article 17 is applicable even when the State’s leaders are themselves

implicated. 7
The Prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all States that might normally exercise
jurisdiction of his or her intention to commence an investigation. 8 Thereupon, any State
with jurisdiction over the case, whether a State party or not, may within one month of
receipt of such notice inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the
situation domestically. 9

Such notice may be accompanied with a request that the

Prosecutor stop his or her own investigation in the case. 10 On receipt of the request, the

3

Id., Preamble, Para. 10, arts. 1, 17. (Article 1 of the Statute provides that the Court shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in
this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction).
4
William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 (2nd
ed. 2004).
5
See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 47, 59-60 (Nov. 2001-Feb. 2002) (noting that Article 17 was ostensibly drafted to accommodate and
protect the United States’ interest).
6
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(a).
7
Id., art. 28.
8
Id., art. 18(1).
9
Id., art 18(2).
10
The request must be made in writing and must contain information regarding the State’s investigation.
See, ee ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, First Session,
New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rules 53 & 54, available
at:, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rules_of_Proc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf (visited
March 3, 2006) [hereinafter ICC Rules].
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Prosecutor must defer to the State’s investigation but may make an application to the PreTrial Chamber which may decide to authorize the investigation. 11 To the extent that the
Prosecutor has no choice in the matter but to comply, “the ‘request is really not a request.
It is a demand or an assertion by the State of its right to primacy”. 12
Therefore, the complementarity notion in the ICC Statute replaces the primacy
jurisdiction of international tribunals as was the case with the ad hoc tribunals such as the
Nuremberg 13 and Tokyo 14 war tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia 15 (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 16 (ICTR)
as well as the mixed tribunals in Sierra Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia with priority
for national courts. 17 This deference to national courts suggestively makes the ICC a
court of last resort. 18

11

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Article 18 Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 395, 401 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
13
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by an agreement between four
victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War II. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted
in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
14
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in Tokyo pursuant to the Special
Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Establishment of an
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20.
15
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, annexed to S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1192
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
16
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602 (1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
17
See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 385 (1998) (noting that ICTY and ICTR raised
for the first time the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of national courts and that of an
international criminal court which was clearly to resolve the jurisdictional conflict in favor of the
International Tribunal). Id.
18
John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S. Objections to the
Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 85, 94 (2000); James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms Declined: The United
States and the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 129 (2000).
12
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Thus, under the complementarity provision, any State with jurisdiction can
effectively prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its nationals by informing
the Court of its willingness to investigate the allegation under article 18(2). 19 In the event
that the Pre-trial Chamber rejects such request, article 18(4) allows the requesting State to
appeal an adverse ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber. 20 In addition,
under article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber may
challenge the admissibility of the case under article 19 on grounds of additional
significant facts or significant change of circumstances. 21 With these arrangements, the
possibility that the ICC would exercise its jurisdiction without hindrance from one State
or the other is exceedingly remote because no State will wish the Court to remove a case
from its jurisdiction where it intended to conduct the investigation and prosecution
itself. 22
In view of this development, the complementarity provisions have watered down
the jurisdiction of the Court and created an avenue where a State may use the
complementary provisions to shield its nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction. 23 The
Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur, Sudan exposes this concern as it
promises to test the effect of such referral. Already, the Sudanese government has left no
one in doubt that it has no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not surrender

19

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 18(2).
Id., art 18(4).
21
Id., art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 or challenges to
the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that
it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the case.
22
Id.
23
Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal
Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 1 (2002).
20
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any of their nationals to the Court regarding this referral. 24 Thus, after the referral, the
government of Sudan created a special court to prosecute individuals suspected of
perpetrating crimes in Darfur.
The Sudanese government has not made any pretensions as to its intention in
creating the special court as an official of the Sudanese Ministry of Justice avers that
“ICC article 17 stipulates that it can refuse to look into any case if investigations and
trials can be carried out in the countries concerned except if they are unwilling to carry
out the prosecutions”. 25 Consequently, the Sudanese government has gone ahead to
allegedly prosecute some security officials over the Darfur conflict. 26 Contrast with the
position of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan who has argued that the special court is
not able to try Sudanese officials responsible for violating international crimes in Darfur,
Sudan. 27 Therefore, the alleged prosecution is nothing but a charade to shield Sudanese
nationals from the reach of the Court by taking advantage of article 17.

24

See, Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan’s Darfur”, February 27, 2006, available at:
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271 (reporting that the Sudan’s Justice Minister
Mohamed al-Mardi told Reuters in an interview on 13 December 2005 that Moreno Ocampo’s investigators
would not have any access to Darfur, where ethnic cleansing has resulted in killings, rape and the uprooting
of 2 million refugees. The paper quoted the Justice Minster as saying that “the ICC officials have no
jurisdiction inside the Sudan or with regards to Sudanese citizens,” and that “they cannot investigate
anything on Darfur”).
25
See Wim van Cappellen, Sudan: Judiciary Challenge ICC Over Darfur Cases, Integrated Regional Info.
Networks, June 24, 2005 (reporting that the Sudanese Council of Ministers avowed a total rejection of
Security Council Resolution 1593 and that Sudan’s Justice Minister, Ali Mohamed Osamn Yassin, has
been quoted by local media as stating that the new domestic institution would be a substitute to the
International Criminal Court).
26
See, Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, February 26, 2006, available at:
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14276 (reporting that the head of the governmental
Human Rights Advisory Council (HRAC) Abdel Monim Osman Taha Gave a UN official in charge of
human rights in the Sudan, Sima Samar, a list individuals of the regular services who have been tried for
perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict).
27
Reuters, Sudan Unable to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, March 6, 2006, available at:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD652175.htm (quoting Sima Samar, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Sudan to the effect that “Sudan’s special court for Darfur is not able to try Sudanese officials
responsible for war crimes and authorities continue to abuse freedom of expression.” Ms. Samar said the
courts had not yet tried anyone with command responsibility for crimes in Darfur and that she had only
been given a list of 15 officers from the police and army who had been tried for crimes between 1991 and
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It has been suggested that a State may be unable to prosecute if it lacks the
required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful criminal prosecution.28
Such a situation could have arisen after the genocide in Rwanda, where very few lawyers
and judges survived the 1994 massacre. 29 On the other hand, a State may be unwilling to
prosecute a perpetrator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to do so. This may
occur where the accused is a member of the State government, or exerts influence over or
accepts favors from those in government.
Certainly, the situation in Darfur, Sudan fits into this latter category as the
government has been fingered as an active party to the crisis in Darfur and has done
nothing to disarm militias or end the “culture of impunity” there. 30 Human Rights Watch
notes that “the Sudanese government’s systematic attacks on civilians in Darfur have
been accompanied by a policy of impunity for all those responsible for the crimes,” and
requests that “[s]enior Sudanese officials including President Omar El Bashir must be
held accountable for the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur.” 31

Whether the

government and military officials Sudan will be held accountable or would hide under
article 17 protection is anyone’s guess.

2003, before the Darfur conflict even began. “We did ask for information and they didn’t provide much
information so that means that maybe they are not able to bring anybody to justice,” she said).
28
David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Court: Arbour Says Rules Shield World’s Worst
Criminals, The Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise Arbour of the Supreme Court
of Canada and former ICTY/ICTR prosecutor).
29
Id.
30
See Human Rights Watch Report, Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for International
Crimes in Darfur December 12, 2005, Volume 17, No. 17A available at:
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/; (visited March 14, 2006) (documenting the role of more than a
dozen named civilian and military officials in the use and coordination of “Janjaweed” militias and the
Sudanese armed forces to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur since mid-2003)
available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/; (visited March 14, 2006).
31
Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Put Sudan’s Top Leaders on Sanctions List: ICC Should Investigate Darfur
Officials, available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/sudan12186.htm (visited March 14, 2006)
(quoting Peter Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch).
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A related matter concerning article 17 is that under the guidelines for determining
“unwillingness” or “inability” to prosecute or investigate, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where an investigation or prosecution carried out by western countries with an
advanced judicial system and history of criminal prosecution would be considered
fraudulent. On the contrary, developing countries are less likely to benefit from the
complementarity provision as their legal systems and political climate would easily be
judged unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and successful prosecutions. As has
been observed by Justice Arbour, “states with relatively developed legal systems will
have a ‘major trump card’ to evade justice and will clash with developing countries that
don’t.” 32 She rightly posits that such a clash will be intensely political so that the ICC
risks becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing countries, subjecting the Court
to major political legal battles with everyone else. 33 This may result in the Court been
viewed suspiciously by developing countries as a vestige of western countries thereby
tainting the Court as an independent judicial institution. 34
While this study disputes the primacy jurisdiction of national courts over the ICC,
it however suggests that an assessment that a government is unwilling to prosecute
should not be based on lack of action in a single case, but on a systematic pattern of

32

David Rider, supra note 28.
Id., (quoting Justice Louise Arbour).
34
See, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC
Considers Prosecutions, February 28, 2006, available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=259927&apc_state=henh (visited February 28, 2006) (reporting that
the ICC’s main work is so far concentrated on Darfur, northern Uganda and the Ituri region of the Congo,
and that this heavy concentration on one continent has perplexed many Africans. They argue that it would
have made public relations sense for such a new and important international court to have cast its net over
several continents, including Europe from where it operates).
33
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judicial inaction in pertinent cases. 35 Where a judicial system is considered unable to
conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself with assuming jurisdiction; rather the
international community should offer assistance and training to overcome any
shortcomings. 36 In this way, the ICC would retain the integrity of governments’ judicial
systems. This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute the Court’s
national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are integral to its functioning. 37
Also, since States are likely to perceive the process by which the Court
determines that a State is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute as a challenge to
their sovereign powers, the Court is likely to refrain from making such determination. 38
Conferring the Court with primacy jurisdiction ratione personae over all cases within the
Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae would avoid the need for the Court to sit on judicial
review of a State’s national legal system or the likelihood of abdicating in its
responsibility by avoiding confrontation with a State anxious to defend its sovereignty.

35
See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International Criminal
Court (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2003).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
In a related development, the general approach followed by the Office of the Prosecutor with respect to
its proprio motu powers indicates a clear preference for initiating investigations of alleged core crimes,
wherever possible, on the basis of a referral by a State party pursuant to Article 14 or by the Security
Council pursuant to Article 13(b). While this predilection does not mean, of course, that the Prosecutor
will never exercise the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu, the Prosecutor seems inclined not
to use these powers unless absolutely necessary, for example where states have failed to refer an
objectively serious situation. See Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1,5 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Paper on Some Policy Issues];
Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003).
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As poignantly argued by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, jurisdictional
primacy is a functional necessity for an international criminal tribunal. 39 According to
the Appeals tribunal:
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is
created, it must be endowed with primacy over national courts.
Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a
perennial danger of international crimes being characterized as
“ordinary crimes” or proceedings being “designed to shield the
accused,” or cases not being diligently prosecuted.
If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, any one
of those stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of
the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the
benefit of the very people whom it has been designed to
prosecute. 40
The Appeal’s Chamber rightly noted that States and/or their national courts may
not be able to handle the trial of some high profile persons. For instance, in spite of the
U.S. support, the Iraqi Special Tribunal has not been able to conduct a hitch free trial of
Saddam Hussein and some members of his Baath party. 41 The chaotic scenes that have
marred the trial so far have prompted one commentator to suggest that the whole trial is
being undermined and to observe as follows:
I think it was a big mistake that this trial was held in Iraq because
the judge, you cannot find a person, one individual today in Iraq judge, lawyer, prosecutor who is impartial vis-à-vis Saddam
Hussein. Either they are with him or against him. 42
Therefore, the Court is in a better position to withstand the political pressure
associated with prosecuting high level individuals and avoid allegations of unfairness that
may be leveled against a State. The Court will also hold individuals to a worldwide
39

Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, P 58-59 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995) (Appeal on Jurisdiction) [hereinafter
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction].
40
Id.
41
Saddam Walks Out in Trial Uproar, BBC News, January 29, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4659274.stm
42
Id. (referring to Saad Djebbar, an international lawyer and commentator on Middle East politics
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standard of international justice. 43 This approach would promote universal and uniform
individual criminal responsibility for the crimes concerned because any person accused
of a core crime would normally be tried by the ICC, not by national courts. 44
Further, it should be borne in mind that the Court’s jurisdiction is designed to
target a limited number of “persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern”. 45 In addition, the high threshold requirements for the crimes under the ICC
Statute, provides additional device limiting the Court’s jurisdiction only over crimes
against humanity committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack” 46 or war

43

See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 60 (1997) (noting that “A
permanent system of international criminal justice based on a preexisting international criminal statute
would allow any person from any nation to be held accountable for violations. Equal treatment for violators
would be guaranteed”). Id. at 60.
44
See Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE FAILURE OF STATES TO
ENACT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, AI Index: IOR 40/019/2004, 1 September
2004, [hereinafter AI: Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation] available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385 (observing that not many
States have enacted national legislation implementing the ICC Statute, and that the few States that have
done so, enacted flawed and inconsistent legislation.)
The report notes that the most common problems that are emerging in draft legislation now being prepared
or considered are:
· weak definitions of crimes;
· unsatisfactory principles of criminal responsibility and defenses;
· failure to provide for universal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by international law;
· political control over the initiation of prosecutions;
· failure to provide for the speediest and most efficient procedures for reparations to victims;
· inclusion of provisions that prevent or could potentially prevent cooperation with the Court;
· failure to provide for persons sentenced by the Court to serve sentences in national prisons; and
· failure to establish training programs for national authorities on effective implementation of the Rome
Statute.
Id., at 2.
Also of concern is the failure of some of the implementing legislation to provide adequate procedural
guarantees, including the right to fair trial. Further, some national implementing legislation allow the
imposition of death penalty. This is contrary to Article 77 of the ICC Statute which provides that the
maximum penalty the Court may impose is life imprisonment. It is therefore inappropriate that national
courts should impose a more severe penalty for a crime under international law than the one chosen by the
international community itself.
Id., at 25, 27.
45
ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. 9, arts. 1, 5.
46
Id., art. 7.
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crimes when such crimes have been committed as part of a plan or policy or have taken
place on a particularly large scale. 47 The Prosecutor is also required under the ICC
Statute to satisfy the Court that the case is of “sufficient gravity to justify further action
by the Court”. 48
In view of the above, the Court will not occupy the field as it will target only a
small portion of perpetrators who are highly responsible for the atrocities and decline to
exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases in which deferral to national jurisdiction will be
more appropriate.

Thus, the States would still exercise concurrent jurisdiction by

prosecuting others responsible at a lower degree.

8.3.

Suspension of the Court’s Jurisdiction by the UN Security Council
One concern throughout the negotiations for the ICC Statute, expressed mostly by

the permanent members of the Security Council, was the possibility of conflict between
the jurisdiction of the Court and the functions of the Council. It was argued that there
may be situations in which the investigation or prosecution of a particular case by the
Court could interfere with the resolution of an ongoing conflict by the Security Council.
Also, the permanent members of the Security Council wanted to preserve a central role
for the Council in the new Court. 49 To this extent, some lobbied for a provision that
would automatically exclude the Court’s jurisdiction over any situation under
consideration by the Council. Most States regarded this proposal too sweeping and
feared it would undermine the Court, for situations could remain pending before the
Council indefinitely without its taking any final or serious action.

47

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.
Id., art. 17(1)(d).
49
John Seguin, supra note 18, at 95-96.
48
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In the end, a

compromise provision was reached, which provided that the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could adopt a resolution requesting deferral of an
investigation or prosecution for a period of twelve months and that such a request could
be renewed at twelve-month intervals. 50
Article 16 is an unnecessary limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court because it
allows the Security Council by resolution to stop a prosecution initiated by a State or the
ICC Prosecutor from going forward, for an initial period of twelve months if in the
opinion of the Security Council the prosecution will interfere with the Council’s efforts to
maintain international peace and security under Article VII of the UN Charter. The
Security Council can renew its request indefinitely, in twelve month segments, under the
same conditions. 51 In other words, the UN Security Council may perpetually intervene to
suspend a case before the ICC at every twelve month interval on same grounds because
article 16 does not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the
suspension of a case for security reasons. 52 This provision was a result of a compromise
suggestion by Singapore to placate the U.S. 53
One of the main reasons for the creation of the ICC was to end the culture of
impunity by holding individuals criminally responsible for egregious violations of crimes
prohibited by international law. 54 Therefore, the rationale behind the establishment of the
ICC is that it would help end or at least reduce the commission of genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and other related atrocities that shock the conscience of
50

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
Id., art. 16.
52
Id.
53
John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrivers - The U.S. Position: Status and Prospects, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 873, 878 (2002) (citing Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the
Security Council, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE 143 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999)).
54
ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble.
51
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humankind. 55

Thus, it is an irony of sort to suggest that the Court’s exercise of

jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes may impede the Security Council’s efforts to maintain
international peace and security under Article VII of the UN Charter.
It is plausible to suggest that only States that are permanent members of the
Security Council stands in a better position to use this provision to perpetually forestall
the prosecution of a case concerning their nationals. Members of the Security Council
may choose to use this provision to stop investigations into situations concerning
nationals of member States and would be likely to do so at the urging of one of its
powerful permanent members. In deed, in 2002, the U.S. threatened to withdraw its
nationals from U.N. peacekeeping missions unless the Security Council pass a resolution
grating immunity to U.S. nationals from the ICC. The Security Council yielded to U.S.
pressure and passed Resolution 1422 in July 2002 which deferred the Court’s jurisdiction
for one year over personnel of non-State parties participating in peacekeeping missions or
operations authorized by the UN. 56 Resolution 1422 was renewed for another year by
Resolution 1487 in June 2003. 57
While Resolution 1422 was adopted unanimously in 2002, France, Germany and
Syria abstained from voting in 2003 for Resolution 1487. In 2004, the U.S. withdrew the
request to renew Resolution 1487 because it failed to receive the necessary votes to
support a draft resolution to defer the Court’s jurisdiction. 58 However, the Security
55

See discussions on chapter five, pages 163-164 and accompanying notes.
See Security Council Resolution 1422, S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422
(2002), July 12, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Docs/Scres/2002/sc2002.htm.
57
Security Council Resolution 1487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487
(2003), June 12, 2003, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html.
58
See Coalition for the ICC, Chronology of the Adoption and Withdrawal of Security Council Resolutions
1422/1487, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/declarationsresolutions/UN1422_2004.html. The failure to
56
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Council has created a precedent that may be latched onto by other States to demand
similar exemptions in the future. To forestall the unnecessary hindrance to the Court’s
jurisdiction, it is suggested that article 16 should be deleted from the Statute as it serves
no useful purpose. 59
Further, even where the Security Council refers a case to the Court, the Council
may seek to micro manage the investigation or prosecution of the case. For instance,
Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the Court
requires the Chief Prosecutor of ICC to periodically apprise the Security Council with
actions taken by the ICC pursuant to Resolution 1593. 60 Accordingly, the Prosecutor has
addressed the Security Council on the Darfur situation twice. 61 It is not impossible that
the Security Council may decide at a latter stage to invoke article 16 to stop the Court
from going forward with the case.

secure the vote to renew Resolution 1487 has to do with concerns about allegations of abuse by U.S.
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Id. See Amnesty International, US Threats to the International
Criminal Court, [hereinafter US Threats to the ICC] available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/iccUS_threats-eng (visited February 10, 2006).
59
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available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engIOR400082003?Open&of=eng-393 (visited February
10, 2006).
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SC Resolution 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593, 8 (March 31, 2005)
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The idea that the Security Council should play an oversight role on the operations
of the Court should be resisted. 62 The Court is envisioned as an independent entity and
should remain as such and the Security Council should not be allowed to politicize the
judicial functions of the Court. While the Security Council cooperation with the Court
will enhance its effectiveness, any attempt to subject it to the whims and caprice of the
Security Council will greatly undermine the Court’s independence and credibility.
States, particularly developing and “third” world countries may view the Court as another
vestige of western domination.

8.4.

Failure to Provide for Universal Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional reach of the ICC is more limited than the general international

jurisdiction currently enjoyed by States or groups of States over jus cogens violations.63
As noted above, States delegates at the Rome Conference agreed on a compromised
article 12 which sets out the preconditions for the Court’s jurisdiction when a situation is
not referred to the Court by the Security Council. Throughout the Conference, the U.S.
sought to limit the Court’s jurisdiction by arguing that the Court should exercise
jurisdiction only against nationals of States Parties or territorial States on claims of

62

Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
2002-Sep Army Law. 1, 11 (2002) (noting that one of the main concerns of the United States is the limited
role played by the United Nations Security Council in the operation of the ICC).
63
Damrosch et al., supra note 39, at 534; (noting that “Jus cogens norms also give rise to obligations erga
omnes, thus, all states have standing to bring to justice violators of jus cogens norms and have, even before
the introduction of the ICC”). See also Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of
Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 116 (2001)
(observing that “the core crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes-are crimes of universal jurisdiction.”).
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official acts. The United States wanted a situation in which no U.S. national would ever
be brought before the ICC without U.S. consent. 64
Also, the U.S. demanded a guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women would be
investigated or prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent. 65 It has been suggested that
the justification for the U.S. position was that “more than any other country the United
States is expected to intervene to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world.” 66 It
was therefore argued that this position renders U.S. personnel “uniquely vulnerable to the
potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court.” 67 According to Ambassador
David Scheffer:
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful,
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately
seek from the United States and other military powers. There will
be significant new legal and political risks in such
interventions... 68
Apart from the apparent inequality of this request, its obvious implication is that a
guarantee for America would mean a de jure and de facto exemption of all other States
which would effectively render the purpose of the Court moribund. 69
Although the U.S. position was not acceptable to most States at the Rome
Conference, they rejected a proposal by Korea that the Court should also exercise
64

Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95
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“Operation Enduring Freedom”, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 44-45 (2003).
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jurisdiction if the victim’s State or the custodial State has ratified the ICC Statute in order
to accommodate U.S. concerns regarding supposed over-reach of the Court’s
jurisdiction. 70 Thus, absent submission of a case to the ICC by the UN Security Council,
the Court can only exercise jurisdiction if the case occurs in the territory of a State party,
or if the crime is committed by a national of a State party. 71 It should be noted that in
most cases, the State of nationality and the territorial State are likely to be the same, as
was the case with Pol Pot of Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile, and as
exemplified by the first three State referrals to the Court.
The inclusion of the custodial State would have made it possible to apprehend an
accused while traveling outside his or her State, or in the alternative, make it difficult for
the accused to travel outside his or her State, thereby denying a safe haven anywhere.
But, given the way article 12 was drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is
residing will have no legal basis under the ICC Statute to surrender the accused to the
Court. This is because article 12 only requires a State party to submit to the Court’s
jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the person accused of the crime
is a national. 72 In other words, a situation in which a national of State A commits a crime
in State A and then enters State B ostensibly to evade justice, State B is not obliged to
surrender him or her to the Court because the crime was not committed in State B’s
territory and the accused is not a national of State B. The situation becomes compounded
if State B is not a State party to the ICC Statute.

70

Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998 available at
http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Treaty Text
Analysis]. Id.
71
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
72
Id., art. 12(2)(a-b).
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Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim’s State to initiate a case to the
ICC if its nationals were victims of international crimes in the territory of another State or
by nationals of a non-State party. It has been suggested that if a victim’s State is allowed
to submit a case to the Court, the Spanish government would have been in a position to
petition the ICC (if it were then in existence) for the “disappearance” of some Spaniards
in Argentina in the 1970s and 80s. 73 This possibility is not available even under the new
ICC Statute.
The idea that extending the ICC jurisdiction to include custodial and/or victim’s
States or that the current jurisdiction of the Court is overreaching and therefore violates
fundamental principles of international law because it binds non-State parties 74 is
untenable. The U.S. takes the position that under customary international law, a treatybased international court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party
State when acting under the direction of such a non-party State. 75
Also, another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the ICC
jurisdiction over non-party nationals, the ICC Statute would abrogate the pre-existing
rights of non-parties which, in turn, would violate the law of treaties. 76

This

commentator suggested that a State has a right to be free from the exercise of exorbitant
jurisdiction over its nationals which cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not a
party. 77 Cited in support were the ILC official Commentaries on the Vienna Convention
to the effect that “international tribunals have been firm in laying down that in principle

73

ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 70.
David Scheffer, supra note 195, at 18.
75
Id.
76
Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26 (2001).
77
Id., at 27.
74
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treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither imposes obligations on States which are
not parties nor modify in any way their legal rights without their consent.” 78
Furthermore, it was argued that because of the gravity of the outcome, member States
cannot delegate to the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction. 79
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over
individuals if his or her State has not ratified the ICC Statute confuse and/or equate the
position of a nonparty State with that of its nationals. As would be expected, this
argument has been rejected by international law commentators on the simple basis that
while a non-party State is not itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented,
the same cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the territory of a
State that is a party. 80 Responding to criticism of the Court’s jurisdiction over nationals
of non-party States for crimes committed within the territory of State parties to the ICC
Statute, Judge Philippe Kirsch, current President of the Court, noted as follows:
This does not bind non-parties to the [s]tatute. It simply confirms
the recognized principle that individuals are subject to the
substantive and procedural criminal laws applicable in the
territories to which they travel, including laws arising from treaty
obligations. 81
The above expression accords with article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties which provides that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third state without its consent.” 82 Also, article 35 states that a treaty cannot establish
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an obligation on a non-party State unless it “expressly accepts that obligation in
writing.” 83

The ICC Statute does not violate the above provisions of the Vienna

Convention as no provision of the ICC Statute expressly created obligations for non-party
States. Also, allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction based on the consent of a custodial
or victim’s State will not violate the Vienna Convention. 84
Suffice it to note that there are plethora of international conventions acceded by
the U.S. and many States that are globally binding on nationals of party and non-party
States because they reflect the common interest of humanity. 85 No doubt, the crimes
prohibited by the ICC Statute reflect the common interest of humanity. Presently, any
individual State may try perpetrators of these crimes under the universal or territorial
jurisdiction principle without consent from the State of his or her nationality. 86 Thus, if
individual States can exercise universal jurisdiction over the same crimes contained in the

83

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 35.
Id., art. 38 (“Nothing … precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State
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ICC Statute, 87 there has not been any convincing legal argument to deny a group of States
joining together to set up a court that does the same thing. Indeed, the Nuremberg
tribunal set the precedent for this situation when it stated: “[the Allied Powers] have done
together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any
nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law.” 88
In view of the above, it cannot be argued that the Court’s exercise of treaty-based
jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party State for international crimes contravenes this
rule of international law. 89

Therefore, the argument that the ICC Statute is

“overreaching” because it purportedly obligates non-party States through the exercise of
jurisdiction over their nationals is a gross distortion of customary international law.90
Conferring the ICC with universal jurisdiction helps to realize one of the objectives
behind the establishment of the Court, which is, to ensure there is no safe sanctuary for
individuals wanted for committing egregious crimes.
Until the Court is invested with universal jurisdiction, we will continue to see a
similarity of what is going on in the case of Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia
finding safe haven in Nigeria even though there is an international arrest warrant for his
surrender to the tribunal in Sierra Lone. The only reason Nigeria is under guided
pressure to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Sierra Leonean tribunal is because Nigeria has
87
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expressed its willingness to surrender Mr. Taylor but for its stated reasons. 91 It would be
a different situation if Mr. Taylor was wanted by the ICC after he had successfully fled to
or granted amnesty by a non-party State. The non-party State would have no obligation
whatsoever to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Court and in that circumstance Mr. Taylor
would find a safe haven in that State. Also, even if Mr. Taylor finds himself in the
territory of a State party to the ICC Statute, that State cannot confer jurisdiction on the
Court if Mr. Taylor did not commit the crime in the territory of the said State and he is
not a national of the State party. In the above scenario, the traveling tyrant is allowed to
exploit the limitation in the ICC jurisdiction to evade justice. 92

8.5.

War Crimes Opt-Out Provision
With pressure from the United States the Rome Conference agreed on article 124

which allows a State party to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction for war crimes committed
on its territory or by its nationals in internal armed conflict for seven years after

91

Mr. Obasanjo, Nigerian’s President takes the position that it granted asylum to Mr. Taylor pursuant to the
so called Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord to prevent a bloodbath in Liberia on the understanding that
he would not be required to try or surrender Mr. Taylor to an International Tribunal except at the request of
the government of Liberia or if Mr. Taylor violates his undertaking not to interfere in Liberian politics.
See, James Seitua, Why Obasanjo Has Not Turned Taylor Over?, The Perspective, Atlanta, Georgia, May
31, 2005, available at: http://www.theperspective.org/articles/0531200502.html (visited February 28,
2006); BBC News, Taylor meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, February 27, 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4754982.stm (visited February 28, 2006); BBC NEWS, Taylor
off Agenda at Abuja Talks, March 4, 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4775012.stm (reporting that Mr. Taylor departure into exile was
part of a deal backed by African and Western powers and quoting BBC’s Elizabeth Blunt in Abuja as
saying that the terms of the deal are believed to have included a comfortable home in Nigeria and a pledge
that he would not be handed over for prosecution. BBC News also quoted Remi Oyo, Mr. Obasanjo’s
spokeswoman that “the prerogative of the return of former President Taylor remains that of the Liberian
people and government.”); BBC News, Taylor Meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, February 27, 2006, available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4754982.stm (visited February 28, 2006).
92
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Cadern, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution,
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 414, n. 194 (2000) (attributing the phrase “traveling tyrant” to Jelena Pejic,
representative of the Lawyer’s Committee at the Rome Conference).

343

becoming a party to the ICC Statute. 93 The United States’ representatives to the Rome
Conference had sought a ten year “opt out” from the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes,
but the Conference agreed only to a seven year opt-out period for war crimes. 94 Article
124 provides a compromise capable of “undermining the status of war crimes as truly
universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented jurisdiction.” 95 Such
declaration effectively grants impunity from prosecution by the Court for those who
commit war crimes in the future that have caused immense suffering to humankind for
many years. Therefore, it has been criticized as creating a loophole to evade justice
which is legally and morally unjustifiable. 96
Presently, Columbia and France have availed themselves of the provisions of
article 124. 97

Fortunately, the Burundian government’s desire to make article 124

93

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 124. Article 124 provides that a state party to the ICC may elect to exempt
its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven years from the date of
ratification of the statute for war crimes.
94
See David Scheffer, U.N. International Criminal Court, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23, 1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512 [hereinafter David Scheffer
Testimony].
95
Jonathan Stanley, Focus: International Criminal Court: A Court that Knows No Boundaries?: The
International Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver what it Promises?, The
Lawyer, Aug. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987.
96
Phillippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal court: Current Issues and Perspectives, 64 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (2001).
97
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and Reservations, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp#N7 [hereinafter
“ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservations”].
The Columbian article 124 Declaration states as follows:
5. Availing itself of the option provided in article 124 of the Statute and subject to the conditions
established therein, the Government of Colombia declares that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the
Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been
committed by Colombian nationals or on Colombian territory. Id.
The French government article 124 Declaration states:
III. Declaration under article 124
Pursuant to article 124 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the French Republic declares that
it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. Id.

344

declaration was rejected by the Senate. 98

The “opt out” clause is an unwarranted

restriction on the Court’s jurisdiction which will severely hamper its effectiveness for
years, if not decades. 99 While it is reassuring that only two States have made article 12
declaration, it is however necessary that States demonstrate their willingness to hold war
criminals accountable by ensuring that article 124 is deleted from the ICC Statute when it
comes up for review in 2009. 100

8.6.

Reliance on States’ Cooperation
Generally, in other for the Court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction, the Court

must rely on the ability and willingness of State parties to discharge their obligations
under the ICC Statute. 101 In the preamble to the ICC Statute, States Parties affirm that
“'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at
the national level and by international cooperation”. 102 With the efforts of likeminded
States, 103 delegates at the Rome Conference agreed on the need for effective and speedy
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cooperation with the Court. As a result, Part 9 of the ICC Statute contains the obligations
of international cooperation and judicial assistance of States Parties to the Court. 104
When a State ratifies the ICC Statute, it assumes the obligations to “cooperate
fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court”. 105 Further, the ICC Statute requires that States Parties ensure that there are
procedures under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified in the
Statute. 106
A significant aspect of this obligation is arresting and surrendering persons
accused of crimes to the Court. 107 This is necessary as the Court cannot try an accused
person in absentia. 108 Thus, “a decision by the Prosecutor to bring charges against an
accused will prompt the critical, indeed crucial question of arrests and transfer to The
Hague”. 109 In other words, the Court would be unable to exercise its jurisdiction if States
refused, delayed or otherwise failed to carry out their obligation to arrest and/or surrender
104
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the accused to the Court. There is no doubt that “the credibility of the Court would suffer
if an arrest warrant issued by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the
prosecutor pursuant to article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the
States Parties were slow, or failed, to execute it”. 110
Apart from other express and implicit obligations contained in the ICC Statute,
Article 93 of the Statute details certain specific cooperation obligations on States parties
to assist the Court with respect to investigations and prosecutions. 111 These obligations
are by no means exhaustive and should at best represent a minimal requirement on State
parties to the ICC Statute. However, a study by Amnesty International in 2004 reveals
that States Parties’ response to their obligations under the Statute has been
disappointing. 112 The study notes that among the few States that have adopted national
legislation implementing their obligations under the ICC Statute, almost all the States
110
111

Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 101, at 383.
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including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
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(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
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view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
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have taken a minimalist approach to cooperation with the Court and few have included
provisions that go beyond the express requirements of the ICC Statute. 113 This author
shares the concern of Amnesty International that “if every state party were to take a
minimalist approach to implementing its cooperation obligations, the effectiveness of the
Court would be greatly reduced, leading in some cases to impunity.” 114

8.7.

Article 98 Immunity Agreements
While the ICC Statute requires States Parties to ensure that there are procedures

under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified in the Statute, 115 some
States Parties have taken steps that make their compliance with article 88 impossible such
as entering into an “impunity” agreement with the U.S.

The bilateral immunity

agreement is an undertaking by the States concerned that U.S. persons will not be
surrendered to the Court without U.S. consent. 116

The Bush administration has

threatened ICC States Parties with withdrawal of military aid, including education,
training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry, if they fail to protect
Americans serving in their countries from ICC reach. 117 By May of 2005, about 100

113

Amnesty International, Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 44,
at 32.
114
Id. Regarding the situation in Darfur, Sudan, see, Sudan Tribune, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan’s
Darfur, February 27, 2006, available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14271
(visited February 28, 2006) (reporting that the ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Moreno Ocampo has told the Security
Council that the International Criminal Court and the African Union, which has troops in Darfur, had
drawn up a Cooperation Agreement in May 2005, which still was not signed).
115
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 88.
116
Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield its Peacekeepers, New York Times, August
6, 2002 .
117
Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2002, at A1.
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States have signed this immunity agreement which is referred to colloquially as “Article
98 Agreement”. 118
It has been suggested that “these bilateral agreements … are provided for under
Article 98 of the Rome Statute”. 119 This argument is inapposite. 120 Article 98, which
emerged at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, was drafted to address the question of the
relationship between the obligations of States Parties under the future ICC Statute and
existing obligations of States Parties under international law. 121

118

See U.S. Department of State Press Statement, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement, May 3, 2005,
2005/463, available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (the press statement notes that on
May 2, 2005, Angola became the 100th country to conclude such an agreement with the United States). As
at May 18, 2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that have ratified an impunity agreement
with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, Kazakhstan,
Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama,
Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan have ratified such agreements.
See Amnesty International, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/pages/int_jus_icc_imp_agrees (last
updated May 18, 2005).
119
Id. See also, Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 93 (1999). As at May 18, 2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that have ratified an
impunity agreement with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel,
Kazakhstan, Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Palau, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan have ratified
such agreements. See Amnesty International, available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/int_jus_icc_imp_agrees (last updated May 18, 2005).
120
For a detailed analyses on this, see generally, Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: US Efforts to Obtain Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, AI
Index: IOR 40/025/2002, September 2, 2002, [hereinafter US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement]
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engIOR400252002?Open&of=eng-385 (visited February
10, 2006); Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: The Need for the European
Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members From Signing US Impunity Agreements, AI
Index: IOR 40/030/2002, October 1, 2002, [hereinafter The Need for EU to Take More Effective Steps],
available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400302002?open&of=eng-385 (visited February
10, 2006); Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court:
Article 98 (2) Agreements, July 9, 2002, available at www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/icc_article98.pdf (visited
February 10, 2006) (expressing the view “that existing U.S. SOFAs are not the type of agreement that
would qualify under Article 98 (2), and cannot trump any obligations under the Rome Statute”. Ibid.
(footnote omitted); Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12
CRIM. L.F. 429 (2001).
121
Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7. Article 98
(Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender) reads:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic
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Article 98 paragraph 1 deal exclusively with the limited question of the
relationship between the obligations of States Parties to the ICC Statute and their prior
obligations under customary or conventional international law concerning diplomatic
immunities and State immunities, particularly those incorporated in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 122 On the other hand, article 98 paragraph 2 was
intended to address the question of the effect of the ICC Statute on existing Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFAs). 123 As explained by Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, both
members of the German delegation, article 98 (2) was designed to address possible - not
certain - conflicts between existing obligations under SOFAs and under the ICC Statute:
The idea behind the provision [Article 98 (2)] was to solve legal
conflicts which might arise because of Status of Forces
Agreements which are already in place. On the contrary, Article
98 (2) was not designed to create an incentive for (future) States
Parties to conclude Status of Forces Agreements which amount to
an obstacle to the execution of requests for cooperation issued by
the Court. 124

immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(1)(2).
Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7. William A.
Schabas, supra note 4, at 92; See Bruce Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145
(2003); John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Paola Gaeta, Official Capacities and Immunities, in THE ROME
STATUTE,
123
Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 7 (emphasis in
the original).
124
Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises, 2 Y.B. INT’L. HUM. L. 143, 165 (1999). See also,
Christopher Keith Hall, The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 773, 786 n. 36 (2000) (noting that Article 98 (2) was added to address
existing agreements on status of forces);
122
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Similarly, Kimberly Prost, a member of the Canadian delegation, and Angelika
Schlunck, a member of the German delegation, have noted that States were concerned
about existing international obligations when drafting article 98. 125 Thus, “it would be
very hard indeed to concede by way of an interpretive statement that a State Party acted
in conformity with its obligation to ‘fully cooperate’ with the Court in concluding [a] new
Statu[s] of Forces Agreement to this effect.” 126
However, even if article 98 (2) were to be construed by the Court to apply to
renewed SOFAs and new SOFAs entered into by States Parties to the ICC Statute, these
agreements would have to be consistent with the object and purpose of the Statute, as
well as with other international law. 127 The object and purpose of the ICC Statute is to
end impunity by ensuring that no one is above the law and immune for genocide, crimes
against humanity or war crimes. 128 Article 98 “immunity” agreement is what it is called
– an immunity of U.S. nationals from the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, to the extent
that the immunity agreement is intended to insulate certain persons from the Court’s
jurisdiction, the immunity agreement is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the

125

Kimberly Prost & Angelika Schlunck, Article 98, in Otto Triffterer, ed., THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1131
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999) (“All States participating in the negotiations in Rome had
concerns about conflicts with existing international obligations. Thus, there are several provisions within
Part 9, including those in articles 90, 93 para. 9 and 98 which address that concern. . . . Even States which
advocated for a strong Court were concerned about actions taken pursuant to this Statute, which would
violate these existing fundamental obligations at international law.”).
126
Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra note 124, at 174.
127
Amnesty International, US Efforts to Obtain Impunity Agreement, supra note 120, at p. 9 (citing the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 210, art. 31(1)). Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
128
ICC Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. para. 5, art. 27(1). Article 27(1) provides that:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
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ICC Statute. States Parties to the ICC Statute should therefore not enter into such
immunity agreement as they are obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty. 129
Further, the conclusion of immunity agreements between States Parties to the ICC
Statute and the United States or any other State is questionable, as it contradicts the
customary international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a State
party to a treaty not to do anything that will undermine its treaty obligations. 130 Besides,
the validity of these bilateral immunity agreements are doubtful considering that they
were procured under coercion 131 and/or by threat 132 of withdrawal of military aid,
including education, training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry if
the States failed to sign the immunity agreements. 133
Also, the immunity agreements are void because they contradict a jus cogens
norm of pacta sunt servanda 134 which is undoubtedly universally recognized as a

129

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 18 (“A state is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty …”). See, Judy Dempsey, Accords with US
‘will violate’ ICC treaty, Financial Times, 27 August 2002, (referring to the text of the legal opinion of
European Union’s legal experts which concluded that a:
contracting party to the statute concluding such an agreement with the US acts against the object and
purpose of the statute and thereby violates its general obligation to perform the obligations of the statutes in
good faith. …[a contracting party’s] legal obligation vis-à-vis its co-contracting parties and the Court to
surrender a person to the Court upon request cannot be modified by concluding an agreement of the kind
proposed by the US.
130
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”).
131
The expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of
its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal effect. 51, 52
132
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 52 (“A treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations”). 52
133
See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers’ Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002,
at A1.
134
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”).
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peremptory norm of customary international law. 135 States Parties to the ICC agreed in
article 88 to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all
forms of cooperation” listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, any national
legislation, procedures or practices which would delay or obstruct full cooperation with
the Court would be inconsistent with States Parties’ obligations under the ICC Statute. 136
Thus, since States Parties to the ICC have an affirmative duty to comply
immediately with requests by the ICC to arrest and surrender accused persons in their
territories, 137 they should be concluding agreements that will expedite this obligation.
However, the essence of a bilateral treaty with the United States is to insulate U.S.
nationals from the jurisdiction of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the
Court to prosecute those accused of committing international crimes. The ICC was
created to ensure that anyone, no matter his or her position, who commits international
crime, is held accountable for his or her actions. Therefore, there is no doubt that States
Parties to the ICC are violating their international obligations under the Statute by signing
such impunity agreement and that such violation could lead to a finding of noncooperation pursuant to article 87, paragraph 7. 138

8.8.

Observations and Commentary
The highlighted bottlenecks to the Court’s effective exercise of jurisdiction are by

no means exhaustive. Due to sovereignty concerns, some of the noted impediments were

135

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 82, pmbl. Para 3, (“Noting that the principles
of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized”).
136
Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 9, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, 1 August 2000, available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 [hereinafter Checklist for
Effective Implementation].
137
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 59(1).
138
Amnesty International, Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 136, at p. 9.
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not mere oversights, but compromises that had to be made in order to gather enough
support to establish the Court. While there is nothing to suggest that these sovereignty
concerns are waning, it is nevertheless imperative that more is required from the
international community to ensure the effective operation of the Court and to enable the
Court achieve its stated objective. Fortunately, there is an expectation from States Parties
that the ICC Statute require further elaboration which informed the requirement to review
the Statute within seven years of entry into force. 139
A meaningful review of the ICC Statute should consider amending the operation
of the complementarity principle to at least, grant the Court primacy jurisdiction over the
crime of genocide 140 and certain categories of offenders who by virtue of their official
position are unlikely to be genuinely prosecuted domestically. 141 The complementarity
principle remains a viable threat to the future of the international criminal system and the
effectiveness of the Court.

It is worrisome that States may under the guise of

complementarity shield their nationals from the Court and only selectively refer
situations or willingly surrender accused persons to the Court that it does not want to deal
with. 142 This kind of selective referral by States may unwittingly expose the Court to
accusations of aiding the State to pursue its vendetta against perceived opponents. A
139

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 123.
See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10
(1994) art. 21 (prescribing inherent jurisdiction to the ICC only for the crime of genocide); Johan D. van
der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 1, 20 (2000) (noting that the United States was willing to concede “inherent jurisdiction” of the ICC
in regard to the crime of genocide).
141
Such amendment would draw from the Statute of the Sierra Leone which restricted the primacy
jurisdiction of the tribunals to “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for the atrocities. See The
Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, as amended [hereinafter Sierra Leone Special Court
Statute], annexed to the Secretary-General’s Sierra Leone Report, available at:
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf, also available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
142
Claus Kress, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and
Policy, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUS. 944, 946 (2004) (noting that States may embark on ‘selective or
asymmetrical self-referral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal armed conflict).
140
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perception of the Court as an avenue to pursue victor’s justice will not augur well for the
image of the Court.
Further, States Parties should at the next review conference delete article 124
from the Statute because its retention sends a dangerous signal that it is okay to commit
war crimes for seven years before accountability can be attributed. Equally, there is the
need to discourage States Parties from concluding the so called “article 98” immunity
agreement. Such immunity agreement flies in opposition to the States Parties obligation
under the ICC Statute. Without States Parties’ assistance and cooperation to surrender
accused persons to the Court, the Prosecutor and the Court will face a formidable
challenge to discharge the objective of the ICC Statute. Such support is urgently needed
because, except when a situation is referred by the Security Council pursuant to article
13(b) of the Statute, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Court will constantly be
confronted with a special problem and would need to make special efforts to ensure the
ready and voluntary support and cooperation of States Parties to the extent possible.
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CHAPTER NINE
======================================================
9.0.

CONCLUSION
__________________________________
The conflicts witnessed during the recent decade gave rise to an increasing

attention to the issue of accountability for international crimes such as genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious human rights violations. It seemed that the
natural legal response to address these atrocious violations is to devise a means to hold
the individuals responsible for those acts accountable.

While individual criminal

responsibility at the international level for violations of international crimes began to
creep into international criminal law from the Nuremberg trials through the ad hoc
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively, it has now become firmly
established with the adoption of the Statute of the ICC. The principle of individual
criminal responsibility is also reflected in the mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone, TimorLeste, and Cambodia that were established after the ICC Statute was adopted.
With the entry into force of the ICC Statute, 129 years after the idea was first
suggested by Gustave Moynier in 1872, 1 the ICC Statute became the first multilateral
legal document in recent years to detail the investigation and prosecution of international
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

After the

establishment of the ICC, it is very unlikely that the international community may
establish another ad hoc international or hybrid criminal tribunal to prosecute persons

1

Gustave Moynier, Note sur la creation d'une institution judiciaire internationale propre a prevenir et a
reprimer les infractions a la Convention de Geneve, BULLETIN INTERNATIONAL DES SOCIETES DE
SECOURS AUX MILITAIRES BLESSES, NO. 11, Apr. 1872, at 122, translated in Christopher Keith
Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, INT’L REV. RED CROSS, NO.
322, Mar. 1998, at 57, 72.

accused of international crimes post 2002 when the ICC Statute entered into force. 2
Thus, the continued application of international individual criminal responsibility rests on
the Court. It is therefore imperative that the Court be endowed with sufficient personal
jurisdiction in order to ensure that perpetrators of egregious international crimes do not
go unpunished.
This study suggests that the ICC should be endowered with universal jurisdiction
to enable the Court reach pepertrators of international crimes prohibited in the ICC
Statute. The exercise of universal jurisdiction by the Court will ensure that international
criminal justice is on a progressive path and not retrogressing from the Nuremberg
standard which recognizes that States may do together what any one of them could have
done separately. 3 The crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction are crimes which there exists
universal jurisdiction enabling each State to exercise jurisdiction over those crimes. 4
Thus, since States have come together to establish the ICC, the Court should exercise that
jurisdiction which national courts of the States can individually exercise. Limiting the
Court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed in the territory of a State party or by a national
of a State party unfairly limits the Court’s jurisdiction and inadvertently creates a safe
haven for perpetrators of international crimes.

2

For instance, instead of establishing another ad hoc tribunal in Sudan, the Security Council chose to refer
the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court.
3
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 216-17
(1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
4
See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2, 12 n.19 (1999). Also see, the preamble to the ICC Statute,
supra note 1, which “affirms that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole must not go unpunished,” states that the Rome Conference is “determined to put an end to impunity
for the perpetrators of these crimes,” and “recalls that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also
Michael P. Scharf, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the
Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 67 (2001).
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Similarly, the application of complementarity principle serves as a labyrinth
capable of rendering the Court otiose. The complementarity principle is a foundational
principle that will not only shape the international criminal law system but will also
determine the functioning of the Court. 5 As presently stated in the ICC Statute, the
complementarity principle will so dramatically limit the Court’s jurisdiction, role, and
authority such that the Court could easily become only a meaningless, residual
institution. 6 Should States satisfactorily discharge their overriding duty to prosecute
individuals for the crimes under the ICC Statute, the Court will be redundant. 7 This is
however a utopian expectation. As already mentioned, the ICC was created in part,
because of unwillingness or inability of national authorities to conduct domestic
prosecutions and trials of perpetrators of serious crimes under international law. 8
For the Court to exercise jurisdiction under the complementarity principle absent
Security Council referral, all States that have colorable jurisdiction must consent. Where
State(s) failed to consent, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after determining that
the State(s) with jurisdiction is/are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute. 9
Using ICC as a residuary Court is certainly not what was envisioned by the pioneer and
advocates of a permanent international criminal court.

Besides, the international

supervision necessary for the full implementation of complementary jurisdiction under

5

Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Court: Construction Site For More Justice:
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370, 384 (2005).
6
Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
International Criminal Tribunals 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 425 (1998) (citing the Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 22, P 157, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter 51st Sess. Preparatory Committee Report].
7
Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 5, at 384.
8
Peter Finell, ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW FOR ATROCITIES AGAINST MINORITY GROUPS COMMITTED BY NONSTATE ACTORS 23 (Åbo Akademi Institute for Human Rights, 2002).
9
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 17.
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this circumstance could be extremely embarrassing to States 10 and may pitch the Court
and States Parties in an unhealthy rivalry. Thus, the likely scenario is that the Court and
the State may be locked in a contest for jurisdiction.
By design, the Court’s jurisdiction extends only to a small number of persons who
commit the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.11
Also, the high subject matter jurisdictional threshold of the Court 12 as well as the limited
instructional and financial resources of the Court further makes it inevitable that the
Court can only target those few individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the
violations of crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, this study suggests that
conferring the Court with primacy jurisdiction over this category of individuals would not
impinge States’ sovereignty. The Court would still rely on the ability and willingness of
States to prosecute other perpetrators at the national level in order to minimize the burden
on the ICC.

Should States insist upon preserving the totality of their sovereign

prerogatives, no effective international criminal jurisdiction will thrive. 13
The challenge is to establish appropriate balance between the need for
international prosecutions in some cases and national prosecutions in others. It may well
be that in some cases, the Court may be preferable than national courts for reasons
unrelated to national courts’ credibility. 14

10

For instance, the Court may be better

Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, at 431(noting that some of the States may eventually conclude that the
complementarity principle compromises their sovereignty more than would a general primacy).
11
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, arts. 1, 5.
12
See the Chapeau of Articles 6,7, & 8 which further limits the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to
genocide “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part”; crimes against humanity committed “as
part of a widespread or systematic attack”, and war crimes “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes.” ICC Statute, supra note 4, arts. 6, 7, & 8. These
jurisdictional thresholds ensures that the application of the Statute is limited to serious violations.
13
Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, at 431.
14
See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-OTP, September 2003, 5
(noting that “There may be cases where inaction by States is the appropriate course of action. For example,
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positioned to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity
because these crimes are principally crimes of States. The major actors are more often
agents of the State or other state like or quasi-state entities. 15 What distinguishes these
crimes from other international crimes is that they are the product of a “state action or
policy”, and require some form of organizational structure. 16 In such situations, it might
well serve the interest of justice to have the Court prosecute the responsible individuals.
The Court will also be in a better position to absorb the political pressure that may be
associated with domestic prosecution of the “high” profile individuals.
The idea that the Security Council may block the Court’s jurisdiction is troubling
as it is an invitation of political meddlesomeness in judiciary function. It puts the
independence and credibility of the Court at issue. At the same time, it exposes the Court
to allegations of institution of western dominance by developing countries. There is no
doubt that an effective and independent judiciary can only be achieved when courts are
institutionally shielded from direct political influence. Independence of the judiciary is a
sine qua non to effective and credible national court. There is no reason why the ICC
Statute which exerts its independence status should not confer unfettered independence
on the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 17 Should the Security Council prevent ICC

the Court and a territorial State incapacitated by mass crimes may agree that a consensual division of labour
is the most logical and effective approach.”).
15
John Dugard, Criminal Responsibility of States in M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, vol. 1, CRIMES, 2nd ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999) p. 239.
16
Peter Finell, supra note 8, at 29-30 (observing that up to the Second World War victimization of civilians
and mass scale human rights violations of human rights was perpetrated by the State’s public apparatus,
such as the armed forces, the police, paramilitary units and the civilian bureaucracy, as products of a State
action or policy.
17
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 2; Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the
International Criminal Court, Oct. 4, 2004, UN Doc. A/58/874, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1, pmbl.4.,
UN Doc. A/58/874, annex (2004) (entered into force Oct. 4, 2004). (Preamble 4 to the Relationships
Agreement states expressly that “the International Criminal Court is established as an independent
permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations.”). Thus, ICC is not a specialized agency or
as otherwise belonging to the “UN Family.” For a discussion on the earlier draft of the Relationship
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investigations or prosecutions willy nilly, this will violate the principle of prosecutorial
independence. 18
While the inclusion of article 16 in the ICC Statute was not a popular decision,
and that the prudent thing to do is to delete it from the Statute of the Court, it is not
politically feasible as long as the lonely super power maintains its grip on the Security
Council. 19 However, the value of a permanent ICC will lie in its international credibility
as an impartial institution capable of promoting equal justice for all. Much of that
credibility would be lost if its prosecutions can be halted or otherwise subject to the
approval of the Security Council. This would represent a step backwards from the
practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which, apart from matters of enforcement, operate
independently of the Security Council. No doubt, the ICC may have to rely on the
support of the Security Council for the enforcement of its arrest warrants and other
orders. This unavoidable dependence will do doubt influence relations between the two
bodies. Hopefully, the Security Council will rise above political considerations and apply
high moral leadership in the exercise of its powers under article 16.
Further, an important aspect to the success of the Court depend to a large extent,
on the willingness of States Parties to the ICC Statute to rise above sovereignty
protection, embrace the Court wholeheartedly as they did at the Rome Conference, by
demonstrating the political will to cooperate with the Court by providing the Court the

Agreement, see Daryl A. Mundis, The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional Framework of the
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L 132 (2003).
18
Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, 389.
19
See Barbara Crossette, World Criminal Court Having a Painful Birth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1997, at A10
(noting that “Washington wants the Security Council to be the arbiter of what cases would go to the
international court, a view at odds with nearly all other countries. Europeans and some Latin American
nations would give international prosecutors wide latitude in bringing cases.”).
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necessary resources and cooperation it needs to carry out its responsibility.

20

The ICC,

as currently structured, has no police force to assist it with finding, arresting, and
securing potential suspects. 21 The ICC relies on the cooperation of States to arrest and
surrender suspects to the Court. 22 Also, the ICC does not have a facility where ICC
convicts will be incarcerated but depends on “willing States” to provide prison
facilities. 23 In addition, the ICC depends on the assessed contributions of States Parties
and the United Nations to fund the operations of the Court. 24 Thus, the Court can only be
as strong and effective as the States Parties would want it to be. 25
While this study advocates the review of the ICC Statute to grant the Court
primacy or inherent jurisdiction, it notes this may not be politically feasible yet because
States believe that conferring the Court with such jurisdiction over its nationals somehow

20

M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55, 66 (1999).
21
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution,
88 GEO. L.J. 381, 415 (2000).
22
The ICC is based in The Hague but its investigations may need to be conducted in the territory of a State
where the crime allegedly happened. Without the support of the local authorities, the work of the ICC
investigators will be difficult and probably impossible. The credibility of the Court would suffer if an
arrest warrant issued by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the Prosecutor pursuant to
Article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the State parties were slow, or failed, to execute
it. In this respect, it is encouraging to note that the government of Uganda has held talks with the ICC
about the possible arrest of rebel leader Joseph Kony and his co-indictees. See Govt Meets ICC Over Kony
Arrest, The Monitor (Kampala), February 3, 2006, at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200602020781.html (last
visited February 9, 2006) (reporting that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sam Kuteesa told journalists
on February 8, 2006 that he met the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, at The Hague in
Netherlands to explore issues of possible partners and financing of the process of arresting and surrendering
the indictees to the Court. Last year the ICC issued arrest warrants for Kony, Vincent Otti, the second in
command, and three other top rebel commanders the Lord’s Resistance Army for war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
23
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 103. Article 103 provides in pertinent part that:
1(a) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of States
which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.
1(b) At the time of declaring its willingness …, a State may attach conditions to its acceptance as agreed by
the Court … . Id.
24
ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 115. The ICC may also receive additional voluntary contributions from
governments, nongovernmental organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities. Id., art. 116.
25
Bartram S. Brown, supra note 6, 383.
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deprives or belittles its sovereignty. Thus, the principle of complementarity set out in the
ICC Statute can only be effective if States Parties fulfill their obligations to cooperate
fully with the Court. Satisfactory national legislation that criminalizes the crimes in the
ICC Statute and fully implements the obligation of each State party to cooperate with the
Court is essential to ensure that the Court is able to fulfill its historic function with full
cooperation by the States. Therefore, it is of serious concern that draft and enacted
implementing legislation deals unsatisfactorily, and in some cases not at all, with the
question of cooperation. This trend may undermine the ability of the Court to function
effectively given that the foundation of the Court is based on the proper application of the
principle of complementarity. 26
Therefore, to ensure that national courts of States Parties to the Statute serve as
effective complement to the Court, States Parties should enact implementing legislation
and/or reform their national criminal justice systems to fully integrate the ICC Statute and
international system of justice in their national legal systems. Also, such legislation
should strengthen the existing system of interstate cooperation through extradition and
mutual legal assistance by eliminating inappropriate grounds of refusal and having courts,
not political officials make decisions on whether to cooperate. 27 The implementing

26

Amnesty International, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE FAILURE OF STATES TO
ENACT EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 29, AI Index: IOR 40/019/2004 1 September
2004, available at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385 (visited
February 20, 2006) [hereinafter The Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation]
27
See Amnesty International, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CHECKLIST FOR
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 3, AI Index: IOR 40/011/2000, August 1, 2000, available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400112000?open&of=eng-385 (visited February 20, 2006);
Amnesty International, The Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 25,
at 26 (noting that several States are including the requirement of consent to prosecute by the Attorney
General, a political official, in their national implementing legislation. These States include Australia
(Article 268.121 of the International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002), Canada
(Section 9 (3) and (4)), Malta (Article 54 (I) (2) of the Criminal Code, as amended by the ICC Act), New
Zealand (Section 13), UK (England, Wales and Northern Ireland Act, Sections 53 (3), 54 (5), 60 (3) and 61
(5)) and Uganda (Section 17). Although these States have argued that such consent is given in the Attorney
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legislation should also define the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction as crimes under
national law consistent with the ICC Statute and international law to expressly confer
adequate jurisdiction to their national courts to prosecute the crimes.
Further, the implementing legislation should clearly permit the surrender of
accused persons to the Court and require relevant authorities to cooperate with the Court.
To this end, States Parties and the ICC should develop, on the basis of Part 9 of the Rome
Statute, a system of “best practices” for effective cooperation in conducting criminal
investigations, in particular with regard to arrests and transfers to The Hague. 28
This study argues unequivocally that the conclusion of bilateral immunity
agreements between States Parties and the U.S. which serves to insulate U.S. nationals
from the Court’s jurisdiction is indubitably a violation of the obligations of States Parties
under the ICC Statute. Such conduct sends a wrong signal that States may avoid the
Court’s jurisdiction by offering military and economic assistance to States Parties to the
ICC Statute. Therefore, this study urges the Assembly of States and the Court to reject
any argument that the immunity agreement serves as a legal basis prohibiting States
Parties from complying with their obligation to arrest and surrender accused persons to
the Court.
Although the Court is an independent institution and not a specialized agency of
the United Nations, the Relationship Agreement between the Court and the United
Nations calls for close cooperation and consultation between them on matters of mutual
General’s role as a professional prosecutor, rather than as a political official, and is in keeping with
common law doctrine, Amnesty International is concerned that such a requirement risks creating the
perception that prosecution decisions in cases involving crimes under international law have been made for
political reasons. Such a requirement should be excluded in all implementing legislation. On the other
hand, the better approach is one adopted by some States, including South Africa (Section 5) which provides
that the decision whether to prosecute a person for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes is to be
made by a professional prosecutor). Id.
28
Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 5, at 379.
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interest. 29

In particular, under the Relationships Agreement, the United Nations

undertakes to cooperate with the ICC on judicial matters. 30 This obligation requires the
United Nations to provide inter alia, information and other forms of cooperation and
assistance compatible with the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. Also, the United
Nations has agreed, in principle, to waive the confidentiality obligations of its officials
when they testify in ICC proceedings. 31 How this cooperation will work out in practice
remains to be seen. It is hoped that the Court will not be hamstrung by the cumbersome
United Nations’ bureaucratic and financial procedures.
This study however notes that the extent of United Nations’ cooperation with the
Court will depend to a large extent, on the disposition of the UN Secretary-General to the
Court. Thus, as the term of office of the current Secretary-General nears to an end,
Assembly of States parties to the ICC Statute should play an active role in the selection of
the next Secretary-General to ensure the continuation of the cordial relationship between
the Court and the United Nations under Kofi Annan. 32

Considering U.S. current

objection to the ICC, it is necessary that Assembly of States Parties, especially those in
the Security Council should work together to ensure that the next Secretary-General is
not adverse to the operation of the ICC.
The ICC Statute has been praised for detailing the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes more than previous legal instruments. On the other
29

Relationship Agreement, supra note 17, art 3.
Id., art. 15.
31
Id., art. 16.
32
Already the United States is looking to influence the choice of the next U.N. Secretary-General. See
Edith M. Lederer, Bolton Launches Talks on Replacing Annan, AP News, February 17, 2006, available at
http://www.townhall.com/news/ap/online/headlines/D8FQOOF02.html (visited February 18, 2006); Patrick
Goodenough, Security Council Discord Expected Over Annan’s Successor, Cybercast News Services,
February 13, 2006, available at:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=\ForeignBureaus\archive\200602\FOR20060213b.htm
l (visited February 18, 2006).
30
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hand, the Statute has also been criticized for its failure to elaborate on these crimes due to
sovereignty concerns and reluctance to tinker with the definition of genocide as stated in
the Genocide Convention. While further elaboration may and are indeed desirable in
some situations, it should however be noted that no criminal Statute addresses all possible
crimes at once. The Review Conference should serve as opportunities to embark on this
objective. The emphasis now should be on breathing life to the crimes prohibited in the
ICC Statute to achieve the objectives of the Statute. The objectives of the ICC Statute to
instill a culture of individual criminal accountability and end the culture of impunity
would be achieved if States and the Court successfully prosecute individuals who commit
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Suffice it however to note that one of the major disappointments of the Rome
Conference was the inability of States to agree on a definition of the crime of aggression
based on the Nuremberg conclusions regarding the crime of aggression. 33 Hopefully at
the Review Conference in 2009, States Parties may find the political will to agree on a
definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of the Court’s
jurisdiction. 34
Notwithstanding the highlighted jurisdictional limitations of the Court, the
establishment of the ICC remains one of the remarkable achievements of the twentieth
century. In this respect, it is commendable that the governments of Uganda, DR Congo,

33

Theodor Meron, Defining Aggression For the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (observing that the “the crime of aggression was extremely
controversial during the Rome Statute's negotiations. Although many countries wished to see the crime
included in the Statute, there was no agreement on the definition or on how to respect the Security
Council’s mandate under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter with respect to determining whether an act of
aggression has occurred).
34
The Rome Conference resolved that the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is deferred until
a definition of the crime and conditions under which the Court will exercise jurisdiction over the crime is
concluded. ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1).
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and Central African Republic (CAR) have referred situations in there respective States to
the Court. Equally commendable is the decision of the Security Council to refer the
situation in Darfur, Sudan to the Court. Fortunately, the Court obtained jurisdiction over
these situations based on self referrals and “waivers of complementarity”, 35 thereby
avoiding the concerns of procedural hurdles expressed in this study that may follow the
application of the complementarity principle. 36
These referrals give the Court its first set of opportunities to show to the
international community that the ICC is a useful institution capable of successfully
handling international criminal investigation and prosecution. At the same time, there is
the concern that the implementation of State referrals may lead to a “temptation of the
territorial state to proceed to what may be called a ‘selective or asymmetrical selfreferral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal armed conflict.” 37
Cognizant of this possibility, the Prosecutor interpreted the referral by the
Ugandan government to the ‘situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army’ as
covering ‘crimes within the situation of northern Uganda by whomever committed’.38

35

See generally, Claus Kress, ‘Self Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’: Some Considerations in
Law and Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004).
36
Note however that Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir has vowed not to extradite any of its citizens to
the ICC, insisting that it can prosecute any war criminal in its own courts.” See, Xinhua News Agency,
“Sudan Vows Not to Extradite Suspects of Darfur War Crimes, February 19, 2006, available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-02/19/content_4200443.htm (visited February 28, 2006); Sudan
Tribune, Only Sudanese Judiciary Can Try Darfur War Crimes -al-Bashir, February 19, 2006, available at:
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14151 (visited February 28, 2006). See also, IWPR,
Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC Considers Prosecutions, February 28, 2006, available
at: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=259927&apc_state=henh (visited February 28, 2006) (reporting
that President al-Bashir has warned that Sudan will not cooperate and has also sworn “before Allah three
times” that he will never extradite a Sudanese citizen to any foreign court).
37
Claus Kress, ‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’ Some Considerations in Law and
Policy, 2 J. INT’L. CRIM. JUS. 944, 946 (2004).
38
Letter by the Chief Prosecutor of 17 June 2004 addressed to the President of the ICC as attached to the
decisions of the Presidency of ICC, supra note 5. See the Decision of the Presidency assigning the situation
in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 July 2004, ICC-01/04, and the Decision of
the Presidency assigning the situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 July 2004, ICC-02/04.
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Similarly, with respect to the referral by Cote d’Ivoire, although the State accepted ICC
jurisdiction to investigate in the country and requested the ICC’s help in bringing to
justice rebels who started the civil war in that country, the Prosecutor noted that since
only “situations” can be referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor will consider the actions of all
individuals in groups involved in the conflict. Such approach is consistent with the
principle of individual criminal responsibility espoused in the Statute to the effect that the
“Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction …” 39
The establishment of the Court is only the beginning as the important work of the
Court lies ahead. The sustainability of international criminal justice will depend on how
well the Court is able to deliver on its objective to bring justice to victims of international
crimes and to end the culture of impunity. It is hoped that in the interest of justice, States
Parties to the ICC Statute will support the Court to establish confidence in the
international criminal system. Thus, efforts are necessary across the board, not only by
the new institution and its staff, but also by the States Parties that established the Court,
the United Nations as an institution, the Security Council as well as nongovernmental
organizations to support the works of the Court. A successful cooperation between the
above named entities and the ICC can cement an international consensus in favor of
strong and effective ICC jurisdiction.
The cooperation of the United States as a permanent member of the Security
Council and the lone super power is vital to the success of the Court. States Parties
should therefore make every effort to persuade the United States’ government to abandon

39

ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
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its hostility toward the ICC. 40 The U.S. and other States that fear the scrutiny of an
independent international Prosecutor should heed the counsel of Justice Louise Arbour,
former Prosecutor of the ICTY and the ICTR, who observed that there is more reason to
fear that the international prosecutor will be impotent than there is to fear that the
Prosecutor will overreach. 41 According to Justice Arbour, the ICC Prosecutor must
necessarily depend upon States and the Security Council for essential political support
and enforcement, thus, the Prosecutor will have no reason to pursue frivolous
prosecutions against the citizens of any State. 42
There is therefore no reason for the United States, as a permanent member of the
Council, to fear frivolous international prosecutions of U.S. military personnel and other
U.S. nationals. It would be both futile and irrational for the ICC to pursue such a course

40

See Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of
Operation Enduring Freedom, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 48-52 (2003) (noting that U.S. has
taken various measures to undermine the ICC such as “un-signing of the ICC Statute; the adoption of the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002; and systematic campaign to coarse States parties to
sign the so-called Article 98 agreements).
41
See NATO: Statement by Justice Louise Arbour on Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
M2 Presswire, Dec. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Currnws File. In her statement before
the ICC PrepCom, Justice Arbour observed:
Turning then to the powers of the Prosecutor of the permanent Court, I would like to expand on my earlier
remarks that it may be unwarranted for States to fear the possible overreach, or simply the untrammelled
power of the Prosecutor of the permanent Court. Despite the fact that the ad hoc Tribunals’ powers
originate in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the taxing experience of my Office suggests that it
is more likely that the Prosecutor of the permanent Court could be chronically enfeebled by inadequate
enforcement powers combined with a persistent and widespread unwillingness of States Parties to cooperate. The existence of jurisdiction will not necessarily correspond to the reality facing the Prosecutor of
the permanent Court on a day-to-day basis.
Id.
42
Justice Arbour drawing on her experience as Prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR noted as follows:
In my experience, based on the work of the two Tribunals to date, I believe that the real challenge posed to
a Prosecutor is to choose from many meritorious complaints the appropriate ones for international
intervention. …. [A]n appropriate process of vigorous internal indictment review, such as we presently
have in place at the two Tribunals [as is the case in the ICC Statute], confirmation by a competent judge,
and the inevitable acquittal that would result from an unfounded prosecution, should alleviate any fear that
an overzealous or politically-driven Prosecutor could abuse his or her powers.
Id.
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of action. There are implicit safeguard in the ICC Statute to ensure that the United States
will be able to protect its legitimate interests without compromising the independence of
the ICC.
We must always remember that it is now the expectation of many that the ICC is
necessary to ensure that acts of mass murder, rape and torture whether committed in the
form of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are not committed with
impunity. 43 To realize this noble goal, it is imperative that the Court be endowed with
jurisdiction and provided the necessary resources and cooperation to enable the Court
hold individuals responsible for these heinous acts and egregious violations of
international crimes that are of grave concerns to the international community as a whole,
accountable for their actions.
In the final analysis, whether the Court will achieve the aspirations behind its
establishment will depend largely on the application of the complementarity principle, a
concession to States’ sovereignty, whose retention in the Statute remains a potential
source of conflict between the Court and States.

The complementarity principle is

capable of undermining the efficacy of the Court because it is antithetical to the objective
of the Court. 44
Lastly, it should be reiterated that the full cooperation of States Parties and the
United Nations, particularly the Security Council, is necessary for the realization of the
objectives of the ICC.

In deserving situations, such support should include timely

military actions especially where it will lead to immediate end to the killing of innocent
43

Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal
Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2001)
44
See Leila N. Sadat & S. Richard Carden, supra note 21, at 413 (noting that “the ends sought by the
Statute are imperfectly addressed by the means chosen”). Id.
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civilians. 45 As one of the Judges of the International Criminal Court, and President of the
Pre-Trial Division noted, “[w]hether they will do so remains, as it were, the question to
end all questions”. 46

45

See, CNN World Edition, Senate Urges Bush to Take Action on Darfur, Friday, March 3, 2006, available
at: http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/03/03/sudan.congress.reut/index.html ((reporting that the
U.S. Senate on March 2, 2006, unanimously passed a resolution urging President Bush to take swift action
to stop the genocide that the United States says is occurring in Sudan, and pressed for NATO to send troops
and enforce a no-fly zone in the Darfur region. The resolution also calls on the U.N. Security Council to
approve a peace enforcement mission for the region where tens of thousands of people have been killed and
2 million driven from their homes in three years of fighting between rebels and government-allied Arab
militias).
46
Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 5, at 383.
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